Corporate tax evasion: The case for specialists

We analyze the role of accounting specialists who help corporations evade/avoid taxes in a game of incomplete information played by a tax authority, corporate taxpayers, and an accounting specialist. In addition to a full equilibrium characterization, we establish that (i) marginal changes in enforcement are not effective when evasion/avoidance is pervasive; (ii) fines on firms as opposed to specialists are more effective in such situations; (iii) reducing auditing costs and increasing “creative accounting” costs are effective in curbing evasion when tax compliance is relatively high.     

Why is the corporate tax rate lower than the personal tax rate?: The role of new firms

In many OECD countries, statutory corporate tax rates are lower than personal income tax rates. This tax rate difference is often particularly large for small firms. The present paper argues that a reduction of the corporate tax rate below the personal tax rate is an optimal tax policy if there are problems of asymmetric information between investors and firms in the capital market. The reduction of the corporate tax rate below the personal tax rate encourages equity financing and thus mitigates the excessive use of debt financing induced by asymmetric information. Our main theoretical result stands in marked contrast to the traditional view of corporate taxation and corporate finance theory, according to which there is a tax disadvantage to equity financing. More recent empirical evidence on this issue, however, is in line with our result.     

Profit tax and tariff under international oligopoly

A simple model of international duopoly is developed to examine the effects of tariff and corporate profit tax. It is shown that in an export-cum-on-site-production regime, a tariff continues to be an effective instrument for shifting net profit away from foreign to domestic firms. A corporate profit tax, on the other hand, could lower the domestic output and employment and decrease the net earnings of both domestic and foreign firms. Thus when the host government's ability to raise tariff is limited, it should seriously consider a corporate tax cut policy to achieve the dual purpose of creating more jobs and increasing corporate earning at home.     

The impact of the corporate income tax: evidence from state organizational form data

By taxing the income of corporate firms at a different rate than non-corporate firms, taxes can play an important role in a firm's choice of organizational form. The sensitivity of the organizational form decision to tax rates provides a key indicator of the distortion created by the corporate income tax. This paper uses new cross-sectional data on organizational form choices across states compiled in the Census of Retail Trade to estimate this sensitivity. The results document a significant impact of the relative taxation of corporate to personal income on the share of real economic activity that is done by corporations and that the impact is many times larger than has been found in the previous empirical literature based on time-series data. The results show little impact, however, on the actual operations of firms such as their labor intensity, wages and the like. They do indicate that firms are able to exploit the progressivity of the corporate income tax system by dividing into numerous firms.     

Does dividend tax impede competition for corporate charters?

We develop a model of jurisdictional competition for corporate charters among the states in which a firm’s agency cost depends on the federal dividend income tax rate and the takeover regulations of its domicile state. When firms are mobile across states, the federal dividend income tax rate affects both the intensity of competition among the states and the equilibrium level of state takeover regulations. Our model shows that increasing dividend tax rate weakens the competition for corporate charters under a condition: dividend-paying and the market for corporate control are complementary corporate governance mechanisms. This condition holds empirically, suggesting that dividend tax not only discourages firms from paying dividends but also weakens their corporate governance by disincentivizing states to improve their corporate laws.     

Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada

We study corporate income taxation when firms operating in multiple jurisdictions can shift income using tax planning strategies. Because income of corporate groups is not consolidated for tax purposes in Canada, firms may use financial techniques, such as lending among affiliates, to reduce subnational corporate taxes. A simple theoretical model shows how income shifting affects real investment, government revenues, and tax base elasticities, depending on whether firms must allocate income to provinces or not. We then analyze data from administrative tax records to compare the behavior of corporate subsidiaries that may engage in income shifting to comparable firms that must use the statutory allocation formula to determine their taxable income in each province. The evidence suggests that income shifting has pronounced effects on provincial tax bases. According to our preferred estimate, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates for “income shifting” firms is 4.9, compared with 2.3 for other, comparable firms.     

Investment incentives and corporate tax asymmetries

Recent facts on the importance of corporate losses motivate more careful study of the impact of tax incentives for investment on firms that lose money. I model firm investment decisions in a setting featuring financing constraints and carrybacks and carryforwards of operating losses. I estimate investment responses to tax incentives allowing effects to vary with cash flows and taxable status. Results suggest that asymmetries in the corporate tax code could have made recent bonus depreciation tax incentives at most 4% less effective than they would have been if all firms were fully taxable. Cash flows have more important effects on the impact of tax incentives. Recent declines in cash flows would predict a 24% decrease in the effectiveness of bonus depreciation. Results thus suggest that tax incentives have the smallest impact on investment exactly when they are most likely to be put in place — during downturns in economic activity when cash flows are low.     

Corporate income tax,investment grants,and the cost of capital

While the influence of the corporate tax system on the cost of capital faced by firms in the corporate sector has been studied extensively, these studies generally assume that government intervention is restricted to alterations in the rates and deductibility allowances of the corporate income tax. In this paper the case where government intervention also includes the payment of investment grants to the corporate sector is considered; it is shown that the interactions between the corporate tax system and the grant structure are crucial in determiningthe cost of capital. In particular, conditions are derived under which a higher grant rate will raise the relative cost of capital.     

Corporate tax competition: A meta-analysis

Do jurisdictions compete over corporate taxes? The extent of uncooperative strategic government interactions in corporate tax policy remains unclear, because the results reported in relevant econometric studies vary considerably. This paper applies meta-analysis and meta-regression methods to a novel dataset consisting of 604 observations on corporate tax competition reported in 33 primary studies. The results point to the presence of corporate tax competition effects, and there is no consistent evidence for publication selection bias. The analysis, however, reveals that several data and specification choices systematically affect the results reported in the literature: the choice of the weighting scheme applied in estimating the corporate tax function and details of the econometric estimation strategy are significant when it comes to explaining variation in reported results. Furthermore, we find that accounting for partisan politics and country size matters.     

Corporate social responsibility,stock prices,and tax policy

We model a market in which some investors get utility from owning shares of firms that engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). In equilibrium, investors' CSR considerations influence portfolio choices, stock prices, and CSR spending. We study tax policy designed to maximize total giving (individual and corporate) net of government tax breaks and find that its effectiveness is non‐monotonic in the proportion of altruistic investors: with few or many altruistic investors, it has little impact on giving, but, at intermediate levels, effective tax policy intuitively relates the corporate tax rebate rate on giving and the cap on allowable tax savings.     

企业避税与年报可读性

避税活动加剧了企业的信息不对称，管理层在信息披露中是否会采用晦涩的文本信息掩盖避税行为？本文利用2008—2017年中国A股上市公司数据，考察企业避税对年报可读性的影响及其机制。结果发现，避税活动越多，企业年报采用的复杂词汇就越多，年报可读性就越差。在运用工具变量弱化内生性问题、更替年报可读性指标与企业避税指标、考虑递延所得税信息披露和税收政策影响等一系列稳健性检验后，避税行为降低企业年报可读性的结论依然成立。机制分析发现会计信息质量在避税行为对年报可读性的影响中发挥了部分中介作用，避税活动通过降低会计信息质量削弱了年报可读性，信息披露中文本信息与数字信息相配合的观点从企业避税视角得到了验证。此外，在无税收优惠、递延所得税负债较多和外部治理环境较差的企业中，避税降低年报可读性的现象更为明显。因此，规范企业税收制度能够减少企业避税、限制管理层寻租行为，促进税收透明化，从而提高企业的信息披露质量。     

A journey from a corruption port to a tax haven

We sketch a model according to which tax havens attract corporate income generated in corrupted countries. We consider the choice of optimal bribes by corrupt officials and the share of the proceeds of corruption that will be concealed in tax havens. Our framework provides novel welfare implications of tax havens. First, tax havens’ services have a positive effect on welfare through encouraging investment by firms fearing expropriation and bribes in corrupt countries. Second, by supporting corruption and the concealment of officials’ bribes, tax havens discourage the provision of public goods and hence have also a negative effect on welfare. The net welfare effect depends on the specified preferences and parameters. One source of this ambiguity is that the presence of multinational firms in corrupted countries is positively associated with demanding tax havens’ operations. Using firm-level data, we provide new empirical results supporting this hypothesis.     

Identifying peers in international tax competition

Multinational companies (MNCs) have historically used corporate subsidiaries to isolate income earned in lower-taxed jurisdictions from tax in a higher-rate home country. This planning technique has been long accepted as a strategy to lower the MNC’s effective tax rate and maintain shareholder value. A recently study, however, demonstrates that this is an inefficient, and possibly inappropriate, strategy. This article conducts a comprehensive empirical benchmarking analysis by applying cluster analysis to empirically identify peer groups of MNCs operating in the pharmaceutical industry. We find that most firms consistently fall into the same cluster, providing evidence that income shifting can be benchmarked by industry sector. We also find special cases where firms should be excluded from the benchmark.     

Is there a relation between labor investment inefficiency and corporate tax avoidance?

This paper investigates the relation between labor investment inefficiency and corporate tax avoidance. Employing a large sample of 61,542 U.S. firm-year observations over the 1962–2014 period, our regression results show that labor investment inefficiency is significantly positively related to tax avoidance. More specifically, we find that a one standard deviation of labor investment inefficiency leads to a 0.71% reduction in the accounting effective tax rate. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns, alternative proxy measures of tax avoidance and labor investment efficiency, and additional control variables pertaining to accounting quality and managerial ability. Taken together, our regression results show that labor investment inefficiency is an important determinant of corporate tax avoidance.     

Cross-border tax effects on affiliate investment—Evidence from European multinationals

Recent studies suggest that multinational firm activities at home and abroad are positively correlated which may be due to the use of common inputs (like marketing, patents, etc.). Then, a cost shock at one location may lead to reduced activity in all other locations within the firm. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically analyze national corporate tax policy in such a setting. Our main hypothesis is that corporate taxation at the parent location not only reduces the parent's capital stock but also lowers capital stocks at affiliates abroad. Using micro data on European multinational firms, we confirm the hypothesis showing that a 10 percentage point increase in corporate tax rates is associated with a 5.6% decrease in the affiliate's capital stock. From a welfare point of view, this cross-border tax effect on the capital stock gives rise to a negative fiscal externality of corporate taxation which is empirically shown to compensate a substantial fraction of the well-known positive externality due to profit shifting.     

Corporate tax policy and heterogeneous firm innovation: Evidence from a developing country

This paper adds to the literature by identifying the causality of corporate tax policy on firm innovation in a developing country. We exploit the China’s 2006 corporate income tax base reform to integrate the tax system between foreign-invested and state/collective-controlled firms as a natural experiment. The difference-in-differences strategy documents a positive effect of corporate tax deduction on firm patenting. The effect is particularly significant if a firm is of larger size or locates in eastern provinces. We also examine possible channels behind the findings, including changes in R&D and capital investment, intangible assets, financial constraints, and new product sales.     

Does the value-added tax Reform increase a firm’s collateral bank loans? Evidence from China

By leveraging the value-added tax (VAT) Reform as an exogenous event in China, we examine the impact of the tax cut on bank collateral loan on firms. Our findings suggest that (1) The Reform allows firms to deduct the tax of purchasing fixed assets that leads to a significant increase in the firm's collateral loan amounts. (2) The transmission mechanism is due to the increased level of corporate transparency and a lowered financial risk after the Reform. (3) The impact of the Reform on collateral bank loans is more pronounced for state-owned firms, large firms, firms far away from lenders and firms located in low financial development regions.     

Firms' financial choices and thin capitalization rules under corporate tax competition

Thin capitalization rules have become an important element in the corporate tax systems of developed countries. This paper sets up a model where national and multinational firms choose tax-efficient financial structures and countries compete for multinational firms through statutory tax rates and thin capitalization rules that limit the tax-deductibility of internal debt flows. In a symmetric tax competition equilibrium, each country chooses inefficiently low tax rates and inefficiently lax thin capitalization rules. We show that a coordinated tightening of thin capitalization rules benefits both countries, even though it intensifies competition via tax rates. When countries differ in size, the smaller country not only chooses the lower tax rate but also the more lenient thin capitalization rule.     

Corporate profit tax,firm entry with unemployment,and income inequality

In this paper, we provide a general equilibrium analysis of corporate profit tax on income distribution, unemployment, and wage inequality. With firm dynamics in industrial sector, we identify a new channel through which profit tax affects income and wage inequality: profit tax cut will widen not only the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor, but also exacerbate the wage inequality of unskilled labor among different sectors. The welfare effect of profit tax cut depends on unemployment deepening (labor-distortion effect) and more manufacturing firms enter the market (business-creation effect), eroding the market share of incumbent firms (business-stealing effect).     

A spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses: evidence from Canada

Abstract.  Using a model of interdependent tax choices, and accounting for equalization entitlements and general transfers, this paper estimates – making use of a spatial econometric framework – corporate income tax-setting functions for all Canadian provincial governments. The results show that there is a statistically significant positive fiscal interaction among a subset of provinces and between all provinces and the federal government. Provincial corporate income taxes are also found to be negatively related to equalization entitlements, general federal transfers, and the federal corporate income tax. A robustness check on the fiscal relationship between Ontario and Quebec verifies the existence of significant bi-directional fiscal interdependencies. The paper also introduces U.S state corporate income taxes as covariates and examines their interaction with Canadian provinces.