The Performance Persistence of Closed-End Funds

The purpose of this study is to extend the research on mutual fund performance persistence to net asset value and market price performance of domestic closed‐end funds. While research has assessed the performance persistence of open‐end mutual funds, it has not assessed the performance persistence of closed‐end funds. Yet, the unique characteristics of closed‐end funds allow stronger arguments for their persistence than the arguments previously submitted for open‐end mutual funds. The results show evidence for risk‐adjusted performance persistence.     

Fund Manager Succession in Closed-End Mutual Funds

Managing the succession process by the hiring and firing of key executives is one of the important functions of a board of directors. In this research we study successions of fund managers in the closed‐end mutual fund industry. The agency issues inherent in closed‐end mutual funds makes them a unique laboratory for such a study. Our results suggest that while the overall abnormal returns of these manager changes are statistically insignificant, that the returns are more positive for funds with large expense ratios and for funds trading at a discount. We also find the abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of inside director stock ownership. Corporate bond funds and international equity funds react more negatively to these announcements than other types of funds. The abnormal returns do not appear to be related to board composition, but board composition does vary across fund type, and may therefore indirectly influence the results.     

Security Concentration and Active Fund Management: Do Focused Funds Offer Superior Performance?

We examine gross fund returns based on the number of securities held and find no evidence that focused funds outperform diversified funds. After deducting expenses, focused funds significantly underperform. Controlling for various fund characteristics, fund performance is positively related to the fund's number of holdings both before and after expenses. We find evidence linking focused fund underperformance to agency and liquidity problems. Finally, the attrition rate of focused funds is higher than that of diversified funds. These results do not support the view that managers holding focused portfolios have superior stock‐picking skills or that focused funds provide value to investors.     

Motivation and Performance of Seasoned Offerings by Closed-End Funds

We examine the motivation and performance of closed‐end funds that engage in seasoned public or rights offerings. We find that closed‐end funds are more motivated to engage in seasoned offerings when their shares exhibit a relatively high premium (compared to their corresponding NAV) and have a high degree of liquidity. We also find a significant negative valuation effect on average in response to seasoned offerings by closed‐end funds. Our cross‐sectional analysis reveals that the valuation effect at the time of the seasoned offering is more unfavorable for funds that have relatively high expense ratios and are relatively large. Furthermore, we find that the closed‐end funds experience significant negative valuation effects over the three‐year period subsequent to the seasoned offering, implying poor post‐offering performance.     

Why Does Performance Persistence Vary Among Closed-End Funds?

This study extends the research on closed-end fund performance persistence by investigating whether the persistence of both net asset value (NAV) and market price returns of U.S. registered closed-end funds is related to various fund characteristics. The sample consists of 505 closed-end funds, which are investigated over the period from January 1976 to December 1996. The analysis tests whether persistence is related to the fund characteristics size, goal, management fees, turnover, fund family membership, fund experience, and the exchange on which a fund is traded. The results vary across holding periods used to calculate persistence but are similar with respect to the NAV and market price returns. Funds with lower expense ratios and funds traded on the NYSE show more persistence of strong NAV and market price performance.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Closed‐end Funds

This study uses a large sample of UK‐listed closed‐end funds to examine whether governance has an impact on two indicators of fund performance: the level of fund‐management fees and the discount at which a fund trades. Fees are under the control of the directors, and we find that they are inversely related to fund returns, even after allowing for differences across investment sectors. Fees are, on average, higher if a fund has a large board, few directors from outside the fund‐family, many directors from within the fund‐family, and low ownership by the management company. Discounts for funds are wider if the management company or any blockholder has a significant long‐term stake, suggesting that investors are wary of entrenched management. The results suggest that boards are frequently compromised in their duty to shareholders by their dependence on fund‐management companies.     

THE COST OF MUTUAL FUND DISTRIBUTION FEES

Many individuals purchase shares in mutual funds as investments. With a lack of evidence supporting performance persistence in fund returns, investors should consider expenses as a fund-selection tool since fund expenses have a negative effect on fund returns. One of the largest expenses incurred by fund investors is distribution expenses, which include both load charges and annual fees. Close to two-thirds of all equity funds charge investors for fund distribution. The true cost of these distribution fees to investors is hard to measure because a myriad of distribution arrangements have evolved that vary both the timing and magnitude of distribution charges. We derive a simple methodology that expresses the present value of distribution costs as a percentage of the original investment in fund shares for any expected holding period. This methodology allows direct comparison of the effect on investors of distribution fees for mutual funds with different types of sales arrangements.     

What Can “Nine‐Eleven” Tell Us about Closed‐end Fund Discounts and Investor Sentiment?

We use the horrific events of September 11, 2001 (“nine‐eleven”) as a natural test of the hypothesis that closed‐end mutual fund discounts from fund net asset values reflect small investor sentiment. Because nine‐eleven was a sudden, unforeseen, and significantly negative and exogenous shock to the world, the capital markets, and investor sentiment, our test avoids many of the problems of extant studies. Discounts worsened dramatically following the event, and then recovered alongside the broader market. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that discounts reflect the sentiment of small investors, who took their cues from the broader market's overall movement.     

Tax Calendar Effects in the Municipal Bond Market: Tax‐Loss Selling and Cherry Picking by Investors and Market Timing by Fund Managers

Examining municipal bond returns, bond fund flows and buying activities by fund managers over the period 1990–2009, we find evidence of tax calendar‐related rational opportunistic trading patterns by fund investors and fund managers. Specifically, fund shareholders conduct tax‐loss selling in December and re‐invest in January. In April, June, and September, fund investors rationally cherry pick to sell their shares of short‐term bond funds instead of their shares of long‐term bond funds to raise cash to pay estimated taxes. Unlike fund shareholders, fund managers adopt a contrarian strategy of buying in December and selling in January.     

Sentimental mutual fund flows

We show that many stylized empirical patterns for mutual fund flows are driven by investor sentiment. Specifically, when sentiment is high, investors exhibit a stronger tendency of chasing past fund performance; fund flows are less sensitive to fund expenses; and investors are attracted more to funds with sheer visibility. Moreover, the well‐documented positive relation between fund flows and future fund performance is significant only during high sentiment periods and is mainly driven by expected component of fund flows. Finally, we show that mutual fund investors exhibit a significantly negative timing ability at the individual fund level when sentiment is high.     

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MUTUAL FUND EXPENSES

Mutual fund investors are subjected to many fees and expenses related to both the management of the fund assets and the sale and distribution of the fund's shares. In recent years these expenses have increased as a percentage of assets. The preoccupation of mutual fund investors with using performance evaluation as a selection criterion is misguided because of the volatility of investment returns. Whether the fund's performance is due to superior management or just good luck is difficult to determine. On the other hand, mutual fund expenses are stable. As such, the mutual fund investor should pursue a policy of choosing funds with low expenses. In this paper we conduct an empirical analysis of these expenses. The results of our analysis of equity funds suggest that expense-conscious investors should look at the fund size, age, turnover ratio, cash ratio, and existence of a 12b-1 fee as key determinants of expenses. Our analysis of bond funds suggests that the key factors are the fund's sales charge, weighted average maturity, size, and existence of a 12b-1 fee.     

Effects of Market Segmentation and Bank Concentration on Mutual Fund Expenses and Returns: Evidence from Finland

A tremendous amount of research examines US mutual funds, but fund markets also thrive in other countries. However, research about these fast growing markets is lacking. This study addresses Finnish funds. Fast growth of the Finnish fund industry, strong bank dominance in the industry and recent EU membership make it an interesting market to examine. The Finnish fund market is also of particular interest since it had the fastest growth among the EU countries during 1996–2000. We find evidence that bank‐managed and older funds charge higher expenses but investors are not compensated for paying higher expenses with higher risk‐adjusted returns, suggesting a potential agency problem. Overall, Finnish fund expenses have decreased over time, consistent with EU membership reducing market segmentation and generating competition.     

Gains to Mutual Fund Sponsors Offering Multiple Share Class Funds

Although the number of mutual funds grew during the 1990s, much of the growth is attributable to the introduction of multiple share class (MS) funds. Proponents argue that the MS structure leads to cost savings, which can be passed onto investors as lower expenses. However, if the structure lowers costs, sponsors are likely to profit from it. Though investors are concerned about the base expense ratio, the sum of administrative and management fees, fund sponsors generate profits from the management fees. As such, they would prefer to increase the management fee if they can simultaneously lower administrative fees. Our results indicate that MS fund investors pay lower administrative fees, but management fees are approximately 7 basis points higher than single-class funds. Overall, base expense ratios are higher than for single-class funds, suggesting fund sponsors capture the cost benefits the MS structure provides. Our results are robust to different model specifications and different estimation techniques.     

Do Invesrtors Capture the Value Premium?

Do investors realize higher returns by investing in value stocks instead of gorwth stocks? Examination of a sample of equity indexes, mutual funds, and large‐cap stocks reveals no evidence that value firms have earned higher returns than growth firms. The value premium reported in the literarture is historically strongest for small‐capitalization firms, yea average annual rerturns for small‐cap equity funds are 14.10% for value funds compared to 14.52% for growth funds. Despite dramatic increases in mutual fund expense ratios from 1965 to 2001, fee differences across style funds cannot explain the absence of a value premium.     

Do Fund Flow‐Return Relations Depend on the Type of Investor? A Research Note

This study investigates whether the relation between aggregate fund flow and market returns differs between retail and institutional funds. For the retail fund sample, we document a contemporaneous relation between flow and market returns and also find evidence of feedback trading. In contrast, there is little evidence of a relation between flow and market returns for the institutional fund sample. Consequently, it appears that retail and institutional fund investors use different investment strategies, with retail investors following a more naive strategy. We find no evidence of flow inducing price pressure for either type of fund.     

Performance Manipulation and Fund Flow: Evidence from China

In this paper, we assess the relation between fund flow and fund returns in China's open-ended fund industry. Analyzing quarterly data from the period January 2005-December 2012, we construct a simultaneous equation model that captures the endogeneity of current and past returns and flows and find that contemporaneous returns have a key role in determining fund flows. We then estimate the fund performance "manipulation degree" to further investigate the performance manipulation effect on fund flows. We find that manipulated funds can attract an additional flow of money and that, notably, individual rather than institutional investors are more likely to be deceived by manipulative behavior.     

The effect of investor service costs on mutual fund performance

We examine the effect of investor service costs on mutual fund performance. Benchmarking passive funds against ETFs managed by the same fund company with the same investment objectives, we show that passive funds on average underperform ETFs by 42 bps in annualized net returns, of which about 90% can be attributed to investor service costs. Further benchmarking active funds against passive funds, we show that active funds on average outperform passive funds by 31 bps in annualized gross returns. However, the higher expense ratios charged by active funds lead to about 28 bps of underperformance in annualized net fund returns.     

IS NOISE TRADER RISK PRICED?

We examine the hypothesis that closed‐end fund shareholders garner greater returns than holders of the underlying assets as compensation for bearing “noise trader risk.” We demonstrate that the returns on fund shares are more volatile and exhibit greater mean reversion than the returns on the underlying assets, consistent with the hypothesis that noise traders play a more active role in closed‐end fund shares than do the underlying assets. Inconsistent with the De Long et al. (1990) noise trader model, however, we find that after accounting for fund expenses, fund shareholders do not earn returns greater than holders of the underlying assets. JEL classification: G12     

Closed‐End Fund Discounts and Expected Investment Performance

This article provides empirical support for the theory that closed‐end fund discounts reflect expected investment performance. Evidence is presented to explain how equity closed‐end fund initial public offerings (IPOs) can sell at a premium when existing funds sell at a discount and why the initial IPO premiums decay after the IPO. Relative premium decay data are presented. Tests on (1) the relation between relative premium changes and investment performance following IPOs, (2) relative premium mean‐reversion following management changes, and (3) net redemptions following closed‐end fund open‐endings for funds trading at pre‐open‐ending announcement discounts individually support and collectively strongly support the theory.     

Luck versus Skill in the Cross‐Section of Mutual Fund Returns

The aggregate portfolio of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds is close to the market portfolio, but the high costs of active management show up intact as lower returns to investors. Bootstrap simulations suggest that few funds produce benchmark‐adjusted expected returns sufficient to cover their costs. If we add back the costs in fund expense ratios, there is evidence of inferior and superior performance (nonzero true α) in the extreme tails of the cross‐section of mutual fund α estimates.