Books Reviewed

Books reviewed:
Julian M. Alston, Philip G. Pardey and Vincent H. Smith, (eds.) Paying for Agricultural Productivity
P.K. Rao, The Economics of Global Climatic Change
Bernard Salanie, The Economics of Contracts: A Primer
Raisuddin Ahmed, Steven Haggblade and Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury, (eds.) Out of the Shadow of Famine: Evolving Food Markets and Food Policy in Bangladesh
Lyle P. Schertz and Otto C. Doering III, The Making of the 1996 Farm Act
Joseph A. Herriges and Catherine L. Kling, Valuing Recreation and the Environment
James R. Prescott, Paul Van Moeseke and Jati Sengupta, (eds.) Urban-Regional Economics, Social System Accounts, and EcoBehavioural Science, Selected Writings of Karl A. Fox
Brent M. Haddad, Rivers of Gold: Designing Markets to Allocate Water in California
J. M. Antle, J. N. Lekakis and G. P. Zenias, (eds.) Agriculture, Trade and the Environment: The Impact of Liberalization on Sustainable Development
J. Barkley Rosser Jr., From Catastrophe to Chaos: A General Theory of Economic Discontinuities: Mathematics, Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, and Finance     

Regulating Broiler Contracts: Tournaments versus Fixed Performance Standards

Grower discontent with tournaments as mechanisms for settling poultry contracts can largely be attributed to the group composition risk that tournaments impose on growers. This article focuses on the welfare effects of a widely advocated regulatory proposal to prevent integrator companies from using tournaments and replace them with schemes that compare performance to a fixed standard. The analysis shows that the mandatory replacement of tournaments with fixed performance standards, absent any rules that regulate the magnitude of the piece rate, can decrease grower income insurance without raising welfare. However, replacing tournaments with fixed performance standards can simultaneously increase income insurance and welfare, provided that the magnitude of the piece rate is also regulated.     

Regulating Nitrogen Pollution with Risk Averse Farmers under Hidden Information and Moral Hazard

We consider a model of pollution regulation for a risk averse farmer involving hidden information, moral hazard, and risk-sharing. The representative farmer faces a production risk originating from nitrogen leaching, and privately observes the soil capacity in retaining nitrogen only after the regulation contract is signed. The latter specifies a transfer and a nitrogen quota, whose decomposition by the farmer among different production stages is unknown to the regulator. We first characterize the optimal solution to the regulator's problem. The sequential decision model is estimated on French crop production data, and the results are used to calibrate and simulate the optimal contract.     

Joint production under uncertainty and multifunctionality of agriculture: policy considerations and applied analysis

The impact of various policy instruments on the production ofenvironmental goods that are complementary to or competing withagricultural commodities is analysed in the light of the uncertaintyin output prices and farmers' risk aversion. Some theoreticalassessments are first summarised and then tested on a case studyconcerning beef and grassland biodiversity production in Montsdu Cantal, France. The results of simulations carried out bymathematical programming farm-level models show that joint commodityand non-commodity production is nearly independent of the degreeof farmers' risk aversion, and that commodity-linked policyinstruments are not suitable for the production of environmentalgoods even under uncertainty.     

Contract Enforcement, Social Efficiency, and Distribution: Some Experimental Evidence

We use economic experiments to investigate how different contract enforcement regimes affect efficiency and the distribution of surplus in a vertically coordinated market with buyer concentration. We find that if a third party (e.g., government) perfectly enforces contracts, social efficiency is enhanced. We also find that when third-party enforcement is imperfect, social efficiency will not necessarily decrease because trading partners find ways to self enforce contracts. However, opportunistic behavior by some traders leaves some sellers (growers) with ex post profits below reservation levels. Finally, partial or one-sided third-party enforcement causes significant efficiency losses by constraining subjects' ability to use informal enforcement instruments.     

Cooperatives, regulation and competition in Norwegian agriculture

This article analyses the efficiency of current market regulations and market structure in Norwegian agriculture. Based on their potential to coordinate farmers' supplies, large marketing cooperatives are assigned a market regulation role. However, market prices frequently tend to fall below target prices, spurring costly additional market regulations. This is not necessarily a result of inefficient coordination by the cooperative. Using a mixed market model, the study shows that over production may be explained by the competition between marketing cooperatives and investor-owned wholesalers (IOW), typically weakening the cooperatives' ability to coordinate market supply. This conclusion is robust over a variety of IOW contracts. However, to what extent competition is to blame, depends on the target price level and the contract structure of the IOW. Moreover, it is shown that current market interventions to remove excess supplies may induce further incentives to increase production.     

Risk, Wealth, and Sectoral Choice in Rural Credit Markets

We model the role of the informal credit sector in developing countries. The informational advantage of informal lenders is portrayed as the ability to monitor borrowers. Monitoring reduces the incentive problem and allows for contracts with lower collateral. This enables informal lenders to serve both individuals who cannot post the collateral required by the formal sector and those who are able but do not want to post collateral. The model is consistent with the conventional view of the informal sector as recipient of spillover demand from the formal sector. It also shows that the informal sector may provide partial insurance as the lower collateral requirement implies greater consumption smoothing for borrowers.     

Risk Averters that Love Risk? Marginal Risk Aversion in Comparison to a Reference Gamble

We propose an analytical distinction between standard risk aversion based on the valuation of a single gamble and marginal risk aversion based on the change in valuation between two gambles. We measure marginal risk aversion in two dimensions—mean and variance. Data from a field experiment is used to study marginal risk aversion. Our results suggest that individuals rely on a reference gamble when assessing marginal risk. Individual responses to marginal changes in mean and variance are nearly identical in direction and magnitude—suggesting that information on both standard and marginal risk aversion is needed to accurately model behavior.     

农户模糊规避和风险规避偏好关系研究

学者常常担忧模糊觃避只是风险觃避的一种极端情况,两者存在一一对应关系,但理论研究幵未对此达成共识。本文以上海为例对农户风险偏好进行了测度,幵依此考察农户模糊觃避和风险觃避偏好乊间的关系。调查结果表明:农户总体表现模糊觃避和风险觃避偏好,两者乊间不存在显著相关关系。     

Is Risk Aversion Really Correlated with Wealth? How Estimated Probabilities Introduce Spurious Correlation

Economists frequently focus on correlations between wealth and risk preferences but rarely observe the probabilities needed to test this relationship empirically. These unobserved probabilities are typically estimated via profit or production functions conditioned on wealth correlates, which may leave statistical fingerprints on subsequently-estimated risk aversion coefficients and confound correlations between wealth and risk preferences. Using data from an experiment with observable probabilities, we compare risk aversion coefficients based on true probabilities with those based on probabilities estimated using standard approaches and show how estimated probabilities can change risk aversion coefficients substantially and introduce spurious correlation between risk aversion and wealth.     

Poverty, Risk Aversion, and Path Dependence in Low-Income Countries: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia

In most low-income countries, rural households depend on mixed rain-fed agriculture/livestock production, which is very risky. Due to numerous market failures, there are few ways to shift risks to third parties. The literature has focused on what determines the responses of households in such environments. Of special concern are path dependencies in which households experiencing failure are prone to further failure and potential poverty traps. This paper estimates levels and determinants of risk aversion in the highlands of Ethiopia. We find high risk aversion and evidence that constraints have important impacts on risk-averting behavior with perhaps significant implications for long-term poverty. The results also suggest the possibility of path dependence and offer insights into links between risk aversion and poverty traps.     

森林经营者风险态度及其度量

风险态度影响个体对风险事件的认识及其对行动方案的选择,不同特性的个体,其风险态度应存在差异。在福建省建阳、建瓯、莆田、连城、上杭、武平、永安等地进行有关森林经营者风险态度问卷调查的基础上,分别利用"标准赌博"衡量法、调查问卷法和经济学试验这三种度量方法,对福建省三类森林经营者的风险态度分别进行度量的结果表明:除了"标准赌博"衡量法无法区分三类森林经营主体风险态度差异性外,调查问卷法和经济学试验均表明各个森林经营者风险态度存在着差异性。森林培育企业和森林培育专业户的风险态度属于风险厌恶,但企业的厌恶程度大于专业户,而兼业农户的风险态度则属于风险偏好。     

植物品种权交易中的“囚徒困境”博弈分析

借助"囚徒困境"博弈模型分析植物品种权交易中普遍存在的道德风险问题。结果表明:在没有任何监督、惩罚措施的情况下,最终的博弈均衡只能是交易双方都选择不遵守策略,以实现各自利益的最大化;但通过对博弈模型进行适当的改进,就会发现只要监督和惩罚措施得当,提高其违约成本,交易双方就会为实现各自利益最大化而选择遵守策略,并据此得到实现植物品种权交易良性循环运作的有效条件,提高交易成功率。