The Economic Outlook for London

This article reviews how the London economy has fared over the past six months and prospects for the next few years. For the first time, it includes estimates and forecasts of GVA growth in each of the Central London boroughs. It concludes that there appears to have been something of a slowdown in the London economy recently, and the outlook is for slightly softer growth than at the time of the last 'London Outlook'. But, nonetheless, job creation is expected to remain healthy - and above that for the UK as whole. Central London is expected to grow faster than the rest of London, as it benefits from the renewed expansion of financial and business service employment.     

The Economic Outlook for London

The strength of London's economy has been very apparent over the past year, after a period when the potential for recovery was clear but there was less hard evidence. Financial services have clearly played a large part in driving the acceleration in London's growth, with stock markets, M&A activity and profitability all strong over the last 18 months. London's growth has also been bolstered by strong international immigration. Our latest forecasts show a modest slowdown in London's economy next year from a robust 3.9% in 2006, in response to higher UK interest rates and weaker growth in both the US and the Eurozone. But employment in London is still forecast to rise by 1.2% in 2007, with GDP expected to grow by 2.9% in London compared with 2.3% in the UK as whole.     

The Economic Outlook for London

The recent economic slowdown was very visible in London, with the capital leading the UK into the downturn — employment peaked in London in the first quarter of 2001, a year earlier than in the rest of the country. Now that recovery in the UK economy appears to be well-established, this article considers how this is reflected in improved prospects for the London economy.     

An anatomy of zero‐hour contracts in the UK

We present the first attempt to locate zero‐hour contract (ZHC) jobs—jobs that lack a guaranteed minimum number of hours—within theoretical frameworks of the employment relationship and occupational class and empirically explore their characteristics using successive UK Labour Force Survey. In line with these theories, we find this contentious form of employment to be strongly differentiated by the nature of occupational tasks and to overlap with nonstandard employment features (e.g. part‐time and temporary). They are also highly concentrated in a small number of occupations and sectors, with over half of ZHC jobs found in just 10 occupations. We further show that ZHCs are associated with indicators of inferior job quality such as low pay and underemployment. Although we find no evidence that ZHCs are a particularly pervasive feature of the UK labour market, further growth cannot be ruled out in certain occupations.     

“Offshoring”: How big an issue?

Spurred by the political debate in the US and several high-profile corporate moves, "offshoring" has become a lively topic of discussion. This paper by Grant Colquhoun, Keith Edmonds and David Goodger tries to put recent developments in context and argues that "offshoring" should be seen as part of a long-standing and largely beneficial trend of international specialisation. In the short term at least, the transfer of service sector activities abroad is likely to involve relatively small numbers of jobs when compared to overall UK employment and labour market turnover. However, specific areas — such as call centres, back office functions and software programming — are expected to be increasingly affected, impacting upon regions of the UK with heavy exposure to those activities and giving rise to adjustment costs. In contrast, retailing, hotels and catering and personal services could well benefit from the move of low value-added jobs abroad. Overall, the impact of "offshoring" on the UK economy in terms of output and productivity should be positive.     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Global growth resilient to trade slowdown

• ? It seems increasingly clear that the manufacturing‐ and trade‐driven soft patch in late‐2018 is extending into this year. But we still think that global recession risks remain low and see no reason to make any notable shifts to our outlook for the global economy this year. We continue to forecast that GDP growth will slow from 3.0% in 2018 to 2.7% this year, with a similar outcome seen in 2020.
• ? Various indicators show that trade volumes slowed sharply at end‐2018 and survey indicators for January suggest that the situation has not improved since then (see Chart). The main reason for this weakness has been China, where imports ended the year on a very weak note and we expect a further slowdown in Q1.
• ? We have lowered our forecast of Chinese imports in 2019 by around 1.5pp in response. However, we expect a bounce back in Q2 and beyond; reflecting this, Chinese import growth over the year as whole is still expected to be notably stronger than in the 2015/16 soft patch. In a similar vein, while global trade growth is expected to slow sharply from 4.6% to 3.3% this year (down from 3.6% last month), it should still be stronger than in 2012–16, providing a solid backdrop for exporters.
• ? Meanwhile, financial markets have rebounded sharply from the December sell‐off due to renewed optimism regarding US and China trade talks and a more dovish Fed. We now expect the Fed to leave rates on hold until at least Q3 and hike rates only once this year. This, along with lower government bond yields and weaker inflation, is also likely to reduce the need for monetary tightening elsewhere, particularly in emerging markets (EMs), helping to support global growth later in the year.
• ? Overall, we still see global GDP growth softening in H1, but with a modest rebound in H2 as Chinese growth stabilises and EMs and European growth regain momentum. Sharper slowdowns in China and global trade and financial‐market weakness remain key concerns for the 2020 outlook. But the risk of inflation‐induced policy tightening is still low and the odds of a renewed flare‐up in trade tensions have ebbed lately.

     

The economic outlook for London

London's economy clearly entered a new growth phase in 2005, supported by strong recovery in financial markets. This improvement in economic performance has been especially marked within the Central London Boroughs, but with some significant variation between them. This article argues that this marks a return to London-led growth for the UK, becoming more noticeable moving into the medium term once the short-term impacts of last year's terrorist attacks have disappeared.     

Secular stagnation – are we stuck in Summers' long winter?

• We estimate that the UK has a relatively large output gap of around 2¾% of potential output. With the legacy of the financial crisis fading, the UK should see healthy growth in potential output of around 2.1% a year from 2015–24. Usually this would drive a period of strong economic growth, but we expect GDP growth to average a relatively underwhelming 2.4% a year over this period, largely due to the drag from aggressive fiscal consolidation.
• There is significant disagreement amongst economists about the size of the output gap. Estimation of the output gap has been problematic since the financial crisis because of the depth of the recession and relatively slow pace of the subsequent recovery, while sizeable revisions to the national accounts data have been an added complication. Our estimate of the output gap is towards the top of the range of independent forecasters surveyed by HM Treasury, but it is consistent with the literature on the impact of financial crises on potential output.
• We expect potential output growth of 2.1% a year from 2015–24, a faster pace than that seen since the financial crisis, but some way short of the experience of the pre‐crisis decade. The shortfall relative to the pre‐crisis period is largely due to a smaller contribution from growth in labour supply, which reflects the impact of an ageing population. However, labour is set to make a much stronger contribution to potential output growth in the UK than in most other major European countries over the next decade.
• The combination of a large output gap and healthy growth in potential output will provide the conditions for firm growth and low inflation over the medium term, with GDP growth expected to average 2.4% a year from 2015 to 2024. Growth could be stronger were it not for the sizeable drag from fiscal consolidation over the next four years and the dampening effect that this will have on activity. This will ensure that the output gap closes very slowly. The government's fiscal plans are heavily influenced by the OBR's view that there is limited scope for stronger growth to drive an improvement in the public finances. But if our view turns out to be correct, it will become apparent that the government has pursued a more austere path than is strictly necessary in order to comply with its fiscal rules.

     

Brexit and world growth – what are the risks?

• The initial global market reaction to the UK Brexit vote was very negative and in our view overdone. Nevertheless, we expect the uncertainty to linger for a while, with the vote having refocused investors on existing vulnerabilities in the world economy. Our new forecasts see the main negative impacts on growth being in the UK, the Eurozone and Japan. Risks to our new forecasts remain skewed to the downside, with a significant danger of world growth dropping below 2% this year.
• Our new forecasts see UK growth dropping to 1.4% a year in 2017–18, down from 2.2–2.3% a year before. In the Eurozone, growth will be around 0.2% a year weaker in 2017–18 and Japan is also a loser as a result of the risk aversion‐driven stronger yen, with growth at just 0.3% in 2017 from 0.5%.
• The size of the initial global market sell‐off makes no sense in the context of the likely impact from a weaker UK. In part, it seems to have reflected the pricing in of very negative scenarios in the Eurozone. But investors may also be worrying about other global problems glossed over in recent months.
• One risk to our forecast is that confidence effects on businesses and consumers are larger than we expect – but such effects are often overstated. Another danger is that more of the recent financial market weakness will ‘stick’ than our new baseline forecasts assume.
• Our world recession indicator is already at elevated levels and suggests a significant danger of world growth slipping below 2% this year; not a recession, but it might feel like one. Global policymakers need to act quickly to head off the risks.

     

Productivity Growth,Import Leakage and Employment Growth in Puerto Rico, 1967–87

Using Puerto Rican input–output data that cover the period 1967–87, we find that employment growth was led primarily by a rapid increase in final output—5.1% per year—although labor productivity growth was also substantial, at 3.7% per year. Import leakages also fell over this period, but had little impact on employment growth. Local absorption was more successful than exports in generating new jobs. Employment generated by local absorption grew by 35% and that from exports by 29%, even though exports increased almost four-fold, while local absorption only doubled. The difference reflects the greater labor intensity of industries that supply local absorption. There was also a notable shift in the occupational structure toward white-collar employment and away from blue-collar jobs. The primary reason for this was the shift in the composition of final demand toward industries that rely heavily on white-collar workers. A secondary reason was a bias in technological change, which favored white-collar over blue-collar workers.     

Forecast in detail

Recent months have seen a significant shift in the UK fiscal backdrop. Statistical changes have caused a significant upward revision to the level of borrowing last year, while muted growth in tax receipts and faster‐than‐expected rises in public spending have pushed up the deficit in 2019–20 to date. Moreover, the political climate has shifted against austerity, with both Conservative and Labour party pledges implying a rising deficit for the foreseeable future.     

UK Overview

We have revised down our forecasts of GDP growth for this year and next, from 2.4% and 2.5% respectively three months ago, to 2.1% and 2.3% now. The downgrades reflect the heightened uncertainty caused by the recent financial market turbulence and the upcoming referendum on the UK's membership of the EU, as well as evidence of softer global growth. We expect the first interest rate hike to come in Q2 2017, with the risks skewed towards a later move.     

Economic Viewpoint: Economic Models and Economic Forecasting: Ptolemaic or Copernican?

Economic forecasters have come in for a lot of criticism in recent months. But this is not new. The failure to predict the boom in 1988 and ensuing inflation and balance of payments problems led to some serious re-examination of the structure of the main macroeconometric models in the UK. The speed with which the UK economy moved into sharp recession in the second half of 1990- also appeared to catch most forecasters on the hop. This Briefing Paper is not directly about forecasting; it is about macroeconometric models. However, forecasting provides by far the most extensive use of these models. Not all macroeconomic forecasters use a formal econometric model - some City economists find a spreadsheet more than adequate - but those that do find that they are an invaluable aid to clear thinking and provide an effective way of filtering all of the information that is available, in one form or another, about the economy. This paper was originally intended to provide a retrospective review of the development of UK macro-models since the late 1970s, coinciding broadly with my period at London Business School. However, it became clear that there was a need to argue more generally in favour of macro-modelling, given the numerous assaults that this activity has sustained over the last 15 years. I want to demonstrate that the conduct of research in this area - at the very least in the UK - has been, and continues to be, a progressive research strategy in the sense in which philosophers of science use this term. I believe that macro-modellers, because they have an obligation to forecast and to make the forecast public, are closer to how theoretical constructs in economics conflict with the observation of economic events, and provide a more robust testing ground for economic theories than the relatively narrow - though very important - confines of single equation statistical testing, that dominate academic journals. This should not mean that every new theoretical idea should be expected to be able to survive immediately the rigours of testing within an existing macro-model. One of the attractions of recent developments in macroeconomic theory has been an explicit attempt to seek to try to reconcile macroeconomics with micro-economic reasoning and to derive macroeconomic principles from how rational, maximizing individuals can be expected to behave in a market economy. There is always a need periodically to re-examine the basic postulates of any area of economics, especially one such as macroeconomics, which provides the basis for the conduct of national and international economic policy, and for providing explanations for economic cycles. Macro-econometric model building is a worthwhile exercise because it confronts theoretical models of how the macro-economy is supposed to work with the hard lessons of experience. The use of these models for forecasting is therefore crucial to their continued growth and development.     

Has the ECB increased interest rates too soon?

Even though the Eurozone recovery is far from entrenched, the ECB decided to raise interest rates towards the end of 2005 and another hike is expected soon. Those in the ECB who have been looking for a reason to start tightening for some time can point to an inflation rate that remains stubbornly above target as a justification. In this article we find that the price rises of non‐energy industrial goods ‐ particularly those for clothing and footwear ‐ have remained very sticky when compared to the deflation seen in countries like the UK. A lack of competitive forces may be an issue ‐ the impact of China and India on goods prices does not seem to be fully feeding through to consumers. And weak productivity in the distribution sector may have prevented retailers from driving down prices to the same extent as in the UK. Does the current ECB action form the start of a prolonged tightening cycle as seen in the US? Despite worries over asset price and credit growth ‐ and here we argue that the ECB's reliance on monetary aggregates as a signal of impending inflation is misguided ‐ there is a possibility that the ECB has acted at the same time that inflation is finally set to subside. Consequently, we expect a "wait and see" approach to further moves, and unless growth comes in much stronger than the 2.2% we expect in 2006, rates should end the year at around 2½%.     

Forecast Summary

A pause in world activity held back UK industry in the first quarter of the year and, even though we expect faster growth from now on, we forecast total output growth of only 2 per cent this year. But next year a stronger world economy and pre-election tax cuts lift growth to 3 1/4per cent. Lower oil prices and falling interest rates help keep inflation at its current level both this year and, as long as wages respond, next. In the medium term we expect the growth rate to fall back but, assuming that a fairly tight fiscal policy is pursued by whichever government is in power, we predict that inflation stays below 3 per cent     

Brexit and immigration

• Net inward migration from the EU has been running at record levels in recent years, although the steep increase in new National Insurance numbers issued suggests that the official data may be understating the level of immigration. There was a clear step up in inflows after both expansions of the EU into central and eastern Europe, while the relative strength of the UK labour market has been an important driver of the more recent rise in inflows.
• High levels of immigration have helped to offset the impact of an ageing population and ensured that the UK has enjoyed stronger labour supply growth than many of its peers. With migrants typically being better educated than their UK‐born counterparts, the quality of the stock of labour has also improved, and migrants have been found to have a net positive fiscal impact.
• But there have been some downsides, with evidence that high immigration has had a small dampening impact on wages. That migrants tend to head to London and the other southern regions over other destinations has exacerbated the imbalances in regional housing markets.
• Given that a desire to have greater control over immigration is usually one of the key motivations for those favouring Brexit, a vote in favour of leaving the EU is likely to see the UK abandon the policy of free movement of labour. This would probably see the UK extend the points‐based system that it currently uses for non‐EU countries to include EU migrants.
• Our modelling suggests that the adoption of a ‘populist’ immigration policy which lowers net inward migration by 60,000 a year could reduce the level of GDP by 1.1% in 2030 compared with our baseline forecast.

     

How tight is the UK labour market?

With the unemployment rate touching 25-year lows and some signs of a pick-up in earnings growth, concern has again focussed on how much scope the labour market has to meet the requirements of the above-trend growth forecast for the UK. This article by David Tinsley reviews some of the evidence for how 'tight' the UK labour market is. It suggests that, although the labour market has probably tightened over the last year or so, the headline figures give a somewhat misleading picture. It goes on to argue that there are a number of other margins for adjustment by which the demands of the robust growth forecast for the UK over the next few years can be met without igniting significant inflationary pressure.     

Tighter labour markets to finally lift global wages

• Wage growth has been relatively slow since 2007 in advanced economies, but an upturn may be in sight. Slow productivity growth remains an issue but tighter labour markets make a positive response by wages to rising inflation more likely and there are signs that compositional and crisis‐related effects that dragged wage growth down are fading – though Japan may be an exception.
• Overall, our forecasts are for a moderate improvement in wage growth in the major economies in 2017–18, with the pace of growth rising by 0.5–1% per year relative to its 2016 level by 2018 – enough to keep consumer spending reasonably solid.
• Few countries have maintained their pre‐crisis pace of wage growth since 2007. In part this reflects a mixture of low inflation and weak productivity growth, but other factors have also been in play: in the US and Japan wage growth has run as much as 0.5–1% per year lower than conventional models would suggest.
• The link with productivity seems to have weakened since 2007 and Phillips curves – which relate wages to unemployment – have become flatter. A notable exception is Germany, where the labour market has behaved in a much more ‘normal’ fashion over recent years with wage growth responding to diminishing slack.
• ‘Compositional’ factors related to shifts in the structure of the workforce may have had an important influence in holding down wage growth, cutting it by as much as 2% per year in the US and 1% per year in the UK. There are some signs that the impact of these effects in the UK and US are fading, but not in Japan.
• The forecast rise in inflation over the next year as energy price base effects turn positive is a potential risk to real wages. But the decline in measures of labour market slack in the US, UK and Germany suggests wages are more likely to move up with inflation than was the case in 2010–11 when oil prices spiked and real wages fell.

     

Impact of EU exit on our UK industry forecasts

• We have lowered our forecast for UK economic growth following the vote to leave the EU on 23 June. GDP growth is now forecast at 1.1% in 2017 and 1.4% in 2018, and the medium‐term outlook has also been nudged down. We have also lowered our forecast for all of the main industrial sectors, with the biggest reductions in the long‐term forecasts for construction and manufacturing, although the weak pound could provide some short‐term boost to the latter.
• Our baseline forecast assumes that the government triggers Article 50 by the end of this year and that the UK leaves the EU by end‐2018. We assume that the government draws a red line under the freedom of movement and thus loses access to the single market. Trade relations revert to WTO rules.
• A number of factors determine the relative impact on each sector. First, in the short term, heightened uncertainty will hit business confidence, causing firms to delay capital spending. Second, less favourable trade relations with the EU could see export‐oriented sectors migrate production away from the UK. Finally, restrictions on migration will reduce the potential size of the labour force.
• Consequently, investment‐oriented sectors such as construction and machinery have seen some of the largest downgrades. Moreover, transport equipment is heavily exported to Europe, so increased trade barriers could see some production move out of the UK. Meanwhile, labour shortages could weaken growth prospects in labour‐dependent sectors. In addition, the vote has created uncertainties around the long‐term viability of London as Europe's major financial centre.
• The outlook for more consumer‐focused sectors is less downbeat, although an uptick in inflation may erode household purchasing power in the near‐term, and the multipliers from lower economic activity are likely to permanently reduce household incomes in the long term relative to our last baseline

     

The myths and realities of structural change in the UK labour market

Recent discussion of developments within the UK labour market has highlighted the growth of more 'flexible' types of employment: part-time work, temporary jobs, and self-employment. The structure of employment has also been shifting – away from manufacturing and manual employment and towards the service sector and non-manual employment. In this article, Peter Robinson argues that these are not new developments and in some respects the pace of structural change in the labour market has slowed down. Together with evidence that the labour market is now adapting successfully to earlier structural changes, this bodes well for the prospect of further gradual reductions in unemployment.