The Impact of Industry Structure and Penalty Policies on Incentives for Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement

This paper examines the optimal fine for violations of environmental regulations, taking into account financial constraints facing regulated firms and the hierarchical structure of regulatory enforcement. Contrary to the existing literature, which suggests that maximal fines are sub-optimal, we find that the optimal fine is either the maximum amount the firm can afford to pay or zero (i.e., no regulation). The impact of a change in industry structure on the optimal fine, firm compliance and regulatory resource strategies is considered. We identify conditions under which the equilibrium level of regulatory resources decreases with an increase in the number of firms in the industry.     

When green isn't mean: economic theory and the heuristics of the impact of environmental regulations on competitiveness and opportunity cost

The conventional neoclassical economic wisdom argues that the opportunity costs of environmental regulations are high, with negative implications for costs and profits and, by implication, for growth and per capita gross domestic product (GDP). The minority view that environmental controls induce cost offsets that minimise such opportunity costs is marginalised by the conventional wisdom, which assumes that economic agents are x-efficient in production. A behavioral model of the firm is presented in this paper, whereby x-inefficiency in production prevails even in a world of perfect product market competition that is dominated by rational economic agents. In this model, environmental regulations affect both the level of x-efficiency and the extent of technological change and greener firms can be cost competitive and profitable. However, private economic agents cannot be expected to adopt ‘Green’ economic policy independent of regulations since, in this model, there need not be any economic advantage accruing to the affected firms in becoming greener.     

Environmental regulation and technology transfers

This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign firm with advanced abatement technology to license it to a domestic firm without this technology. Furthermore, when the domestic firm's production technology is less efficient than that of the foreign firm, the foreign firm may freely reveal its technology to the domestic firm. These improvements through the voluntary transfer of technology imply that environmental regulations have positive impacts on innovation.     

Effects of vertical integration on price and volume: An empirical inquiry

A simple model with two stages of production is used for deriving some empirically testable hypotheses. Firms (two upstream and two downstream) in the industry are either vertically integrated or not, hence the industry has three alternative patterns: Complete unintegrated, partially integrated, or fully integrated.Final good prices, outputs and profits of firms are different in each integration pattern but what is optimal can not be stated (i.e., pay-offs are much too complicated in order to solve the sub-game equilibrium).The essential feature of the model is that there are external markets for the intermediate inputs. Hence input trade between the four firms/divisions need not balance since excess supply or demand is traded at the external market. With this feature purely downstream exogenous shocks have no effect on upstream pricing nor production decisions if all four firms are unintegrated. Such exogenous shocks have non-zero effects if at least one firm is vertically integrated. There are also other dissimilarities in comparative statics of each industry integration pattern.An indirect method to test the effects of vertical integration on price and volume is presented and empirically tested. Depending on the vertical integration pattern of an industry exogenous shocks have dissimilar effects on prices and outputs of the final and intermediate good. A four equations system is estimated by using Finnish forest industry firm data. Final good demand rise has a reducing effect on both paper and pulp prices. Stumpage prices (upstream marginal costs) have a negative impact on paper and pulp production and a positive impact on prices. These effects from upstream (downstream) stage into downstream (upstream) market should not occur when all firms are unintegrated.This is a revised version of a paper which was presented at seminars at Brussels, Turku, Vienna, and Stuttgart. I would like to thank seminar participants (specially Frank Schmid) and anonymous referees for helpful comments. Financial support from the Marcus Wallenberg Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve

In the political discussion, it is often emphasized that the environmental service industry (which produces a clean factor of production) benefits from an early and strong environmental policy. This is especially likely if the costs of production are decreasing over time due to learning curve effects. Surprisingly, the environmental service industry has not been integrated into the theory of strategic environmental policy yet. Our main question is whether a national leadership in environmental policy can pay off if profits of the environmental service industry are taken into account. We consider a two-period model with one firm in each country competing on a third market. Emissions can be substituted by the clean factor when deciding upon the production technology. The unit costs of producing the clean factor in the second period are decreasing in the quantity produced in the initial period. We derive the optimal environmental policy for both periods from a national point of view and show that the presence of the environmental service industry can indeed lead to a national leadership in pollution control.     

Does it pay firms to register for taxes? The impact of formality on firm profitability

This paper estimates the impact of registering for taxes on firm profits in Bolivia, the country with the highest levels of informality in Latin America. A new survey of micro and small firms enables us to control for a rich set of measures of owner ability and business motivations that can affect both profits and the decision to formalize. We identify the impact of tax registration on business profitability using the distance of a firm from the tax office where registration occurs, conditional on the distance to the city center, as an instrument for registration. Proximity to the tax office provides firms with more information about registration, but is argued to not directly affect profits. We find tax registration leads to significantly higher profits for the firms that the instrument affects. However, we also find some evidence of heterogeneous effects of tax formality on profits. Tax registration appears to increase profits for the mid-sized firms in our sample, but to lower profits for both the marginal smaller and larger firms, in contrast to the standard view that formality increases profits. We show that owners of large firms who have managed to stay informal are of higher entrepreneurial ability than formal firm owners, in contrast to the standard view (correct among smaller firms) that informal firm owners are low ability.     

Did the Invisible Hand Need a Regulatory Glove to Develop a Green Thumb? Some Historical Perspective on Market Incentives,Win-Win Innovations and the Porter Hypothesis

The idea that properly designed environmental regulations can improve a firm’s competitiveness while simultaneously contributing to a cleaner environment through the development of so-called ‘win-win’ innovations (i.e., that reduce environmental damage while simultaneously increasing profits) is usually credited to Porter (1991). Numerous studies have since attempted to assess the validity of the concept, with mixed results. This paper contributes to this debate by surveying a nearly forgotten body of literature written in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that discussed the impact of market incentives on the development of valuable by-products out of industrial waste. Based on the opinions held by several industrial chemists, engineers, technical journalists and economists, the development of ‘win-win’ manufacturing practices seems to have been primarily the result of the profit motive, although actual or potential legal actions based on private property rights and/or government regulations occasionally triggered this process. After reviewing some important historical writings on the latter issue, a suggestion is made that perhaps the best way to craft ‘well-designed’ environmental regulations is to return to a private property rights approach to mitigating pollution problems whenever possible.      

Temporary shocks and offshoring: The role of external economies and firm heterogeneity

We construct a model of offshoring with externalities and firm heterogeneity. Due to the presence of externalities, temporary shocks like the Y2K problem can have permanent effects, i.e., they can permanently raise the extent of offshoring in an industry. Also, the initial advantage of a country as a potential host for outsourcing activities can create a lock in effect, whereby late movers have a comparative disadvantage. Furthermore, the existence of firm heterogeneity along with externalities can help explain the dynamic process of offshoring, where the most productive firms offshore first and the others follow later. Finally, we work out some unexpected welfare implications which show that net industry profits can be lower in an outsourcing equilibrium than in a regime of no outsourcing. Consumer welfare rises, and under fairly plausible conditions this effect can offset the negative impact on profits.     

外商直接投资与环境规制关联机制的面板数据分析

利用Panel Data模型和时间序列模型对我国各地区外商直接投资与环境规制之间的关联机制作了实证分析。计量结果显示,环境规制确实对我国各个地区引进外资具有一定影响,而且这种影响呈现为负效应,“污染天堂假说”在一定程度上存在。当然,影响外商直接投资的决定因素主要是地理区位、经济发展水平和市场化进程,而劳动力成本也逐渐成为外商企业投资选址时考虑的因素。该研究结果具有重要的政策含义,即在中国各个地方政府在引进外资时,FDI对当地环境的负面影响需要逐渐引起各级地方政府在环境保护和政策制定过程中一定程度的关注。     

STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS*

A firm which lobbies government for a change in policy, say an import tariff, can increase its profits in two ways. First, the policy can increase the profits of all firms in the industry. This effect therefore involves a free-rider problem. Second, a firm's lobbying expenditures may signal other firms about its costs and interests. For example, a firm with low marginal costs may profit much from an import ban. Other firms which see that this firm expects to profit much from the ban may decide not to enter the industry. This may further increase the low-cost firm's profits.     

Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment

We study incentives to vertically integrate in an industry with vertically differentiated downstream firms. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased production costs negatively affects quality investment both by the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival. Quality investment by both firms decreases under any (vertical integration) scenario. The decrease in quality invesment by both firms softens competition among downstream firms. By integrating first, a firm always produces the high quality good and earns higher profits. A fully integrated industry, with increased product differentiation, is observed in equilibrium. Due to increase in firm profits, social welfare under this structure is greater than under no integration.     

Stock market response to environmental policies: Evidence from heavily polluting firms in China

Pollution problems have recently become prominent in China, which has not only amplified public concerns on environmental protection but has also pushed the Chinese government to enforce more stringent environmental regulation. In this paper, we investigate the stock market response to the release of new environmental policies in China from the perspective of investor attention. By using the event study methodology, we assess the impact of 10 environmental policies issued by the central government over the period of 2014–2017. We find consistent evidence that the announcement of new environmental policies hurts the stock returns of heavily polluting firms in the short term. Meanwhile, compared to environmental regulations, environmental laws result in more adverse market reactions due to stricter policy enforcement. More importantly, investor attention to the environment issues, as measured by the Baidu Index, plays an essential role in predicting the stock market response, as we find a higher Baidu Index leads to lower stock returns for heavily polluting firms. Heterogeneity analyses further reveal the negative impact of environmental policies on market value is contingent on firm characteristics such as size, ownership structure, profitability and industry.     

Trade Liberalization and Heterogeneous Technology Investments

We propose a trade model where heterogeneous firms decide on a productivity‐enhancing technology investment. The model analyzes the impact of multilateral trade liberalization on firm‐ and industry‐level productivity. Freer trade increases the incentives to invest in technology by raising export profits. It also dampens these incentives, however, as profits stemming from domestic sales are reduced. Only exporters benefit from the former positive effect. The shape of the distribution of efficiency draws, the level of trade costs and the technology intensity of the industry are key elements removing the ambiguities regarding the net impact of trade liberalization.     

The impact of environmental policy on international competitiveness in manufacturing

The aim of this study is to test the hypothesis that environmental stringency adversely affects the international competitiveness (net exports) in manufacturing sectors. The model follows the standard factor endowment approach to explain the effects of environmental regulatory policy on net exports in different product-based industries. An econometric model is constructed, which includes factor endowments and environmental regulations to examine how strict environmental policies impact export competitiveness. A panel dataset of 10 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, over 17 years, 1987–2003, was constructed for the modelling effort. The study finds that environmental regulations can be a way to combat the flight of manufacturing out of developed countries if the output from these industries can be identified as environmentally friendly. A positive relationship between net exports and environmental regulations was found for paper products, wood products and textile products. However, most manufacturing industries are harmed by increased environmental regulations.     

When do firms support environmental agreements?

Several firms have recently supported their countries’ participation in international environmental agreements where countries commit to stricter environmental regulation. This paper analyzes the rationale of this conduct by examining equilibrium emission standards with and without environmental treaties. We identify that more stringent environmental regulation produces two effects on firm profits: a negative effect due to larger abatement costs, and a positive effect that arises from the amelioration of duopoly overproduction. We describe under which conditions the positive effect dominates the negative effect, increasing firm profits, and inducing them to support their countries’ participation in environmental treaties.     

Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship

This paper investigates the effects of bargaining power on downstream firms’ profits. Consider a vertically related industry consisting of one upstream and two downstream firms, the latter having different marginal costs. Each pair bargains over a linear wholesale price, and then the downstream firms engage in Cournot competition. We show that the inefficient downstream firm may benefit from an increase in the bargaining power of the upstream firm. Furthermore, we obtain similar results when each downstream firm trades with its exclusive upstream agent, under non-linear demand function, or when downstream firms compete in price.     

Corporate Investment and Information Technologies: The Case of the Greek Refining Industry

The need to improve competitiveness and the enforcement of stringent environmental regulations created the need for the technological modernization of the Greek oil refining industry. The emphasis in this paper is on the pattern of investment decisions, the linkages between the acquisition of production processes and supporting IT applications and on the influence exercised by new technological investment projects on the availability of endogenous resources required to facilitate the adoption of technical change at the firm level. The Greek experience suggests that the role of IT application is becoming increasingly important in large-scale investment projects. The successful implementation of these projects depends, to a large extent, on the learning processes and the accumulation of knowledge at the firm level. These learning processes are directly linked to the specific requirements of the production process and our evidence support that there is a lack of positive feedback between administrative applications and the successful introduction of new manufacturing technologies.     

Corporate Investment and Information Technologies: The Case of the Greek Refining Industry

The need to improve competitiveness and the enforcement of stringent environmental regulations created the need for the technological modernization of the Greek oil refining industry. The emphasis in this paper is on the pattern of investment decisions, the linkages between the acquisition of production processes and supporting IT applications and on the influence exercised by new technological investment projects on the availability of endogenous resources required to facilitate the adoption of technical change at the firm level. The Greek experience suggests that the role of IT application is becoming increasingly important in large-scale investment projects. The successful implementation of these projects depends, to a large extent, on the learning processes and the accumulation of knowledge at the firm level. These learning processes are directly linked to the specific requirements of the production process and our evidence support that there is a lack of positive feedback between administrative applications and the successful introduction of new manufacturing technologies.     

Do data policy restrictions impact the productivity performance of firms and industries?

This paper examines how policies regulating the cross‐border movement and domestic use of electronic data on the internet impact the productivity of firms in sectors relying on electronic data. In doing so, we collect regulatory information on a group of developed economies and create an index that measures the regulatory restrictiveness of each country's data policies. The index is based on observable policy measures that explicitly inhibit the cross‐border movement and domestic use of data. Using cross‐country firm‐level and industry‐level data, we analyse econometrically the extent to which these data regulations over time impact the productivity performance of downstream firms and industries, respectively. We show that stricter data policies have a negative and significant impact on the performance of downstream firms in sectors reliant on electronic data. This adverse effect is stronger for countries with strong technology networks, for servicified firms, and holds for several robustness checks.     

Monopolization through endogenous vertical mergers

While endogenous merger analysis has been applied to horizontal mergers, the thrust of vertical merger analysis has been based on exogenous mergers. The goal of this paper is to analyze endogenous vertical mergers. I consider a market structure with a downstream monopolist and an oligopolistic upstream industry. The downstream monopolist chooses to buy a certain number of the upstream firms. Mergers are endogenous, in the sense that the bids made by the downstream firm must be accepted by each of the integrated upstream firms, and must not exceed the increase in the profits of the downstream firm. It is shown that the unique equilibrium is complete monopolization: the buyer buys all the firms in the upstream industry. This result is consistent with the result that vertical mergers are profitable. However, it is in contrast with horizontal endogenous mergers, where complete monopolization is generally not an equilibrium.