The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

低碳经济视角下国外财税政策经验借鉴

发达国家促进低碳发展的财税政策实践表明,征收碳税有利于碳的减排并能够获得相应的财政收入,但是,征税的主要目的在于碳减排.对低碳产品的生产和消费提供财政补贴,具有显著的激励效果.对低碳技术的研发提供资助,不仅能够促进碳减排,而且能够促进低碳发展,实现双重盈利.我国实施促进低碳发展的财税政策需要考虑发展阶段、经济水平、经济形势等诸多因素.     

The Political Economy of Social Security

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive pay-as-you-go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is higher than the rate of population growth. The workers with medium wages (not those with the lowest wages) and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social security. This level depends on the difference between the rates of population growth and interest as well as on the redistributiveness of the benefit rule.     

The Political Economy of Argentina's Debacle

In this paper I argue that political economy considerations and, in particular, the identity of the reformers, are central to understanding the Argentine crisis that culminated in sovereign default in January 2002. During the 1990s, the main political parties remained attached to populism, and no strong party emerged at the center of the political spectrum. This had two effects in the reform process. First, it severely deteriorated it (efficiency, corruption), reducing the support of the population. Second, when a series of shocks hit the economy the anti‐reform camp tried to undo most reforms, and thus convey a message to the population about the “right” model of the world.     

The Political Economy of the IRS

This paper tests a multiple principal–agent model of the Internal Revenue Service. Using data for 33 IRS districts over six tax years, 1992–1997, we report evidence that the fraction of individual income tax returns audited is significantly lower in districts that are important to the president electorally and that have representation on key congressional committees. These findings suggest that the IRS is not a rogue government agency, but rather is an effective bureaucratic agent of its political sponsors. Reforming the IRS by subjecting it to an independent oversight board appointed by the president would therefore seem to be redundant.     

论政治经济学、西方经济学的位置和功能

准确定位政治经济学、西方经济学的位置和功能,需要把握好以下问题:要正确看待西方经济学,分清西方经济学和当年马克思批判的资产阶级庸俗经济学的关系,鼓励对西方经济学进行创新性研究,有分析地加以利用;正确看待马克思主义在教学和研究中的指导作用,理解好马克思主义的基本内涵,采取与时俱进的态度来创新和发展政治经济学的资本主义部分,针对社会主义国家建设过程中出现的社会各阶层之间利益关系的矛盾,来创建社会主义政治经济学;深刻认识政治经济学和西方经济学的互补性。     

Fiscal Decentralization and Political Budget Cycles

We analyze a problem à la Rogoff where incumbents can distort fiscal policy to signal their competency, but where fiscal policy can be centralized or decentralized. Our main focus is on how the equilibrium probability that fiscal policy is distorted in any region (the political budget cycle, PBC) differs across fiscal regimes. With centralization, there are generally two effects that change the probability of a PBC. One is the possibility of selective distortion: the incumbent can be reelected with the support of just a majority of regions. The other is a cost diversification effect, which is present unless costs are perfectly correlated across regions. Both these effects work in the same direction, with the general result that the PBC probability is lower under centralization when decentralization also involves PBC. Welfare analysis shows that voters tend to be better off when the PBC probability is lower, so voters prefer centralization when decentralization involves PBC. Our results are robust to a number of changes in the specification of the model.     

The Political Economy of the Kuznets Curve

The paper provides a political economy theory of the Kuznets curve. When development leads to increasing inequality, this can induce political instability and force democratization on political elites. Democratization leads to institutional changes which encourage redistribution and reduce inequality. Nevertheless, development does not necessarily induce a Kuznets curve, and it is shown that development may be associated with two types of nondemocratic paths: an "autocratic disaster," with high inequality and low output, and an "East Asian Miracle," with low inequality and high output. These arise either because inequality does not increase with development, or because the degree of political mobilization is low.     

The Political Economy of Water Abstraction Charges

An important economic instrument in the management of a river catchment's water resources is the charges made by government for the abstraction of water from ground and surface sources. Abstraction charges are a form of rent. However, the classical theory of differential rent has limited application to abstraction prices because that theory's assumption of competition in the supply of the natural resource does not hold in this case. Here, the property rights of individual households and of institutions to draw water are assigned by a state monopoly. In order to understand the specific and contingent practices of government in different countries, a taxonomy of charge-setting principles is proposed. This paper sets out six principal fields of action for sustainable water resource planning and, in that context, recommends full incentive charging as the basis of catchment policy.     

The Political Economy of the Global Environment

Issues of the ‘global commons’ have secured a prominent place in environmental discourse. The temperature-regulating functions of the global atmosphere and radiation control functions of stratospheric ozone offer clear examples of true public goods. Other environmental assets, such as biodiversity and forests, are treated as if they are public goods, but in reality are complex mixtures of private goods, local public goods and global public goods. The approach to the provision and protection of these goods has tended to focus on the development of international agreements, such as those at the Rio de Janeiro ‘Earth Summit’ in 1992. But do these agreements contain the relevant incentives to conserve the global commons? Much depends on one's view of human nature. The Scottish economic tradition suggests that unless incentives focus on ‘self love’, as postulated by Hume and Smith, improvements will, at best, be marginal. A richer array of policy measures is obtained by analysing the potential for ‘global bargains’, trades that improve the environment whilst making each party better off. The souls of Hume and Smith surely approve recent developments in practical global bargains.