中国应积极发展私募股权基金

如果你问"谁在2006年全球经济中影响力增长最快",可能很多人会想到中国和印度,但是我的答案其实是另外一个:私募股权基金。关于私募股权基金在中国的发展,我有三个基本观点:中国应该积极发展私募股权基金我认为在总体上私募股权基金对于促进中国经济发展、提升中国经济的全球影响力将起到非常正面的推动作用。这些作用将具体表现在以下几个方面:     

阳光私募基金评价体系研究

随着国内证券市场的不断发展与完善、阳光私募基金相互监督制约机制的延续及监管自律的加强、经济持续快速发展下居民财富积累丰厚尤其是高收入群体日渐扩大,阳光私募行业有望继续保持快速发展,并在市场中逐步扩大影响力。本文构建阳光私募基金评价体系,形成对阳光私募基金的日常跟踪管理机制,为其提供准确的投资信息参考,引导其正确识别基金...     

窥探私募基金

私募基金是相对于公募基金而言的，两者只是在基金发行方法上有所差异。向社会非特定公众发行或公开发行的基金界定为公募基金。中国常说的“私募基金”或“地下基金”，是一种非公开宣传的、私下向特定投资人募集资金的一种集合投资，其基本方式有两种：一是基于签订委托投资合同的契约型集合投资基金；     

窥探私募基金

私募基金是相对于公募基金而言的,两者只是在基金发行方法上有所差异。向社会非特定公众发行或公开发行的基金界定为公募基金。中国常说的“私募基金”或“地下基金”,是一种非公开宣传的、私下向特定投资人募集资金的一种集合投资,其基本方式有两种:一是基于签订委托投资合同的契约型集合投资基金;二是基于共同出资入股成立股份公司的公司型集合投资基金。私募基金通过非公开方式募集资金,投资对象仅限于少数特定的投资者,而为募集足够的资金,所以投资门槛不低。由于私募基金在监管机构管理范围之外,因此私募基金的投资更具隐蔽性,运作也更为灵活,相应地获得高收益回报的机会也更大,但风险和诈骗行为也更加突出。     

走近私募基金

一、私募基金的概念。 私募基金是一种非公开宣传的,私下向特定投资者募集资金进行的一种集合投资。一般说来,作为私募基金,必须包括三个方面相互关联的内容：（1）必须有依照法律或相关规定成立的基金管理公司。     

私募基金投资

想了解一下私募基金的特点以及如何投资私募基金。     

私募基金刍议

目前,国内对私募基金的讨论很多,但什么是私募基金呢?比较流行的一种说法是"指通过非公开方式,面向少数机构投资者募集资金而设立的基金"。另一种说法是"私募基金的名称相对于公开募集基金而言,指并非面向所有投资者,只面向特定的投资者,一般以投资意向书(非公开的招募说明书)等形式募集的基金,但私募基金并非地下的非法的不受监管的基金"。后一种定义显然比前一种定义来得严格准确,它将"非公开发行"界定为"面向特定的投资者"和"以投资意向书募集"两个要素。同时,将私募基金区别于"非法的不受监管的基金"。那么我们该如何准确理解私募基金私募的含义,如何从     

The size of venture capital and private equity fund portfolios

We propose a model that examines the optimal size of venture capital and private equity fund portfolios. The relationship between a VC and entrepreneurs is characterized by double-sided moral hazard, which causes the VC to trade off larger portfolios against lower values of portfolio companies. We analyze the structural relations between the VC's optimal portfolio structure and entrepreneurs' and VC's productivities, their disutilities of effort, the value of a successful project, and the required initial investment in a venture. We also test the model's predictions using a small proprietary dataset collected through a survey targeted to VC and private equity funds worldwide.     

Fat tails in private equity fund returns: The smooth double Pareto distribution

Does the distribution of private equity returns have fat tails? A new smooth double Pareto distribution can explain the stationary distribution of private equity funds' valuation multiples. This distribution emerges from a random growth model with lognormally distributed initial fund valuations. This model endogenously generates power-law tails in the stationary cross-section. The new distribution fits the data better than competing distributions. Fat tails are particularly pronounced in venture capital funds and suggest returns with infinite variance over the lifetime of the fund. The smooth double Pareto distribution has wide applicability to growth processes with a random initial value.     

股权投资信托是否编制合并会计报表的探讨

2007年3月1日开始实施的<信托公司管理办法>和<信托公司集合资金信托计划管理办法>,对"一法两规"(<信托法>、<信托投资公司管理办法>和<集合资金信托管理办法>)所确立的信托公司业务规则作出了重大调整.     

The private placement of bank equity

This paper investigates the role of private placements of common stock as a source of bank capital. Our results show that information asymmetry problems that typically attend new offers of bank equity are mitigated in the private placement process. Moreover buyers of privately placed common stock seem to provide a quality certification of capital deficient bank holding companies. Our evidence is also consistent with the notion that buyers of privately placed common stock provide a monitoring service that aligns the interest of the bank's managers and shareholders. Finally, we find no evidence that private placements are predominately motivated by incumbent management's attempts to sell equity to a friendly buyer at the expense of the bank's current shareholders.     

权威视野：中国股权投资基金发展趋势

随着中国进入经济发展方式转型期,如何看待中国股权投资基金的发展？有哪些问题？有哪些机遇？面临哪些发展趋势？有哪些新的思路？在第四届中国企业融洽会举办的第三届中国股权投资基金年会上,专家对此发表了他们的看法     

There's no need to be a pioneer in emerging private equity markets

There is currently considerable enthusiasm for emerging private equity markets, where investors believe they have access to “untapped deal flow”. Early entry may allow them to capitalize on exceptional growth opportunities; however, the pioneering investors enter immature capital markets and have no local transaction experience. This may outweigh the potential benefits of low deal-flow competition and expected growth. We address this potential drawback by analyzing a unique, hand-collected dataset of emerging private equity market transactions. We refer to 1157 deals in 86 host countries between 1973 and 2009, and find that early transactions underperform later deals. The evidence presented is robust and consistent with the improvement in the deal-making environment over time and the benefits of learning how to conduct emerging market private equity deals. The learning benefits are stronger if investors are located in the same country as the investee firm.     

Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity transactions

We examine how board networks affect change-of-control transactions by investigating whether directors’ deal exposure acquired through board service at different companies affect their current firms’ likelihood of being targeted in a private equity-backed, take-private transaction. In our sample of all US publicly traded firms in 2000–2007, we find that companies which have directors with private equity deal exposure gained from interlocking directorships are approximately 42% more likely to receive private equity offers. The magnitude of this effect varies with the influence of directors on their current boards and the quality of these directors’ previous take-private experience, and it is robust to the most likely classes of alternative explanations—endogenous matching between directors and firms and proactive stacking of board composition by management. The analysis shows that board members and their social networks influence which companies become targets in change-of-control transactions.     

The risk appetite of private equity sponsors

Using a unique proprietary data set of 460 realized buyouts completed between 1990 and 2005, we examine the risk appetite of private equity (PE) sponsors in different states of the PE market and analyze key determinants of deal-level equity risk. We develop a new approach to mathematically model PE investment equity risk based on the Black-Cox default model. We find higher equity volatilities during boom periods. Further, deals conducted by more reputed PE sponsors have lower equity volatilities as they are unwilling to imperil their reputation by taking excessive risks. In addition, we find that PE sponsors' risk appetite is negatively related to the ownership stake in the buyout target company.     

Benchmarking private equity: The direct alpha method

We propose a simple and intuitive measure of the annualized excess return of investments in private equity (PE) funds, as well as in similar vehicles that hold hard-to-value assets. Our ‘Direct Alpha’ method is well-founded in theory and dominates the existing approaches to convert fund lifetime returns into inputs amenable for portfolio-wide optimization. Existing Public Market Equivalent (PME) approaches are either heuristic or involve significant approximation errors. Using real-world PE fund cash flow data, we juxtapose Direct Alpha against nearly all PME methods that have been in broad use.     

引进私募股权投资基金时机已经成熟

私募基金在中国走过怎样的一个发展历程?有怎样的特点?未来的发展地位如何?这些问题直接关系到此次中国企业国际融资洽谈会的大背景,更关系到今后私募资本在中国发展趋势,对此,全国工商联并购公会会长、本次"融洽会"副秘书长王巍做出了解答