The financial system and the Pasinetti theorem

Palley (Inside debt, aggregate demand, and the Cambridge theoryof distribution, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 20, no.4, 465–74, 1996; Financial institutions and the Cambridgetheory of distribution, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol.26, no. 2, 275–7, 2002) considers the Pasinetti theoremin the context of the credit money system where banks generatedebts endogenously, and claims that the theorem ceases to holdin such a system, being valid only in the loanable funds system.This paper traces the root of Palley's claim to his assumptionregarding the ownership of banks, sets out an alternative (morerealistic) ownership arrangement, and thereby restores the Pasinettitheorem unscathed in the credit money system (at least in thekind Palley must have considered). The paper, however, uncoversthe case where the theorem indeed collapses and discusses thereason for it: the hoarding of a non-interest-bearing asset.     

Ecological economics and the politics of knowledge: the debate between Hayek and Neurath

Hayek's epistemic arguments against planning were aimed notjust against socialism but also the tradition of ecologicaleconomics. The concern with the physical preconditions of economicactivity and defence of non-monetary measures in economic choicewere expressions of the same rationalist illusion about thescope of human knowledge that underpinned the socialist project.Neurath's commitment to physicalism, in natura calculation andplanning typified these errors. Neurath responded to these criticismsin unpublished notes and correspondence with Hayek. These highlightedthe epistemological premises his work shared with Hayek's, representinga response to Hayek from Hayek's own assumptions. This paperexamines the cogency and continuing relevance of the argumentsin this debate.     

Dealing with the Duhem-Quine thesis in financial economics: can causal holism help?

Acceptance of the Duhem–Quine thesis implies a recognitionthat empirical tests of individual hypotheses are in fact testsof individual hypotheses in conjunction with the networks fromwhich those hypotheses are derived. This leads to a problemin the evaluation of disconfirming evidence: is it the individualhypothesis or the network that is refuted? This paper examineshow financial economists deal with this ‘joint-testing’problem in their empirical evaluation of the efficient marketshypothesis. Causal holists argue that the holistic testing theyespouse circumvents the difficulties surrounding joint-testingproblems. This paper assesses whether a causal holist approachcan resolve the ambiguity surrounding the evidence against theefficient markets hypothesis. It concludes that, without a resolutionof the ontological–epistemological tension in causal holismidentified by Fleetwood (Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2002,vol. 26, 27–45) and a clearer outline of the nature ofholistic testing, causal holism cannot help financial economistsdeal with the implications of the Duhem–Quine thesis forempirical testing.     

The Coasean analysis of lighthouse financing: myths and realities

In ‘The Lighthouse in Economics’ (Coase, R. H. Journalof Law and Economics, vol. 17, no. 2, 357–76, 1974), Coasereached the conclusion that in England there existed a relativelyefficient privately financed lighthouse system, which wouldrefute economists' traditional statements concerning the productionof public goods. The purpose of this paper is to challenge hisconclusion. We first show that, from a methodological and theoreticalperspective, ‘The Lighthouse’ is consistent with‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (Coase, R. H. Journalof Law and Economics, vol. 3, 1–44, 1960). Then, applyingCoase's own method (historical case studies), we attempt tore-examine the respective roles and efficiencies of privateinitiative and government.     

Some Reflections on F.A. Hayek's The Sensory Order

Though F.A. Hayek is principally known for his work in economics, he also made contributions, both positive and critical, to the field of psychology. His most important piece in the latter field is his 1952 book, The Sensory Order. This paper attempts to locate The Sensory Order in relation to some of Hayek's other works. The origins of Hayek's interests in psychology, as revealed by an early student paper that provided a starting point for his later book, is noted. We then examine what may have motivated Hayek some 25 years later to return to psychology. Finally, the larger role that the book came to play in Hayek's overall system is explored. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Evolution of Income-related Health Inequalities in Switzerland Over Time

This article presents new evidence on income-related healthinequality and its development over time in Switzerland. Weemploy the methods lined out in Van Doorslaer and Jones (2003,"Inequalities in self-reported health: validation of a new approachto measurement", Journal of Health Economics 22(1), 61–78)and Van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004, "Explaining the differencesin income-related health inequalities across European Countries",Health Economics 22(7), 609–628) measuring health usingan interval regression approach to compute concentration indicesand decomposing inequality into its determining factors. Nationallyrepresentative survey data for 1982, 1992, 1997, and 2002 areused to carry out the analysis. Looking at each of the fouryears separately the results indicates the usual positive relationshipbetween income and health, but the distribution is among theleast unequal in Europe. No clear trend emerges in the evolutionof the inequality indices over the two decades. A small butsignificant increase over the first 15 years is followed bystabilization if not a slight decrease in total income-relatedhealth inequality. The most important contributors to healthinequality are income, education and activity status, in particular,retirement. Regional differences including the widely varyinghealth care supply, in contrast, do not exert any systematicinfluence. (JEL codes: D32, I10, I12)     

Hayekian evolution reconsidered: a reply to Hodgson

This is a reply to Geoffrey Hodgson's Comment on an earlierpaper by Caldwell (Hodgson on Hayek: a critique). Though certainareas of agreement are noted, differences in interpretationconcerning Hayek's views on the Malthus–Darwin relationship,on cultural evolution, on the extent to which Hayek may be characterisedas an ontogenist, and on methodological individualism remain.     

Erratum

The Cambridge Journal of Economics erroneously stated     

On Sraffa's Standard commodity: is its price invariant with respect to changes in income distribution?

In his 1960 book, Sraffa suggested using a composite commodity,which he called the ‘Standard commodity’, to solveRicardo's search for an invariable measure of value, i.e., astandard capable of isolating the price movements of any othercommodity induced by changes in income distribution. The absencein Sraffa's book of an explicit proof of the invariance propertyof this standard gave rise to many misunderstandings about itsmeaning and its role as an invariable measure of value. In orderto clear up these questions, Bellino (On Sraffa's Standard commodity,Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 28, 121–32, 2004)has proposed a ‘proper’ definition of an ‘invariablemeasure of value’, showing that Sraffa's Standard commoditydoes fulfil the requirements of this definition. He claims thatthe fulfilment of this property (but not the constancy of its‘nominal’ price) qualifies the Standard commodityas an invariable measure of value. In this paper, a proof ofthe invariance of the price of the Standard commodity with respectto changes in income distribution is given, and the equivalenceof this property with Bellino's definition of invariance isshown.     

Announcement: Publishing Online Ahead of Print

We are pleased to announce that in 2005 the Cambridge Journalof Economics will be publishing articles online in advance ofprint publication. Once accepted, articles will enter the     

Marx's value forms and Hayek's rules: a reinterpretation in the light of the dichotomy between physis and nomos

This paper argues that both Marx and Hayek objected to the dichotomybetween physis and nomos, and offered concepts which integrate,or mediate between, the two. Marx's value forms and Hayek'srules aim to grasp something neither purely natural nor purelyartificial or social, but ‘socially natural’. Valueforms and rules are natural in the sense that they pre-existagents and are taken by agents as given. On the other hand,forms and rules are social in that production relations or spontaneousorder are reproduced as the unintended consequences of agents'using forms or following rules. Thus value forms and rules standas links between agents and production relations or spontaneousorder.     

David Gawen Champernowne, 1912-2000: in appreciation

David Champernowne, who died in August 2000 aged 88, was notdirectly associated with the Cambridge Journal of Economics,but his major contributions belong to and serve to extend theapproach to economics which the journal wishes to preserve andadvance. This short obituary article records the journal's appreciationof his life and work.     

Naturalised epistemology and economics

The relevance to economics of naturalised epistemology (alsoknown as the naturalistic turn) from philosophy of science hasrecently been argued by economic methodologists, especiallyby D. Wade Hands (Reflection Without Rules: Economic Methodologyand Contemporary Science Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2001). This concept is held by Hands to constitute partof the ‘new economic methodology’ that consistsof the ‘interpenetration of economics and science theory’.Contrary to Hands's case, naturalised epistemology is shownhere not to represent a qualitatively new concept, to possesslittle coherent meaning, and to be incapable of charting aninnovative way forward for economics. Although there are moreissues concerning naturalism bearing on economics than are notedby Hands, three specific limitations of naturalised epistemologyare discussed. These and other limitations are related to theeconomics examples Hands proposes suggesting the usefulnessof naturalised epistemology for economics.     

The Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics

There have been strong ties between the Cambridge Journal ofEconomics (CJE) and the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics,from the very beginning. In this paper, the author investigatesthe environment that saw the birth of the CJE at Cambridge (UK),in 1977, and the relationship that linked it to the direct pupilsof Keynes. A critical question is explicitly examined: why didn'tthe ‘Keynesian revolution’ succeed in becoming apermanent winning paradigm? Some behavioural mistakes of themembers of the Keynesian School may explain this lack of success,but only to a certain extent. In any case, there were and therestill are remedies too. But what we are inheriting is a uniqueset of analytical building blocks (the paper lists eight ofthem) that makes this School of economics a viable (and in somedirections definitely superior) alternative to mainstream economics.Admittedly, there is some important work still to be done. Thepaper highlights the need for a two-stage approach, addressingpure theory and extensive institutional analysis. It is arguedthat a combination of the two would strengthen the coherenceof the theoretical foundations, and at the same time would providea fruitful extension of economic analysis to empirical, institutionaland economic dynamics investigations.     

Entrepreneurship and envy

This paper is a critical evaluation of Hayek's “Atavism of social justice” thesis, suggesting an alternative explanation of the widespread demands for social justice in contemporary society. It is based on the analysis of the nature of entrepreneurship and its tendency to incite envy. The advantages of the proposed explanation include a better understanding of the persistent hostility against commerce and the market system and the possibility of a systematic exploration of the factors which make the demand for social justice stronger or weaker. An earlier draft was presented at the Friedrich August von Hayek Memorial Symposium, Bleibach, Germany, June 9–12, 1993. I thank the participants of the symposium for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Normative judgments and spontaneous order: The contractarian element in Hayek's thought

This paper explores the apparent tension between Hayek's moral skepticism and his role as a defender of liberal institutions. It looks at Hayek's concept of spontaneous order, and asks whether there are any grounds for claiming that spontaneous orders have moral value. The argument from group selection is considered but rejected. Hayek is interpreted as putting most weight on arguments which show, for specific orders (such as the market and common law) that their rules assist each individual in the pursuit of his or her ends, whatever those ends may be. It is suggested that this form of argument is contractarian in character. However, Hayek's contractarianism is distinctive in that it looks for agreement among individuals within an ongoing social order, rather than among rational agents who stand outside any particular society. This paper was written while I was a Visiting Scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University; I am very grateful for the Center's support. An early version was presented at the Friedrich August von Hayek Memorial Symposium in Freiburg, in June 1993. In revising the paper, I have benefited from the comments of the participants at that symposium.