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1.
Summary. Under take-it-or-leave-it offers, dynamic equilibria in the discrete time random matching model of money are a “translation”
of dynamic equilibria in the standard overlapping generations model. This formalizes earlier conjectures about the equivalence
of dynamic behavior in the two models and implies the indeterminacy of dynamic equilibria in the random matching model. As
in the overlapping generations model, the indeterminacy disappears if an arbitrarily small utility to holding money is introduced.
We introduce a different pricing mechanism, one that puts into sharp focus that agents are forward-looking when they interact.
Received: January 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001 相似文献
2.
Summary. We show that Arrow-Debreu equilibria with countably additive prices in infinite-time economy under uncertainty can be implemented by trading infinitely-lived securities in complete sequential markets under two different portfolio feasibility constraints: wealth constraint, and essentially bounded portfolios. Sequential equilibria with no price bubbles implement Arrow-Debreu equilibria, while those with price bubbles implement Arrow-Debreu equilibria with transfers. Transfers are equal to price bubbles on initial portfolio holdings. Price bubbles arise in sequential equilibrium under the wealth constraint if some securities are in zero supply or negative prices are permitted, but cannot arise with essentially bounded portfolios.Received: 19 November 2003, Revised: 24 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D50, G12, E44.Correspondence to: Jan WernerWe acknowledge helpful discussions with Roko Aliprantis, Subir Chattopaydhyay, Steve LeRoy, Manuel Santos, and seminar participants at Brown University, University of Pennsylvania, NBER Workshop in General Equilibrium Theory, SITE 2000, the 2000 World Congress of the Econometric Society, and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City or the Federal Reserve System. 相似文献
3.
4.
In defining random belief equilibrium (RBE) in finite, normal form games we assume a player's beliefs about others' strategy choices are randomly drawn from a belief distribution that is dispersed around a central strategy profile, the focus. At an RBE: (1) Each chooses a best response relative to her beliefs. (2) Each player's expected choice coincides with the focus of the other players' belief distributions. RBE provides a statistical framework for estimation which we apply to data from three experimental games. We also characterize the limit-RBE as players' beliefs converge to certainty. When atoms in the belief distributions vanish in the limit, not all limit-RBE (called robust equilibria) are trembling hand perfect Nash equilibria and not all perfect equilibria are robust. 相似文献
5.
Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary We show by an example that the sunspot equilibria of a competitive economy are not equivalent to the correlated equilibria if sunspots generate transfers between (extrinsic) states of nature (through a contingent commodities market). Nevertheless, we prove that the sunspot equilibrium allocations of a standard overlapping generations economy coincide with the (strategic form) correlated equilibrium allocations of a natural market game mimicking the economy. 相似文献
6.
We study a class of stochastic Overlapping generations (OLG) economies that have one-memory equilibria, that is equilibria
that are determined by the current and past realizations of the states of uncertainty. This class is negligible, but important.
In particular, it contains all the known examples of nonexistence of recursive equilibrium. We show that, within this restricted
domain, the existence of recursive equilibrium is actually typical, and such examples are therefore nonrobust.
We thank Felix Kubler, Herakles Polemarchakis and Steve Spear for many useful discussions. This paper was started while the
first author was visiting Columbia Business School. 相似文献
7.
Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, C72.
Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper. 相似文献
8.
We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. We restrict attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology and solve for time-consistent competitive equilibria globally and explicitly. We then characterize the welfare properties of competitive equilibria and compare them to that of a planning problem. The planner is a consumer representative who, without commitment but in a time-consistent way, maximizes his or her present-value utility subject to resource constraints. The competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than the planning problem whenever the discounting is not geometric. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E21, E61, E91. 相似文献
9.
Stability of supply function equilibria implications for daily versus hourly bids in a poolco market
We consider a supply function model of a poolco electricity market where demand varies significantly over a time horizon such
as a day and also has a small responsiveness to price. Although there are equilibria yielding prices at peak that are close
to Cournot prices, it is known that the wider the range of demand uncertainty the narrower the range of such supply function
equilibria. Here we show that such equilibria are also typically unstable and consequently would be difficult to sustain in
practice. This strengthens the results of Green and Newbery by ruling out many equilibria that have high prices. We demonstrate
this result both theoretically under somewhat restrictive assumptions and also numerically using both a three-firm example
system and a five-firm example system having generation capacity constraints. Hence, this reinforces the conclusion that the
market outcome is significantly influenced by a requirement that offers into the poolco be consistent over the time horizon.
This result contrasts with markets where bids can be changed on an hourly basis, where Cournot prices are possible outcomes.
The stability analysis has important policy implications for the design of day-ahead electricity markets. The stability perspective
also provides a narrowing of the equilibrium selection that strengthens empirical analysis.
相似文献
10.
Takeshi Momi 《Economic Theory》2008,36(3):503-513
In this note, we emphasize the role of consumers’ risk aversion in the non-existence of sunspot equilibria in incomplete market
economies. We prove that there are no sunspot equilibria if the fundamentals of the underlying economy admit a unique equilibrium
for any distribution of endowments. This substantiates Mas-Colell’s (Economic analysis of markets and games: essays in honor
of Frank Hahn. MIT, Cambridge, 1992) conjecture. We also prove that, in a two-consumer economy, no sunspot equilibrium exists
under the more relaxed condition that the underlying economy admits a unique equilibrium for the initial endowment. This is
a generalization of Corollaries 1 and 2 of Hens and Pilgrim (Econ Theory 24:583–602, 2004).
相似文献
11.
We develop a methodology to determine numerically how globalized the world economy is. We present a global general equilibrium model capturing major OECD economies and a residual rest of world for which alternative metrics of distance between observed, free trade and autarky equilibria can be developed. We use data for 2000 and report a number of distance measures between the 2000 observed trade restricted equilibrium and both free trade and autarky equilibria noting the absence of prior literature on metrics of distance between equilibria. The measures are used to determine the degree to which the world economy is globalized. 相似文献
12.
Summary. This paper studies the equilibria of a stochastic OLG exchange economies consisting of identical agents living for two periods,
and having the opportunity to trade a single infinitely-lived asset in constant supply. The agents have uncertain endowments
and the stochastic process determining the endowments is Markovian. For such economies, the literature has focused on studying
strongly stationary equilibria in which quantities and prices are functions of the exogenous states of nature which describe
the uncertainty: such equilibria are generalizations of deterministic steady states, and this paper investigates if they have
the same special status as asymptotic limits of other equilibrium paths. The difficulty in extending the analysis of equilibria
beyond the class of strongly stationary equilibria comes from the presence of indeterminacy: we propose a procedure for overcoming
this difficulty which can be decomposed into two steps. First backward induction arguments are used to restrict the domain
of possible prices; then if some indeterminacy is left, expectation functions are introduced to make the forward equilibrium
equations determinate. The properties of the resulting trajectories, in particular their asymptotic properties, can then be
studied. For the class of models that we study this procedure provides a justification for focusing on strongly stationary
equilibria. For the model with positive dividends (equity or land) the justification is complete, since we show that the strongly
stationary equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. For the model with zero dividends (money) there is a continuum of self-fulfilling
expectation functions resulting in a continuum of equilibrium paths starting from any admissible initial condition: under
conditions given in the paper, these equilibrium paths converge almost surely to one of the strongly stationary equilibria-either
autarchy or the stochastic analogue of the Golden Rule.
Received: November 19, 2001; revised version: March 22, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful for the stimulating environment and research support provided by the Cowles Foundation at Yale University
during the Fall 2000 when this paper was first conceived. We are also grateful to the participants of the SITE Workshop at
Stanford University and the Incomplete Markets Workshop at SUNY Stony Brook during the summer 2001 for helpful discussions.
Correspondence to: M. Magill 相似文献
13.
Tasos Kalandrakis 《Economic Theory》2006,28(2):309-329
Summary. We develop an index theory for the Stationary Subgame Perfect (SSP) equilibrium set in a class of n-player
sequential bargaining games with probabilistic recognition rules. For games with oligarchic voting rules (a class that includes unanimity rule), we establish conditions on individual utilities that ensure that for almost all discount factors, the number of SSP equilibria is odd and the equilibrium correspondence lower-hemicontinuous. For games with general, monotonic voting rules, we show generic (in discount factors) determinacy of SSP equilibria under the restriction that the agreement space is of dimension one. For non-oligarchic voting rules and agreement spaces of higher finite dimension, we establish generic determinacy for the subset of SSP equilibria in pure strategies. The analysis also extends to the case of fixed delay costs. Lastly, we provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness of SSP equilibrium in oligarchic games.Received: 13 May 2004, Revised: 1 March 2005, JEL Classification Numbers:
C62, C72, C78.I thank John Duggan and participants of the 2003 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, the Political Economy Seminar at Northwestern University, and the Economic Theory seminar at the University of Rochester for helpful comments. 相似文献
14.
Sandeep BaligaStephen Morris 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,105(2):450-468
We analyze the role of cheap-talk in two player games with one-sided incomplete information. We identify conditions under which (1) players can fully communicate and coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria of the underlying complete information game; and (2) players cannot communicate so cheap-talk does not alter the equilibrium set of the Bayesian game. We present examples that illustrate several issues that arise when there is two-sided incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82. 相似文献
15.
Summary. We consider a linear exchange economy and its successive replicas. We study the notion of Cournot-Walras equilibrium in which
the consumers use the quantities of commodities put on the market as strategic variables. We prove that, generically, if the
number of replications is large enough but finite, the competitive behaviour is an oligopoly equilibrium. Then, under a mild
condition, which may be interpreted in terms of market regulation and/or market activity, we show that any sequence of oligopoly
equilibria of successive replica economies converges to the Walrasian outcome and furthermore that every oligopoly equilibrium
of large, but finite, replica is Pareto optimal. Consequently, under the same assumptions on the fundamentals of the economy,
one has an asymptotic result on the convergence of oligopoly equilibria to the Walras equilibrium together with a generic
existence result for the Cournot-Walras.
Received: June 20, 2002; revised version: November 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Part of this paper was written while the second author was visiting the Universidad de Vigo. The support of the department
of mathematics is gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence to: J.M. Bonnisseau 相似文献
16.
We propose an elementary game form that allows to obtain the allocations proposed by any acceptable bankruptcy rule as the unique payoff vector of the corresponding Nash equilibria. 相似文献
17.
Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other. 相似文献
18.
In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.Two information structures are equivalent from the perspective of a modeler, if they induce the same equilibrium outcomes. We characterize the situations in which two information structures are equivalent in terms of natural transformations, called garblings, from one structure to another. We study the notion of ‘being equivalent to’ in relation with three equilibrium concepts: Nash equilibrium, agent normal-form correlated equilibrium and the belief invariant Bayesian solution. 相似文献
19.
Christopher Sleet 《Economic Theory》2001,17(2):371-397
Summary. This paper considers the existence and computation of Markov perfect equilibria in games with a “monotone” structure. Specifically,
it provides a constructive proof of the existence of Markov perfect equilibria for a class of games in which a) there is a
continuum of players, b) each player has the same per period payoff function and c) these per period payoff functions are
supermodular in the player's current and past action and have increasing differences in the player's current action and the
entire distribution of actions chosen by other players. The Markov perfect equilibria that are analyzed are symmetric, not
in the sense that each player adopts the same action in any period, but rather in the sense that each player uses the same
policy function. Since agents are typically distributed across many states they will typically take different actions.
The formal environment considered has particular application to models of industries (or economies) in which firms face costs
of price adjustment. It is in this context that the results are developed.
Received: November 9, 1999; revised version: February 10, 2000 相似文献
20.
James C. Moore 《Economic Theory》2005,26(2):345-359
Summary. This paper presents very general conditions guaranteeing that a quasi-competitive equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium. We also develop a generalization (and a simplified proof) of Nikaidos and McKenzies extensions of the classic Debreu-Scarf theorem on core convergence, and apply the first result to obtain an equivalence between the set of Edgeworth equilibria and the set of Walrasian equilibria in a production economy.Received: 6 September 2002, Revised: 14 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
C71, D50, D51. 相似文献