Multiplicative uncertainty in a model without inflationary bias

This paper shows that an increase in the degree of multiplicative uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy will reduce social loss when policymaker’s preferences are highly uncertain. This result is still valid even when there is no distortion in the market.     

The product market opportunity loss of mandated disclosure

In the interests of protecting decision makers in the financial markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires publicly traded companies to publicly disclose certain accounting information. Such disclosure requirements however create a potential opportunity loss. They may destroy firms’ opportunities for implementing an alternative information acquisition and exchange regime – one that would optimize the firms’ product market profits. Nevertheless, we show that despite the previous imposition of an opportunity loss, firms may still favor future increased disclosure requirements. Finally, when information cost declines, although firms’ welfare may decrease, their desire for increased disclosure requirements always strengthens.     

Growth and employment differentials under alternative wage-setting institutions and integrated capital markets

This paper compares the effects of different labor market institutions on economic growth and employment. In the general equilibrium model here presented, a mechanism causing persistence (on-the-job training) interacts with the strategic complementary between investors’ decisions on capital accumulation and workers’ decisions on labor-market participation. Within this framework (i) structurally and institutionally similar economies preserve forever their differences in output and employment levels, (ii) the steady-state growth rate is higher in an economy with competitive wage determination than in an unionized economy, (iii) this growth differential enlarges when the product and the capital markets of these two economies are integrated.     

考虑革新程度认知差异的新产品技术授权研究

建立博弈模型，探讨技术革新认知差异情形下，外部技术创新者向寡占竞争格局的生产企业授权生产新产品专利的最优决策问题。研究发现，创新授权者关于新产品市场的认知劣势使固定收费契约不具备完全优于特许权收费契约的绝对优势；在双重收费契约下，专利人授权对象选择因认知差异影响，由排他性授权向非排他性授权决策转变；认知差异性削弱了创新企业市场势力，从而提高特许权收费契约优势，而拍卖、股权投资等有助于创新企业克服认知劣势。据此，建议创新企业明晰创新专利长期回报，综合搭配应用多种授权契约；以非排他性授权策略配合特许权收费、双重收费和股权投资等契约模式，实现技术交易产业链激励共容下的利润最大化，促进技术创新传播应用，提高社会福利水平。     

Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome

It is well known that in a duopoly model of product choice with quadratic transportation cost, the firms locate at the extreme endpoints of the market. Jehiel (1992, Int. J. Ind. Organ, 10, 633–641) has examined this model in an infinite horizon setting where in the initial period the firms choose location and in subsequent periods charge the Nash bargaining solution prices. Then, in the unique equilibrium both firms locate at the center of the market. This paper examines the case when the firms instead charge the prices determined by either the egalitarian bargaining solution or the Kalai–Smorodinski bargaining solution. It is shown that central agglomeration is an equilibrium. Furthermore, there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria in addition where the firms locate apart from each other. So the products are not necessarily minimally differentiated. Thus different bargaining solutions provide quite different outcomes.     

Failures and Coping Strategies in Indigenous Technology Capability Process

This paper reports on a theory building effort aimed at understanding persistent difficulties with efforts at developing plant-level indigenous technology in a developing country. The firms, having obtained the technology from a donor firm or a laboratory find that implementation and adaptation issues are difficult due to tacit technology knowledge and lack of technical or managerial or market-related systems and experiences. These lead to technological failures referring to situations where serious deviations from expected opportunities and outcomes occur. The failures include loss of entry opportunities, or rejection of technology by the market, or failure at improving processes. With insights offered from 92 organizations in India we identify the different technological failures that occur and ways used to overcome these problems. Exploratory results suggest four major technological failures. (1) Failure due to inappropriate choice of technology leading to longer-than-expected time for establishing production, or inefficient production process, and/or market losses due to poor image of the poorly calibrated product. (2) Failure due to inadequate planning and support for innovation occurs when firms do not invest sufficiently in plant level data collection and analysis, thus missing important avenues for incremental innovation. (3) Failures due to inappropriate processes reveal how short-term orientation and low integration amongst different functional groups thwart the firm’s adaptive and innovative abilities. (4) Finally, failure due to product‐market mismatch and inadequate market survey occurs when market desired features are not maintained, or the incorporated changes are not cost effective. The coping strategies adopted by the firms are also discussed.     

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

Summary. In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when the manager’s ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previous results, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjusted contracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gather information. We find that the risk-averse manager’s effort is an increasing function of her share in the portfolio’s return. This result affects the risk-averse investor’s choice of contracts. Unlike previous results, the purely risk-sharing contract is now shown to be suboptimal. Using numerical methods we show that under the optimal linear contract, the manager’s share in the portfolio return is higher than what it is under a purely risk sharing contract. Additionally, this deviation is shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager’s risk aversion and (ii) larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. As the constraint is relaxed the deviation converges to zero.Received: 25 July 2002, Revised: 12 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D81, D82, J33.Juan-Pedro Gómez: Correspondence toAn earlier version of the paper was circulated under the title “Providing Managerial Incentives: Do Benchmarks Matter?” We are grateful to an anonymous referee whose comments helped to improve the paper. We also thank comments by Viral Acharya, Alexei Goriaev, Ernst Maug, Kristian Rydqvist, Neil Stoughton, Rangarajan Sundaram, Fernando Zapatero and seminar participants at the 1999 SED meetings in Sardinia, the 1999 Workshop in Mutual Fund Performance at EIASM, Brussels, the 2000 EFA meetings in London, the Bank of Norway, the Stockholm Schools of Economics, the Norwegian School of Management and the 2001 WFA meetings in Tucson. Sharma gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Asociacion Mexicana de Cultura.     

Comparing tests of the theory of exhaustible resources

The empirical relevance of Hotelling’s exhaustible resource theory has been tested with primarily negative results. Tests have been performed on various resources, at different levels of aggregation, with varying market structures, and over different time periods. Consequently, it is difficult to draw any general conclusions concerning the theory’s applicability in explaining producer behavior, given the assumptions and restrictions implicit in the data and tests. This paper compares test results when the implicit restrictions associated with the data are removed. Employing a single data set we compare the results for four published tests. Even with this uniform data set, two approaches reject the theory while two do not.     

Uncertainty and the Choice of Policy Instruments: A Note On Baumol and Oates Propositions

Baumol and Oates' propositions, the irrelevancy of benefit uncertainty and the importance of cost uncertainty on the choice between a tax and a system of marketable permits, are limited to a large-number case in which the opportunities for victims of pollution to participate in a permit market are non-existent. However, with the evolution of environmental groups and coalitions of victims in neighborhoods, the large-number case can easily transform into a small-number case. This paper shows that when the pollution standard, set at what appears to be optimal ex ante, is excessively lenient, the system of marketable permits offers such groups a flexibility to buy pollution permits in a competitive market and destroy them until the optimal solution is realized. In the reverse situation, however, Baumol and Oates propositions are unambiguously valid.     

How does a mixed ownership firm license a patent?

This paper demonstrates that a cost disadvantaged innovator increasingly relies on licensing with a fixed fee as its public ownership share grows. Moreover, when the innovation is drastic, a cost disadvantaged innovator frequently licenses by fixed fee when it has a public share even as a fully private firm will never use a fixed fee. As the fixed fee improves welfare, these results suggest that the licensing method of a partial public firm helps correct the market failure of imperfect competition.     

Bundling, product choice, and efficiency: Should cable television networks be offered à la carte?

We conduct a numerical analysis of bundling’s impact on a monopolist’s pricing and product choices and assess the implications for consumer welfare in cable television markets. Existing theory is ambiguous: for a given set of products, bundling likely transfers surplus from consumers to firms but also encourages products to be offered that might not be under à la carte pricing. Simulation of “Full À La Carte” for an economic environment calibrated to an average cable television system suggests that consumers would likely benefit from à la carte sales. If all networks continued to be offered, the average household’s surplus is predicted to increase by $6.80 (65.6%) under à la carte sales (despite a total bundle price that almost doubles) and reduced network profits would have to be such that 41 of 50 offered cable networks have to exit the market to make her indifferent. Simulation of a “Theme Tier” scenario provides intermediate benefits. The incremental marginal costs to cable systems of à la carte sales and its impact in the advertising market and on competition are important factors in determining consumer benefits.     

Failures and Coping Strategies in Indigenous Technology Capability Process

This paper reports on a theory building effort aimed at understanding persistent difficulties with efforts at developing plant-level indigenous technology in a developing country. The firms, having obtained the technology from a donor firm or a laboratory find that implementation and adaptation issues are difficult due to tacit technology knowledge and lack of technical or managerial or market-related systems and experiences. These lead to technological failures referring to situations where serious deviations from expected opportunities and outcomes occur. The failures include loss of entry opportunities, or rejection of technology by the market, or failure at improving processes. With insights offered from 92 organizations in India we identify the different technological failures that occur and ways used to overcome these problems. Exploratory results suggest four major technological failures. (1) Failure due to inappropriate choice of technology leading to longer-than-expected time for establishing production, or inefficient production process, and/or market losses due to poor image of the poorly calibrated product. (2) Failure due to inadequate planning and support for innovation occurs when firms do not invest sufficiently in plant level data collection and analysis, thus missing important avenues for incremental innovation. (3) Failures due to inappropriate processes reveal how short-term orientation and low integration amongst different functional groups thwart the firm's adaptive and innovative abilities. (4) Finally, failure due to product-market mismatch and inadequate market survey occurs when market desired features are not maintained, or the incorporated changes are not cost effective. The coping strategies adopted by the firms are also discussed.     

Licensing versus assignment: Innovation transfer in an asymmetric duopoly

Suppose that the relatively inefficient firm in an asymmetric duopoly market develops a nondrastic process innovation. To maximize returns on the innovation, the innovator must determine the most lucrative commercial policy. Should it be in‐house exploitation, or licensing or assignment? It turns out that the innovator never uses innovation exclusively. The choice of licensing or assignment depends on the size of the initial cost difference. When the initial cost difference is relatively small, the innovator would resort to licensing, whereas when there is a significant initial cost gap, the innovator would rather assign the property rights of the innovation to the rival. In the case of assignment, the assignee may license the innovation back to the assignor. With the option of reverse licensing, an assignment will always be more profitable than (direct) licensing. Interestingly, if the initial cost gap were sufficiently large, the innovator would exit the market postassignment, and thus act as an outside nonoperating licensor.     

需求导向的企业技术创新能力成长理论

以8家重点工业企业(哈电、大唐电信、中国船舶、海尔、海信、奇瑞、长庆油田、鞍钢)为案例研究对象,系统探讨了需求在企业技术创新能力成长中的作用机理,提出需求导向的技术创新能力成长理论模型———"需求导向-实践积累-能力跃迁"模型。该模型包括以下3个命题:第一,需求导向是指企业主动把握需求带来的创新实践机会,这些机会来自需求宽度(国家战略需求、国际市场需求、国内市场需求和企业内部需求)和需求深度(首次需求、需求升级和创造需求)的不同组合及其动态变化;第二,企业技术创新能力的积累表现为能力宽度(整体产品/工艺技术能力)和能力深度(核心技术能力)的动态组合提升,这种积累是企业在技术创新核心过程的5个要素(技术来源、产品设计、工艺设计、生产/制造和自主品牌)的动态组合上进行持续实践的结果;第三,企业技术创新能力的积累可以形成向"主导产业链创新的能力"的跃迁,该能力的主导力量来源具有多样性,由整体产品/工艺技术能力、核心技术能力、自主品牌3个核心要素及其不同组合决定。     

Scientific and technical planning in the People's Republic of China

At a time when Western market economies are struggling with ways of directing and stimulating technological innovation, China, with a highly centralized system for the planning and coordination of science and technology, offers an unusual perspective on the feasibility and operations of a large-scale, national organization of scientific and technical resources. This paper describes the mechanics of the science and technology planning process in the Chinese system and then draws conclusions on a variety of pertinent issues, such as: whether or not planning is actually conducted at a macrolevel; what are the useful sources of information for scientific and technical decision making within the system; what are the motivations for doing research in China's planned economy and how do they affect the research that is done; and, in summation, does the Chinese attempt at macroscience and technology planning really work?     

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Commitment to Periodic Auditing and a Non-retrospective Penalty System

This paper generalizes Khalil’s (1997) static model to a multiperiod one. The associated optimal dynamic contracts are derived and analyzed. At every-period’s equilibrium, the principal conducts no sure auditing. While duplication of the Baron-Myerson-type (1982) contract cannot be optimal, duplication of the Khalil-type (1997) contract can be optimal when the cheating penalty is large or discount factors are small. This implies that static contracts with no-commitment to auditing can describe players’ long-run behavior only under specific conditions. Moreover, our separating and pooling equilibria are compared with Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) and Laffont and Tirole’s (1987) equilibria, respectively.     

Stackelberg竞争结构中质量提高型创新技术授权和企业兼并

本文基于Stackelberg双头垄断竞争模型,分析比较了质量提高型创新技术拥有企业的技术授权策略和企业兼并。研究结果表明:不论技术拥有企业是市场先行者还是跟随者,其总是偏向于企业兼并,而不会选择固定费用授权方式;如果政府禁止企业的兼并行为,那么当技术拥有企业在市场中是产量跟随者时,其愿意以提成许可方式进行技术授权;从社会福利角度考虑,技术授权可提高社会福利,而企业兼并一般不利于社会福利的提高,只有当创新技术拥有企业是Stackelberg竞争结构中的产量跟随者且其创新规模较大时,企业兼并才可提高社会福利。     

The forecasting ability of a cointegrated VAR system of the UK tourism demand for France, Spain and Portugal

This paper uses the vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology as an alternative to Deaton and Muellbauer’s Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), to establish the long-run relationships between I(1) variables: tourism shares, tourism prices and UK tourism budget. With appropriate testing, the deterministic components and sets of exogenous and endogenous variables of the VAR are established, and Johansen’s rank test is used to determine the number of cointegrated vectors in the system. The cointegrated VAR structural form is identified and the long-run structural parameters are estimated. Theoretical restrictions such as homogeneity and symmetry are tested and not rejected by the VAR structure. The fully restricted cointegrated VAR model reveals itself a theoretically consistent and statistically robust means to analyse the long-run demand behaviour of UK tourists, and an accurate multi-step forecaster of the destinations’ shares when compared with unrestricted reduced form and first differenced VARs, or even with the structural AIDS model.     

The effects of one-way compatibility on technology adoption in systems markets

This paper analyzes the effects of one-way compatibility on technology adoption in a market that is characterized by a free-entry condition on the software side. We show that hardware-backward compatibility increases a new-generation hardware firm’s profit; the effects of software-backward compatibility on the hardware firm’s profits depend on the distribution of consumer types.