The Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism Needs Better Categories: Clearing up the Confusions that Result from Blurring Analytic and Lay Concepts

Synopsis It has been difficult to make progress in the study of ethnicity and nationalism because of the multiple confusions of analytic and lay terms, and the sheer lack of terminological standardization (often even within the same article). This makes a conceptual cleaning-up unavoidable, and it is especially salutary to attempt it now that more economists are becoming interested in the effects of identity on behavior, so that they may begin with the best conceptual tools possible. My approach to these questions has been informed by anthropological and evolutionary-psychological questions. I will focus primarily on the terms ‘ethnic group’, ‘nation’, and ‘nationalism’, and I will make the following points: (1) so-called ‘ethnic groups’ are collections of people with a common cultural identity, plus an ideology of membership by descent and normative endogamy; (2) the ‘group’ in ‘ethnic group’ is a misleading misnomer—these are not ‘groups’ but categories, so I propose to call them ‘ethnies’; (3) ‘nationalism’ mostly refers to the recent ideology that ethnies—cultural communities with a self-conscious ideology of self-sufficient reproduction—be made politically sovereign; (4) it is very confusing to use ‘nationalism’ also to stand for ‘loyalty to a multi-ethnic state’ because this is the exact opposite; (5) a ‘nation’ truly exists only in a politician’s imagination, so analysts should not pretend that establishing whether something ‘really’ is or is not ‘a nation’ matters; (6) a big analytic cost is paid every time an ‘ethnie’ is called a ‘nation’ because this mobilizes the intuition that nationalism is indispensable to ethnic organization (not true), which thereby confuses the very historical process—namely, the recent historical emergence of nationalism—that must be explained; (7) another analytical cost is paid when scholars pretend that ethnicity is a form of kinship—it is not.     

Wage formation in historical perspective: the French experience

Translator's note: In this article Robert Bayer introduces thenotion ‘regulation’ as a key concept in analysesof the labour market. The term refers to the balance of social,institutional and economic forces which characte rise at a particulartime the economic system as a whole or particular parts of it.I considered translating ‘regulation’ as ‘order’,‘regime’, ‘system’ or ‘formation’;but these terms are either too static or already bear inappropriateconnotations. It was therefore decided to retain the Frenchexpression in the English text.     

ACCUMULATION, CAPACITY UTILISATION AND DISTRIBUTION

This paper examines three approaches to the process of accumulationwhich are based on the ‘Keynesian premise’: the‘neo-Keynesian’, the ‘Kaleckian’ andthe ‘Sraffian’. Making some criticisms of the firsttwo from the viewpoint of the third and from a certain formal/conceptualperspective, we propose a synthetic model which is free fromthese criticisms and in which the adjustment of savings to investmentin the long period is achieved through all the three routesemphasised separately by these approaches: changes in the long-perioddegree of utilisation; changes in the ‘normal’ distributionof income; and variations in the size of productive capacity.The key to the synthesis is the hypothesis that, in the longperiod, the ‘normal’ degree of utilisation is endogenouslydetermined to coincide with the average level through mutualinfluence effected by investment in the short period. Our syntheticmodel, like the first two approaches, is in the line of steady-stateanalysis, but in a way compatible with the ‘Keynesianpremise’.     

Sustainable recursive social welfare functions

What ethical criterion for intergenerational justice should be adopted, e.g., when faced with the task of managing the global environment? Koopmans’ axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism is based on seemingly compelling conditions, yet this criterion leads to hard-to-justify outcomes. The present analysis considers a class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions within Koopmans’ general framework. This class is axiomatized by means of a weak equity condition (“Hammond Equity for the Future”) and general existence is established. Any member of the class satisfies the key axioms of Chichilnisky’s “sustainable preferences”. The analysis singles out one of Koopmans’ original separability conditions (his Postulate 3′a), here called “Independent Present”, as particularly questionable from an ethical perspective.     

The process and a simple logic of ‘meso’. Emergence and the co-evolution of institutions and group size

‘Summing-up’ aggregation of micro decisions contrasts with structural emergence in complex systems and evolutionary processes. This paper deals with institutional emergence in the ‘evolution of cooperation’ framework and focuses on its size dimension. It is argued that some ‘meso’ (rather than ‘macro’) level is the proper level of cultural emergence and reproduction. Also Schumpeterian economists have discussed institutions as ‘meso’ phenomena recently, and Schelling, Axelrod, Arthur, Lindgren, and others have dealt with ‘critical masses’ of coordinated agents and emergent segregations. However, emergent group size has rarely been explicitly explored so far. In an evolutionary and game-theoretic frame, ‘meso’ is explained in terms of a sustainably cooperating group smaller than the whole population. Mechanisms such as some monitoring, memory, reputation, and active partner selection loosen the total connectivity of the static and deterministic ‘single-shot’ logic and thus allow for emergent ‘meso’ platforms, while expectations ‘to meet again’ remain sufficiently high. Applications of ‘meso-nomia’ include the deep structure of ‘general trust’ and macro-performance in ‘smaller’ and ‘well networked’ countries which helps to explain persistent ‘varieties of capitalism’.     

FDI and environmental regulation: pollution haven or a race to the top?

Increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) flows accompanied with globalization have raised the concern of a “race to the bottom” phenomenon in environmental protection. This is because footloose investors of “dirty” industries tend to relocate to “pollution havens” of the developing world. However when pollutant is transboundary (as in the case of greenhouse gases), the source country’s incentive to relocate and the recipient country’s willingness to host such industries are not straightforward. This article studies the relationship between FDI and environmental regulation using a North–South market share game model in a two-country setting, when pollution is transboundary. Contrary to the pollution haven hypothesis, our model shows that if market sizes of the two countries are small, FDI will raise the emission standard of the host country, resulting in a “race-to-the-top” phenomenon; but if market sizes are large enough, FDI will not change the emission standard of the South (from its laxest form), a finding that is consistent with the “regulatory chill” argument. Equilibrium FDI is contingent on the fixed cost of FDI, as the traditional proximity–concentration tradeoff theory predicts.     

Schumpeter’s ‘conduct model of the dynamic entrepreneur’: scope and distinctiveness

Schumpeter formulated a ‘conduct model’ of entrepreneurial behaviour. Received wisdom has emphasised the economic functions of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur, neglecting behavioural aspects. Schumpeter’s model is examined; it posits a continuum of behaviours which are ‘entrepreneurial’, that rely on socially situated, tacit knowledge and are expressions of conscious, subjective rationality. Schumpeter’s model excluded unconscious optimisation and decision rules derived from bounded rationality. Comparisons are drawn with modern neoclassical, Austrian, and the older behavioural characterisations of entrepreneurial behaviour. The newer ‘effectuation’ model of entrepreneurial behaviour is also contrasted with Schumpeter’s approach. We find, among other things, that modern Schumpeterian economics associated with Nelson and Winter is not a natural continuation of Schumpeter’s model. However, some developments in neo-Schumpeterian economics, including the effectuation model deriving from the older behavioural tradition, are congruent with both the original ‘conduct model’ and Schumpeter’s directions for further research.     

Social Change versus Transition: The Political Economy of Institutions and Transitional Economies

The “transition” process in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) was one of the most dramatic non-marginal adjustments in economic systems ever experienced. During the transition process, elements of centrally administered socialism and embryonic market relations co-existed. This made traditional economic theory irrelevant. The purpose of this paper is to discover policy concerns and outcomes that orthodox “transition” literature ignores. Stanfield’s contribution to the economic literature, a cultural-holistic approach of radical institutionalism, makes it possible to understand the “transition” process from a new and more enlightened perspective. Stanfield provides a better understanding of the complexities involved, since the nature of change in the EEFSU is social and ever-lasting, not an end-state in the form of “transition”. Students of transition and of international development would benefit from this novel approach, which dismisses “transition” and substitutes “social change”, as the proper designation and manifestation of what actually took place in EEFSU.     

Synergy Goes to War: A Bioeconomic Theory of Collective Violence

Synopsis Synergy – here defined as otherwise unattainable combined effects that are produced by two or more elements, parts or individuals – has played a key causal role in the evolution of complexity, from the very origins of life to the evolution of humankind and complex societies. This theory – known as the ‘Synergism Hypothesis’ – also applies to social behavior, including the use of collective violence for various purposes: predation, defense against predators, the acquisition of needed resources and the defense of these resources against other groups and species. Among other things, there have been (1) synergies of scale, (2) cost and risk sharing, (3) a division of labor (or, better said, a ‘combination of labor’), (4) functional complementarities, (5) information sharing and collective ‘intelligence’, and (6) tool and technology ‘symbioses’. Many examples can be seen in the natural world – from predatory bacteria like Myxococcus xanthus to social insects like the predatory army ants and the colonial raiders Messor pergandei, mobbing birds like the common raven, cooperative pack-hunting mammals like wolves, wild dogs, hyenas and lions, coalitions of mate-seeking and mate-guarding male dolphins, the well-armed troops of savanna baboons, and, closest to humans, the group-hunting, group-raiding and even ‘warring’ communities of chimpanzees. Equally significant, there is reason to believe that various forms of collective violence were of vital importance to our own ancestors’ transition, over several million years, from an arboreal, frugivorous, mostly quadrupedal ape to a world-traveling, omnivorous, large-brained, tool-dependent, loquacious biped. The thesis that warfare is not a recent ‘historical’ invention will be briefly reviewed in this paper. This does not mean that humans are, after all, ‘killer apes’ with a reflexive blood-lust or an aggressive ‘drive’. The biological, psychological and cultural underpinnings of collective violence are far more subtle and complex. Most important, the incidence of collective violence – in nature and human societies alike – is greatly influenced by synergies of various kinds, which shape the ‘bioeconomic’ benefits, costs and risks. Synergy is a necessary (but not sufficient) causal agency. Though there are notable exceptions (and some significant qualifiers), collective violence is, by and large, an evolved, synergy-driven instrumentality in humankind, not a mindless instinct or a reproductive strategy run amok.      

税收增速大于GDP增速的产业结构分析

Recently, qualitative and comparatively simple positive research on tax revenue increase faster than that of GDP are mostly based upon some factors, such as economic growth, levy technology enhancement, difference between structure of GDP and that of tax, excessive increase of high-tax industries due to local governments’ land-leasing behavior, etc. We firstly develop a theoretical model and responding algorithm about this phenomenon based on industry structure and their tax burden. Our model explicitly takes into account every industry’s contribution to this phenomenon. We attempt to provide a path for explaining tax revenue increase faster than GDP increase and suggestion for forecasting the change of macro-tax burden. __________ Translated from Shuliang Jingji Jishu Jingji Yanjiu 数量经济技术经济研究 (The Journal of Quantitative & Technical Economics), 2008, (10): 108–118     

The origins of meso economics

The paper starts from Schumpeter’s proposition that entrepreneurs carry out innovations (the micro level), that swarms of followers imitate them (meso) and that, as a consequence, ‘creative destruction’ leads to economic development ‘from within’ (macro). It is argued that Schumpeter’s approach can be developed into a new—more general—micro-meso-macro framework in economics. Center stage is meso. Its essential characteristic is bimodality, meaning that one idea (the generic rule) can be physically actualized by many agents (a population). Ideas can relate to others, and, in this way, meso constitutes a structure component of a ‘deep’ invisible macro structure. Equally, the rule actualization process unfolds over time—modelled in the paper as a meso trajectory with three phases of rule origination, selective adoption and retention—and here meso represents a process component of a visible ‘surface’ structure. The macro measure with a view to the appropriateness of meso components is generic correspondence. At the level of ideas, its measure is order; at that of actual relative adoption frequencies, it is generic equilibrium. Economic development occurs at the deep level as transition from one generic rule to another, inducing a change of order, and, at the surface level, as the new rule is adopted, destroying an old equilibrium and establishing a new one.     

Economic Growth and (Re-)Distributive Policies in a Non-cooperative World

Many models show that redistribution is bad for growth. This paper argues that in a non-cooperative world optimizing, redistributing (“left-wing”) governments mimic non-redistributing (“right-wing”) policies for fear of capital loss if capital markets become highly integrated and the countries are technologically similar. “Left-right” competition leads to more redistribution and lower GDP growth than “left-left” competition. Efficiency differences allow for higher GDP growth and more redistribution than one's opponent. Irrespective of efficiency differences, however, “left-wing” governments have higher GDP growth when competing with other “left-wing” governments. The results may explain why one observes a positive correlation between redistribution and growth across countries, and why capital inflows and current account deficits may be good for relatively high growth.     

The political economy of constitutional restraints

Constitutions are multidimensional objects with non-trivial implications on the structure of the political environment and, therefore, on the policy outcomes. This paper models constitutions as sets of “restraints” on the authority’s choice freedom (absolute and democracy restraints). We argue that even if both kinds of restraints seem to be serving the same purpose (increase social welfare), “democracy restraints” prolong the “life” of a constitution while “absolute restraints” not. We moreover use the proposed way of modelling constitutions in order to explain the dominance of intermediate (in terms of tightness of “democracy restraints”) constitutions in the real world.     

Endogenous structural change and crisis in a multiple time-scales growth model

The slow and endogenous twist of economic macro-structure makes up an important evolutionary feature of capitalist economies, and may be at the root of structural crisis. In this line, a Goodwinian growth model with increasing returns and profit-sharing that tries to picture a simple scenario of the seventies crisis is considered. It is shown that the exhaustion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn “productivity law” can entail, in a nonlinear framework, a “catastrophic” bifurcation from a “high” to a “low” growth path. Slow/fast dynamical systems then allow one to formalize a multiple time-scales dynamics where the growth path is shaped by the structural framework in which it takes place, but has also a long -un feedback. Structural change and crisis appear as long term and endogenous outcomes.     

Darwinism in economics: from analogy to ontology

Several social scientists, including ‘evolutionary economists’, have expressed scepticism of ‘biological analogies’ and rejected the application of ‘Darwinism’ to socio-economic evolution. Among this group, some have argued that self-organisation is an alternative to biological analogies or Darwinism. Others have seen ‘artificial selection’ as an alternative to natural selection in the socio-economic sphere. Another objection is that Darwinism excludes human intentionality. It is shown that all these objections to ‘biological analogies’ and ‘Darwinism’ are ungrounded. Furthermore, Darwinism includes a broad theoretical framework for the analysis of the evolution of all open, complex systems, including socio-economic systems. Finally and crucially, Darwinism also involves a basic philosophical commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal explanations. For these reasons, Darwinism is fully relevant for economics and an adequate evolutionary economics must be Darwinian, at least in these fundamental senses. However, this does not undermine the need for auxiliary theories and explanations in the economic domain.