Pareto-Improving Redistribution and Pure Public Goods

In the pure public good model, the Nash equilibrium associated with one initial income distribution may Pareto dominate the equilibrium associated with another distribution of the same aggregate income. We explore this possibility and examine its implications for Pareto-improving policy intervention by undertaking a comparative static analysis of Pareto-improving tax-financed increases in pure public good provision. Under some circumstances, a government can engineer policies that raise public good provision while increasing the well-being of contributors and non-contributors. Crucial factors promoting this outcome involve a large number of non-contributors, a high marginal valuation for the public good by non-contributors and a large aggregate response of contributors to changes in their income.     

Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

Redistribution from a constitutional perspective

In its traditional form, Paretian welfare economics has little to say about policies of redistribution. I argue that by adopting a constitutional perspective, elements of a theory of redistribution can be developed without recourse to interpersonal utility comparisons. Individuals who find themselves under an imperfect veil of uncertainty at a constitutional stage face a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of redistribution. The benefits consist of a reduction in the variance of a risk-averse agent's income distribution. The costs are represented by deadweight losses caused either by bureaucracy or by disincentive effects associated with the transfer scheme. My simple formal analysis shows that individuals may, even under an imperfect veil of uncertainty, be able to agree unanimously on a certain transfer policy if their personal characteristics are not too different from each other. This paper is a modified version of a chapter from my Master's thesis, submitted at the University of Bonn in 1992. Revisions were done during a stay at DELTA/Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris. A scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank Urs Schweizer, Hartmut Kliemt, Niclas Berggren, and an anonymous referee of this journal for valuable comments and suggestions, which have greatly improved the paper.     

Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input

What price should downstream entrants pay a vertically integrated incumbent monopoly for use of its assets? Courts, legislators, and regulators have at times mandated that incumbent monopolies lease assets required for the production of a retail service to entrants in efforts to increase the competitiveness of retail markets. This paper compares two rules for pricing such monopoly inputs: marginal cost pricing (MCP) and generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR). The GECPR is not a fixed price, but is a rule that determines the input price to be paid by the entrant from the entrant's retail price. Comparing the retail market equilibrium under MCP and GECPR, the GECPR leads to lower equilibrium retail prices. If the incumbent is less efficient than the entrant, the GECPR also leads to lower production costs than does the MCP rule. If the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant, however, conditions may exist in which MCP leads to lower production costs than does the GECPR. The analysis is carried out assuming either Bertrand competition, quantity competition, or monopolistic competition between the incumbent and entrant in the downstream market.     

Redistribution and fairness: a note

The introduction of (inequity adverse) fair agents in a simple redistributive voting game reduces the political relevance of the middle class and increases the equilibrium level of redistribution. Interestingly, some of the predictions in Meltzer and Richard [J. Polit. Econ. 89 (1981) 914–927] are affected: a rise in the income inequality between poor and middle class may not decrease redistribution, because of the additional support for redistribution provided by the fair agents.     

论正常垄断与非正常垄断

我国的垄断源自于计划经济,改革开放后有所改变,但行政垄断依然占主导地位。鉴于我国的国情,行政垄断组织的存在,有些是合理的,有些是不合理的。合理的行政垄断和经济垄断可称之为正常的垄断,不合理的行政垄断可称之为非正常的垄断。非正常的垄断会破坏资源的合理配置,损害社会经济福利。所以在我国反垄断应把矛头主要指向非正常的垄断。     

Durability in a Monopoly With a Small Number of Buyers

This paper shows that the number of buyers is a crucial demand characteristic for a monopolist's choice of durability. When he sells to a few large buyers, he offers a more durable good than when selling to many small buyers. By increasing durability of the good sold to large buyers, the monopolist encourages current purchasing and can thus engage in greater intertemporal price discrimination and make more profit. Therefore Bulow's proposition of minimal durability does not survive in the case of few buyers. This has not been pointed out thus far.     

论市场经济中反垄断与垄断利用

生产集中导致垄断,垄断阻碍自由竞争,发展市场经济,必须反对垄断。为此,各国政府普遍制定了《反托拉斯法》,并以此维护本国企业的竞争秩序。但实际效果怎样呢?应如何看待我国的垄断现象?应如何有效地反对垄断和合理地利用垄断?本文对相关问题加以探讨。     

Vertically Differentiated Monopoly with a Positional Good

We analyse positional effects in a monopoly market with vertical differentiation, comparing monopoly and social planning. The provision of quality under monopoly depends upon the relative size of positional effects and the hedonic evaluation of quality. An elitarian equilibrium where quality increases in the level of positional concern emerges under monopoly, only if the market is sufficiently rich. Under social planning, quality increases in the level of positional externality, independently of market affluency. As long as partial market coverage obtains under both regimes, the monopoly deadweight loss decreases as the positional externality becomes more relevant.     

A Note on Technology Transfer by a Monopoly

This paper studies the incentive for a monopoly to license its technology. It shows that a patent–holding monopoly may be willing to license its proprietary technology to a potential competitor when such a technology transfer has a market–expanding effect.     

Monopoly rationing revisited

This paper establishes that, whenever a simple pricing strategy fails to attain to the rationing outcome, a more complex pure price strategy may yet do so. It is also shown that rising marginal cost with uncertain demand may make rationing beneficial.     

对垄断的再认识

全球竞争首先表现为世界垄断性公司的国际竞争 ,其结果是垄断从一国走向国际 ,因此 ,二十一世纪国际经济的真正特点不是自由竞争 ,而是全球垄断。在竞争和行政手段无法真正打破垄断的情况下 ,真正从普通公众利益出发的只能是依靠法律手段打破垄断。     

Pigouvian Taxes in General Equilibrium with a Fixed Tax Redistribution Rule

This paper establishes existence of a first-best emission tax in a general equilibrium model with pollution, when the redistribution rule of the tax income is chosen fixed and independently of the Pigouvian tax rate. It is known that under standard convexity assumptions each Pareto efficient allocation can be implemented by simultaneously choosing a Pigouvian tax rate and an appropriate lump sum redistribution of income. In real politics, however, tax redistribution schemes are often restricted to a small feasible set. Nonetheless we show that for any given lump sum redistribution rule, being continuous in overall tax income, an emission tax rate exists that leads to a Pareto efficient equilibrium.     

Correlated Pollutants, Interregional Redistribution and Labor Attachment in a Federation

We examine the efficiency of federal policies in a federation characterized by decentralized leadership, imperfect labor mobility and transboundary pollution. Selfish regional governments regulate correlated pollutant emissions by choosing pollution tax and abatement levels in anticipation of the center’s redistributive policy. The center’s objective function obeys a proportional equity principle, which implies that its choice of interregional transfer satisfies the equalization of weighted regional welfare levels. Regional and central governments make their choices subject to migration incentives. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the sequential game played by regional and central governments yields socially optimal policies. An erratum to this article can be found at     

管制垄断构建和谐社会

市场不是完美无缺的,垄断市场的存在就是市场缺陷的重要体现.解决市场的垄断问题,需要政府的管制.政府管制的目的主要是构建和谐社会.政府对垄断市场的管制,主要解决企业进入垄断、产品价格垄断和不正当竞争行为.通过政府对垄断的管制,限制垄断,鼓励竞争,维护生产者和消费者的权益,建立正常的市场秩序,促进和谐社会的发展.     

谈谈中国的政府垄断

本文论述的是中国存在的与市场垄断不同的另一种垄断-政府垄断。本文首先阐释了中国政府垄断的两种形式（全国性垄断以有地方垄断）以及它们的严重危害,然后针对这种垄断提出了不同的措施。本文辩证地看待垄断,竞争是垄断的天敌,打破垄断就要发展竞争,但是要打破地方垄断,发展适度的市场垄断也不失为一条好的措施。     

市场过程内生的垄断:市场权势和自然垄断

作为内生的垄断现象,市场权势实际上是争胜竞争过程的结果,并非垄断的市场结构所决定。如果将竞争理解为一个动态过程,市场权势具有竞争性和暂时性。自然垄断现象也是市场过程演化过程中的自然现象,无论源于规模经济还是范围经济,都表明自然垄断具有动态效率特征。除非政府人为阻碍争胜竞争过程的展开,通常市场过程内生力量能够有效制约非政府垄断现象。