Modeling coordinated foreign exchange market interventions: The case of the Japanese and U.S. interventions in the 1990s

During the past thirty years, central banks often intervened in foreign exchange markets. Sometimes they carried out foreign exchange market interventions on a unilateral basis. However, central banks often coordinated their foreign exchange market interventions. We develop a quantitative reaction function model that renders it possible to study the factors that made central banks switch from unilateral to coordinated interventions. We apply our model to the intervention policies of the Japanese monetary authorities and the U.S. Federal Reserve in the yen/U.S. dollar market during the period 1991–2001. To this end, we use recently released official data on the foreign exchange market interventions of the Japanese monetary authorities. JEL no. F31, F33, G14, G15     

The evolution of the monetary system: Future possibilities

Summary This article discusses in the first place the functioning of floating exchange rates; the tendency to volatility and to unnecessary fluctuations is explained. The conclusion is drawn that the authorities of the main countries should cooperate in exchange rate policies that would bring about a greater stability in exchange rate movements. The article then sketches the historical development which brought us to the present multiple reserve currency system. The functioning of this system is analysed and some suggestions are presented for a more satisfactory management of this system by central banks, possibly along guidelines tobe developed in the IMF. Finally some possibilities are outlined to develop a stabler and better system in the future by creating a more attractive market-oriented SDR-substitution account in the IMF. This article is based on important parts of two speeches which I have given recently: ‘The changing monetary system; evolution and reform’ (20 years' anniversary Central Bank of Malaysia, Feb. 1979) ‘Managing reserves in the 1980s’ (Second International Monetary Conference, Philadelphia, Nov. 1980).     

Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?

Granting central banks independence is widely assumed to decreaseinflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to pricestability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behaviorin a sample of 17 OECD countries for evidence of variationsin disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions. Thepaper does not find evidence that the costs of disinflationare lower in countries with independent central banks. It alsofinds no evidence that independence inhibits collection of seignoragerevenues or electoral manipulation of policy. These resultsraise questions about some explanations of the negative correlationbetween central bank independence and inflation.     

Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.     

The Institutional Foundations of Monetary Commitment: A Comparative Analysis

This paper adopts an institutional perspective on the problem of designing governance structures for restraining monetary policy. This perspective broadens the standard literature on central bank independence in several dimensions. First, although it recognizes that an independent central bank is one important institutional arrangement, it also considers a much broader variety of institutional arrangements that have been used (historically and today) to restrain monetary policy. Second, it considers not only the formal or legal institutional arrangements governing monetary policy, but also the broader environment, or institutional endowment, in which those formal arrangements are embedded. Third, this paper is concerned with the problem of enforcement: given the institutional endowment in which formal monetary rules are implemented, how likely are they to stick? Broadening the perspective in these ways frames the issue as a matching problem. When it is recognized both that countries differ in the nature of their institutional endowments, and that there is an array of possible formal arrangements that can be adopted to govern monetary policy, the question then becomes how best to align the formal arrangements with the endowment in which they will be embedded. Case studies of diverse monetary policy-making institutions in Côte d'Ivoire, Argentina, Thailand and New Zealand are used to motivate and illustrate the analysis.     

Delegation and Fiscal Policy in the Open Economy: More Bad News for Rogoff's Delegation Game

This article studies the open-economy Rogoff delegation game, taking into account both intra-country and intercountry interactions between fiscal authorities and central banks. With representative bankers, the Nash equilibrium of fiscal and monetary authorities independently responding to supply-side shocks sees insufficient monetary adjustment and an imbalance towards fiscal stabilization if shocks are sufficiently symmetric; the opposite occurs if shocks are sufficiently asymmetric. Appointing conservative bankers shifts the fiscal–monetary balance away from monetary towards fiscal policy. Unilateral delegation benefits that country; but when all countries independently delegate, the outcome is only favorable if shocks are sufficiently asymmetric.     

Deciding to Peg the Exchange Rate in Developing Countries: The Role of Private-Sector Debt

We argue that a higher share of the private sector in a country’s external debt raises the incentive to stabilize the exchange rate. We present a simple model in which exchange rate volatility does not affect agents’ welfare if all the debt is incurred by the government. Once we introduce private banks who borrow in foreign currency and lend to domestic firms, the monetary authority has an incentive to dampen the distributional consequences of exchange rate fluctuations. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that not only the level, but also the composition of foreign debt matters for exchange-rate policy.     

货币政策透明性制度的国际比较:以央行沟通方式为基调

自20世纪90年代末期以来,世界绝大多数央行的货币政策透明性有了显著提高,但是未表现出一致性收敛特征。各国央行的货币政策信息沟通面临着不同程度的现实约束,有的央行在某些方面透明性还非常有限。在央行信息沟通方面还有许多值得研究的策略性、细节性技巧,处理不当就可能损害央行信誉。我国货币政策透明度还处于较低水平,需要进一步提高。     

The Evolution of Australian Monetary Policy in the 1950s

The 1950s in Australia was a decade of major change in both central banking and the financial system. The changes fed upon one another: financial innovation responded to monetary policy; the authorities adapted their strategy in response. The private banks resisted the harnessing of their balance sheets to policy, and a protracted process of conflict and compromise unfolded. Meanwhile, the growth of non‐bank financial institutions undermined bank‐centred policy. Official controls on bank interest rates opened a space for the new intermediaries. The central bank's attempt to restrain their growth contributed to a credit squeeze at the turn of the 1960s.     

Fiscal-monetary Interactions: The Effect of Fiscal Restraint and Public Monitoring on Central Bank Credibility

This paper offers new insights into the interactions between private agents, the government, and a central bank, and their effect on the outcomes of monetary policy. In a simple game theoretic model we show that, unless there is public monitoring, impatient governments will be tempted to override or outmaneuver the central bank and create surprise inflation to boost output. This both undermines the government’s reputation for sound fiscal policies and reduces the central bank’s credibility. The result is not only higher and more volatile inflation but also sub-optimal output. More importantly, it is also shown that this is likely to occur even if the central banker is fully independent and the government is always patient. In contrast, if the public monitors sufficiently carefully, the central bank is never overridden and monetary policy can be credible even under an impatient government. We derive the general conditions under which each scenario occurs and then relate them to the developments in central banking over the past two decades, most notably to the trends towards greater independence, explicit inflation targeting, clearer communication and transparency. Interestingly, transparency is shown to reduce the variability of both inflation and output (by reducing the monitoring cost and making public monitoring more likely) which is in contrast to the usual transparency literature with a single policymaker which supposes a transparency-volatility trade-off.

The optimal exchange rate regime for a small country

This paper examines the welfare comparisons between a freely floating, a managed floating, and a pegged exchange rate regime. We compare the expected loss under these regimes by modifying and generalizing Hamada’s (2002) model to accommodate intervention policy. We consider the de jure and de facto classifications, where the former is defined by the officially stated intentions of the monetary authorities, while the latter is based on the actually observed behavior of the nominal exchange rate. We first examine the exchange rate regimes from the central bank’s policy stance and the actual exchange rate policy. Next we assume that the regime which the private sector perceives according to an official announcement may be different from the one adopted actually by the central bank. We examine nine combinations of the de jure and de facto regimes. We interpret that, whenever they are different, there is informational friction between the central bank and the private sector. We show that the welfare level of a small country under freely floating is no less than that under other regimes, and that with some restrictive conditions, the de facto pegged or de facto managed floating is close to freely floating. This partly explains “Fear of floating” and “Fear of pegging”.     

ARE AFRICAN CENTRAL BANKS SUFFICIENTLY INDEPENDENT FOR MONETARY CONVERGENCE?

Central bank independence (CBI) is currently a widely debated and topical issue commanding the centre point of many economical and political debates, filling the pages of many scholarly journals. Both central bank independence and accountability are currently regarded as necessary best practices for achieving price stability. The importance of CBI rests on the premise that inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon, and that the cost of reducing inflation can be lowered by an independent central bank with credibility. Support for CBI also stems from the argument that the power to create money should generally be separated from the power to spend it. This is even more relevant for countries with weak political institutions. However, various studies (cited below) detected lower inflation in those countries where independence of their central banks is the strongest. Countries all over – including some on the African continent – have increased the independence of their central banks accordingly.     

On Monetary Analysis of Derivatives

Financial derivatives are products whose price is linked with that of an underlying asset. The relationship between these two prices has been studied in depth, and the following conclusions have been reached: (1) the volatility of underlying asset's price decreases after the introduction of derivatives, (2) the price discovery effect improves, (3) the liquidity of the underlying asset's market increases, (4) the bid-ask spread decreases together, and (5) the noise component of prices decreases. Those results are microeconomic and are not coherent with a macroeconomic analysis of derivatives. Derivatives tend to change the effectiveness of monetary policy actions by modifying the instruments that can be used. Derivatives have a monetary nature that has not been yet recognized by central banks and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements. This monetary nature can be evident by testing the relationship between derivatives and the interest rate. The consciousness of the monetary nature of derivatives would impose the quantification of transactions at least by the institutions that hold them, such as banks and other financial operators, and consequently by national authorities.     

Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability

We analyse the issue of central bank accountability with the aid of a simple monetary policy game with uncertainty about the agent's inflation stabilisation preferences. We find that there may be an important economic role for accountability in addition to its political function of making the central bank answerable to voters through its accountability to the executive. The model suggests that for countries with relatively little central bank independence, or perhaps a poor inflationary track record, significant reductions in inflation can be achieved by lowering monetary policy uncertainty. These reductions are much smaller for inflation-averse central banks, when monetary policy uncertainty is reduced by the same absolute amount. Thus, the effectiveness of accountability – as a means of lowering both inflation and inflation uncertainty – is higher the lower the degree of central bank conservativeness.     

Is Numérairology the Future of Monetary Economics?

The paper discusses some fundamental problems in monetary economics associated with the determination and role of the numéraire. The issues are introduced by formalising a proposal, attributed to Eisler, to remove the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates by unbundling the numéraire and medium of exchange/means of payment functions of money. The monetary authorities manage the exchange rate between the numéraire (‘sterling’) and the means of payment (‘drachma’). The short nominal interest rate on sterling bonds can then be used to target stability for the sterling price level. The paper puts question marks behind two key bits of conventional wisdom in contemporary monetary economics. The first is the assumption that the monetary authorities define and determine the numéraire used in private transactions. The second is the proposition that price stability in terms of that numéraire is the appropriate objective of monetary policy. The paper also discusses the merits of the next step following the decoupling of the numéraire from the currency: doing away with currency altogether—the cashless economy. Because the unit of account plays such a central role in New-Keynesian models with nominal rigidities, monetary economics needs to devote more attention to numérairology—the study of the individual and collective choice processes that govern the adoption of a unit of account and its role in economic behaviour.

The Impact of EMU on Inflation Expectations

This paper analyses the impact of the monetary regime change from the Bundesbank to the ECB on inflation expectations. In the theoretical part, the Barro-Gordon model is used to derive the potential effect of a new central bank on inflation and inflation expectations. The econometric investigation is based on a flexible specification of expectation formation which allows both for rational and adaptive elements. The results indicate that the monetary regime change did not have a strong and lasting impact on the formation of inflation expectations and that the credibility of both central banks is not perceived to differ significantly anymore. JEL Classification Numbers: E 58, E 31     

Transatlantic Trade-Offs in the Age of Balanced Budgets and European Monetary Union

We develop a model of monetary and fiscal policies appropriate for considering U.S.-European policy interactions in an era of near-balanced budgets and European monetary union. We study the determinants of policy trade-offs and incentives for central banks and governments across the Atlantic. Smaller, more open economies face more favorable trade-offs, since openness enhances policy effectiveness via the exchange-rate channel. Changes in Europe's monetary arrangements do not affect U.S. trade-offs, although they alter the trade-offs facing European policy-makers. Fiscal trade-offs depend crucially on the extent to which fiscal policy is distortionary. Changes in taxes and spending move both employment and inflation in the desired direction following a worldwide supply shock when spending is financed with distortionary taxes.     

Introducing Instruments of Central Bank Accountability in a Monetary Union

With an increasing number of independent central banks, accountability of central banks is also getting more attention. This paper analyses the possibility of introducing instruments of central bank accountability in a monetary union. In our model, monetary policy is influenced by the governments of the member states according to the degree of independence granted to the central bank. Instruments of democratic accountability are introduced which generate different expected losses for a government. The amount of the expected loss will determine the approval of a government to the implementation of a particular mechanism. We show that the agreement between the governments will only be unanimous for the definition of the inflation target of the central bank.

Joining the European Monetary Union—Comparing First and Second Generation Open Economy Models

We log-linearise the Dellas and Tavlas (DT) model of monetary union and solve it analytically. We find that the intuition of optimal currency area analysis of DT’s second generation open economy model is essentially the same as that of first generation models. Monetary union results in no welfare loss if its member states are symmetric. However, asymmetry causes loss in welfare both due to the failure of the union policy to deal suitably with a country’s asymmetric shocks and due to an active monetary policy by the union in pursuit of its distinct objectives. The asymmetry in DT is largely due to the differing wage rigidities across countries. JEL Classification Numbers: F41, F42, E4     

Controlling inflation in transition economies: The relevance of central bank independence and the right nominal anchor

Controlling inflation is a central problem in transition economies. This paper asks under what conditions or even whether central bank independence helps in this task. The conclusion shows that merely imposing legal independence on the central bank may be ineffective or even counterproductive. It is necessary to make a monetary strategy and the responsibilities and restrictions of central bank policy transparent to the public. In addition, it is important that the right nominal anchor is selected—one that is, or is believed to be, effective and sustainable. Both monetary targeting and inflation targeting are assumed to be unsuitable for most transition countries. Instead, some kind of dynamic exchange rate targeting appears to be the most reasonable choice.