Norwegian Emissions of CO2 1987–1994 A Study of Some Effects of the CO2 Tax

Several countries have introduced taxes on fossil fuels with the aim of reducing atmospheric emissions, partly because of local environmental goals (SO₂, NO_x) and partly to participate in a global effort to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Many macroeconomic studies, based on both global and national models, have been made of how emissions can be reduced with the help of taxes and the consequent reduction in GDP following the introduction of such taxes. Norway has had a CO₂ tax for five years, thereby providing a unique opportunity to evaluate the effects of this tax on emissions. The paper provides a counterfactual analysis of energy consumption and emissions if no CO₂ taxes had been introduced, compared with the actual situation in which such taxes exist. The effect of a CO₂ tax on oil consumption, and thus CO₂ emissions is studied on the basis of partial economic models for various sectors of the Norwegian economy. The study indicates that the CO₂ tax has had an impact on CO₂ emissions in Norway.     

Is commodity taxation unfair?

In a model where agents have unequal skills and heterogeneous preferences about consumption goods and leisure, this paper studies how to combine commodity taxes and non-linear income tax. It proposes a particular social welfare function on the basis of fairness principles. It then derives a simple criterion for evaluating the social welfare consequences of various tax schedules. Under the proposed approach, the optimal tax should have no commodity tax for some range of consumptions, and income redistribution would feature high subsidies to the working poor. It is also shown that, even when the income tax fails to be optimal, commodity taxes may not improve social welfare.     

Residence-and source-based taxation of capital income in an overlapping generations model

By using an intertemporal equilibrium model with overlapping generations, this paper explores how residence-and source-based taxes on capital income affect the external current account in small open economies. These taxes influence the saving-investment balance not only through their incentive effects on rates of return but also through their impact on the intergenerational distribution of resources. This paper, in its examination of these effects — both intertemporal substitution and intergenerational distribution — identifies the net effect of the various impacts.The author would like to thank Dieter Bös and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

基于价值分级的级差式石油资源税制研究

本文对我国石油业缴纳资源税的现状进行了分析,指出了实施级差式资源税的必要性,在此基础上,介绍了石油资源价值分级的理论、方法和数学模型。最后．以石油资源价值分级结果为依据．对我国实施级差式资源税的具体操作方法作了说明。     

Religious heterogeneity and municipal spending in the United States

The goal of this paper is to examine the effect of religious heterogeneity on various important metro-area variables such as total expenditure, taxes, property taxes, debt, and employment as well as spending on the specific services of education, roads, police, health, and welfare. Two indices are used to measure religious heterogeneity, a fractionalization index and a polarization index. Polarization, designed to be a measure of social conflict, generally led to less spending and taxes, while fractionalization, the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to different religious groups, generally led to more spending and taxes.     

The dynamic welfare cost of seignorage tax and consumption tax in a neoclassical growth model with a cash-in-advance constraint

Using a public finance approach, this study investigates welfare costs between seignorage and consumption taxes in a standard growth model. One of these two taxes is used to finance exogenous public spending to balance the government budget. The steady-state welfare cost of consumption taxes is lower if the consumption effect dominates the leisure effect. This paper compares equilibrium along transitional dynamic and steady-state paths and finds that because of lower consumption and leisure and thus higher welfare costs of consumption taxes during early periods, the welfare cost of consumption taxes is larger than the welfare cost of seignorage taxes.     

Optimal income taxation with human capital accumulation and limited record keeping

This paper characterizes optimal income taxes in a dynamic economy where human capital is unobservable and the government is restricted to use taxes that depend only on current income. I show that unobservability of human capital tends to decrease the labor wedge, while the effect on the human capital wedge is uncertain. I also analyze the relationship between optimal taxes in economies with and without endogenous human capital and identify two qualitative reasons why the optimal tax codes will differ. I perform numerical simulations to calculate the quantitative relevance of endogenous human capital formation for optimal tax policy. I find that endogenous human capital lowers marginal tax rates by about 9% on average, as compared with a static model without human capital.     

Precautionary Principle and Robustness for a Stock Pollutant with Multiplicative Risk

The interest shown by policy makers and economists in the precautionary principle indicates the importance of model uncertainty in global warming policy. I show that through robust control, policy makers can implement the precautionary principle to regulate a stock pollutant, and I analyze its effect on expected steady state pollution taxes, stocks and welfare. The paper is broadly comprised of a theoretical part and an application to global warming policy. I find that: (1) an increase in either uncertainty about the model or risk about abatement cost increases expected steady state pollution taxes; (2) a robust policy is preferred for any level of model uncertainty and this preference increases for either higher model uncertainty or higher multiplicative risk and (3) the effect on expected steady state pollution taxes and stock of introducing model uncertainty is relatively small for high levels of model uncertainty. These results advocate using robust policies for a stock pollutant in the presence of model uncertainty.      

Taxes versus quotas in lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on abatement costs

We present a model of lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on pollution abatement costs and compare taxes with quotas under such conditions. We also examine the effect of private information on lobbying activity and social welfare under these two instruments. It is found that private information might improve social welfare under taxes when the government has little concern for social welfare, whereas private information does not improve social welfare under quotas. Quotas are generally socially preferred when the slope of marginal abatement costs is steeper than that of marginal damage or when the government does not concern itself with social welfare. However, private information reduces the comparative disadvantage of taxes compared to quotas when the government has little concern for social welfare. Finally, the results of numerical examples suggest that quotas are employed rather than taxes if the difference in natural emission levels between high- and low-cost industries is large.     

Reflections on the Double Dividend Debate

We survey the history of carbon taxation, the range of market-based instruments (MBIs) of environmental control, and the state of the double dividend debate, in order to suggest directions for future research into MBIs. Returning MBI revenues as lower distortionary taxes rather than as lump sums raises aggregate welfare, but we favour MBIs which raise little or no revenue, for reasons of political acceptability to interest groups. At the same time, the overall case for any environmental improvement is weaker because of general equilibrium interactions with prior distortionary taxes. Research seems most necessary on quantifying the efficiency benefits of market control of heterogeneous polluters, the benefits of environmental improvement, the tax interaction effect, and the various information costs of an MBI, all on a case-by-case basis for different pollutants and places.     

Taxes,inequality and the size of the informal sector

In this note, we develop a simple heterogeneous-agent model with incomplete markets to explain the prevalence of a large, low-productivity, informal sector in developing countries. In our model, taxes levied on formal sector agents are used to finance the provision of a productive public infrastructure, which creates a productivity premium from formalization. Our model offers endogenous differentiation of rich and poor countries. Complete formalization is an equilibrium only in countries with the appropriate initial conditions. We discuss the existence of this equilibrium and highlight the ambiguous effect of taxes.     

Emission Taxes versus Other Environmental Policies

In the environmental policy of most countries, various forms of quotas and direct regulation are more important than environmental taxes. This paper addresses four arguments which are often given against the use of emission taxes. The three arguments related to information asymmetries and non-convexities are valid in the sense that they point to complications in the use of environmental taxes. The fourth argument is related to the employment effects of different types of environmental policies in economies with unemployment. Although this argument is frequently used by politicians, the analysis provides no justification for it. On the contrary: in the model used, employment is higher with environmental taxes than with non-revenue-raising environmental policies.     

Why has Europe Become Environmentally Cleaner? Decomposing the Roles of Fiscal,Trade and Environmental Policies

This paper examines the role of fiscal policy, trade and energy taxes on environmental quality in Europe using disaggregated data at the monitoring station level for the 12 richest European countries spanning the period from 1995 to 2008. Our estimations show that fiscal policies and energy taxes are important determinants of pollution through various mechanisms. We find that increasing the share of fiscal spending in GDP and shifting the emphasis towards spending in public goods and against non-social subsidies significantly lower the concentrations of sulfur dioxide and ozone but not nitrogen dioxide. At the same time, energy taxes reduce nitrogen dioxide concentrations but have no effect on ozone and sulfur dioxide. Finally trade openness has a direct effect on sulfur dioxide but no effect on nitrogen dioxide or ozone. Our estimates account for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity.     

Optimal growth and distribution policies

The paper studies the impact of various policy instruments in a two-class Ramsey style model of optimal growth. It examines how conventional results must be modified when one considers the effect of policy instruments (taxes, government borrowing, and public investment) on the distribution of income and on factor supplies. The main conckusion is that without the availability of the ideal lump-sum tax, the (modified) golden rule is unlikely to be the optimal policy.     

Environmental Taxes and First-Mover Advantages

This paper studies whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental policies. To analyze this question I assume transboundary pollution and two countries that have to decide whether to set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously. When taxes are set sequentially an effect, denoted as the sequential setting effect, arises that raises the equilibrium taxes. I show that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners. When this overspill is low enough, taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting. However, the leader country obtains greater welfare than the follower. In this case, governments set taxes sequentially. When the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners is high enough, taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously. In this case, each government wants to avoid becoming the follower in taxes.     

Choice and design of regulatory instruments in the presence of green consumers

Using a vertically differentiated product model, this paper examines welfare implications of various government policies in a situation where consumers are environmentally discerning. It studies ad valorem taxes/subsidies and emission taxes. The optimal policy depends on the magnitude of damage parameter associated with environmental externality. For a given distribution of tastes and preferences, as the damage parameter increases from a low to a high value, the optimal policy shifts from an ad valorem tax to an ad valorem subsidy. It also shows that for a sufficiently low damage parameter, an ad valorem tax dominates an emission tax.     

Corporate Investment and Tax Disincentive: Evidence from China

This study investigates how taxes influence corporate investment behavior. Based on a census of Chinese industrial enterprises, we utilize a tax-adjusted q model to examine the effects of taxes on corporate investment in fixed assets in China. Results show that the effective tax rate has a relatively small but significantly negative impact on Chinese firms’ investment in fixed assets. We extend the tax-adjusted q model to control for the lagged investment effect and peer effect of investment. Models with these effects do better at explaining the impact of taxes on firms’ investment. The lagged investment models present smaller but significant tax disincentive. Firms compete for investment with other firms both in the same region and in the same industry through peer effect. In addition, the tax disincentive differs among state owned enterprises, private enterprises, and other enterprises in China.     

Cross-Border Pollution,Terms of Trade,and Welfare

We construct a two-good general equilibrium model of international trade for two small open economies where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Governments in both countries impose emission taxes non-cooperatively. Within this framework, we examine the effect of changes in the degree of cross-border pollution on Nash emission taxes, emission levels and welfare. We do so under two scenarios: when changes in cross-border pollution do not affect domestic pollution (non-strategic) and when they do (strategic). We also examine the effect of changes in international terms of trade on pollution and welfare when cross-border pollution is non-strategic.      

Commodity taxes and welfare under endogenous market conduct

We consider consumption taxes in a model of endogenous Cournot versus Bertrand competition. It is argued that when the choice of unit versus ad valorem taxes affects longer-term decisions beyond the customary price or quantity decisions, the mix of the two taxes co-determines market conduct. This gives ad valorem taxes an anti-competitive effect that harms ad valorem taxes’ efficiency in comparison with unit taxes. We show that a mix of the taxes—or a unit tax alone if we compare one or the other of the taxes—is sometimes welfare superior on account of consumer-price and tax revenue effects. A practical implication of our findings is that pass-through rates are only sometimes useful guides for policy. In fact, we show when the proper response to demand for higher revenue is a higher unit tax rate and a lower ad valorem tax rate.     

Progressive taxes and automatic stabilization in an open economy

In a simple model with a fixed exchange rate, more progressive taxes are likely to lead to a fall in the multiplier for autonomous expenditure. The effect on the multiplier for an autonomous wage shock may go either way, and increased progressivity may change the sign of this multiplier. The wage bargaining is modeled as a trade-off between employment and real disposable income. Depending on them weight attached to employment and the way expectations are formed, more progressivity may contribute to stabilize rather than destabilize this wage formation process. Indexation of taxes to imported inflation seems preferable to alternatives.