物流联盟稳定性的博弈分析

基于博弈理论分析了物流联盟成员之间关系的，稳定性，建立了重复博弈模型，研究了物流联盟稳定性的条件。     

影响战略联盟绩效的因素分析

本文通过产业组织经济学和资源学说两种理论，建立起“联盟的伙伴分析——联盟的状态特征——联盟的绩效”的线性因果关系模型，系统地说明了影响战略联盟绩效的关键因素，并得出了几点启示。     

建设项目动态联盟形成动因的模型分析

本文首先从利益最大化角度考虑,建立数学模型,分析建设项目动态联盟形成的合约条件;然后从产出最大化、生产成本最小化角度出发,以新古典经济学中的规模经济理论、范围经济理论为基础,建立经济模型,并运用灰色生产函数模型,分析了建设项目动态联盟的经济优势;再从生产成本节约、交易成本节约角度考虑,以新制度经济学中的交易成本理论为基础,建立经济模型,分析得出建设项目实现的动态联盟方式优于市场方式。     

物流联盟稳定性的博弈分析

基于博弈理论分析了物流联盟成员之间关系的稳定性,建立了重复博弈模型,研究了物流联盟稳定性的条件。     

企业联盟有效性的条件及其识别

企业联盟因其能产生“互补效应”和“协同效应”而被许多经理推崇，但美国Mckhsey公司所做的一项研究却得出了这样的结论：在所有原本期望与其他公司建立合作关系的公司中，大约只有2％的公司最终建立了成功的长期合作关系。或许这一结论不具有普遍性，但有一点确是不争的事实：联盟中的利益十分诱人，但联盟中的陷阱也令人生畏。本文着重从有效联盟的形成条件和有效联盟的运行条件两个方面，来分析企业应该如何进行有效联盟，才能谋取联盟利益而规避联盟中的陷阱。     

不确定环境下不平等联盟的利益分配博弈

不确定性的普遍存在，使得不平等联盟中伙伴企业间的利益分配问题日益敏感和困难。通过建立不确定环境下的博弈模型并运用丘奎特期望效用理论来解决联盟中这一问题，可使模型分析更接近实际。     

中小物流企业战略联盟的博弈分析

我国中小物流企业具有“弱、散、乱”的特点,严重影响了企业的发展。建立战略联盟是实现中小物流企业合作共赢发展的重要途径。建立战略联盟是有条件的。联盟博弈分析表明,个体合理性和整体合理性是中小物流企业建立战略联盟的必要条件,合作博弈的VN—M解是战略联盟的稳定性条件。     

中小物流企业战略联盟的博弈分析

我国中小物流企业具有"弱、散、乱"的特点,严重影响了企业的发展.建立战略联盟是实现中小物流企业合作共赢发展的重要途径.建立战略联盟是有条件的.联盟博弈分析表明,个体合理性和整体合理性是中小物流企业建立战略联盟的必要条件,合作博弈的VN-M解是战略联盟的稳定性条件.     

基于生命周期的企业集群价值网稳定性分析

企业集群价值网是一个共生组织,稳定性是其重要的维生机制,稳定性越好,组织的维生能力越强。鉴于此,运用生物种群共生理论,针对不同生命周期阶段的企业集群价值网的不同形态分别建立了反映其收益增长规律的Logistic模型,得出了稳定共生的条件和原因,并分析了其经济学意义。     

战略联盟、外包战略的演变形成机理

20世纪90年代以来，跨国公司之间广泛发展国际战略联盟、外包战略；开展更高层次的竞争与合作。国际战略联盟、外包战略改变了企业经营策略、竞争战略和竞争规则。因此探讨战略联盟、外包战略的演变形成过程及对社会资源配置。技术水平的影响是理论界的重要命题。本文利用管理经济学的原理主要分析了战略联盟、外包战略在提高企业成本优势中的形成机理、对社会技术水平的影响以及对企业技术适销水平的影响。     

International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter

International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter. Spatial Economic Analysis. This paper considers the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for biodiversity conservation with an explicit spatial structure. It studies the impact of distance between countries on coalition stability. It analyses a circular spatial structure with different spatial patterns. Robust results are obtained for a wide range of cost-and-benefit parameters: stable coalitions have a maximum size of two members. The best global payoff is obtained when coalitions are composed of neighbouring countries with the smallest possible distance. A ‘remoteness effect’ is observed, i.e., some coalitions of two members are unstable when one of the signatory countries is far away from the other coalition member and from the singletons.     

Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game

This paper analyses the formation and stability of coalitions to form international environmental agreements. We present and apply the Stability of coalitions model to assess the internal and external stability of all possible coalition structures in a cartel formation game; first under the assumption that no transfers take place and second for a transfer scheme. One important novelty of this paper is the analysis of the incentive structure of twelve regions for all possible combinations of (cartel) coalitions in an empirical setting with asymmetric regions. We show that stable coalitions can emerge only if benefits from global abatement are sufficiently high or if an appropriate transfer scheme is introduced.The authors acknowledge the support of Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, Eligius Hendrix, Niels Olieman, Pepijn van Oort, Arjan Ruijs and Hans-Peter Weikard in the analysis. Furthermore, the comments by two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Cooperation for Publication? An Analysis of Co-authorship Patterns in Leading Accounting Journals

This paper examines patterns, antecedents, and effects of (international) cooperation in accounting academia based on 7105 papers published in 15 leading accounting journals. In particular, we investigate the dissemination of different forms of cooperation, identify author characteristics that are related to the propensity of cooperation and analyze whether cooperation is associated with research performance (in terms of research impact and output). We find that scholars from Asian countries tend to be more heavily involved in international cooperation than researchers from most European countries and the USA. A Ph.D. from a leading school, a scholar's previous publication experience and a past appointment as editor or editorial board member are positively associated with the propensity for cooperation, while a researcher's current affiliation has only limited impact. Surprisingly, our findings show that cooperation is not related to a greater research impact as measured by citation numbers per paper. Finally, we find a significant negative relationship between a scholar's share of co-authored papers and his or her research output in leading accounting journals as measured by the weighted numbers of papers per author.     

湄公河环境保护国际合作问题研究

湄公河是一条跨越中国、老挝、缅甸、泰国、柬埔寨和越南六国的国际河流。国际河流的利用和开发是中国在面向次湄公河区域合作过程中不可避免要面对的问题和迎接的挑战。本文通过对国际河流利用中,中国同下游国家进行环境保护国际合作的必要性、湄公河利用与环境保护现状及问题的阐述,提出了应当建立湄公河开发、生态保护与航运贸易相结合的管理规划模式、与相邻国家在国内外环境保护与水利开发增加互动的国际合作并明确相应的国际责任的建议。     

Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games

Uncertainty is a daily presence in the real world. It affects our decision making and may have influence on cooperation. Often uncertainty is so severe that we can only predict some upper and lower bounds for the outcome of our actions, i.e., payoffs lie in some intervals. A suitable game theoretic model to support decision making in collaborative situations with interval data is that of cooperative interval games. Solution concepts that associate with each cooperative interval game sets of interval allocations with appealing properties provide a natural way to capture the uncertainty of coalition values into the players’ payoffs. In this paper, some set-valued solution concepts using interval payoffs, namely the interval core, the interval dominance core and the interval stable sets for cooperative interval games, are introduced and studied. The main results contained in the paper are a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the interval core of a cooperative interval game and the relations between the interval core, the interval dominance core and the interval stable sets of such a game.     

Stable and efficient coalitional networks

We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with her coalition members and with individuals outside her coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concepts of strong stability and of contractual stability. Contractual stability imposes that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. Requiring the consent of coalition members under the simple majority or unanimity decision rule may help to reconcile stability and efficiency. Moreover, this new framework can provide insights that one cannot obtain if coalition formation and network formation are tackled separately and independently.     

Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization

The basic difference between Nash and strong (Nash) implementations originates from the possibility of coalition formation. The results of Nash implementation are applicable when agents in no group can cooperate (or form a coalition) and those of strong implementation are applicable when agents in every group can cooperate. In the present paper we consider an environment where agents in some groups can cooperate and agents in other groups cannot. We completely characterize the set of correspondences that are implementable in such a general environment, and we provide an algorithm which enables us to verify whether a correspondence satisfies the condition that appears in the characterization results. By applying the algorithm in an exchange economy, we show that the core, the definition of which depends on the possibility of cooperation, is implementable in the equilibrium corresponding to the cooperation possibility.     

Spatial pillage game

A pillage game is a coalitional game as a model of Hobbesian anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage game. Players are located in regions and can travel from one region to another. The players can form a coalition and combine their power only within their destination regions, which limits the exertion of the power of each coalition. Under this spatial restriction, a coalition can pillage less powerful coalitions without any cost. The feasibility of pillages between coalitions determines the dominance relation that defines stable states in which powers among the players are endogenously balanced. With the spatial restriction, the set of stable states changes. However, if the players have forecasting ability, then the set of stable states does not change with the spatial restriction. Core, stable set, and farsighted core are adopted as alternative solution concepts.     

The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy

International environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma. Since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement, international environmental agreements must be self‐enforcing. Game theoretical models explain why rewards and punishments imposed through the environmental externality generally fail to enforce full cooperation. Therefore, environmental treaties incorporate provisions that enhance the incentives for participation such as transfers, sanctions and linkage to other negotiation topics in international politics. Moreover, interaction with markets and governments as well as the rules and procedures adopted in the negotiation process influence the design and the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement.     

Power and efficiency in production pillage games

A pillage game is a formal model of Hobbesian anarchy as a coalitional game. The technology of pillage is specified by a power function that determines the power of each coalition as a function of its members and their wealth. A coalition can despoil any other coalition less powerful than itself. The present paper studies the problem of achieving an efficient allocation of resources when the required reallocation changes the distribution of power. For example, land redistribution may increase total production, but may also deprive the original owners of the power they need to compel compensation. In this case the original owners would block the redistribution. Previous work on pillage games has focused on the stable set (von Neumann–Morgenstern solution) as a representation of a stable balance of power. However, the balance of power is typically too delicate to support all efficient allocations. The present paper shows that for a large class of power functions, a recently developed extension of the stable set, called the legitimate set, can be rich enough to support all efficient allocations.