Dissertation abstract: Essays on veto bargaining games

This dissertation experimentally analyzes the outcomes of multilateral legislative bargaining games in the presence of a veto player. The first essay examines veto power—the right of an agent to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure his/her preferred outcome. Using Winter’s (1996) theoretical framework, I consider two cases: urgent committees where the total amount of money to be distributed shrinks by 50% if proposals do not pass and non-urgent committees where the total amount of money shrinks by 5% if proposals do not pass. Committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) than without a veto player and veto players proposals generate less consensus then non-veto players proposals, outcomes on which the theory is silent. In addition, veto power in conjunction with proposer power generates excessive power for the veto player. This suggests that limiting veto players’ proposer rights (e.g., limiting their ability to chair committees) would go a long way to curbing their power, a major concern in committees in which one or more players has veto power. Finally, non-veto players show substantially more willingness to compromise than veto players, with players in the control game somewhere in between. I relate the results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees. The second essay discusses in detail the voting patterns in the veto and control games reported in the first essay. The empirical cumulative density functions of shares veto players accepted first degree stochastically dominates that of shares for the controls and the empirical cdfs of shares the controls accepted first degree stochastically dominate that of shares for non-veto players. Random effect probits support this conclusion as well. In addition, regressions imply favorable treatment of voting and proposing between non-veto players which, however, does not result in larger shares in the end. Coalition partners consistently demand more than the stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium share except for veto players in non-urgent committees. JEL Classification C7, D7, C78, D72 Dissertation Committee: John H. Kagel, Advisor Massimo Morelli Alan Wiseman Stephen Cosslett     

议价力、专业知识能力与风险投资最优组合企业数量

风险投资机构通常持有一定数量的组合企业,而议价力和专业知识能力与最优组合企业数量间关系密切。将议价力和专业知识能力引入风险投资组合企业数量选择问题中,运用合作博弈与最优化理论方法,基于议价力和专业知识能力,建立决策模型并进行实证分析。研究发现,议价力和专业知识能力在风险投资组合企业数量确定过程中具有互补作用,专业知识能力强的机构会投资更多数量创业企业,而议价力决定了风险投资机构与创业企业间的利润分配结构,从而间接对组合企业数量产生非单调影响。模型一方面为风险投资机构根据自身情况和外部环境作出组合企业数量决策提供了理论依据;另一方面,从与以往研究不同的视角阐释了风险投资组合企业数量与利润分配结构间的关系。     

Improving Assessments of Gender Bargaining Power: A Case Study from Bangladesh

Gender bargaining power has entered into mainstream economic theory and public policy. However, common empirical measures are only loosely related to the theoretical concept, and research has not produced consistent results regarding the causal chains underlying women’s empowerment. This study critically examines accepted measures of bargaining power, arguing that participation in specific household decisions is not directly associated with the theoretical concept of bargaining power. The study analyzes the relationship between measures of participation in household decisions and individual and household characteristics thought to contribute to bargaining power. Using Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data on Bangladesh over the period 1999–2011, the study finds that despite the loose relationship of the survey questions to the theoretical construct bargaining power, the decision-making questions provide relatively consistent and theoretically supported measures of this unobservable characteristic. Simple changes in using the measures would contribute to more robust and consistent findings.     

Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley–Shubik index

In a recent paper, we provide an interpretation of the Shapley–Shubik index as a measure of the ‘bargaining power’ that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee negotiating in search of consensus. It is assumed that negotiation takes place under the condition that every winning coalition can impose any agreement. In this paper we further investigate the axiomatic foundations of this interpretation of the Shapley–Shubik index. To this end a wider framework admitting random voting rules is considered.     

Gaining power through enlargement: Strategic foundations and experimental evidence

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain even if voters are bargaining over a fixed budget. We show that this phenomenon can occur as an equilibrium of a non-cooperative bargaining game based on the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory and find that power can be gained by adding new members as the theory predicts.     

The labor market effects of trade union heterogeneity

Empirical evidence suggests that the bargaining power of trade unions differs across firms and sectors. Standard models of unionization ignore this pattern by assuming a uniform bargaining strength. In this paper, we incorporate union heterogeneity into a Melitz (2003) type model. Union bargaining power is assumed to be firm-specific and varies with firm productivity. This framework allows us to re-analyze the labor market effects of (i) a symmetric increase in the bargaining power of all unions and (ii) trade liberalization. We show that union heterogeneity unambiguously reduces the negative employment effects of stronger unions. Firm-specific bargaining power creates a link between unionization and the entry and exit of firms, implying a reduction of the unions' expected bargaining power. Moreover, union heterogeneity constitutes an (un)employment effect of trade liberalization. If unions are most powerful in the high-productivity (low-productivity) firms, trade liberalization will increase (decrease) unemployment.     

Waiting to settle: Multilateral bargaining with subjective biases

We study multilateral bargaining games where agents disagree over their bargaining power. We show that if agents are extremely optimistic, there may be costly delays in an arbitrarily long finite game but if optimism is moderate, all sufficiently long games end in immediate agreement. We show that the game with extreme optimism is highly unstable in the finite-horizon, and we examine the ramifications of this instability on the infinite-horizon problem. Finally, we consider other voting rules, and show that the majority-rule may be more efficient than the unanimity rule when agents are optimistic.     

Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers

Two agents bargain over the allocation of a bundle of divisible commodities. After strategically reporting utility functions to a neutral arbitrator, the outcome is decided by using a bargaining solution concept chosen from a family that includes the Nash and the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky solutions. When reports are restricted to be continuous, strictly increasing and concave, it has been shown that this kind of “distortion game” leads to inefficient outcomes. We study the distortion game originated when agents are also allowed to claim non-concave utility functions. Contrasting with the previous literature, any interior equilibrium outcome is efficient and any efficient allocation can be supported as an equilibrium outcome of the distortion game. In a similar fashion to the Nash demand game we consider some uncertainty about the opponent's features to virtually implement the Nash bargaining solution.     

Easter Island’s collapse: a tale of a population race

The Easter Island tragedy has become an allegory for ecological catastrophe and a warning for the future. In the economic literature the collapse is usually attributed to irrational or myopic behavior in the context of a fragile ecosystem. In this paper we propose an alternative story involving non-cooperative bargaining between clans to share the crop. Each clan’s bargaining power depends on its threat level when fighting a war. The biggest group has the highest probability of winning. A clan’s fertility is determined ex ante by each group. In the quest for greater bargaining power, each clan’s optimal size depends on that of the other clan, and a population race follows. This race may exhaust the natural resources and lead to the ultimate collapse of the society. In addition to well-known natural factors, the likelihood of a collapse turns out to be greater when the cost of war is low, the probability of succeeding in war is highly responsive to the number of fighters, and the marginal return to labor is high. We analyze whether these factors can account for the difference between Easter and Tikopia Islands. The paper also makes a methodological contribution in that it is the first fertility model to include strategic complementarities between groups’ fertility decisions.      

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a search theoretic model of monetary exchange

Search models of monetary exchange commonly assume that terms of trade in anonymous markets are determined via Nash bargaining, which generally causes monetary equilibrium to be inefficient. Bargaining frictions add to the classical intertemporal distortion present in most monetary models, whereby agents work today to obtain cash that can be used only in future transactions. In this paper, we study the properties of optimal fiscal and monetary policy within the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). We show that fiscal policy can be implemented to alleviate underproduction while money is still essential. If lump sum monetary transfers are available, a production subsidy can restore the efficiency of monetary equilibria. The Friedman rule belongs to the optimal policy set, but higher inflation rates are also possible. When lump-sum monetary transfers are not available, equilibrium allocations are generally not first-best. Nevertheless, fiscal policy still results in substantial welfare gains. Money can be extracted from circulation via a sales tax on decentralized market activities, and the Friedman rule is only optimal if the buyer has relatively low bargaining power.     

Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory

This paper addresses the following issue: if a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives ‘in the shadow’ of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a ‘winning coalition’ supports it, what general agreements are likely to arise? In other words: what influence can the voting rule used to settle (possibly nonunanimous) agreements have on the outcome of consensus? We model the situation as an extension of the Nash bargaining problem in which an arbitrary voting rule replaces unanimity. In this setting a natural extension of Nash's solution is characterized.     

议价能力变化对家务劳动时间配置的影响——来自中国双收入家庭的经验证据

本文在纳什议价模型基础上,使用来自中国9个省的双收入家庭的调查数据,检验了议价能力变化对家务劳动时间配置的影响。结果发现,议价能力提高将减少本人的家务劳动时间和家务分担比例,并使本人家务劳动时间和家务分担比例对其他因素的弹性增大。议价能力的影响存在明显的性别差异,对男性的效果强于对女性的效果。本文拓展了已有的关于家庭内部时间配置的研究成果,对议价能力的定义和衡量方法做了探讨,并通过实证分析显示出议价能力在家务劳动时间配置上起着不可忽视的作用。     

Host-country policy – commitment or no-commitment: a theoretical analysis

This paper develops a model of foreign entry strategy and examines welfare of the host-country under two situations - (i) where host-country government commits to the tax policy, (ii) where host-country government does not commit to the tax policy. It turns out that under the non-committed government policy the foreign firm does not prefer to hold equity share in the domestic project. The host-country welfare, however, is more under the committed government policy than the non-committed government policy when the foreign firm has sufficiently higher bargaining power. The possibility of technology choice by the foreign firm reduces the range of bargaining power of the foreign firm over which the host-country welfare is more under the committed policy compared to the non-committed policy.     

Maternal Healthcare in Tajikistan: A Bargaining Framework

Abstract

This study examines women's declining use of maternal healthcare services in post-socialist Tajikistan. Using data from the 2003 and 2007 Tajikistan Living Standards Surveys (TLSS), the findings support previous evidence that a woman's use of prenatal and delivery care depends on her education, household income, and proximity to services. However, previous models have not specified who makes the decision to use maternal healthcare services. This study finds that in Tajikistan a woman shares decision making with her spouse and the eldest woman in the household. There is limited evidence that traditional proxies for bargaining power, such as relative earnings level, affect outcomes. The authors conclude that where women's exit options are limited, surveys evaluating the value of women's assets and their services in the home, as well as questions about decision making, will allow more refined measures of women's bargaining power.     

Bargaining with a possibly committed seller

We consider negotiations with an open time horizon where a buyer has private information about his valuation and does not know whether the seller is committed to the advertised price. This setting combines two common specifications made in the non-cooperative bargaining literature: one side is privately informed about its valuation, which is drawn from a continuum, and the other side is possibly committed to a fixed offer. We analyze the game both in discrete and in continuous time and show convergence of the two settings, which extends results from Abreu and Gul [2000. Bargaining and reputation. Econometrica 68, 85–117]. One interesting result is that as time proceeds, the non-committed seller becomes less likely to concede in a given period, i.e., it appears as if he becomes more “stubborn.” We further show that a seller may prefer to negotiate with a “worse” buyer as this enhances the value of his possible commitment.     

Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities

This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel and Moldovanu by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria [Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., 1995a. Cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities. Rev. Econ. Stud. 62, 619–637]. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers.     

Politics with(out) Coase

Political markets may be curative of political externalities, yet they are often unviable due to the presence of bargaining externalities. In this paper, we study the extent to which the choice of voting dimensions may affect the viability of Coasian bargaining in a political context. The results suggest that bargaining in a multi-dimensional policy space, although desirable in an ideal world of zero-transaction costs, is almost unavoidably affected by bargaining externalities. Disaggregating the policy choices and voting in a one-dimensional policy space can reduce bargaining externalities and lead to median voter outcomes. Bargaining by a limited number of players in a median voter situation can achieve a social first-best. We show the equivalence between the outcomes of multiple independent voting in one-dimensional space and the hypothetical outcome of Coasian bargaining in a multi-dimensional policy space.     

Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory

We compare Gamson's Law, a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining, with two non-cooperative bargaining models in three players divide the dollar games in which no player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own. Both of the game theoretic models better organize the comparative static data resulting from changes in nominal bargaining power than does Gamson's Law. We also identify deviations from the point predictions of the non-cooperative bargaining models. Namely, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted under the Baron–Ferejohn model, and a significant number of bargaining rounds tend to take more than two steps under demand bargaining and more than one stage under Baron–Ferejohn, counter to the models' predictions. Regressions using the experimental data provide results similar to the field data, but fail to do so once one accounts for predictions regarding coalition composition under Gamson's Law.     

Access to infrastructure and women’s time allocation: Implications for growth and gender equality

Improved access to infrastructure is commonly viewed as a critical step to increase women’s labor force participation and promote economic growth in developing countries. This positive relationship is first established in a basic gender-based, overlapping generations model with collective households and congestion costs. The model is then extended to account for endogenous gender bias in the market place and women’s bargaining power, as well as fertility choices and rearing time. Numerical experiments, based on a calibrated version of the extended model, show that increased access to infrastructure may induce women to devote more time to child rearing – in line with the model’s predictions and some of the empirical evidence – thereby mitigating the increase in time allocated to market work. As a result, it may weaken the benefits of increased female labor force participation in terms of reduced gender bias in the market place, improved women’s bargaining power in the family, and higher growth rates in the long run.     

外资讨价还价能力与地区引资结构

本文在不完全契约理论基础上构建了一个开放经济垄断竞争模型,考察了外资讨价还价能力的地区差异对引资结构的影响。理论分析表明:外资讨价还价能力的提高,对于外资拥有所有权优势的行业的外资流入具有显著促进作用。在此基础上,我们利用中国2001-2007年30个省市细分行业的数据,采用动态面板方法对该结论进行了实证检验。结果显示,外资讨价还价能力的提高对人力资本、物质资本、管理和研发密集型等外资拥有所有权优势行业的外资流入有显著的促进作用。并且在控制了地理集聚、市场潜力和基础设施水平等因素后,本文的实证结果依然稳健。