The effects of wind generation capacity on electricity prices and generation costs: a Monte Carlo analysis

We use Monte Carlo analysis to examine the potential of increased renewable generation to provide a hedge against variability in energy prices and costs. Fuel costs, electricity demand and wind generation are allowed to vary and a unit commitment and economic dispatch algorithm is employed to produce cost-minimizing generation schedules under different levels of installed wind capacity. Increased wind capacity reduces the mean and the variance of production costs but only the variance of electricity prices. Wind generators see their market revenues increase while consumer payments and fossil generator profits do not considerably vary as wind capacity increases. Risk aversion is captured by considering the conditional value-at-risk for both consumers and producers. The optimal level of wind generation increases as risk aversion increases due to the potential of wind to act as a hedge against very high electricity prices in high fuel price scenarios.     

Deregulation,news releases,and price discovery

We hypothesize that the firm’s regulatory environment influences the sensitivity of its equity value to information. Using intraday stock price data of utilities operating in differing regulatory environments we test for systematic differences between the responsiveness of stock prices of utility firms operating in deregulated and regulated environments to a common information set. Our findings reveal sharp differences in responses, with those of utilities operating in deregulated environments the strongest, and the responses of utilities in highly regulated environments the weakest. While the evidence supports our hypothesis, in a broader sense, the evidence suggests that deregulation aids in the process of price discovery. We also find evidence that suggests that deregulation, per se, does not lead to higher stock price volatility.      

Fuel inventory and price relationships in the U.S. electric power sector under regulatory and market change

Long-run relationships among coal inventories at U.S. electric power plants, corporate bond rates and coal, natural gas, and electricity prices are estimated over the period July 1976 to October 2014. Tests for constancy of the long-run relationships show periods of instability which coincide with major regulatory events in the electric power sector. Deregulation of the natural gas and electricity markets are likely sources of instability for the period mid-1994 to mid-2001. Additionally, inventory behavior may have had a smoothing effect over instability caused by natural gas prices during the recent U.S. shale boom. Policy makers should be aware that altering the regulatory environment can result in considerable fluctuations in how firms’ inventory decisions interact with input and output markets and opportunity costs in the long run.     

Wholesale Spot Price Pass-Through

It has been proposed that, when electricity markets open to retail competition, incumbent distribution utilities should be required to sell to residential customers at wholesale spot market prices. It is argued here that this overestimates the value of spot-price sales to customers, and underestimates the costs and disadvantages of the proposed policy. Experience in San Diego illustrates the problems. But other policies such as shopping credits have deficiencies too. An alternative approach, based on transitional maximum price caps, has facilitated the development of a competitive and fully deregulated residential retail market in the United Kingdom.     

Decoupling in electric utilities

Distributing electricity to users has been covered through the charge per kilowatt-hour for electricity used. Conservation advocates have promoted policies that “decouple” distribution revenues or profits from the amount of electricity delivered, claiming that usage-based pricing leads utilities to encourage use and discourage conservation. Because decoupling separates profits from conduct, it runs against the dominant finding in regulatory economics in the last 20 years—that incentive-based regulation outperforms rate-of-return profit guarantees. Even if distribution costs are independent of use, some usage charges can be efficient. Price-cap regulation may distort incentives to inform consumers about energy efficiency—getting more performance from less electricity. Utilities will subsidize efficiency investments, but only when prices are too low. If consumers fail to adopt energy efficiency measures that would be individually beneficial, decoupling can increase welfare, but only if all energy revenues are separated from use, not just those associated with distribution.     

Price Discrimination, Regulation and Entry in the UK Residential Electricity Market

The residential electricity market in Great Britain has recently been opened to competition and is served by 14 regional incumbents, and up to 15 entrants in each area. This study finds that the incumbents' regulated prices are discriminatory between consumers using different payment methods, and that firms are practising third‐degree price discrimination between areas. The authors discuss the implications for regulatory policy both in the UK and in other countries where electricity markets are being deregulated.     

THE EFFECTS OF FIRM BOUNDARY AND FINANCING CONSTRAINTS ON UTILITY COSTS: THE CASE OF MUNICIPALLY OWNED ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES

ABSTRACT: A number of studies have examined costs and potential for scale and scope economies in electricity distribution; however, few if any, have examined this area in terms of the unique constraints associated with municipal ownership or historical and regulatory constraints associated with former municipal ownership. This paper focuses on 19 distribution‐only municipally owned utilities for a ten‐year period (1988–97). Distortions from variable outputs but largely fixed inputs are minimized. The data used were collected specifically to assess productivity, cost, and efficiency performance and include value‐based capital inputs and service prices. Outputs include energy conveyed and number of connections; inputs include capital, system losses, labour, and materials. We examine the effect of using third‐party financing (e.g., connection charges), with its inherent principal‐agent problems, on utility costs, as well as the effect of shared services and multi‐utility output (e.g., electricity and water). A translog total cost function is estimated. Our findings suggest significant returns to scope but also significant increases in costs associated with the use of third‐party financing. The results also suggest scale diseconomies. Shared outputs, which have been greatly restricted or eliminated under restructuring, may have provided larger, and now lost, economies than the scale returns blindly pursued by some through restructuring or incented/forced mergers or divestitures. Finally, it is clear that third‐party financing can raise costs; such financing is widely used among utilities providing electricity, gas, water, and telecommunications, and should be closely scrutinized.     

PRICING FOR WATER CONSERVATION

Water utilities tend not to use prices to encourage conservation. Many utilities still use declining block rates. Even after switching to ascending blocks, however, some have hookup charges that amount to fixed charges of more than half the cost of water. Converting the hookup charge from aflat amount to an amount based on actual water use could lead to substantial savings in usage and cost. In Denver, where a hookup charge now is equivalent to $400 per year added to one's mortgage, the savings in usage that would result from a usage-based hookup charge are estimated at between 9 and 32 percent of total use. A usage-based hookup charge would substitute for a proposed dam costing more than $500 million. Structuring prices to control usage would be far simpler than implementing the conservation programs now being proposed in some water utilities, would result in lower water costs for anyone desiring lower costs, and would allow individuals to choose whether to conserve but require them to pay the costs of their decision.     

AGENCY COSTS OF THIRD-PARTY FINANCING AND THE EFFECTS OF REGULATORY CHANGE ON UTILITY COSTS AND FACTOR CHOICES

ABSTRACT ** :  Beginning in 1999, the Canadian Province of Ontario undertook restructuring and tried to implement performance based regulation for local electricity distribution utilities. Regulatory parameters were based on productivity research covering 1988–1997 that found little productivity difference by size, but wide variations in costs, factor mix, financing, and returns to capital among utilities. While some utilities questioned their ability to improve efficiency, other observers maintained many utilities were over-capitalized, especially from third-party financing paid by customers for connection/development charges; these observers noted that rates, profits, and valuations would be inflated. Despite its pervasive use, we can find no literature dealing with the implications of third-party funding. We assess the effects and adjustment dynamics of regulatory and financing changes on costs, factor mix, and performance.     

Price mimicking under cost-of-service regulation: the Swedish water sector

This study provides an empirical test of price mimicking among publicly owned water utilities. Using a fixed effects spatial Durbin model with data from Swedish municipalities during 2002–2012, I estimate the elasticity of the own relative to neighbors’ average price to 0.14. This behavior can be explained in terms of an informal yardstick competition: when consumers use neighboring municipalities’ prices as benchmarks for costs or as behaviorally based reference prices, policy makers will face the risk of consumer complaints and reduced voter support if deviating too much from neighboring municipalities’ prices. Further, I find some evidence that price mimicking is more pronounced in municipalities where voter support for the ruling coalition is weak.     

HAVE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS RAISED ELECTRICITY RATES? EVIDENCE FROM U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITIES

Using a panel dataset of U.S. electric utilities, we investigate the effect of a Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) on the rates of electric utilities affected by the mandate. Our findings are twofold. First, we find that, on average, electric utilities affected by an RPS mandate charged a higher electricity rate. This would suggest that an RPS mandate is a costly constraint on the utilities that have to comply with the requirement. The second finding of our analysis is that marginal increases in a utility's RPS requirement do not necessarily translate into higher electricity rates. This would imply that the costs imposed on utilities affected by the RPS mandate tend to be fixed costs rather than variable costs. We also find that controlling for time‐varying unobserved factors at the state level is key to identifying the RPS effect on electricity retail rates. (JEL Q42, Q48, L98)     

Technological Change Bias In The U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utility Industry Following Potential Deregulation

This paper estimates regulated and poientially deregulated costs of production for a multiproduct electric utility industry. The empirical evidence suggests technological regression with respect to costs in both regulated and deregulated environments. Analysis of factor cost shares indicates that technological change in a deregulated environment is expected to be less apital saving than technological change in the regulated environment. In addition, this study finds that overall diseconomies of scale may be nduced over time and to a greater extentunder deregulation than under regulation. Also, cost complementarities may be enhancedover time, but to a lesser extent under deregulation. Hence. tendencies toward natural monop oly may be increased or decreased by deregulation, and advancing deregulation may or may not be an appropriate policy.     

Conservation Incentives for Consumers

This paper investigates profit-maximizing conservation incentives of a utility, where the interest in conservation results from prices regulated below the marginal costs of supply and where consumers differ with respect to their subjective time preference. Conventional least-cost planning implies that a program should focus on inefficient consumers (those who apply high discount rates). However, this scheme provokes strategic reactions of the consumers. Hence, incentive-compatible conservation schemes-one tied to efficiency, the other tied to electricity consumption-are derived that differ starkly from the above finding and from actual programs.     

Economic determinants of deregulation in the gas distribution market

Many state public commissions have deregulated their utility markets. However, evidence of welfare or efficiency improvements under deregulation is ambiguous. It is also unclear why different states adopt consumer choice, price caps, sliding-scale plans, or retain rate-of-return regulation. This study evaluates several economic factors behind deregulation in gas distribution markets using a survey of state commissions. Logistic and hazard models show that utilities’ prices and capacity, and states’ stock of own gas wells, prices of competing fuels and the regulatory climate, help explain the pattern of deregulation. Demonstration effects from surrounding markets also contribute. These factors make the propensity to use price caps versus restructuring vary regionally.     

FOUR REVOLUTIONS IN ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY

Demand prospects for electricity are being altered profoundly by four synergistic types of revolutionary change: new technologies for improved end-use efficiency, new ways to finance and deliver those technologies to customers, cultural change within utilities, and regulatory reforms to reward efficient behavior. Dramatic energy savings achieved so far have been largely in direct fuels and not in electricity, mainly due to price distortions and unique market failures. Resulting inefficient use of electricity is misallocating some $60 billion a year to unnecessary expansions of U.S. electric supply. Yet the best technologies now on the market could save about 92 percent of U.S. lighting energy, about half of motor energy, and much of the electricity used for other purposes. Complete retrofit could deliver equal or better services with only a fourth of the electricity now used. The levelized cost of that quadrupled end-use efficiency averages about 0.6 cents/kWh– well below short-run marginal cost. Analogous oil-saving potential from the best demonstrated technologies is about 80 percent of present oil consumption at an average cost below $3/bbl, partly because two of the 9–10 prototype cars already tested at 67–138 miles per gallon are said to cost nothing extra to make. Many utilities already save large amounts of electricity very quickly and cheaply by financing customers' efficiency improvements through loans, gifts, rebates, or leases. Even more promising is an emerging “negawatt market” making saved electricity a fungible commodity subject to competitive bidding, arbitrage, derivative instruments, secondary markets, etc. Utilities can make more money selling less electricity and more efficiency. They can earn a spread on the difference in discount rates between themselves and their customers. They can save operating and capital costs while avoiding the associated risks and, under emerging regulatory reforms, can even keep as extra profit part of what they save. They also can generate tradeable emissions rights under the new Clean Air Act. Some utilities now properly ignore sunk costs and seek to minimize marginal variable costs. These utilities, driven by economic– not accounting–principles, find this approach both profitable and operationally advantageous.     

Is a little sunshine all we need? On the impact of sunshine regulation on profits,productivity and prices in the Dutch drinking water sector

This paper analyzes the performance of Dutch drinking water utilities before and after the introduction of sunshine regulation, which involves publication of the performance of utilities but no formal price regulation. By decomposing profit change into its economic drivers, our results suggest that, in the Dutch political and institutional context, sunshine regulation was effective in improving the productivity of publicly organised services. Nevertheless, while sunshine regulation did bring about a moderate reduction in water prices, sustained and substantial economic profits suggest that it may not have the potential to fully align output prices with economic costs in the long run. In methodological terms, the DEA based profit decomposition is extended to robust and conditional non-parametric efficiency measures, so as to account better for both uncertainty and differences in operating environment between utilities.     

Capture or contract? The early years of electric utility regulation

Jarrell (J Law Econ 21:269?C295, 1978) found that electricity prices fell more slowly in states that adopted state regulation before 1917, suggesting that regulators were ??captured?? by the interests of the regulated electric utilities. An alternative explanation is that state regulation more credibly protected specialized utility assets from regulatory opportunism than did the municipal franchise contracting that preceded it. We test this alternative hypothesis using a panel of data from the U.S. Electrical Censuses of 1902?C1937. We find that the shift from municipal franchise contracting to state regulation was associated with a substantial decrease in investment propensity, an outcome supporting the capture hypothesis.     

Greenhouse gas policy and California electricity prices

California has adopted a policy of mandatory reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2020. (California Legislature (2006) Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, California Air Resources Board (2008) Climate change draft scoping plan, Sect. 2) Electricity utilities will need to recover related expenses, such as for the purchase of emissions permits. Economists often assume that raising usage prices for the commodity is the best way to recoup such expenses. However, regulated usage prices to California residential customers already exceed the cost of electricity generation plus a plausible externality cost for carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions. Instead, recovering compliance expenses through usage insensitive charges could avoid causing unnecessary economic harm to consumers.     

The Value Relevance of Earnings and Nonearnings Information in Regulated and Deregulated Markets: The Case of the Airline Industry

This paper examines the valuation effects of earnings and two nonearnings-based measurements (book values and operating cash flow) on security prices of airline companies under two different market structures: regulated and deregulated. The literature lacks empirical evidence in examining the relative importance of earnings and nonearnings accounting-based measurements in regulated and deregulated markets, especially in the airlines industry. We compare coefficient estimates of regressing stock prices on earnings, book value, and cash flow from operations of airline companies during regulated and deregulated times. A control sample of manufacturing companies is also used for supporting inferences from the airline sample’s findings. In a typical regulated market, using cost recovery plus an adequate rate of return on assets, security prices are highly aligned with nonearnings measurements such as the book value. In the airline industry, regulation took the form of guaranteed routes and subsidies to service rural areas, giving rise to a differential effect of both earnings and nonearnings measurements. Under deregulation, airline firms operate in highly competitive markets with large airline firms enjoying the benefits of economy of scale and service diversification. Thus, the asset capitalization (book value), cash flow, and operational efficiencies (earnings) would be major indicators in the market assessment of the firm’s future profitability and security price. This paper finds that nonearnings measures have higher explanatory power of security prices in regulated times for the airline firms. In deregulated times, although earnings have a stronger relationship with prices, nonearnings measures continued to influence stock price levels, reflecting airline specific economics.

The Emergence of Structural Faults on the Supply Side in Deregulated 'Energy Only' Electricity Markets

This article examines the effect of plant entry and exit in a deregulated ‘energy only’ electricity market. A partial equilibrium framework is presented that determines the optimal portfolio of base, intermediate and peaking plant for a given electricity load curve. An optimal result for Queensland is compared against the actual plant stock. Analysis of the portfolio indicates that deregulation is failing a key objective, namely enhancing dynamic efficiency, because too much base plant has been delivered. The research presents scenarios of structural corrections, using the theory of the generalised war of attrition to develop the cases. Results from simulation experiments are clear—consumers will secure lower electricity prices in the short run. But oversupply of base plant may suppress prices to such an extent that they fail to signal timely entry of peaking plant—the consequence of this failure being eventual price shocks and, potentially, load shedding.