信息不对称与医疗保险中的“博弈之道”

医疗保险作为一种特殊行业存在信息不对称.在医生与患者之间,患者面对的是一群更有权威、更占优势的“公共产品”供应者,不可避免地产生信息不对称以及待遇歧视.当今的中国处于社会转型时期,建设社会主义“和谐社会”就是对社会成员施以公平的医疗卫生待遇,而面对日益增长的看病费用,政府在医疗卫生支出方面却“力不从心”.     

信息不对称与金融风险隐患

在经济转轨时期，商业银行等一些金融机构还没有完全从计划的模式转变过来，甚至仍然扮演着“官商”的角色，从而在整个金融运行体制中出现了不可忽视的不同于西方国家的信息不对称问题，进而产生逆向选择和道德风险，给整个国家的金融秩序带来隐患或混乱。我们以商业银行和中介机构为例，分析国家同商业银行及中介机构的信息不对称和商业银行同工商企业的信息不对称的问题。１－国家同商业银行及中介机构的信息不对称问题。首先，国家作为国有商业银行的生产资料所有者，对商业银行拥有全部的控股权。商业银行的经营者是国家的雇员，他们受…     

不对称信息经济学研究现状述评

以不完全信息和不对称信息为前提取得的理论研究成果,形成了当代最富特色的信息经济学研究领域。信息的形式及效用、委托代理理论与激励机制设计、不利选择与道德风险、市场信号模型、搜寻与价格离散、拍卖与投标、最优税制理论等内容构成了不对称信息经济学的微观分析基础。本学科的学术价值可以从以下至少三个方面的创新中得到阐释：方法论的创新,基本假设的创新和研究主题的创新。在我国全面建设小康社会。实现国家宏观发展战略的实践中,迫切需要发展成熟、诚信的市场经济,真正解决某些领域存在的市场效率低下甚至市场失灵问题,而不对称信息经济学的理论成果可以为问题的解决提供全新的思路和有益的政策指导。     

信息不对称与保险市场的脆弱性

和其他行业相比,保险业具有一些内在的脆弱性,表现为往往在没有明显前兆的情况下出现故障,甚至发生危机。保险市场的脆弱性指保险市场趋于一种高风险的状态,一旦整个保险市场的总风险达到一定水平,就会导致整个保险市场的危机。产生保险市场脆弱性的原因是多方面的,本文从信息经济学的角度,利用信息不对称理论来分析保险市场主体在导致其脆弱性方面的作用。     

证券市场的信息不对称分析

信息不对称是证券市场普通存在的一个现象,它的存在严重地扰乱了市场秩序,并阻碍其健康发展,损害国家和广大中小股东的利益,证券市场的信息不对称问题,是值得广泛关注的一个问题。本文分析了证券市场信息不对称的表现及危害,并提出了治理措施。     

信息不对称与税收征管

税收征管中的信息不对称是导致征管质量和效率下降的最基本原因。征管实践中存在的纳税人偷逃税、税收机关收入造假、税务人员贪污受贿等问题，都是与征管中的税收机关与纳税人、政府与税收机关、各级税收机关以及税收机关与税务人员之间的信息不对称有着及其密切的联系。针对信息不对称在税收征管中不同表现，可以分别设计出相应的解决机制。     

信息不对称与证券市场

信息不对称的形成源于交易双方信息获取成本的不同。证券市场中的信息不对称既可能造成交易之前的逆向选择 ,也可能造成交易之后的道德风险 ,这给证券市场带来一定的危害。我们应积极采取措施 ,完善信息披露制度、建立信誉机制、设立证券监管奖惩制度、加大政策的透明度、建立良好的法制化环境 ,最大限度降低信息不对称带来的负面影响     

信息不对称与金融监管的效率

金融监管对一国金融、经济的稳定意义重大,但现实经济中,由于信息不对称现象的广泛存 在,由此产生了逆向选择问题和道德风险,金融监管的效果大打折扣。本文分析了信息不对称 对金融监管的种种影响,讨论了我国实际问题,提出了解决这些问题的一些建设。     

浅议信息不对称与企业信用问题

企业是市场经济运行的主体，其信用管理水平决定着整个市场信用的程度。笔者认为企业信用缺失的表现在一定程度上都与信息不对称有关，都是由信息传输不畅而导致。因此，本文从信息角度出发探讨信息不对称在企业层面上的表现，企业信用缺失的危害以及如何弱化企业信用缺失。     

Trade imbalance and the endogenous optimal tariff

Endogenous tariff literatures reveal empirically that trade imbalance is negatively related with import tariff, this article gives a theoretical evidence and explanation to support this finding with the methodology of multi-country numerical general equilibrium modelling and simulation. We explore how optimal tariff changes after trade imbalance is introduced, and find that optimal tariffs decrease substantially, either for surplus or deficit countries, when imbalance is considered. Specifically, when the imbalance is modelled in endogenous monetary and inside-money structures, the optimal tariffs decrease by 26% globally on average. Our results suggest that the deepening trade imbalance is beneficial to the global trade liberalization due to its driving tariffs down.     

Vertical fiscal imbalance and energy intensity in China

Environmental and Resource Economics - The effective evaluation of the factors of energy intensity (EI) at the system level has become an engaging topic in the high-quality development of the...     

Trade imbalance in international message telephone services

An econometric model is estimated to identify determinants of trade imbalance in international message telephone services markets. Results indicate that asymmetric market structure is important in explaining bilateral market imbalances for high income country pairs. For low and high income country pairs, GDP per capita is the dominant cause of traffic imbalances. The findings suggest that telecommunications liberalization policies are effective in reducing distortions in international traffic flows and settlement payments. However, liberalization should be accompanied by developmental programmes that enhance income per capita and telecommunications network investment in developing countries. Such programmes may be effective in providing a more equitable distribution of the gains from telecommunications reform across countries.     

Social security and unsecured debt

In this paper, we use a calibrated life-cycle model to explore quantitatively ways of reducing the burden of social security in a world populated by both optimizing and rule-of-thumb consumers. Social security contributions force young households with upward-sloping income profiles to save a sizeable portion of their income for retirement, when their optimal consumption plan would likely have them either saving little or borrowing. We first use household data to document that young households have accumulated social security contributions that are large relative to debt holdings. Then, using a calibrated life-cycle model, we show that both allowing households to use social security wealth to pay off their debt and exempting young households from social security contributions (but in both cases requiring higher contributions later) mitigate many of the inefficiencies of social security from the perspective of life-cycle financial planning. Specifically, in our preferred experiment, which exempts households whose heads are under 30 from making social security contributions, we find that certainty-equivalent consumption increases by 3.4% for optimizing households and by 3.3% for rule-of-thumb households.     

Differential mortality and social security

Abstract This paper studies the normative problem of redistribution between individuals who differ in their lifespans. We discuss aspects related to the objective function and argue that aversion to multiperiod inequality should be taken into account. Then, we study the properties of the social optimum both with full information and with asymmetric information. We highlight the role of aversion to multiperiod inequality and show that it has substantial consequences on the design of Social Security schemes. In particular, we show that for a low (resp. high) aversion to multiperiod inequality, a negative (resp. positive) implicit tax rate on continued activity is desirable.     

Social security and economic integration

This letter analyzes the impact of economic integration on capital accumulation and capital flows when countries differ in their social security systems. Funding and early retirement both foster capital accumulation relative to pay-as-you-go pensions with flexible retirement. When economies integrate, both imply capital outflow possibly resulting in utility losses.     

Social security and risk sharing

In this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security system is ex ante Pareto-improving in a stochastic OLG economy with capital accumulation and land. We argue that these conditions are consistent with realistic specifications of the parameters of the economy. In our model financial markets are complete and competitive equilibria interim Pareto efficient. Therefore, a welfare improvement can only be obtained if agents? welfare is evaluated ex ante, and arises from an improvement in intergenerational risk sharing. We also examine the optimal size of a given social security system as well as its optimal reform.     

Social security and intergenerational equity

This paper considers the implications of social security for intergenerational equity. It shows that a balanced-budget unfunded system can be optimal even in a dynamically efficient economy without uncertainty and externalities. The relevant criteria for the optimality of the public transfer program are equity among generations and time consistency. The scheme can survive adverse shocks if the well-being of the elderly at each point in time is sufficiently valued.     

社会保障的新理念与中国农民扶持性社会保障体制

中国的市场化改革使广大的中国农民直接暴露在现代市场经济风险下,而家庭联产承包制的实施又使改革开放前与计划经济体制相适应的保障体制无法运转,这样,中国广大农民成为了现代市场经济中最没有保障的弱势群体。因此,建立农民社会保障体系的意义重大。中国农民社会保障体制迟迟没有建立的原因有二:其一,传统社会保障理念仅考虑到其工具价值,忽视了其目的价值;其二,农民的组织化程度低,导致他们在社会利益分割过程中没有谈判地位。从建立农民社会保障体制的双重价值出发,建立保障农民生存权和基本发展权的农民扶持性社会保障体制具有重要意义。     

Two universal,probabilistic measures of competitive imbalance

I propose two universal measures of competitive imbalance. The first is, like those in the existing literature, based on team season win–loss records. The second is based solely on the outcomes of the various series of individual matchups during a season. Both measures will on average equal (2p ? 1)², where p is the ‘typical’ probability that the stronger team will win any particular game. Both measures will average zero when a league is competitively balanced and will converge to 1 as the league approaches perfect imbalance. In addition, both measures are universal, in that they are on average independent of the number of teams in the league and the number of games played during the season.