地区腐败、企业性质与高管腐败

企业所处的外部环境对企业高管腐败行为的影响日益引起学者的关注,地区腐败作为企业所处外部环境的重要特征,对企业高管腐败行为会产生何种影响?通过手工搜集2007-2013年我国各省市地方官员腐败和上市公司高管腐败的数据后发现:地区腐败越严重,所在地区的企业高管发生腐败的可能性越高;进一步研究发现,地区腐败对民营企业高管的影响作用更加明显,而2012年开始的反腐行动尚未对地区腐败影响高管腐败产生实质的约束作用。研究有助于深化对企业高管腐败环境诱因的理论认知,同时,将政府官员腐败的经济后果拓展至企业管理层面。     

Corruption and auctions

We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller’s expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe. The bribe can be a percentage of the difference between the winning and the second-highest bid or a fixed amount. We show that there exists a symmetric bidding strategy equilibrium that is monotone, i.e., higher valuation buyers bid higher. Corruption does not affect efficiency but both the auctioneer’s expected bribe and the seller’s expected revenue depend on the format of the bribe payments. We also find the optimal bribe scheme.     

Corruption and anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper examines the relationship between individuals’ experience of corruption and their anxiety using microeconomic data from the Afrobarometer surveys. The results show a statistically significant and economically meaningful relationship in probit models using both an experience of corruption index and a simple dummy variable. Having to pay a bribe to obtain documents and permits, to avoid problems with the police or to access medical care are the scenarios in which this relationship is strongest. Some evidence is presented that an individual needs to experience such corruption more than ‘once or twice’ for these relationships to become evident.     

高管权力与高管腐败——基于内部控制与外部市场环境的双重视角

上市公司的高管腐败及其治理是我国反腐败的重要领域。因此,高管权力与高管腐败的关系日益受学者的关注。本文运用逻辑斯蒂模型,基于内部控制与外部市场环境的双重视角分析了高管权力诱发高管腐败行为的影响。研究发现:高管权力越大,越可能诱发高管腐败行为;内部控制质量越好,高管腐败概率越低,且高质量的内部控制可以抑制高管权力过大诱发的高管腐败行为;上市公司所在地市场化进程水平越高,高管腐败概率越低,且市场化进程水平越高越能抑制企业高管权力过大诱发的高管腐败行为。研究结果表明:良好的内部控制与外部环境是可以约束高管权力减少腐败,降低权力进行寻租的空间。     

Corruption: A Review

As is increasingly recognised in academic literature and by international organisations, corruption acts as a major deterrent to growth and development. The aim of this survey is to organise and summarise existing theoretical and empirical work on corruption with a view to identifying opportunities for further research. The paper begins with a brief overview of key definitions of corruption, and then turns to a review of the factors that favour or deter the growth of corruption together with a brief look at related models. This is followed by an examination of the consequences of corruption for society, and the consideration of measures that might help to reduce corruption. The paper ends with suggestions for future research and includes summaries of data sources and key variables for use in this research.     

洗澡的腐败风险

乌克兰新任总统下令“禁止官员上公共浴室泡澡”今年1月就任乌克兰总统的尤先科上台伊始就称,任人唯亲、欺诈和腐败是乌克兰面临的最大问题,清除腐败将是本届政府的首要任务。而尤先科总统治理政府官员腐败开出的第一剂药方竟然是“禁止官员上公共浴室泡澡”。乌克兰人素有有事     

Corruption in the Context of International Business

Abstract

Corruption is widely accepted in the popular press as a problem for economic development and in conducting international business. Yet, it remains somewhat under-researched, particularly in an academic setting. This article describes corruption in the context of international business. It presents a critical evaluation of the conceptual and methodological issues associated with corruption. In doing so, it portrays the inherent complexities in studying this topic. The paper ends with recommendations for addressing the main concerns.     

Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement

This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A first-price multiple-object auction is administered by an agent who has legal discretion to allow for a readjustment of (all) submitted offers before the official opening. The agent may be corrupt, that is, willing to "sell" his decision in exchange for a bribe. Our main result shows that the corrupt agent's incentives to extract rents are closely linked with that of a cartel of bidders. First, collusive bidding conveys value to the agent's decision power. Second, self-interested abuse of discretion to extract rents (corruption) provides a mechanism to enforce collusion. A second result is that package bidding can facilitate collusion. We also find that with corruption, collusion is more likely in auctions where firms are small relative to the market. Our main message to auction designers, competition authorities and criminal courts is that risks of collusion and of corruption must be addressed simultaneously. Some other policy implications for the design of tender procedures are discussed.     

Corruption,development and demography

This paper presents an analysis of the joint, endogenous determination of bureaucratic corruption, economic development and demographic transition. The analysis is based on an overlapping generations model in which reproductive agents mature safely through two periods of life and face a probability of surviving for a third period. This survival probability depends on the provision of public goods and services which may be compromised by corrupt activities on the part of public officials. The dynamic general equilibrium of the economy is characterised by multiple development regimes, transition between which may or may not be feasible. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts that low (high) levels of development are associated with high (low) levels of corruption and low (high) rates of life expectancy. The authors are grateful for the comments of two anonymous referees on an earlier version of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.     

信誉腐败和信息流通

信誉的腐败是我国商品经济过渡时期中存在的一个普遍问题,在商品交易中各种欺诈行为比比皆是,其严重性危害了有效市场体制的建立.从经济学角度分析,在单次双方博弈中,由于存在信息的不对称,各方都有进行商业欺诈的积极性.重复博弈虽能有效的解决这个悖论,但是在市场中,重复博弈的基础是信息的有效流通.缺乏这种基础,重复博弈无法采取"触发战略"(triger strategy),而只是单次博弈的简单重复,信誉腐败问题仍然不能得到解决,因此建立畅通的信息流通体制是恢复我国市场信誉的重要途径.     

Corruption, institutions and trade

The economics literature describes various factors that affect trade between countries, which, in addition to the standard economic and geographic factors, also include cultural, ethnic and historical factors. The present study is apparently one of only a few attempts in the literature to examine directly the effects of corruption on trade and the first attempt to examine trade over time in a specific country whose level of corruption changed significantly. Israel was chosen as the subject of the study mainly because of the fact that, according to international indexes, the country’s status as a civil society has declined significantly over the past decade. According to the corruption index of Transparency International, Israel was ranked 33rd in the world, at the end of the sample period in 2008, having fallen from 14th in 1995. The results of the research can serve as the basis for comparison to similar studies of other Western countries. The study’s conclusions support the hypothesis that the effect of corruption on trade of any given country is significant, stable and negative.     

Corruption, institutions and regulation

We analyze the effects of corruption and institutional quality on the quality of business regulation. Our key findings indicate that corruption negatively affects the quality of regulation and that general institutional quality is insignificant once corruption is controlled for. These findings hold over a number of specifications which include additional exogenous historical and geographic controls. The findings imply that policy makers can focus on curbing corruption to improve regulation, over wider institutional reform.     

论人的非理性因素在腐败发生中的作用

认识主体的非理性因素在认识过程中起着重要的作用,需求选择认识对象,推动人的认识活动向前发展;意志、情感、直觉和灵感调节和控制认识的过程。在国家政治生活中,不正当的欲望和需要是腐败产生的诱因;意志薄弱、观念错误,使得腐败的发生成为现实;理性让位于情感,激化腐败的发生。因此,要正确引导非理性因素,从根本上预防和遏止腐败的发生。     

企业采购腐败控制研究

从采购业务整体流程的角度审视了控制采购腐败的方法与工具,提出了系统全面的控制企业采购腐败的解决方案,为企业控制采购腐败、提高企业效率,最终改进企业运营绩效提供了有意义的思路.     

Nigeria and the Market for Corruption

Two Keynesian economists, Peter Wynarczyk and Brian Snowdon, of the Newcastle upon Type Polytechnic, resist Professor Charles Rowley's argument that economic doctries can be falsified     

Corruption, decentralization and yardstick competition

Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states, we also provide new evidence that points to the existence of a spatial autoregressive component to explaining corruption. We interpret this as consistent with the theoretical findings.     

以阳光财务遏制贪腐丑行

面对信息不对称带来的种种困扰,信息虚假造成的各种恶果,信息屏蔽引发的官员贪腐,笔者越发认为实现信息对称对重塑公司治理结构,实现社会公平正义,遏制官员贪腐贿赂具有重要的实现意义。论文以官员贪腐为研究起点,分析成因,谋划措施,采用比较研究法,明确提出让财政晒晒太阳,实行阳光财务,是治理贪腐和贿赂的强力措施。     

防控腐败的经济学探析

腐败的成因有文化成因和经济成因,反腐要提高腐败的成本、完善反腐监督制约机制。     

Corruption and distribution of public spending in developing countries

This paper empirically examines the impact of corruption on the structure of government spending by sector. Using the three-stage least squares method on 64 countries between 1996 and 2001, we show that public corruption distorts the structure of public spending by reducing the portion of social expenditure (education, health and social protection) and increasing the part dedicated to public services and order, fuel and energy, culture, and defense. However, civil and political rights seem to be a stronger determinant of expense on defense than corruption. Our results are robust to instrumentation by the latitude of the country.