共查询到18条相似文献,搜索用时 125 毫秒
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李贤祥 《经济理论与经济管理》2016,36(4):66
越来越多的发展中国家企业通过劳工认证获取较多的市场份额,劳工标准移植的问题也受到较多关注。本文选择从供应商道德风险视角研究发展中国家的劳工标准移植的特征。研究发现,风险规避供应商的存在促使采购商必须在道德风险和努力水平之间选择一个次优均衡。尤其是考虑到最低标准等有限责任信息租的存在,使得采购商必须额外支付一定的代理成本以满足委托代理过程,最后的均衡劳工标准比仅考虑逆向选择更加扭曲。 相似文献
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风险投资家的最优激励契约模型研究--一种基于逆向选择和道德风险条件下的博弈模型分析 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
为减少风险投资融资中风险投资家的逆向选择和道德风险,风险投资者必须设立一套有效的激励机制来让风险投资家选择,从而根据风险投资家选择的结果来甄别其真实能力类型,同时又能激励其努力工作。文章建立了风险投资家能力类型和努力都是不可观测条件下的最优激励契约模型,并根据显示原理,利用最优控制理论求出了最优解进而进行了分析。得出的结论是:最优激励契约能使高能力风险投资家乐于选择具有高强度激励、低固定收入和风险小的项目,同时又能激励其签约后更加努力工作。 相似文献
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农产品供应链中的农户与农产品加工企业是两个重要节点,有效协调二者的权责具有极为重要的价值和意义。文章利用委托代理理论,探讨了现实环境下(既有逆向选择问题又有道德风险问题)二者的委托代理关系,就此建立了委托代理混合模型,并对不同情况下信息甄别的重点进行了探讨。 相似文献
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通过分析委托代理关系中委托人与代理人之间的信息不对称,提出拥有信息优势的代理人容易产生信息寻租行为,为了减少信息租金,委托人需要设计激励约束机制,降低交易成本,增加收益,揭示了委托代理关系的核心是设计激励约束机制从而减少信息租金问题。文章在回顾信息经济学中逆向选择理论的基础上,重点探讨信息甄别模型,提出了委托代理关系中激励约束机制设计的基本思路,补充了委托代理中机制设计理论,为金融业、保险业、银行业等的发展提供了理论指导。 相似文献
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风险投资人、风险资本家与风险企业家之间存在严重的信息不对称和多重委托代理关系,使得风险投资中的代理问题较一般企业更加复杂。如何通过机制设计形成风险投资中的激励形容机制,防止严重的道德风险,对风险投资业持续健康发展具有特殊重要的意义。本文运用双重委托代理模型,分析了风险资本家和风险企业家在信息不对称和线性支付契约下的最优努力水平和最优报酬支付比例问题。研究表明,报酬支付比例对风险资本家和风险企业家的激励及风险投资绩效产生重要影响。其中风险资本家和风险企业家的最优报酬支付比例与风险企业家的产出呈正向变动关系,但与他们的保留效用无关。 相似文献
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道德风险是导致标准代理模型无效率的重要原因之一。道德风险的存在使得委托人采取外部激励,代理人必然要承担部分风险,从而降低二者的总财富。直观上讲,如果代理人愿意签订低激励程度但需高努力水平的契约,那么委托人和代理人的总收益就较大。另外,在这种情况下,代理人可以通过获得固定的工资得到补偿,避免承担风险,收益也相应增加。 相似文献
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保险委托-代理关系是一种不完全契约关系,委托人要为代理人的行为承担风险,而契约的执行力掌握在代理人一方,契约的制约力掌握在委托人一方,事前逆向选择和事后道德风险是委托人不能回避的两大难题,其很大程度上取决于代理人的行为。信号传递、激励方式、信誉机制三方面决定了保险委托代理关系的状况,也决定了寿险营销的发展前景。 相似文献
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风险投资企业与风险企业之间存在突出的信息不对称,可能导致严重的委托-代理问题和道德风险,对 此,可通过甄别机制、契约机制、分期投资机制、对管理层特殊的薪酬机制和企业治理机制等实现风险投资企业对风险 企业的激励与约束。 相似文献
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The implementation of nature conservation policy is often based on contracts between public authorities and landowners. In
this article, we model incentive contracts in forest areas in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard when the
conservation outcome is uncertain ex ante but observable ex post. The results show that agents who are likely to achieve a
higher level of conservation should be offered a contract where transfers depend on the final outcome, with a bonus for a
high ecological level of the forest. When conservation measures are correlated with forest management, we show that the contractual
measures involve distorted transfers. We analyse the payment mechanisms used in France and Denmark in the context of the Natura
2000 policy. These mechanisms result in overcompensation and under-performance since they do not take the problem of moral
hazard and natural variability into account. 相似文献
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F. H. Page Jr 《Economic Theory》1991,1(4):323-338
Summary We examine the problem of incentive compatibility and mechanism design for incomplete information principal-agent problems. Allowing for risk aversion on the part of the principal and agent, we show the existence of an optimal, incentive compatible contract selection mechanism for the principal under conditions of moral hazard and adverse selection. Since we assume that the contract set is a function space of state contingent contracts, and that the set of agent types is uncountable, the set of contract selection mechanisms becomes infinite dimensional. Hence, novel existence arguments are required. Our existence result extends those of Grossman and Hart [10] and Page [23] to an infinite dimensional setting with incomplete information. 相似文献
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We examine legal services contracts characterized by a contingency fee and an hours reporting requirement in a moral hazard setting. We find that hours reporting requirements in contingency contracts can reduce the rent needed to induce high attorney effort under moral hazard. Under certain conditions, the ability to set hours above the first-best level leads a client to choose a contract inducing high effort when she otherwise would not. The important condition of this result is, however, that hours must be contractible. We apply our model to the 2010 Florida “sunshine” law that requires hours reporting by private attorneys employed on a contingency fee basis by the attorney general. We find the sunshine laws of Florida and other states may, in addition to providing more transparency in government contracting, increase the public benefit from an attorney general’s employment of private attorneys. 相似文献
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Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and Ability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We examine the optimal design of contracts when an agent is privately informed about his wealth, his ability, and his effort supply. We find that the agent's wealth and ability act as perfect complements in determining the power of the incentive scheme under which he operates. Only if his ability and his wealth both increase can an agent be assured of operating under a more powerful scheme. Consequently, severe under-utilization of wealth and ability arise in equilibrium. 相似文献
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本文研究了数量柔性契约下服务供应链的最优激励机制问题。运用连续工作表现的道德风险模型,构建了服务供应链激励模型,得出最优的激励转移支付,并详细分析了数量柔性契约下供应商需要努力的必要性条件、不同激励程度的机制设计以及不同谈判力要求下的激励机制控制等。研究认为:①在数量柔性契约中,只有特定需求分布的服务供应链才能提供有效的供应商激励机制;②最优激励机制存在一个震荡间断点;③可通过改变参数来调整激励程度并调整成员间的利润分配。 相似文献
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Michael Casson 《Forum for Social Economics》2013,42(2):87-92
America’s elementary and secondary educational system is faced with an inefficiency stemming from a basic problem associated with unobservability: moral hazard. In this case, the teacher (agent) has an incentive to exert less effort (given cost associated with more work) if the school district (principal) cannot distinguish between low student performance due to a lack of teacher effort and low student performance due low student quality (random variable). This research develops an optimal incentive scheme that guarantees the teacher a fixed payment, plus a variable payment that would be a function of teacher ‘action’ variables thereby reducing moral hazard. 相似文献
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An agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal. Information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent's effort. Contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering, and there are both moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following “good news” with a fixed low-powered option otherwise. 相似文献