International law as a moral theory of state territory?

Current states face challenges from other states and secessionist movements, and no moral theory exists to evaluate these conflicting claims. One step towards a theory is to evaluate international law on territory, specifically as articulated through decolonisation. I argue that international law does not provide a plausible moral theory of territory because the principles of territorial integrity and uti possidetis cannot coherently coexist with the principle of self‐determination. I suggest that philosophers must choose between viewing territory as an expression of national self or as a property right, or else develop a third view from sources beyond current international law.     

Entrepreneurial drain under moral hazard: A high-yield sector curse?

We describe a two-sector, general-equilibrium model of productive sorting under output risk and incomplete information. Risk-neutral (entrepreneurial) individuals can either produce alone, or - acting as employers/insurers - team up with risk-averse (non-entrepreneurial) individuals. Although the latter option has the potential to generate more surplus, when effort is unobservable and risk is high, the moral hazard problem in mixed matches may be too severe for mixing to be attractive to both risk-aversion types, leading to a segregated equilibrium in which risk-averse individuals select low-risk, low-yield activities. An increase in the profitability of the riskier sector can then trigger a switch from a mixed to a segregated equilibrium and cause aggregate output to fall. Evidence from a panel of non-OECD countries - showing that the presence of uninsured, small-scale mining firms has a negative impact on the relationship between natural resource exports and agrarian productivity - suggests that this ‘high-yield sector curse’ might be present in natural resource-rich, low-income countries.     

Crime and moral hazard: Does more policing necessarily induce private negligence?

Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.     

Is market liberalism adaptive? Rethinking F. A. Hayek on moral evolution

Hayek’s social theory of evolution suggests that market liberal morality is adaptive for social groups. He justified the evolutionary superiority of market liberalism by asserting that groups operating under a market liberal morality would have a higher capacity to expand and reproduce than groups with alternative tribal moralities. Thus, market liberal groups would be favoured through cultural and genetic group selection. But in fact, market liberal morality reveals maladaptive tendencies and remains insufficiently powerful to create adaptive social groups. Hayek’s dismissal of moral tribalism in favour of market liberal morality is found to underestimate the importance of tribal goals in the evolutionary system.     

Reciprocity under moral wiggle room: Is it a preference or a constraint?

We analyze reciprocal behavior when moral wiggle room exists. Dana et al. (Econ Theory 33(1):67–80, 2007) show that giving in a dictator game is inconsistent with distributional preferences as the giving rate drops when situational excuses for selfish behavior are provided. Our binary trust game closely follows their design. Only a preceding stage (safe outside option vs. enter the game) is added in order to introduce reciprocity. We find significantly lower rates of selfish choices in the trust baseline in comparison to our treatments that feature moral wiggle room manipulations and a dictator baseline. It seems that reciprocal behavior is not only due to people liking to reciprocate but also because they feel obliged to do so.     

Farmers adoption of integrated crop protection and organic farming: Do moral and social concerns matter?

We investigate empirically the role of moral and social concerns in farmers' decision to adopt integrated crop protection (IP) and organic farming (OF). A survey questionnaire has been sent to 1286 fruit-growers and vegetable producers located in the French areas of Alpes de Haute Provence, Hautes-Alpes and Vaucluse. Analysis of individual responses (N = 243) shows that, although economic concerns play a strong role, a significant number of respondents give high importance to moral and social ones. We also examine how these considerations matter according to different crop protection strategies, that is, conventional farming, IP and OF. Using a multinomial logistic regression, we find that (1) social concerns (e.g., showing to others one's environmental commitment) drive both IP and OF adoption, (2) moral concerns (e.g., do not feel guilty about one's choices) increase the probability of organic farming adoption only, and (3) farmers who give high importance to economic concerns (e.g., cutting production costs) are less likely to adopt OF.