Discretionary monetary policy and inflation persistence

Rational expectations models of staggered price/wage contracts have failed to replicate the observed persistence in inflation and unemployment during disinflationary periods. The current literature on this persistency puzzle has focused on augmenting the nominal contract model with imperfect credibility and learning. In this paper, I re-examine the persistency puzzle by focusing on the discretionary nature of monetary policy. I show that when the central bank is allowed to re-optimize a quadratic loss function each period, imperfect credibility and learning, even in the absence of staggered contracts, can generate a significant amount of inflation persistence and employment losses during a disinflationary period.     

Risk Shifting through Nonfinancial Contracts: Effects on Loan Spreads and Capital Structure of Project Finance Deals

We study capital structure negotiation and cost of debt financing between sponsors and lenders using a sample of more than 1,000 project finance loans worth around US$195 billion closed between 1998 and 2003. We find that lenders: (i) rely on the network of nonfinancial contracts as a mechanism to control agency costs and project risks, (ii) are reluctant to price credit more cheaply if sponsors are involved as project counterparties in the relevant contracts, and finally (iii) do not appreciate sponsor involvement as a contractual counterparty of the special purpose vehicle when determining the level of leverage.     

Prospect theory and the effectiveness of price limits

Assuming that traders are risk-neutral, Brennan (1986) shows that price limits are effective in improving the efficiency of futures contracts with limited accessibility to information because they obscure the exact loss when they are triggered. However, Brennan's (1986) model fails to explain why price limits also exist in contracts with abundant information like those of financial futures. We show that when traders are loss-averse, the effectiveness of price limits is strengthened even in the presence of precise information. Thus, our analysis provides a theoretical foundation explaining why price limits can be useful when market participants are not fully rational.     

Sticky nominal wages and the optimal employment rule

Recent work in macroeconomics examines the implications of sticky nominal wage contracts for the behavior of the price level and real output. A crucial assumption of this work is a rule which relates the real wage and employment. This paper derives the optimal employment rule for a sticky nominal wage contract and examines the properties of this rule under different assumptions about the utility functions of workers and entrepreneurs. The optimal employment rule for a flexible nominal wage contract is also derived and analyzed for comparative purposes.     

Intraday periodicity,long memory volatility,and macroeconomic announcement effects in the US Treasury bond market

In this paper, we provide a detailed characterization of the return volatility in US Treasury bond futures contracts using a sample of 5-min returns from 1994 to 1997. We find that public information in the form of regularly scheduled macroeconomic announcements is an important source of volatility at the intraday level. Among the various announcements, we identify the Humphrey–Hawkins testimony, the employment report, the producer price index (PPI), the employment cost, retail sales, and the NAPM survey as having the greatest impact. Our analysis also uncovers striking long-memory volatility dependencies in the fixed income market, a finding with important implications for the pricing of long-term options and other related instruments.     

Self-enforcing employment contracts and business cycle fluctuations

This paper incorporates risk-sharing employment contracts into an economy in which matching frictions characterize the labour market and in which agents cannot commit. In equilibrium, the terms of ongoing contracts are affected by those being negotiated in the job market because contracts must be self-enforcing. In this context, risk-sharing implies that hours worked and wages are negatively related, while enforcement considerations imply the converse. Overall, the sign of this relationship is ambiguous. Therefore, the existence of such contracts may explain why movements in hours worked appear weakly related to those in real wages in U.S. aggregate data.     

Nominal contracting in a world of uncertainty

This paper evaluates corporate sensitivity to relative price risk and inflation risk and suggests how the existence of various nominal contracts, particularly debt and forward contracts, may modify firm behavior under uncertainty. By differentiating between the two types of price risk, this paper demonstrates the distinct risk reduction functions served by forward contracts and debt. Debt primarily protects against inflation risk whereas forward contracts can be used to protect against relative price risk. Complications arise, however, because forward contracts, which are denominated in nominal terms, also have an impact on the firm's degree of inflation risk.     

The effect of framing and negotiation partner’s objective on judgments about negotiated transfer prices

A common approach to set transfer prices is via intra-firm negotiation. However, Luft and Libby [Luft, J. L., & Libby, R. (1997). Profit comparisons, market prices and managers’ judgments about negotiated transfer prices. The Accounting Review, 72(2), 217–229] found that because of the existence of self-serving biases, negotiating managers have different expectations regarding what constitutes a ‘fair’ transfer price, leading to a less efficient negotiation process. In this study, we examine two factors that are expected to affect managers’ transfer price negotiation judgments, namely, framing as a gain or as a loss and the negotiation partner’s objective (whether the partner’s objective involves high or low concern-for-others). We propose that these two factors affect managers’ perceptions of the negotiation context, and thus the way they interpret the economic and social consequences of accounting information. Our results show that a loss frame (compared to a gain frame) exacerbates managers’ self-serving biases and increases the ‘transfer price expectation gap’ between buyers and sellers. Further, in our experiment where market price is higher than equal-profit price, we find that managers’ transfer price expectations are lower (and deviate more from the prevailing market price) when they are negotiating with a partner with high concern-for-others than with a partner with low concern-for-others. We discuss the broader implications of these results for the design of management accounting systems.     

It is a Sweetheart of a Deal: Political Connections and Corporate‐Federal Contracting

We examine whether political connections measured by political contributions influence the choice of terms included in government contracts awarded to firms. We construct an index of four “sweetheart” contract terms and find that firms making larger political contributions more frequently have these favorable terms included in their contracts. We also find that political contributions have explanatory power for contract design after controlling for lobbying, negotiation power, and the employment of former government employees. These results are robust to alternative model specifications, different estimation techniques, various variable measurements, and adjustments for possible endogeneity.     

Trend inflation, wage and price rigidities, and productivity growth

What are the steady-state implications of inflation in a general-equilibrium model with real per capita output growth and staggered nominal price and wage contracts? Surprisingly, a benchmark calibration implies an optimal inflation rate of -1.9 percent. The analysis also shows that trend inflation has important effects on the economy when combined with nominal contracts and real output growth. Steady-state output and welfare losses are quantitatively important even for low values of trend inflation. Further, nominal wage contracting is found to be quantitatively more important than nominal price contracting in generating the results. This conclusion does not arise from price dispersion per se, but from an effect of nominal output growth on the optimal markup of monopolistically competitive labour suppliers. Finally, accounting for productivity growth is found to be important for calculating the welfare costs of inflation. Indeed, the presence of 2 percent productivity growth increases the welfare costs of inflation in the benchmark specification by a factor of four relative to the no-growth case.     

LIQUIDITY AND PRICE VARIABILITY IN FUTURES MARKETS

This paper tests the hypothesis that market liquidity affects the price variability of futures contracts. The analyses used take into account the maturity effect and various sources of nonstationarity. Empirical testing involved eleven commodities in various markets. The evidence strongly suggests that futures contracts in distant and thinly traded months exhibit different price variability than contracts in near to maturity and liquid traded months, and that the behavior is commodity dependent. These findings could help investors better evaluate risks and provide a better basis for hedging strategies. Also, monthly averages of open interest can be used interchangeably with volume to measure liquidity in determining which pattern applies to a given commodity.     

Distributional dynamics under smoothly state-dependent pricing

Starting from the assumption that firms are more likely to adjust their prices when doing so is more valuable, this paper analyzes monetary policy shocks in a DSGE model with firm-level heterogeneity. The model is calibrated to retail price microdata, and inflation responses are decomposed into “intensive”, “extensive”, and “selection” margins. Money growth and Taylor rule shocks both have nontrivial real effects, because the low state dependence implied by the data rules out the strong selection effect associated with fixed menu costs. The response to sector-specific shocks is gradual, but inappropriate econometrics might make it appear immediate.     

A theory of negotiated equity financing

We examine the sale of equity within the context of a modelof negotiation between a firm and a less well informed purchaser.We introduce a simple form of negotiation by allowing the firmto set the price of the issue and by assuming that the purchaseis a financier-underwriter who acts strategically. This transactionis analyzed as a noncooperative game, and we identify sequentialequilibria that are consistent with observed behavior: namelythat negotiations occasionally fail, that market reactions toequity offers are not uniformly negative, and that equity placementsare often underpriced.     

Universal features of price formation in financial markets: perspectives from deep learning

Using a large-scale Deep Learning approach applied to a high-frequency database containing billions of market quotes and transactions for US equities, we uncover nonparametric evidence for the existence of a universal and stationary relation between order flow history and the direction of price moves. The universal price formation model exhibits a remarkably stable out-of-sample accuracy across a wide range of stocks and time periods. Interestingly, these results also hold for stocks which are not part of the training sample, showing that the relations captured by the model are universal and not asset-specific.

The universal model—trained on data from all stocks—outperforms asset-specific models trained on time series of any given stock. This weighs in favor of pooling together financial data from various stocks, rather than designing asset- or sector-specific models, as is currently commonly done. Standard data normalizations based on volatility, price level or average spread, or partitioning the training data into sectors or categories such as large/small tick stocks, do not improve training results. On the other hand, inclusion of price and order flow history over many past observations improves forecast accuracy, indicating that there is path-dependence in price dynamics.     

INTRADAY STEALTH TRADING: WHICH TRADES MOVE PRICES DURING PERIODS OF HIGH VOLUME?

Research documents a U-shaped intraday pattern of returns. We examine which trade sizes drive the U-shaped pattern and find that intraday price changes from larger trades exhibit a U-shaped pattern whereas price changes from smaller trades show a reverse U-shaped pattern. We argue that price changes from smaller trades are higher during the middle of the day because informed investors break up their trades to disguise their information when intraday volume is low. Price changes from larger trades are likely higher at the beginning and end of the day because high volume allows informed investors to increase their trade size without revealing their information to the market.     

Excess demand and price formation during a Walrasian auction

We conduct a detailed analysis of the relationship between excess demand and the convergence of price to equilibrium during a real-world Walrasian auction, paying special attention to the size and speed of the price adjustment. Using data from the Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE), we first show that because auctions for the various futures contracts occur sequentially, information becomes more evenly dispersed across traders as an auction sequence progresses. Then we show that excess demand is positively correlated with both the eventual price change and the speed with which price adjusts. As information becomes more evenly dispersed, the strength of these relationships weakens. Finally, though excess demand explains a large proportion of the variability of the change in price, it explains only a small proportion of the variability of the speed of adjustment.     

Pricing Double-Trigger Reinsurance Contracts: Financial Versus Actuarial Approach

This article discusses various approaches to pricing double‐trigger reinsurance contracts—a new type of contract that has emerged in the area of ‘‘alternative risk transfer.’’ The potential coverage from this type of contract depends on both underwriting and financial risk. We determine the reinsurer's reservation price if it wants to retain the firm's same safety level after signing the contract, in which case the contract typically must be backed by large amounts of equity capital (if equity capital is the risk management measure to be taken). We contrast the financial insurance pricing models with an actuarial pricing model that has as its objective no lessening of the reinsurance company's expected profits and no worsening of its safety level. We show that actuarial pricing can lead the reinsurer into a trap that results in the failure to close reinsurance contracts that would have a positive net present value because typical actuarial pricing dictates the type of risk management measure that must be taken, namely, the insertion of additional capital. Additionally, this type of pricing structure forces the reinsurance buyer to provide this safety capital as a debtholder. Finally, we discuss conditions leading to a market for double‐trigger reinsurance contracts.     

Information asymmetry,contract design and process of negotiation: The stock options awarding case

Stock option plans are used to increase managerial incentives, and business practices usually set the exercise price equal to the stock market price. The purpose of this paper is to underline the importance of a process of negotiation leading to a possible equilibrium contract satisfying both managers and shareholders. The two key variables of the model are the percentage of equity capital offered by the shareholders to the managers and the exercise price of the options that may be at a discount. We explicitly introduce risk aversion and information asymmetries in the form of (i) an economic uncertainty in the gain of cash flow, (ii) possibly biased information between the two parties and (iii) a noise in the valuation price of the stock in the market. The existence of a process of negotiation between shareholders and managers leading to a possible disclosure of private information is highlighted. As a conclusion, we show that “efficient” stock option plans should be granted in a context of trade-off between the percentage of capital awarded to managers and the discount in stock price.     

Measuring climate policy stringency: a shadow price approach

To assess the effect of environmental policy on production structures, trade structures, or foreign direct investment, a measure for the stringency of policy is necessary. Measures typically used in empirical studies share several disadvantages: they are not available on a sectoral basis to reflect concerns of industry competitiveness; they are not available for a wide range of countries to allow for international comparisons; or they are not broad enough to reflect the multidimensionality of environmental policy. This paper develops a thorough, internationally comparable, sector-specific measure of multidimensional climate policy stringency where a shadow price approach serves as a basis. The approach is applied to climate policy by determining sector-specific emission-relevant energy costs on the basis of the sectors’ usage of emission-relevant energy carriers and the carriers’ respective prices. The resulting shadow price estimates are heterogeneous and can be applied in future research to test for carbon leakage and pollution havens.     

Optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with staggered wage and price contracts

We study optimal monetary policy for a small open economy in a model where both domestic prices and wages are sticky due to staggered contracts. The simultaneous presence of the two forms of nominal rigidities introduces an additional trade-off between domestic inflation and the output gap. We derive a second-order approximation to the average welfare losses that can be expressed in terms of the unconditional variances of the output gap, domestic price inflation, and wage inflation. As a consequence, the optimal policy seeks to minimize a weighted average of these variances. We analyze welfare implications of several alternative simple policy rules, and find that domestic price inflation targeting generates relatively large welfare losses, whereas CPI inflation targeting performs nearly as well as the optimal rule.