Arbitration in classical Athens

The Classical Athenians developed two formal arbitration procedures. They assigned low stakes disputes to a panel of arbitrators, while high stakes cases were handled by a single arbitrator. Given the information aggregation benefit of collective decision making, one would have expected more individuals to be assigned to more important cases. I develop a theoretical model to provide an explanation for their design. Recognizing that arbitrator competence is endogenous, effort put into making a good decision takes time and effort. In larger groups free riding is a concern. Consequently, there exists environments where the free-riding loss is magnified in higher stakes disputes to the point where the socially optimal panel size is inversely related to the stakes involved.     

The impact of economic sanctions on international trade: How do threatened sanctions compare with imposed sanctions?

We draw on established theoretical works in international political economy to compare the empirical effect of threatened and imposed economic sanctions on international trade. To deepen the analysis, we analyze whether there are any differential effects when different instruments of sanctions are employed, as well as whether the effect of sanctions is product specific. To do this, we use the gravity model and recent detailed disaggregated data on sanctions spanning the period 1960–2009. Our results show that the impact of threatened sanctions differs qualitatively and quantitatively from imposed sanctions. Whereas imposed sanctions lead to a decrease in the trade flow between the sender and its target, a threat of sanctions leads to an increase. The positive impact of the threat may be due to economic agents in both the sender and its target resorting to stockpiling prior to the actual imposition of sanctions to minimize any adverse consequences of the sanctions. These differential effects of threatened and imposed sanctions also extend to food and medicinal products, as well as when different instruments of sanctions are employed.     

The effects of tariffs on coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game

The prospects for cooperation on climate protection beyond 2012 are currently uncertain. Thus policy instruments which foster participation in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) are in demand. Among the instruments under discussion are trade sanctions. Multi-region optimal growth models are a state of the art tool for integrated assessment, but introducing trade sanctions distorts the competitive equilibrium, making it difficult to compute numerically. We introduce trade and trade sanctions into a model of coalition stability to assess the potential of trade sanctions to support an IEA. Trade is modeled by having all countries produce a generic output good, but adopting national product differentiation (Armington assumption). Coalitions are free to impose tariffs on imports from non-cooperating countries. We solve the model numerically using a refined version of Negishi's [Negishi, T., 1960. Welfare economics and existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Metroeconomica 12, 92–97] basic algorithm. We then apply the model to analyze the influence of tariffs on international cooperation. The model suggests that there is indeed a significant potential to raise participation through trade sanctions, even when goods from different countries are nearly perfect substitutes. Furthermore we investigate the effect of trade sanctions on global welfare, environmental effectiveness, and the credibility of the tariff mechanism.     

Which sanctions matter? analysis of the EU/russian sanctions of 2014

We use a quasi-natural experiment of reciprocal imposition of trade sanctions by Russia and the EU since 2014. Using UNCTAD/BACI bilateral flows data we take this unique opportunity to analyse both sanctions. In particular, we study the effectiveness of narrow versus broadly defined sanctions, and differences in the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on exports and imports. We show that the Russian sanctions imposed on European and American food imports resulted in about an 8 times stronger decline in trade flows than those imposed by the EU and the US on exports of extraction equipment. These results do not appear to be driven by diversion of trade flows via non-sanctioning countries. Hence the difference in sanctions’ effectiveness can be attributed to the limited retroactivity of Western sanctions, which allowed exemptions for exports made pursuant to contracts made prior to 2014.     

Nexus between economic sanctions and inflation: a case study in Iran

Conventional studies have applied dummy variables to analyse the relationship between economic sanctions and inflation while we construct an index which is called Trade-Financial Sanctions (TF index). TF Index is a liner combination of indices which includes trade openness and foreign investment by applying the principal component model. Through the TF index and market exchange rate the impact of economic sanctions on inflation is analysed in the three phases of sanctions; free sanctions, heavy sanctions, and light sanctions. The results illustrate that the TF index decreases inflation when the Iran’s economy experiences free sanctions or light sanctions relative to when the economy is in heavy sanctions. Heavy sanctions create instability in the market exchange rates and widening the gap between the market and the official exchange rates. Furthermore, economic sanctions increase expected inflation among the people and drive higher inflation. Therefore, these results suggest that the government should work more seriously to solve the main obstacles of trade and investment inflows imposed by the economic sanctions.     

Experiments on unemployment benefit sanctions and job search behavior

This paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions. The experimental set-up allows us to distinguish between the effect of benefit sanctions once they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the threat of getting a benefit sanction imposed (the ex ante effect). We find that both effects matter. Moreover, the ex ante effect turns out to be substantial and bigger than the ex post effect. Benefits sanctions stimulate the outflow from unemployment.     

Trade policy and ecology

Trade sanctions on product exports are often used as measures for conservation of stocks of living resources. Two opposing approaches are investigated. The harvest approach argues that sanctions reduce the harvest, and thus protects the stock. It is shown that this does not consider the long run effects nor the effects of sanctions on the management system. The investment approach argues that increased price protects the stock, making the species a profitable investment. It is shown that this approach does not consider the asset effects of price changes, and that the sanctions usually increase the stock in an one species analysis. If the wildlife competes for land the conclusions may be different, but still sanctions usually works. If the manager has a joint management of several species, the stock effects of sanctions are ambiguous, depending on both the species interaction, and the profitability of the harvesting from each of them. In this case it is not possible to use intuitive reasoning, sanctions give distortions to all stocks simultaneously. The threat of extinction depends crucially on the unit cost in harvesting of depleted stocks. The paper concludes that trade policy is a too general measure for the management of living resources, and may implicate important economic distortions to the ecological system.This study is partially funded by the Research Council of Norway (Environment and Development). I thank Derek Clark, Tore Thonstad, Frode Steen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Do economic sanctions affect protectionism? Evidence from agricultural support

The objective of this paper is to examine whether economic sanctions contribute to influencing the target countries’ protectionist policies in the agricultural sector. Using pooled mean group estimations in a dynamic heterogeneous panel setting, we find robust empirical evidence that, in the long‐run, economic sanctions decrease agricultural protection in the target counties, and this effect is mitigated by the wealth of the target's economy. However, the relationship is insignificant in the short run. Furthermore, our results also suggest that the impact of sanctions on agricultural protection (a) increases with the severity of economic sanctions, (b) is greater for multilateral sanctions than unilateral sanctions, and (c) is more severe on agricultural protection when sanctions span a longer duration.     

Sanctions that signal: An experiment

The introduction of sanctions provides incentives for more pro-social behavior, but may also be a signal that non-cooperation is prevalent. In an experimental minimum-effort coordination game we investigate the effects of the information contained in the choice to sanction. We compare the effect of sanctions that are introduced exogenously by the experimenter to that of sanctions which have been actively chosen by a subject who has superior information about the previous effort of the other players. We find that cooperative subjects perceive actively chosen sanctions as a negative signal which significantly reduces the effect of sanctions.     

The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?

The paper investigates the rationale for, and the effectiveness of the fiscal criteria in the Maastricht treaty against the background of two questions: What are the incentives for an unsound fiscal policy in EMU, and what are the (potential) negative externalities if such a policy were to occur. The paper argues that EMU creates both incentives for a higher fiscal deficit while respecting solvency, and incentives for not rectifying a potentially unsustainable debt level once one is a member. Unsound fiscal policy could trigger important negative extermalities for the other member countries. The paper concludes that the current fiscal provisions of the Maastricht treaty are not sufficiently well defined and the envisaged sanctions not strong enough to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance. This leads to proposals of supplementary measures for surveillance and alternative sanctions. Staying within the framework of the Maastricht treaty, it is strongly suggested that both debt and deficit criteria should be strictly surveyed, but in view of their conceptual and operational deficiencies they should be supplemented by additional indicators. Based on this broader measurement concept, it is proposed to use semi-automatic and market-led sanctions to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance.     

Country impacts of multilateral oil sanctions

In recent years, economic sanctions have become an important tool in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Though usually aimed at a single country, they also can affect the economies of other nations. Knowledge of such impacts would inform U.S. policy-makers as to which other countries might be helped or harmed, and help predict which other nations likely would support or oppose the sanctions. This article presents results relating to the imposition of sanctions in the oil market. These results are obtained from exercising a dynamic computable general equilibrium model built by Charles River Associates under sponsorship of the American Petroleum Institute. The model is used to analyze GDP effects on a number of countries from multilateral oil sanctions against Iraq. The results suggest that it is possible to provide useful information regarding the impacts of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. However, they also indicate that sanctions can be expensive, with substantial spillover effects. Though sanctions may be an appropriate policy choice in given instances, these effects should be incorporated into foreign policy analyses.     

Making direct democracy work: a rational-actor perspective on the <Emphasis Type="Italic">graphe paranomon</Emphasis> in ancient Athens

The specific way the Athenians set up their democracy presents both theoretical and empirical challenges. Decisions were taken by majority vote in the Assembly. To keep politicians in line, the Athenians first used ostracism, which however was replaced by the graphe paranomon around 415 BCE. The latter provided that anybody who had made a proposal in the Assembly could be accused of having made an unconstitutional suggestion, bringing a potentially severe penalty if found guilty. We know of 35 such cases between 403 and 322. During the fourth century the notion of illegality was extended to a mere question of political undesirability. Henceforth any decision by the Assembly could be overturned by the courts, but if the accuser failed to get at least 20% of the jury votes, he was punished instead. While these rules can be seen as a safeguard against bad decisions, they also provided the Athenian politicians with important information about the relative strength of their political support. This effect has not been analysed before, and it may help explain the relative stability of political life in classical Athens. Furthermore this analysis also contributes to our understanding of a curious but often overlooked fact, namely that the decrees of the Athenian Assembly to a great extent concerned honorary rewards, and the use of the graphe paranomon in turn was largely focussed on the honorary decrees.     

Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions

By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an equilibrium outcome, but also Pareto superior to non-compliance and tough economic sanctions.     

International sanctions’ impact on energy efficiency in target states

This paper investigates the impact of international sanctions on energy efficiency by employing the panel fixed effect as well as average marginal effect from the Tobit model via data on 30 sanctioned states over the period 1996–2015 with international sanctions including unilateral, plurilateral, U.S., EU, UN, economic, and non-economic cases. Overall, we find that the imposition of unilateral sanctions leads to a 0.067% decrease in energy efficiency, but that of plurilateral sanctions positively contribute to energy efficiency in the case of the full sample of countries. Moreover, the imposition of UN sanctions has a greater decrease on energy efficiency in the target states than the 0.042% reduction of energy efficiency when the sanctionist is the U.S. For robustness, empirical results indicate that the imposition of plurilateral sanctions results in a drop of energy efficiency in Islamic countries, but an increase in non-Islamic countries, while there are also negative shocks induced by the imposition of EU sanctions on energy efficiency in Asian countries, but not for non-Asian countries. We also consider endogenous problems and dynamic specification by using indicator variables and System GMM. In summary, our empirical findings provide policy suggestions for those sanctioned countries about how to maintain energy efficiency when facing international sanctions.     

Foreign aid as a discipline on illegal immigration

This paper deals with a sanctions policy toward reducing illegal immigration. Using a single-period game, it shows that by imposing a penalty on each apprehended illegal alien, the host country will increase the motivation of the source country to expend money for preventing illegal immigration. It is also shown that although the sanctions are allowed to go only one way, by increasing the efficiency of catching illegal aliens, both parties will be motivated to expend money for restraining illegal immigration. The author thanks Gideon Hollander, Eliakim Katz, and an anonymous referee for their valuable help. All errors are the author's responsibility.     

Credit Rationing, Group Lending and Optimal Group Size

I develop a model of credit rationing with effort unobservable by lenders where borrowers can choose among projects of different riskiness. In such a set-up rationing that can be relaxed if borrowers put up physical collateral arises. Group lending proves to be a possible means to relax rationing and improve efficiency when physical collateral is not available. The optimal size of groups is here analysed as a function of social factors. It turns out that groups can be neither too small nor too large because in both cases the effectiveness of social sanctions on behaviour is too low to offset the negative effect on effort due to profit sharing and free riding. Individual sensitivity to social sanctions is the crucial element determining whether groups can be formed or not.     

Ambiguity on audits and cooperation in a public goods game

We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the other group members is centrally sanctioned and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being audited, both before and after audits are permanently withdrawn. We find that when individuals have initially experienced systematic audits, they decrease both their beliefs and their contributions almost immediately after audits are withdrawn. In contrast, when audits were initially less frequent and more irregular, they maintain high beliefs and continue cooperating long after audits have been withdrawn. This identifies the compliance effect of irregularity and uncertainty due to learning difficulties. By increasing both the frequency of audits and the severity of sanctions, we also identify an educative effect of frequent and high sanctions on further cooperation.     

Group lending and individual lending with strategic default

Papers that compare group lending and individual lending in the presence of strategic default suggest that unless group members can impose costly social sanctions on one another, or unless the bank uses cross-reporting mechanisms group lending may do worse than individual lending. In this paper, we show that if, (1) the amount that a successful borrower owes for his defaulting partner is optimally determined, and (2) the penalty is allowed to vary across group members, then even in the absence of any social sanctions or cross-reporting, (1) expected borrower welfare is strictly higher with group lending when both group lending and individual lending are feasible and (2) group lending is feasible for a greater range of opportunity cost of capital. These results are robust to collusion between borrowers.     

United Nations Sanctions on North Korea's Luxury Goods Imports: Impact and Implications

This article examines the impacts of UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea's banned luxury goods imports from 2004 to 2017 by investigating the bilateral trade flows between North Korea and its 71 trading partner countries. This analysis provides some evidence that the sanctions were effective only for those countries that implemented the sanctions. Overall, it is difficult to conclude that United Nations Resolution 1718, which was mainly targeted to ban luxury goods exports to North Korea, was effective in curtailing North Korea's import of luxury goods for the time period from 2006 to 2007. The article argues that the lack of a clearly defined list of luxury goods and the lack of enforcement are important reasons for the ineffectiveness of the sanctions.     

The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements

This paper analyzes the links between policies aimed at supplying a global public good and international trade in segmented markets. I find that the credible threat to impose trade sanctions may be capable of sustaining full cooperation in the supply of the public good, provided the sanctions are accompanied by a minimum participation clause which serves to coordinate government behavior. In equilibrium, trade is not restricted. But if the threat to impose sanctions were not allowed by the rules of the game, supply of the public good would be Pareto-inefficient.