Risk Changes around Calls of Convertible Bonds

We examine changes in equity and asset betas around convertible bond calls and report two major findings. First, calling firms exhibit an increase in asset betas following the call. We argue that the finding is consistent with the implications of the sequential financing theory but not of the backdoor equity financing theory. Second, abnormal returns at call announcements are negative only for the subsample of firms that also exhibit an increase in equity beta. We conclude that risk changes help explain the market reaction to convertible bond calls.     

Background Risk, Demand for Insurance, and Choquet Expected Utility Preferences

This article deals with demand for insurance with a background risk in a nonprobabilized uncertainty framework, where preferences are represented by a nonadditive model of decision making. The Choquet expected utility model that we use generalizes expected utility and allows for a separation of the attitude towards uncertainty and the attitude towards wealth. When the insurable and the background risk are comonotone, the impact of the background risk on the demand for insurance is related to the attitude towards wealth. In contrast, when the two risks are anticomonotone, the attitude towards uncertainty is determinant. In this case, some of the resulting behaviors cannot be explained by the standard expected utility model.     

基于双因素Wang转换方法的长寿风险债券定价研究

在比较国外经典债券设计的基础上,基于离散型死亡率模型假设,设计一种可调整上触碰点的触发型长寿债券,运用带永久跳跃的APC模型和双因素Wang转换定价方法对长寿债券进行定价,实证结果表明:在不同的参数组合下的风险溢价均处在一个合理的范围,由于模型参数多、可用死亡率数据年限短,风险溢价的结果对无风险利率等参数敏感性较高.     

相依风险下保险公司投资信息安全软件的最优决策分析

网络信息安全保险已经成为企业转移安全风险的最主要工具之一,为了探索保险公司主动参与风险防范对网络安全水平的影响,本文设计了网络信息安全保险公司对被保险企业安全软件投资的均等、最重要和按比例三种策略机制,研究在强相依和弱相依的信息安全风险下保险公司在简单情形和复杂情形中的不同投资决策机制,及其对系统效用和风险的影响。研究结果表明,在保险公司投资被保险企业安全软件的三种投资策略下,相比被保险企业不购买保险,被保险企业购买保险可以显著地提高期望效用,并且整个系统的网络安全水平逐渐提高,但是整个系统的期望收益随着保险公司投资额的增加而降低。此外,在简单情形中,保险公司在不同的投资策略下存在不同的最优投资决策,且在均等投资策略和弱相依风险下系统各主体效用和风险水平均最高;在复杂情形中,在弱相依风险和最重要投资策略下整个系统具有较高的期望和较低的风险水平,说明复杂情形的网络信息安全保险系统存在涓滴效应。     

Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk of Accident: An Empirical Test Using French Individual Data

Insurance has for a long time been perceived as a way of transferring responsibility from insured agents to insurers and thus as potentially influencing insured agents' behavior. Two particular opportunistic behaviors have been analyzed. First, the theory of adverse selection predicts that high-risk agents are likely to demand more insurance than are low-risk agents. Second, the theory of moral hazard predicts that the wider the insurance coverage, the less agents will try to prevent accidents. Both theories thus conclude that agents who are totally insured should have a higher probability of accident than those with only partial insurance, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, one of the aims of insurance rating systems is to control for these opportunistic behaviors. In this article, we use individual data to see if the French automobile insurance rating system has achieved this aim. We do this using a two-step maximum-likelihood method. First, we compute a probit model to estimate the probability of taking out comprehensive versus third-party insurance. We then calculate the generalized residual, which is included as an independent variable in a negative binomial model estimating the probability of having an accident. The coefficient of this variable is argued to represent adverse selection and ex-ante moral-hazard behavior.