绿色金融、普惠金融与绿色农业发展

绿色金融与普惠金融协同发展可有效推动绿色农业发展,在改善环境、降低碳排放的同时,提高“三农”领域的金融可得性.目前,中国在金融支持绿色农业发展上面临的主要障碍包括:绿色农业的标准尚未统一和规范,金融支持绿色农业的范围不够明确,缺乏针对绿色农业融资主体的信用体系,缺少绿色农业供给端的风险分担机制以及绿色农业消费端尚待进一...     

郑州市绿色金融发展路径及对策研究

金融业要为经济的可持续发展服务,发展绿色金融推动绿色产业发展已经成为全社会的共识.郑州市紧跟国家经济发展步伐,积极发展绿色金融,促进绿色产业和金融经济融合,取得了显著成绩.但也存在绿色金融体系不完善,绿色金融产品单一,监管力度不够,缺乏复合型绿色金融专业人才等问题.郑州市应构建绿色金融市场体系,完善金融机构的绿色金融管...     

我国绿色债券监管存在的问题与对策研究

绿色经济发展,离不开绿色金融的支持。绿色债券作为绿色金融体系的重要组成部分,受到多方关注。但是,我国在绿色债券的监管方面还存在一些不足:比如监管法律体系不健全,绿色债券的认定标准不统一,缺乏权威、不够规范绿色认证评估体系和绿色债券信息披露等。本文主要从建立保障绿色金融发展的法律体系、构建统一的绿色债券标准体系、明确绿色债券评级、构建较为完善的绿色认证评估体系、统一并细化规范信息披露标准、加强信息披露指引和完善自律监管和社会公众监督体系等方面,提出完善绿色债券的监管体系的建议。     

基层央行依法行政存在的问题及建议

问题 1.金融法律法规缺位.一是现有的金融法律、法规与规章之间缺乏协调和统一.如《金融违法行为处罚办法》规定,人民银行可对超额提现的金融机构进行处罚,但并未对"超额"做出明确额度规定;二是缺乏有效的执法监督机制.目前对基层人民银行行政执法行为的监督主要是行政复议、内审、行政监察的监督等,但由于监督机制的独立性不强或刚性不足,导致监督效能不高.     

金融服务应贴近农民

近期,笔者在农村调查发现,当前农民对金融服务有以下迫切需求。(1)金融知识常下乡。目前,由于一些农民缺乏金融法律知识,盲目为他人提供贷款担保,被人告上法庭还糊里糊涂;有的农民缺乏对金融法规的了解,在高利率的引诱下,盲目参与一些不正当金融组织的集资、入股和民间高利贷活     

论金融期货交易所及其独占权制度

金融期货交易与商品期货交易在法律规制上是一脉相承的,期货交易所是期货市场的核心和枢纽.各国法律明确规定,所有的期货交易必须在依法成立的交易所内进行,不允许场外对作交易.我国承认期货交易所对期货交易的独占权,并先后颁布了若干行政法规和部门规章予以规范和控制.但由于实践中对这一原则坚持不够,对这一制度实施不力,曾经导致金融期货交易重大违规事件发生,教训深刻.     

对建立我国涉外金融法规的设想

对建立我国涉外金融法规的设想厉广，冯勇随着我国经济不断发展，金融法规逐步完善。但在国外银行渗入和我国金融走向国际化的新形势下，抓紧研究和制定涉外金融法规已提到议事日程上。一、建立涉外金融法规的原则涉外金融法是用以调整涉外金融关系的法律，由于它涉及到两...     

世贸框架下的中国金融法制问题研究

我国目前的金融法规与世界贸易组织规则对金融服务业的相关规定存在着一定冲突,且不能满足我国金融发展的需要.中国加入世贸组织对我国金融法规提出了改进要求.因此,正视金融立法中存在的问题与不足,按照世贸组织规划的要求,建立健全符合国际惯例和中国国情的金融法律体系,是我们面临的一项十分重要而又紧迫的任务.     

金融基本法相互间的协调研究——建立适合中国国情、符合国际惯例的现代金融法律体系

一、现行中国金融基本法协调性缺陷分析 缺陷之一:缺乏科学的系统论思想作指导,金融权域的诸侯分割、各自为政与金融法律空白、重复立法并存. 1、金融监管存在不少法律空白. 一是金融监管主体的法定权责不明确其一、现行立法对法定监管主体监管职权规定过于原则,在监管实践中不具有可操作性.其二、监管主体行使监管职权的法律保障机制不健全.其三、缺乏金融监管法律程序性规定.     

我国绿色金融发展的机制障碍及路径选择

介绍绿色金融内涵及我国发展现状,分析我国绿色金融在制度层面、法律层面、意识层面存在的机制障碍,提出应完善绿色金融法律制度,建立绿色金融标准体系;加大宣传力度,增强环保意识和社会责任意识;加强沟通协调配合,构建信息共享机制;建立健全绿色金融激励机制和监管机制;完善我国绿色金融市场体系.     

tay's as good as cay

The empirical evidence that the consumption–wealth ratio, cay, has strong in-sample predictive power for future stock returns has been interpreted as evidence that consumers take account of future investment opportunities in planning their consumption expenditures. In this paper we show that the predictive power of cay arises mainly from a “look-ahead bias” introduced by estimating the parameters of the cointegrating regression between consumption, assets, and labor income in-sample. When a similar regression is run, replacing the log of consumption with an inanimate variable, calendar time, the resulting residual, which we label tay, is shown to be able to forecast stock returns as well as, or better than, cay. In addition, both cay and tay lose their out-of-sample forecasting power when they are re-estimated every period with only available data.     

上善若水工行人

28年的风雨兼程,她由小变大;28年的千锤百炼,她由弱变强;28年的栉风沐雨,铭刻着几代工行人艰苦奋斗、拼搏进取的缩影,他们在平凡的岗位上,传承敢于承担、乐于奉献,兢兢业业、奋勇争先的精神,创造了一个又一个金灿灿、沉旬甸的硕果。     

当亿万富豪，思想和行动一样远

创业板在金融风暴的2009年启动,正好见证了中国十多年来创业投资的风雨历程,而资本市场A就的A多中国亿万富豪,也极好地证明了实体经济与资本市场相结合确实是国家、企业和个人发达致富的A要之路。本文提出要敢于提出大目标,以“反推法”设计实施A目标的路线图,高屋建瓴而又脚踏实地,则中国广大创业者的亿万富豪之梦并非遥不可及     

Sustainability as Adaptability

Most corporations now view sustainability as a key requirement for competitive advantage, but few claim to have achieved it. One of the key obstacles separating intention from execution is that the sustainability frameworks employed by companies tend to be insufficiently clear, precise, or comprehensive to guide decision making. One of the most pressing challenges for corporate leaders today is, of course, to sustain the economic viability of the core businesses. But given the implicit “beyond business” focus of most sustainability efforts, corporate executives would be better served by a more integrated, holistic framework—one that enables them to make tradeoffs among the economic, social, and ecological aspects of business. This article introduces such a framework—one that redefines sustainability as the ability of companies to adapt to change in three different spheres of operation—ecological, social, and economic—with a near‐term as well as a longer‐term planning horizon. Without such adaptation, business models become obsolete for reasons that can range from economic failure, to competitive inferiority, to social or ecological limits. This ability to adapt can be measured and valued by using the BCG Adaptive Advantage Index, a composite measure of corporate performance during market downturns. The BCG analysis also shows that although the most adaptive companies tend to report lower profits and have lower values during periods of relative stability, such companies perform consistently better over full cycles. Creating social and ecological value alone doesn't automatically confer economic rewards, but—with the right business model and capabilities—it can. The authors explore some of the business model archetypes that successfully achieve this “co‐optimization.”     

Money as stock

The fiscal theory determines the price level from the value of nominal government debt as a claim to government primary surpluses, just as private stock is valued as a claim to corporate profits. Valuation equations are not constraints, so this theory does not mistreat the government's intertemporal budget constraint. I anchor the analysis in a simple cash in advance model. When money demand falls to zero, I show that the price level can still be determined by the government debt valuation equation.     

Strategy as ecology

Microsoft's and Wal-Mart's preeminence in modern business has been attributed to any number of factors--from the vision and drive of their founders to the companies' aggressive competitive practices. But the authors maintain that the success realized by these two very different companies is due only partly to the organizations themselves; a bigger factor is the success of the networks of companies with which Microsoft and Wal-Mart do business. Most companies today inhabit ecosystems--loose networks of suppliers, distributors, and outsourcers; makers of related products or services; providers of relevant technology; and other organizations that affect, and are affected by, the creation and delivery of a company's own offering. Despite being increasingly central to modern business, ecosystems are still poorly understood and even more poorly managed. The analogy between business networks and biological ecosystems can aid this understanding by vividly highlighting certain pivotal concepts. The moves that a company makes will, to varying degrees, affect the health of its business network, which in turn will ultimately affect the organization's performance--for ill as well as for good. Because a company, like an individual species in a biological ecosystem, ultimately shares its fate with the network as a whole, smart firms pursue strategies that will benefit everyone. So how can you promote the health and the stability of your own ecosystem, determine your place in it, and develop a strategy to match your role, thereby helping to ensure your company's well-being? It depends on your role--current and potential--within the network. Is your company a niche player, a keystone, or a dominator? The answer to this question may be different for different parts of your business. It may also change as your ecosystem changes. Knowing what to do requires understanding the ecosystem and your organization's role in it.     

Diversity as strategy

IBM's turnaround in the last decade is an impressive and well-documented business story. But behind that success is a less told people story, which explains how the corporation dramatically altered its already diverse composition and created millions of dollars in new business. By the time Lou Gerstner took the helm in 1993, IBM had a long history of progressive management when it came to civil rights and equal-opportunity employment. But Gerstner felt IBM wasn't taking full advantage of a diverse market for talent, nor was it maximizing the potential of its diverse customer and employee base. So in 1995, he launched a diversity task force initiative to uncover and understand differences among people within the organization and find ways to appeal to an even broader set of employees and customers. Gerstner established a task force for each of eight constituencies: Asians; blacks; the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered community; Hispanics; white men; Native Americans; people with disabilities; and women. He asked the task forces to research four questions: What does your constituency need to feel welcome and valued at IBM? What can the corporation do, in partnership with your group, to maximize your constituency's productivity? What can the corporation do to influence your constituency's buying decisions so that IBM is seen as a preferred solution provider? And with which external organizations should IBM form relationships to better understand the needs of your constituency? The answers to these questions became the basis for IBM's diversity strategy. Thomas stresses that four factors are key to implementing any major change initiative: strong support from company leaders, an employee base that is fully engaged with the initiative, management practices that are integrated and aligned with the effort, and a strong and well-articulated business case for action. All four elements have helped IBM make diversity a key corporate strategy tied to real growth.     

Strategy as revolution

How often does the strategic-planning process start with senior executives asking what the rest of the organization can teach them about the future? Not often enough, argues Gary Hamel. In many companies, strategy making is an elitist procedure and ?strategy? consists of nothing more than following the industry's rules. But more and more companies, intent on overturning the industrial order, are rewriting those rules. What can industry incumbents do? Either surrender the future to revolutionary challengers or revolutionize the way their companies create strategy. What is needed is not a tweak to the traditional strategic-planning process, Hamel says, but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution. Hamel offers ten principles to help a company think about the challenge of creating truly revolutionary strategies. Perhaps the most fundamental principle is that so-called strategic planning doesn't produce true strategic innovation. The traditional planning process is little more than a rote procedure in which deeply held assumptions and industry conventions are reinforced rather than challenged. Such a process harnesses only a tiny proportion of an organization's creative potential. If there is to be any hope of industry revolution, senior managers must give up their monopoly on the creation of strategy. They must embrace a truly democratic process that can give voice to the revolutionaries that exist in every company. If senior managers are unwilling to do this, employees must become strategy activists. The opportunities for industry revolution are mostly unexplored. One thing is certain: if you don't let the revolutionaries challenge you from within, they will eventually challenge you from without--in the marketplace.     

tay's as good as cay: Reply

In a recent comment on our published work [Lettau, M., Ludvigson, S., 2001. Consumption, aggregate wealth, and expected stock returns. Journal of Finance 56, 815–850], Michael Brennan and Yihong Xia [2005. tay's as good as cay. Finance Research Letters 2, 1–14] advance the following argument: A “mechanistic” variable tay, where t is a linear time trend, forecasts stock returns. Since “t has no foresight,” the argument goes, the predictive power of this variable must be attributable to what they call “look-ahead bias.” The authors assert that cay is subject to the same look-ahead bias (generated because we use the full sample to estimate the cointegrating parameters in cay), implying that its forecasting power must be spurious. In this response, we explain why this critique is misplaced.