Time consistency and optimal government policies in perfect foresight equilibrium

This paper develops a framework for determining optimal monetary and fiscal policies in perfect foresight equilibrium. Such equilibria have the property that all underlying demand and supply functions are derived from optimizing behavior, expectations are realized, and all markets clear. The time consistency of optimal policies derived under such circumstances is analyzed for a variety of alternative optimal policy problems. The general conclusion is that time consistency will prevail with respect to the optimization of any single policy instrument which does not appear explicitly in the indirect utility functions; otherwise time inconsistency will result. Monetary instruments are generally examples of the former, and fiscal instruments examples of the latter.     

Distortionary fiscal policy and monetary policy goals

We reconsider the role of an inflation conservative central banker in a setting with distortionary taxation. To do so, we assume monetary and fiscal policy are decided by independent authorities that do not abide to past commitments. If the two authorities make policy decisions simultaneously, inflation conservatism causes fiscal overspending. But if fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy, inflation conservatism imposes fiscal discipline. These results clarify that in our setting the value of inflation conservatism depends crucially on the timing of policy decisions.     

Monetary–fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union

We consider monetary–fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. If monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets, the Nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities. Leadership of either authority is better. Fiscal discretion entirely negates the advantage of monetary commitment: The optimal monetary rule is equivalent to discretionary leadership of monetary over fiscal policy. Agreement about ideal output and inflation creates a monetary–fiscal symbiosis, yielding the ideal point despite disagreement about the relative weights of the two objectives, for any order of moves, without fiscal co-ordination, and without monetary commitment.     

Time Inconsistency and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy

This paper analyses time–inconsistency problems related to the exchange rate channel of monetary policy. Within a simple open–economy macroeconomic model, where the exchange rate is the only forward–looking variable, we show that a difference emerges between optimal policy under discretion and under commitment. Moreover, the nature of the time–inconsistency problem resembles that resulting from standard New Keynesian models: when cost–push shocks occur, the exchange rate channel gives rise to excessive output stabilisation and insufficient inertia in monetary policy under a discretionary policy.
JEL classification : E 42; E 52; E 61     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU

This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy rule that averages the member countries’ most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Capital inflows, fiscal discretion, and exchange rate policy

Many writers have argued for the benefits of a credible fixed exchange rate (a hard peg) as a commitment device in an open economy. But historically, fixed exchange rates have often been associated with large current account deficits and episodes of ‘over-borrowing’. This paper develops a model of capital inflows that are linked to the exchange rate regime because of endogenous fiscal policy. The key message of the paper is that a hard peg is undesirable in the absence of commitment in fiscal policy. In face of a credible fixed exchange rate, the fiscal authority subsidizes capital inflows. The economy will engage in inefficiently high international borrowing, and in welfare terms may end up worse off than under capital market autarky. To eliminate the incentive to subsidize borrowing, the monetary authority must follow a flexible exchange rate rule in which capital inflows lead to exchange rate appreciation. If fiscal policy must be financed by money creation rather than direct taxation, then a fixed exchange rate rule may cause both over-borrowing and a subsequent exchange rate crisis.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions: Evidence from emerging European economies

This paper examines the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy for some former transition, emerging European economies over the 1995Q1–2010Q4 period by using a Markov regime-switching model. We consider the monetary policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993) and the fiscal policy rule suggested by Davig and Leeper (2007) in accounting for monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Empirical results suggest that monetary and fiscal policy rules exhibit switching properties between active and passive regimes and all countries followed both active and passive monetary policies. As for fiscal policy, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia seem to have alternated between active and passive fiscal regimes while fiscal policies of Poland and the Slovak Republic can be characterized by a single fiscal regime. Although the policy mix and the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy point a diverse picture in our sample countries, the monetary policy seems to be passive in all countries after 2000. This finding is consistent with the constraints imposed by European Union enlargement on monetary policy.     

MONETARY–FISCAL INTERACTIONS WITH A CONSERVATIVE CENTRAL BANK

We study macroeconomic stabilization when monetary and fiscal policies interact via their effects on output and inflation and the monetary authority is more conservative than the fiscal. We find that monetary–fiscal interactions result in poor macroeconomic stabilization. With both policies discretionary, the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal with higher output and lower inflation than optimal; the Nash equilibrium may be extreme with output higher and inflation lower than either authority want. Leadership equilibria are not second best. Monetary commitment is completely negated by fiscal discretion and yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks. But fiscal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion. Optimal macroeconomic stabilization requires either commitment of both monetary and fiscal policies, or identical targets for both authorities – output socially optimal and inflation appropriately conservative – or complete separation of tasks.     

The optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a small open economy

Abstract.  This paper studies how the nature of shocks affects the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a small open economy. Three classic rules, fixed exchange rates, monetary targeting, and inflation targeting are studied and ranked by comparing with the optimal monetary policy under commitment. We find that the ranking of the simple rules can be mapped to the terms-of-trade variability that the rule allows relative to what a particular shock optimally calls for. It turns out that inflation targeting dominates the other two rules under productivity or velocity shocks, whereas monetary targeting is the best performer under fiscal shocks.     

Committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility

A fundamental problem for government is how to combine commitment to certain policies with the flexibility required to adjust them when needed. Rogoff (1985) [Rogoff, K., 1985. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target, Q. J. Econ. 100(4) 1169–1189] showed that a way to strike the right balance is to appoint an optimally “conservative” policy-maker. In real life, however, policy-makers also have power over decisions where optimal plans are time-consistent, so delegating to a conservative person could be undesirable. A flexible delegation device can be found in a large committee of randomly appointed members voting over policy after observing a shock. When facing dynamic inconsistency, under a single-crossing property, there exists a supermajority rule that implements the population median's optimally conservative policy-maker with certainty. Another single-crossing property guarantees that if simple majority voting is used to select the voting rule that will govern policy choice, the supermajority preferred by the median is chosen. For problems where dynamic inconsistency vanishes, the committee will choose to make decisions by simple majority, implementing median outcomes. An application to monetary policy is developed. We show that the optimal supermajority is higher when dynamic inconsistency is more severe, when preferences are more homogeneous, and when the economy is less volatile.     

Optimal simple rules for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy

Stabilization policy involves joint monetary and fiscal rules. We develop a model enabling us to characterize systematic simple monetary and fiscal policy over the business cycle. We principally focus on the following question. What are the key properties of the joint simple rule governing the conduct of systematic stabilization policy? We find that conducting stabilization policy incorporates not only a set of monetary policy choices governed by the so-called ‘Taylor principle’ but also fiscal policy that gives considerable force to automatic stabilizers. Recent US and UK monetary and fiscal choices seem broadly consistent with this model. This result is found to be robust to a number of alternate modeling strategies.     

Stepping on a rake: The role of fiscal policy in the inflation of the 1970s

The inflation of the 1970s in the US is often discussed as if the only type of policy action that could have prevented the inflation were monetary policy actions and the only type of policy errors that might have induced the inflation were monetary policy errors. Yet fiscal policy underwent dramatic shifts in the 1970s and economic theory makes clear that in an environment of uncertainty about future fiscal policy, monetary policy instruments may lose potency or have perverse effects. This paper documents the vagaries of fiscal policy in this period and argues that people at the time must have been uncertain about fiscal policy's future course. It also lays out a theoretical framework for understanding the effects of fiscal uncertainties on monetary policy and shows that fiscal variables have predictive value in dynamic models, even if traditional monetary policy indicators are included in the system.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in the Euro Area

The problem of monetary and fiscal policy interactions is an important issue for the euro area, since the individual member states of the EMU are responsible for their fiscal policies but monetary policy is pursued by a single monetary authority, the ECB. This paper is concerned with empirical evidence on monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the euro area. We first explore fiscal regimes with a VAR model and find empirical evidence that a non-Ricardian fiscal policy has been pursued in both France and Germany. As an example, we then study how one member state of the EMU, namely, Italy, is responding to the common monetary policy with its fiscal policy and find that Italian fiscal policy seemed to be counteractive to the common monetary policy between 1979 and 1998. In order to study monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a more general way, we explore time-varying interactions by estimating a State-Space model with Markov-switching for some Euro-area countries. There appear to be some regime changes in monetary and fiscal policy interactions in France and Germany, but the interactions between the two policies are not strong. Moreover, the two policies have not been accommodative but counteractive to each other. Finally we explore forward-looking behavior in policy interactions and find that expectations do not seem to have played an important role in the policy designs.     

Deficit sustainability and inflation in EMU: An analysis from the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

Price determination theory typically focuses on the role of monetary policy, while the role of fiscal policy is usually neglected. From a different point of view, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level takes into account monetary and fiscal policy interactions and assumes that fiscal policy may determine the price level, even if monetary authorities pursue an inflation targeting strategy. In this paper we try to test empirically whether the time path of the government budget in EMU countries would have affected price level determination. Our results point to the sustainability of fiscal policy in all the EMU countries but Finland, although no firm conclusions can be drawn about the prevalence of either monetary or fiscal dominance.     

CONTROLLING INFLATION WITH TIMID MONETARY–FISCAL REGIME CHANGES

Can monetary policy control inflation when both monetary and fiscal policies change over time? When monetary policy is active, a long-run fiscal principle entails flexibility in fiscal policy that preserves determinacy even when deviating from passive fiscal, substantially for brief periods or timidly for prolonged periods. In order to guarantee a unique equilibrium, monetary and fiscal policies must coordinate not only within but also across regimes, and not simply on being active or passive, but also on their extent. The amplitude of deviations from the active monetary/passive fiscal benchmark determines whether a regime is Ricardian: Timid deviations do not imply wealth effects.     

What is the right balance between US monetary and fiscal policy? Explorations using simulated wavelet-based optimal tracking control

This paper uses wavelet-based optimal control to simulate fiscal and monetary strategies under different levels of policy restrictions. The model applies the maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform to US quarterly GDP data and then uses the decomposed variables to build a large 80-dimensional state-space linear-quadratic tracking model. Using a political targeting design for the frequency range weights, we simulate jointly optimal fiscal and monetary policy where: (1) both fiscal and monetary policy are dually emphasized, (2) fiscal policy is unrestricted while monetary policy is restricted to achieving a steady increase in the market interest rate, (3) only monetary policy is relatively active, while fiscal spending is restricted to achieving a target growth rate, and (4) monetary policy emphasizes short-run stabilization, while fiscal policy utilizes political cycle targeting. The results show that fiscal policy must be more aggressive when the monetary authorities are not accommodating the fiscal expansion and that the dual-emphasis policy leads to a series of interest rate increases that are balanced between a steadily increasing target and a low, fixed rate. This research is the first to construct integrated fiscal and monetary policies in an applied wavelet-based optimal control setting using US data.     

欧债危机成因与前景的制度分析

希腊等欧元区国家的主权债务危机可以说是欧洲区域一体化建设中的独特现象,其折射的是欧元区所存在的一个结构性问题：奉行单一货币政策和各国分散的财政政策,集中暴露出了欧洲货币一体化与欧洲福利资本主义的不相容、以及统一货币运行所要求的财政紧缩与欧元成员国经济增长和福利制度之间的矛盾与冲突;欧元不会就此瓦解,但欧债问题的最终解决困难重重;欧元的未来取决于自由与市场的回归欧洲,取决于欧盟的制度完善与欧式福利资本主义改革的成功与否。     

Monetary–fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus

Increases in government spending trigger substitution effects—both inter- and intra-temporal—and a wealth effect. The ultimate impacts on the economy hinge on current and expected monetary and fiscal policy behavior. Studies that impose active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy typically find that government consumption crowds out private consumption: higher future taxes create a strong negative wealth effect, while the active monetary response increases the real interest rate. This paper estimates Markov-switching policy rules for the United States and finds that monetary and fiscal policies fluctuate between active and passive behavior. When the estimated joint policy process is imposed on a conventional new Keynesian model, government spending generates positive consumption multipliers in some policy regimes and in simulated data in which all policy regimes are realized. The paper reports the model's predictions of the macroeconomic impacts of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act's implied path for government spending under alternative monetary–fiscal policy combinations.     

COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY: CANADA'S INTERWAR EXPERIENCE

In January 1929, the Canadian government suspended gold exports and implemented a floating exchange rate regime that endured until the onset of World War II. In sharp contrast to the experience of other countries that left the gold standard, Canada's deflation and declining economic activity continued until 1933. This paper examines why the Canadian government chose to follow a restrictive monetary policy and how that policy affected the Canadian exchange rate. We show that the chosen policy was rational—given the government's assumptions and objectives—and that it was consistent with fiscal policy. In so doing, we argue that the government's commitment to monetary stability was credible. We show that one can explain the Canadian exchange rate's behavior by a simple expectations-based model of exchange rate determination, given external events and the government's monetary policy.