Subprime Mortgage Defaults and Credit Default Swaps

We offer the first empirical evidence on the adverse effect of credit default swap (CDS) coverage on subprime mortgage defaults. Using a large database of privately securitized mortgages, we find that higher defaults concentrate in mortgage pools with concurrent CDS coverage, and within these pools the loans originated after or shortly before the start of CDS coverage have an even higher delinquency rate. The results are robust across zip code and origination quarter cohorts. Overall, we show that CDS coverage helped drive higher mortgage defaults during the financial crisis.     

A Dynamic Analysis of Fixed- and Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Terminations

This paper provides a side-by-side comparison of loan-level statistical models for fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgages. Multinomial logit models for quarterly conditional probabilities of default and prepayment are estimated. We find that the estimated impacts of embedded option values for prepayment and default are generally quite similar across both FRM and ARM loans, providing additional empirical support for the basic predictions of the options theory. We also find that differences in estimates of conditional probabilities of prepayment and default associated with mortgage age, origination period, original LTV, and relative loan size, indicate the continued significance of these other economic and demographic factors for empirical models of mortgage terminations.     

Characteristics of Mortgage Terminations: an Analysis of a Loan-Level Dataset

Understanding mortgage termination behavior is crucial for valuating mortgage-backed securities. Analyzing a unique loan-level dataset, this study examines the characteristics of mortgage prepayment and default behaviors in the Korean housing and housing finance markets. We also analyze mortgage termination behaviors across regions, loan purposes, and periods. The results suggest that the prepayment rate of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and the ratio of adjustable-rate mortgages to FRMs can provide meaningful signals for the Korean household economy. Although the macro-prudential policies pertaining to the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt-to-income ratio (DTI) are very effective, their effects can vary depending on the region or loan purpose. Furthermore, the DTI and credit score cannot always identify the default risks of mortgages not intended for housing purchases even though such mortgages are more vulnerable to macroeconomic changes. The observed changes in default behavior indicate that the government’s policies to promote fixed-rate loans have achieved a certain degree of success.     

Securitization and optimal foreclosure

Does securitization distort the foreclosure decisions of non-performing mortgages? In a model of mortgage-backed securitization with an endogenous foreclosure policy, we find that the securitizing bank adopts a tougher foreclosure policy than the first-best, despite resulting in higher loan losses. This is optimal because foreclosure mitigates the adverse selection problem in securitization by making the optimal security, a risky debt, less information-sensitive. We further show that policies that limit mortgage foreclosure would discourage the bank’s ex ante screening effort, reducing the quality of securitized mortgages. Our model yields novel testable predictions on the effect of mortgage securitization on foreclosure rates, loan performance, and mortgage servicing.     

The effect of foreclosure laws on securitization: Evidence from U.S. states

A mortgage that defaults is more likely to enter foreclosure rather than renegotiation if it has been securitized in the private non-agency market, according to previous research. We study whether this foreclosure-propensity affects lenders’ securitization decision ex-ante. Due to the higher foreclosure probability, the value of a mortgage should be more sensitive to foreclosure costs if it is securitized. Comparing loans made in the same metropolitan area but under different foreclosure laws, we find that lenders are less likely to securitize mortgages in states with higher foreclosure costs, as measured by laws requiring judicial foreclosure. Two additional results are consistent with the proposed channel. First, the effect increases for loans with higher expected default rates and disappears for mortgage-like loans not subject to these laws. Second, the effect of judicial requirements increases for loans with higher expected default rates, consistent with differences in loss given default driving the results. Borrowers in states without judicial requirements also get riskier loans.     

Enhancing Loan Quality Through Transparency: Evidence from the European Central Bank Loan Level Reporting Initiative

We explore whether transparency in banks’ securitization activities enhances loan quality. We take advantage of a novel disclosure initiative introduced by the European Central Bank, which requires, as of January 2013, banks that use their asset‐backed securities as collateral for repo financing to report securitized loan characteristics and performance in a standardized format. We find that securitized loans originated under the transparency regime are of better quality with a lower default probability, a lower delinquent amount, fewer days in delinquency, and lower losses upon default. Additionally, banks with more intensive loan level information collection and those operating under stronger market discipline experience greater improvement in their loan quality under the new reporting standards. Overall, we demonstrate that greater transparency has real effects by incentivizing banks to improve their credit practices.     

Appraisal Quality and Residential Mortgage Default: Evidence from Alaska

We empirically examine the effect of appraisal quality on subsequent mortgage loan performance using data from the high volatility housing market of Alaska in the 1980s. We develop measures of appraisal quality by computing the residual between a hedonic estimate of house value using available information from other appraisals compared to actual ex ante appraised value. We then estimate proportional hazard models of mortgage default and find that several measures of appraisal quality, particularly appraised value in excess of hedonic estimates, are significantly related to default risk. Using valuations subsequent to loan default, we are also able to evaluate how well house price indices perform in terms of estimating current loan-to-value and offer some additional evidence on the controversy over the role of net equity versus trigger events as determinants of mortgage default. We also show that defaults are related to ex ante measures of housing market conditions, with additional implications for underwriting policies and the current industry trend away from traditional appraisal and toward automated valuation.     

Legal Restrictions in Personal Loan Markets

This study examines the pricing of personal loans in the form of second mortgages to determine whether state-specific default laws have an effect on the availability and cost of that debt. We examine the pricing of loans to higher risk borrowers and whether borrowers in states that limit lender ability to seek default remedies pay higher credit costs. Our results indicate that, for the most part, lenders rationally price loans to higher risk borrowers. However, when we focus on borrowers with low credit scores, the results indicate that mean actual loan rates are higher than those predicted by our model. The results also indicate that state-specific default laws have an effect on the price of credit. Finally, the results show that there is a greater degree of error in the pricing of second mortgage loans to borrowers with low credit scores than to borrowers with high credit scores.     

Securitization without adverse selection: The case of CLOs

In this paper, we investigate whether securitization was associated with risky lending in the corporate loan market by examining the performance of individual loans held by collateralized loan obligations. We employ two different data sets that identify loan holdings for a large set of CLOs and find that adverse selection problems in corporate loan securitizations are less severe than commonly believed. Using a battery of performance tests, we find that loans securitized before 2005 performed no worse than comparable unsecuritized loans originated by the same bank. Even loans originated by the bank that acts as the CLO underwriter do not show under-performance relative to the rest of the CLO portfolio. While some evidence exists of under-performance for securitized loans originated between 2005 and 2007, it is not consistent across samples, performance measures, and horizons. Overall, we argue that the securitization of corporate loans is fundamentally different from securitization of other assets classes because securitized loans are fractions of syndicated loans. Therefore, mechanisms used to align incentives in a lending syndicate are likely to reduce adverse selection in the choice of CLO collateral.     

Differences Across Originators in CMBS Loan Underwriting

There is considerable heterogeneity in the organizational structures of CMBS loan originators that may influence originators’ underwriting incentives. We examine data on over 30,000 commercial mortgages securitized into CMBS since 1999, and find significant differences in the propensity to become delinquent depending upon whether a loan was originated by a commercial bank, investment bank, insurance company, finance company, conduit lender, or foreign-owned entity. These differences hold both before and after controlling for key loan characteristics. We then explore possible explanations for these results. Reliance on external financing during a loan’s warehousing period—the period between origination and securitization—could explain the relatively poor performance of loans originated by conduit lenders. Also, despite the potential for engaging in adverse selection, balance-sheet lenders—commercial banks, insurance companies and finance companies—actually underwrote higher-quality loans.     

The role of securitization in mortgage renegotiation

We study the effects of securitization on renegotiation of distressed residential mortgages over the current financial crisis. Unlike prior studies, we employ unique data that directly observe lender renegotiation actions and cover more than 60% of the U.S. mortgage market. Exploiting within-servicer variation in these data, we find that bank-held loans are 26–36% more likely to be renegotiated than comparable securitized mortgages (4.2–5.7% in absolute terms). Also, modifications of bank-held loans are more efficient: conditional on a modification, bank-held loans have 9% lower post-modification default rates (3.5% in absolute terms). Our findings support the view that frictions introduced by securitization create a significant challenge to effective renegotiation of residential loans. We also provide evidence supporting the affordability focus of recent policy actions, such as the Home Affordability Modification Program.     

Anatomy of an ARM: The Interest-Rate Risk of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages

This article analyzes the dynamics of the commonly used indices for adjustable rate mortgages and systematically compares the effects of their time-series properties on the interest-rate sensitivity of adjustable-rate mortgages. Our ARM valuation methodology allows us simultaneously to capture the effects of index dynamics, discrete coupon adjustment, mortgage prepayment, and both lifetime and periodic caps and floors. We can, moreover, either calculate an optimal prepayment strategy for mortgage holders or use an empirical prepayment function. We find that the different dynamics of the major ARM indices lead to significant variation in the interest-rate sensitivities of loans based on different indices. We also find that changing assumptions about contract features, such as loan caps and coupon reset frequency, has a significant, and in some cases unexpected, impact on our results.     

Corporate Loan Securitization and the Standardization of Financial Covenants

We examine whether syndicated loans securitized through collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) have more standardized financial covenants. We proxy for the standardization of covenants using the textual similarity of their contractual definitions. We find that securitized loans are associated with higher covenant standardization than nonsecuritized institutional loans. In addition, we show that CLOs with more diverse or frequently rebalanced portfolios are more likely to purchase loans with standardized covenants, potentially because standardization alleviates information processing costs related to loan monitoring and screening. We also document that covenant standardization is associated with greater loan and CLO note rating agreement between credit rating agencies, further supporting the relation between lower information costs and covenant standardization. Overall, our study provides evidence that loan securitization is related to the design of standardized financial covenants.     

Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Originations

Low-cost deposits and increased balance sheet liquidity raise banks' supply of illiquid loans more than loans easily sold or securitized. We exploit the inability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase jumbo mortgages to identify an exogenous change in liquidity. The volume of jumbo mortgage originations relative to nonjumbo originations increases with bank holdings of liquid assets and decreases with bank deposit costs. This result suggests that the increasing depth of the mortgage secondary market fostered by securitization has reduced the effect of lender's financial condition on credit supply.     

The syndicate structure of securitized corporate loans

Securitized loans have lower lead bank shares, but larger shares held by non-CLO (collateralized loan obligation) institutional investors than nonsecuritized loans. The result can largely be explained by their degree of information asymmetry and credit risk. We find that lead banks increase their holdings after a nonsecuritized loan becomes securitized, but they do not reduce financial exposure to securitized facilities during the boom of the CLO market. Furthermore, we find that securitized loans do not perform differently from similar nonsecuritized loans. We conclude that differences in syndicate structure are likely shaped by participants’ investment preference rather than a manifestation of adverse selection.     

Beyond the Transaction: Banks and Mortgage Default of Low‐Income Homebuyers

We evaluate the effects of the lending institution and soft information on mortgage loan performance for low‐income homebuyers. We find that even after controlling for the propensity of a borrower to get a loan from a local bank based on observable characteristics, those who receive a loan from a local bank branch are significantly less likely to become delinquent or default than other bank or nonbank borrowers, consistent with an unobserved information effect. These effects are most pronounced for loans originated to borrowers with marginal credit, where soft information may have a stronger effect. These findings support previous research on information‐driven lending, and provide additional explanation for observed differences in mortgage loan performance between bank and nonbank lenders.     

The Effects of Purchases of Mortgages and Securitization by Government Sponsored Enterprises on Mortgage Yield Spreads and Volatility

In this paper, we investigate the effects of GSE (government sponsored enterprise) activities on mortgage yield spreads and volatility. Using various regression procedures (i.e., vector error correction (VEC) and GARCH models) and controlling for default and prepayment risk, we find that securitizations and purchases of mortgages by GSEs reduce mortgage yield spreads and volatility. In particular, we find that the yield spread between conforming and 10-year constant maturity treasury (CMT) rates decreases by 8.0 bp per $1billion increase in the level of GSE securitizations. Similarly, if GSEs increase mortgage purchases, the yield spread decreases 10.5 bp per $1billion increase of purchases. In addition, we hypothesize and find that GSE activities have a spillover effect to the non-conforming mortgage market; via investor substitutions, GSE purchases and securitizations of conforming loans reduce non-conforming loan rates. Thus, the measured influence of GSE activities is biased downward when measured using the spread of non-conforming loans over conforming loan rates. We also find that purchases of mortgages by GSEs significantly reduce mortgage yield volatility. In sum, our findings show that GSE activities reduce and stabilize mortgage market rates.     

Credit History and the Performance of Prime and Nonprime Mortgages

Although nonprime lending has experienced steady or even explosive growth over the last decade very little is known about the performance characteristics of these mortgages. Using data from national secondary market institutions, this paper estimates a competing risks proportional hazard model, which includes unobserved heterogeneity. The analysis examines the performance of 30-year fixed rate owner occupied home purchase mortgages from February 1995 to the end of 1999 and compares nonprime and prime loan default and prepayment behavior. Nonprime loans are identified by mortgage interest rates that are substantially higher than the prevailing prime rate. Results indicate that nonprime mortgages differ significantly from prime mortgages: they have different risk characteristics at origination; they default at elevated levels; and they respond differently to the incentives to prepay and default. For instance, nonprime mortgages are less responsive to how much the option to call the mortgage or refinance is in the money and this effect is magnified for mortgages with low credit scores. Tests also reveal that default rates are less responsive to homeowner equity when credit scores are included in the specification.     

Valuing mortgage loan servicing

We develop an intertemporal model for valuing mortgage loan servicing contracts. The model includes a stochastic short-term interest rate and realized inflation rate which jointly determine the current mortgage coupon rate, the mortgagor's prepayment decision, the servicer's future net cash flows, and the rate at which to discount these future cash flows. Several potential uses of the model for institutions that service mortgages and trade servicing portfolios are illustrated by the application of the model to servicing fixed-rate mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages. The model also is applicable to regulatory issues and to the servicing of other types of loans.The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Washington, D.C., the Purdue Research Foundation, West Lafayette, Indiana, and the Richard D. Irwin Foundation, Homewood, Illinois.     

Asymmetric information in securitization: An empirical assessment

Asymmetric information in securitization deals is analyzed based on a unique dataset comprising a million mortgages, both securitized and not, and using a methodology, previously applied to insurance data, that looks at the correlation between risk transfer and default probability. The main finding is that, for given observable characteristics, securitized mortgages have a lower default probability than non-securitized ones. We show that this finding is consistent with banks caring about their reputation for not selling lemons.