Optimal freeware quality in the presence of network externalities: an evolutionary game theoretical approach

New software products often face difficulty in achieving market penetration. A potential remedy is to offer a freeware version of the software to encourage initial adoption and establish a larger user base for the software, thereby increasing the commercial version's value to adopters in future periods. However, to avoid complete cannibalization of the commercial version, the freeware version's quality must be sufficiently low and the price of the commercial version must not be too high. We model the effect of these two decision variables, price and freeware quality, on the adoption of software using static and evolutionary game theory.     

Asset price volatility in a nonconvex general equilibrium model

Summary. Asset prices and returns are known to vary significantly more than␣output or aggregate consumption growth, and an order of magnitude in excess of what is justified by innovations to fundamentals. We study excess price volatility in a lifecycle economy with two assets (claims on capital and␣a public debt bubble), heterogeneous agents, and increasing returns to financial intermediation. We show that a relatively modest nonconvexity generates a set valued equilibrium correspondence in asset prices, with two␣stable branches. Price volatility is the outcome of an equilibrium selection mechanism, which mixes adaptive learning with “noise”, and alternates stochastically between the two stable branches of the price correspondence. Received: March 19, 1998; revised version: June 2, 1998     

A DYNAMIC ENTRY AND PRICE GAME WITH CAPACITY INDIVISIBILITY

Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two‐stage game in which potential entrants choose capacities and next active firms compete in prices. Due to capital indivisibility, the capacity choice is made from a finite grid and there are economies of scale. In the simplest version of the model with a single production technique, the equilibrium turns out to depend on the ratio between the level of total output at the long‐run competitive equilibrium and the firm's minimum efficient scale: if that ratio is sufficiently large (the market is sufficiently ‘large’), then the competitive price emerges at a subgame‐perfect equilibrium of the capacity and price game; if not, then the firms randomize in prices on the equilibrium path. The role of the market size for the competitive outcome is shown to be even more important if there are several available production techniques.     

DYNAMIC TRADING IN A DURABLE GOOD MARKET WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION*

We analyze a dynamic version of the Akerlof–Wilson “lemons” market in a competitive durable good setting. There is a fixed set of sellers with private information about the quality of their wares. The price mechanism sorts sellers of different qualities into different time periods—prices and average quality of goods traded increase over time. Goods of all qualities are traded in finite time. Market failure arises because of the waiting involved—particularly for sellers of better quality. The equilibrium path may exhibit intermediate breaks in trading.     

Local martingales, arbitrage, and viability Free snacks and cheap thrills

Summary. We revisit a standard model of security prices as Ito processes, and provide some new economic insights about the role of arbitrage and credit limits within such a model. We show that the standard assumptions of a positive state prices and existence of an equivalent martingale measure exclude prices that are viable models of competitive equilibrium and that are potentially useful for modeling actual financial markets. These models have been dismissed in the past as allowing arbitrage, but in fact an agent who prefers more to less and who has limited access to credit may have an optimum. Received: June 9, 1999; revised version: October 4, 1999     

Forward markets and the multiproduct,multifactor firm under price uncertainty

In this paper a competitive firm producing multiple outputs with multiple inputs is examined. All input and output prices are uncertain, and forward markets exist for all prices. The firm's optimal production and forward market strategies are analyzed.     

Money,barter, and convergence to the competitive allocation: Menger's problem

This paper explores the propensity of a bilateral exchange economy to get stuck away from the competitive allocation even when the competitive prices have been established. This is Menger's Problem. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a Menger Problem are found to relate to the presence of corner solutions. When money is introduced, convergence can be established.     

THE IMPACT OF UTILITY DEREGULATION IN ARIZONA

This analysis assesses Arizona's short-run price response to utility energy deregulation in the commercial and industrial sectors and the long-term response to deregulated industrial utility prices. Using a standard utility industry approach, ordinary least squares regression confirms commercial/industrial utility prices remain inelastic and Arizona's deregulation efforts have not effectively promoted short-run price competition. Moreover, widening differences in utility rates could be a response to a stronger long-run price elastic effect across states. The findings suggest states not aggressively deregulating utility price to narrow artificial comparative price advantages could be at a competitive disadvantage for interstate manufacturing investment. ( JEL Q41, Q48, Q40)     

Pure numbers effects, market power, and tacit collusion in posted offer markets

This paper studies the effects of seller concentration and static market power on tacit collusion in extensively repeated laboratory posted-offer markets. Contrary to the implications of some earlier research, we find that tacit collusion does not become pervasive with extensive repetition. In a ‘strong no-power’ design persistently competitive outcomes are observed in markets with three or four sellers. Even duopolies are frequently competitive in this design. Unilateral market power raises prices, as predicted. However, static Nash predictions fail to organize outcomes across power treatments, because tacit collusion moves inversely with concentration. Excess capacity appears to explain observed tacit collusion levels.     

The Promise and Pitfalls of Restructuring Network Industries

Abstract. This paper examines the competitive effects of reorganizing a network industry's vertical structure. In this industry, an upstream monopolist operates a network used as an input to produce horizontally differentiated final products that are imperfect substitutes. Three potential pitfalls of restructuring integrated network industries are analyzed: (i) double marginalization, (ii) underinvestment and (iii) vertical foreclosure. The paper studies the net effect of restructuring on retail prices and cost‐reducing investment and discusses policy implications.     

OPTIONAL REAL-TIME PRICING OF ELECTRICITY FOR INDUSTRIAL FIRMS

Abstract. This paper proposes a pricing mechanism, optional real-time pricing (RTP), with day-ahead hourly prices, that exploits the potential offered by a competitive wholesale power market. When an electric utility offers the option to its industrial customers, the retail prices are based on an existing Hopkinson tariff and expectations as to the wholesale market's next-day hourly spot prices. The proposed RTP mechanism is Pareto-superior to the tariff in that it assures both the utility and the customer of profits that will be at least as great as under the tariff.     

Access to Pipelines in Competitive Gas Markets

In this paper we provide the normative benchmark characterizing the optimal allocation of resources in a gas network. By duality, we determine the consumer and producer prices, at each node of the network, which decentralize this allocation with competitive actors. From the nodal prices we derive optimal transportation charges which turn out to be related to distance, but not always in a straightforward manner. We also consider the issue of pricing on secondary markets for capacity when pricing schedules for the transportation of gas consist of two terms: a capacity charge and a quantity charge. Finally, we explore the role of uncertainty in the planning of network capacity.     

Trade prices and supply in the UK economy

Current account imbalances are a major source of instability in the world monetary and trading system. Measures to correct these imbalances have largely involved adjustments to exchange rates. In the international trade literature, when the current account is in deficit, the Marshall-Lerner condition is sufficient for a successful devaluation. However, this partial equilibrium condition — apart from being based on the assumption that supply elasticities are infinite — abstracts from how the domestic economy responds to the change in relative prices. In this paper we develop a model of price and output determination in an open economy with imperpectly competitive markets, and draw a distinction between goods which are exported and those which are supplied to the domestic market. This means that we have to determine jointly both export prices and the domestic price of house sales. We show that as long as there is no money illusion in the labour market a fall in the nominal exchange rate raises domestic and export prices proportionally and leaves trade volumes unaffected. However, shifts in domestic absorption relative to overseas demand — by changing relative prices — cause shifts in the relative supply of exports and domestically sold goods and affect the trade balance. Thus fiscal and monetary measures directed towards reducing domestic absorption are more likely to be successful in correcting current account imbalances than exchange rate depreciation.     

Did the global financial crisis alter the competitive conditions in the Indian banking industry?

This article addresses a pertinent research question: Did the global financial crisis alter the competitive conditions in the Indian banking industry? In order to find the answer of this research question, we applied a dynamic version of the non-structural Panzar-Rosse model on a unique unbalanced panel dataset of Indian banks spanning over the period from 1998/99 to 2015/16. The robust estimates of H-statistic computed on the basis of the generalized method of moments estimates of the elasticities of input prices show that (i) Indian banks earned their interest and total revenue under monopolistic competition throughout the whole of the sample period and (ii) the global financial crisis altered the competitive conditions in the banking industry, and market moved closer to perfect competition following the financial crisis, especially when interest-bearing activities were in focus.     

Competitive price adjustment

A study is made of a competitive trading process in which a price-maker calls prices periodically under the obligation of trading for his own account to satisfy excess demand. Characteristics of the price-maker's optimal behavior are derived. The price-maker system is evaluated with respect to an alternative market clearing system.     

Demand complementarities and cross‐country price differences

Empirical studies document that markups vary across destinations. This paper proposes a novel mechanism to explain variation in markups: consumers’ utility from final goods and services depends on their consumption of complementary goods and services. In countries with more complementary goods and services, consumer demand is less elastic, enabling monopolistically competitive firms to charge higher prices. The paper provides empirical evidence documenting a dependence of prices on demand complementarities.     

A unified beta pricing theory

This paper derives Ross's mutual fund separation theory and a new, equilibrium version of Ross's arbitrage pricing theory as special cases of a general theory. The paper also reveals that the two theories are identical in their predictions of asset prices and portfolio returns. The capital asset pricing model (a restricted case of the mutual fund separation theory) receives special treatment.     

Bertrand vs. Cournot equilibrium with risk averse firms and cost uncertainty

Summary. In an oligopoly game with cost uncertainty and risk averse firms, we show that Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium have different convergence properties when the market is replicated. The Cournot equilibrium price converges to the competitive price. Under very typical and somewhat general conditions, the highest Bertrand equilibrium price converges to one higher than the competitive equilibrium. We also give examples to show how to compute the limit of the highest Bertrand equilibrium prices and illustrate the ideas of the proof. We explore conditions under which the supply curve is upward sloping, a useful condition for our results. Received: April 20, 2000; revised version: May 10, 2001