我国中小企业融资窘境及对策

本文从现代物业管理的机制、特点、发展方向等角度阐述了现代物业管理工作中要实施“公关与社交”手段的必要性 ,并联系实际 ,对在现代物业管理工作中如何强化实施“公关与社交”提出了对策与建议。     

国有企业实施股份制改造中的两个突出问题

安徽省产业结构存在着一些问题 ,如产业结构不尽合理 ,产业结构水平低下 ,这些问题都在一定程度上制约了安徽省经济的发展。因此 ,“十五”期间 ,安徽省应把结构调整摆在经济发展的重要地位 ,具体来说 ,应加强农业的基础地位 ,调整和提升第二次产业 ,积极发展第三次产业。     

安徽省高新技术企业上市的现状分析及比较

本文分为三部分内容 :一是介绍了安徽省高新技术企业上市的基本情况 ;二是比较了安徽省与全国及周边地区高新技术上市企业间存在的差距 ;三是指出了安徽省高新技术企业上市所面临的问题并提出了相应的对策建议。     

安徽省区域创新体系的规划研究

在安徽省现有资源的基础上提出了"一城两区、若干示范工程"的区域创新体系建设的空间布局,按照该思路对安徽省创新资源进行重新整合,从而实现充分利用安徽省的现有资源,最大程度地发挥各个地市的科技创新能力,建设全省的区域创新体系,提高安徽省的区域竞争能力。     

我国老年助听市场的现状、原因及对策分析

本文就当前安徽省高校后勤社会化改革在思想观念、人事和经营管理体制以及外界配套改革措施、保障机制等方面出现的“不适应”和面临的困难进行了剖析与探讨 ,提出加快安徽省高校后勤社会化改革的初步构想。     

目标资本结构的确定探析

本文分析了安徽省房地产业的宏观经济环境和消费的发展趋势 ,以及房地产企业的经营运作、组织和管理发展趋势。     

安徽省区域创新能力评估分析

本文在简要论述发展县域经济的重要性之后 ,紧密结合安徽省情 ,从纵向比较的角度 ,深刻分析安徽省县域经济发展存在的突出问题 ,并对今后如何发展安徽省县域经济做了理论和实践上的思考。     

安徽省非公有制企业征缴扩面难的原因及对策

随着安徽省非公有企业的快速增长,非公有经济在安徽省国民经济中的地位越来越重要,但非公有企业参保征缴难等问题也越突出。如何扩面征缴,本文从加强政策调研、开放再就业政策、强化社保机构管理、加强执法力度等方面进行探讨,并提出建议和对策。     

开放式基金向我们走来

安凯汽车集团对安徽省客车总厂实行托管 ,使该厂快速摆脱困境 ,同时壮大了集团的实力 ,留给我们一些有益的启示。     

我国软件业发展的现状、机会与挑战

本文运用大量统计数据分析了安徽省属高等院校发展的现状 ,提出安徽省属高校为迎接市场经济和知识经济挑战的若干策略和建议。     

房地产企业生态位结构动态与生存策略分析

我国房地产业存在着结构性和制度性问题。文章运用生态位理论分析我国房地产企业群体结构及其生存状态,发现新生的房地产企业已成为一个不容忽视的群体,这类企业的增长导致了资源的重新分配。阐明了房地产企业的两个基本生存策略,提出了通过信用管理制度和相应的立法。完善房地产企业退出机制的建议。其成果有助于理解我国房地产企业的生存状态与结构特征,为管理者提供决策依据。     

房地产金融调控新“亮剑”

2007年9月27日中央政府出台的《关于加强商业性房地产信贷管理的通知》实质上是国家新一轮产业大调整的开始,开发商对此认识不足,造成十分被动的局面。2008年8月28日中央政府颁布了《金融促进节约集约用地的通知》,第一次使土地管理和金融管理结合到一个文件,表示了政府在房地产领域控制金融风险的决心和力度。开发商应正确领会。     

基于博弈论的房地产企业实施绿色管理动力分析

房地产行业消耗了社会物质和能量的46.7％,并且产生了40％的垃圾,房地产商品一旦形成,不但占据了很多资金,还占据了不能置换的空间;我国正处于房地产业快速发展的时期,必须用绿色管理的新理念来管理、开发房地产行业。文章介绍了绿色管理的基本理论,剖析了传统房地产业存在的问题,分析了房地产绿色管理中各种力量的博弈策略,从而得出促进房地产实施绿色管理的三种动力,构建了房地产绿色管理的动力系统,并提出实施房地产绿色管理的对策。     

Industry competition in China: an external governance mechanism or an external incentive

We focus on the impact of industry competition on earnings management in listed companies in China. Empirical analysis reveals the following: (1) When competition within an industry is relatively low, it lowers the extent of earnings management; (2) when competition is relatively high, earnings management is promoted.; (3) within an industry, the more intense the competition, the more companies manipulate earnings when in an inferior competitive position; and (4) state‐owned enterprises that are at a competitive disadvantage within an industry rely more on real earnings management strategies, whereas these effects are insignificant in private firms.     

我国上市民营企业的高管薪酬、真实盈余管理与审计费用相关性实证研究

本文以2015—2019年沪深主板上市民营企业为研究对象,分别实证研究了高管薪酬与真实盈余管理、真实盈余管理与审计费用的关系,并将三者放入同一研究体系中研究了高管薪酬的调节效应,结果表明:高管薪酬的提高可以抑制真实盈余管理;真实盈余管理与审计费用显著正相关;另外,高管薪酬会降低真实盈余管理与审计费用之间的相关性,因此,制定合理的薪酬机制十分必要。     

历史实证方法在管理学研究中的回归

近年来,管理学界着眼于企业本身个案式的实证研究已广泛展开,而联系历史背景对企业进行动态的深层次的历史实证研究尚未引起充分注意。历史实证方法力图按照发展的顺序和历史事实来说明历史,注重组织和事件本身的复杂性和动态性,把企业发展或国家经济的真实历史事件作为研究背景,根据管理学理论对企业历史数据进行分析。历史实证研究方法从动态的、多维的历史角度对企业成长及管理进行剖析,使管理学研究突破静态分析方法的限制,与当前管理学的主流研究方法互为补充。     

Ill-intentioned or well-intentioned: earnings management and trade credit

The use of trade credit as important short-term financing for firms is increasing. This study explores the differential impact of firm earnings management on trade credit financing under different motives, using A-share listed firms in China from 2009 to 2020. The results show that accrued and real earnings management reduce a firm's trade credit. On the other hand, the classification shifting earnings management increases a firm's trade credit. Accrued and real earnings management are opportunistically motivated, while classification shifting earnings management is non-opportunistically motivated. Moreover, external audits weaken the negative effect of accrued and real earnings management on trade credit and enhance the positive effect of classification shifting earnings management on trade credit, indicating the ‘bilateral matching effect’ between external audits and firms. Finally, financing constraints weaken the impact of earnings management on trade credit.     

The Relation Between Earnings Management and Non‐GAAP Reporting

Managers have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence stakeholder perceptions. Earnings management and the strategic reporting of non‐GAAP earnings are just two of the available menu choices. We explore how real earnings management and accruals management influence the probability that a company will disclose a non‐GAAP adjusted earnings metric in its earnings press release and the likelihood that it will do so aggressively. We first investigate situations where managers already meet analysts’ expectations either based on strong operating performance or after employing real and accruals management. We find that when solid operating performance alone allows firms to meet expectations, managers do not employ earnings management or non‐GAAP reporting. However, when managers meet expectations using real and accruals management, they are significantly less likely to report a non‐GAAP earnings metric. Next, we explore scenarios where companies fall short of expectations. We find that when they just miss expectations after managing GAAP earnings, they are significantly more likely to employ non‐GAAP reporting, suggesting that the timing and relatively costless nature of non‐GAAP reporting allows managers to appear to meet expectations on a non‐GAAP basis when managed GAAP earnings fall short. Moreover, we find that companies are more likely to report non‐GAAP earnings (and to do so aggressively) when (i) they are unable to use real or accruals earnings management, (ii) are constrained by prior‐period accruals management, and (iii) their operating performance is poor. Taken together, our results are consistent with a substitute relation between non‐GAAP reporting and both real and accruals management.     

The Real Effects of Real Earnings Management: Evidence from Innovation

We examine the consequences of real earnings management from an innovation perspective and investigate the patent output of firms likely to be managing earnings through altering their R&D expenditures. We find that R&D cuts related to earnings management lead to fewer patents, less influential patent output, and lower innovative efficiency compared to other R&D cuts. Our results thus suggest that real earnings management may obstruct firms’ technological progress and highlight the potential costs of managerial manipulation of R&D expenditures to alter reported earnings.