Analysis of price competition and strategic implications for heterogeneous market structure

This paper examines strategic competition behavior in heterogeneous market structure where both conventional offline and online firms coexist in equilibrium and draws strategic implications with some remarks on welfare. Research on the price competition between conventional offline and online firms has been done through empirical approaches; however, the results are conflicting. This paper reconciles the existing conflicting empirical findings on price levels between conventional offline and online firms through a theoretical approach. We find that as the online market matures, prices in both conventional and online firms drop, and the price in the online firm can be higher than that in a conventional offline firm. Furthermore, if convenience associated with the online increases, the online price tends to exceed the conventional offline price.     

债务期限结构影响公司价值吗?

使用OLS多元回归分析方法研究了中国上市公司的债务期限结构对其市场价值的影响。结果表明,上市公司的长期债务比例越高,公司的市场价值越低。在自由现金流量较高的上市公司样本中,长期债务比例与公司价值间的负相关关系的显著水平和系数绝对值都明显大于在自由现金流量较低的上市公司样本中的情况。这表明,使用更多的短期债务有利于降低公司的代理成本,从而提高公司的市场价值。     

The Influence of a Neighbouring Market on Product Qualities and Prices

This paper analyses a model of vertical product differentiation in which there is a primary market with two firms and a secondary market with no firms. Consumers in the secondary market incur a cost when purchasing the product from the primary market. The firms sequentially choose product quality and then simultaneously choose prices. Firm 1 always chooses the maximum quality, while firm 2's quality and the prices depend on the cost. Also, the cost determines which firm(s), if either, serves the secondary market. It is shown that the firms and the consumers of each market prefer different levels of costs.     

Product entry in a fast growing industry: the LAN switch market

We provide empirical evidence on market positioning by firms, in terms of market niche, distance from technological frontier and dispersion. We focus on the switch industry, a sub-market of the Local Area Network industry, in the nineties. Market positioning is a function of the type of firms (incumbents versus entrants), market size and contestability as well as firm competencies. We find that incumbents specialize in high-end segments and disperse their product in a larger spectrum of the market. Instead, entrants focus on specific market niches. Market size, market contestability and firm competencies are also important determinants of product location.     

Globalization,recruitments, and job mobility

Previous research indicates that firms pay a premium to poach workers from exporting firms if experience working for an internationally engaged firm reduces trade costs. Because international experience is less valuable to non-exporters, we would expect to see differences in recruitments between firms that are internationally engaged and those that serve only the domestic market. Moreover, increased openness might lead to higher job-to-job mobility if more globalization raises both the share of exporters and the number of workers with skills that make them attractive for other exporters. Using linked Swedish employer–employee data for the period 1997 to 2013, we find systematic differences between the way exporters and non-exporters recruit workers: exporters have a relatively high share of recruitments from other exporters as hypothesized. We also find some suggestive evidence that increased openness correlates positively with upward mobility for occupations that play a major role in international commerce, such as professionals and managers.     

A laboratory study of advertising and price competition

We use a laboratory experiment to study advertising and pricing behavior in a market where consumers differ in price sensitivity. Equilibrium in this market entails variation in the number of firms advertising and price dispersion in advertised prices. We vary the cost to advertise as well as varying the number of competing firms. Theory predicts that advertising costs act as a facilitating device: higher costs increase firm profits at the expense of consumers. We find that higher advertising costs decrease demand for advertising and raise advertised prices, as predicted. Further, this comes at the expense of consumers. However, advertising strategies are more aggressive than theory predicts with the result that firm profits do not increase.     

Research and development with publicly observable outcomes

This paper studies the simultaneous evolution of costs and research incentives in a model in which two firms research each period by purchasing a draw from a stationary distribution of possible production costs. Research decisions each period are based on the results of previous research which are common knowledge. When research stops a Bertrand pricing game occurs. We give conditions under which the perfect equilibrium of this game involves a race by both firms to reach some endogenously determined critical cost level. The first firm to reach this critical level wins the race, capturing the entire market, and continues to research until a second critical cost level is reached.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION

We introduce asymmetric information about consumers’ transportation costs (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) in the model of Hotelling. When transportation costs are high, both firms have lower profits with asymmetric information than with perfect information. Contrarily, if transportation costs are low, both firms may prefer the asymmetric information scenario (the informed firm always prefers the informational advantage, while the uninformed firm may or may not prefer to remain uninformed). Information exchange is ex‐ante advantageous for both firms, but ex‐post damaging if transportation costs turn out to be low. If the information is unverifiable, the informed firm does not represent a reliable source of information, since it always prefers to announce that transportation costs are high and there is no contract that induces truthful revelation.     

Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms

The literature on mixed oligopoly shows that when production costs are quadratic the public firm is privatized if the competition in the product market is high enough. Similarly, when the public firm is less efficient than private firms and the marginal costs of production are constant, the government privatizes the public firm if its efficiency is low enough. In this paper we analyze this issue assuming that the public firm maximizes the weighted sum of consumer surplus, private profit and the profit of the public firm. If all firms have the same marginal cost of production we obtain that for some value of parameters the government does not privatize the public firm regardless of how many private firms are competing in the product market. We also obtain that the consumer surplus can be lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private oligopoly.     

Choosing between Time and State Dependence: Micro Evidence on Firms' Price‐Reviewing Strategies

Because of recent findings based on survey data, it is now well known that firms differ from each other with respect to their price‐reviewing strategies. While some firms review their prices at fixed intervals of time, others prefer to perform price revisions in response to changes in economic conditions. Some theories have been suggested to explain this. However, empirical evidence on the relative importance of the factors that determine the different strategies of firms is virtually non‐existent. In this paper, we help to fill this gap by investigating the factors that explain why firms follow time‐dependent, state‐dependent, or both time‐ and state‐dependent price‐reviewing rules. We find that the strategies of firms vary with firm characteristics that have a bearing on the importance of information costs, with the variability of the optimal price, and with the sensitivity of profits to non‐optimal prices.     

IS THE COST OF DEBT CAPITAL HIGHER FOR YOUNGER FIRMS?

Not much is known about the returns to aging (maturing) in the market for small business finance. Using a large panel of closely held micro firms, we document that the cost of debt capital is higher for young firms. The main finding of this paper is that this negative qualitative relation is also obtained when cross‐sectional variation in unobservable creditworthiness of small businesses and within‐firm (i.e., inter‐temporal) variation in their observable creditworthiness are held constant. We control for the former by firm‐specific fixed effects and for the latter by a commercial credit score. We also provide an estimate of the quantitative magnitude of the aging effect, on which both economic theory and earlier empirical research are silent. We find that when a small business ages one year, its cost of debt capital decreases by 1–2 basis points. The effect is neither negligible nor alarmingly large.     

Market Share, Market Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms

This paper examines the empirical relationship between technological innovations, market share and stock market value. New developments in the estimation of dynamic count data models are used to control for unobserved firm specific heterogeneity. We find a robust and positive effect of market share on observable headcounts of innovations and patents although increased product market competition in the industry tends to stimulate innovative activity. Furthermore, the impact of innovation on market value is larger for firms with higher market shares. We argue that our results are consistent with models where high market share firms have incentives to pre-emptively innovate.     

Cross-border mergers and strategic alliances

This paper develops a model with distribution costs to study firm cooperation in forming strategic alliances and mergers, under different types of foreign market entry modes, that is, export or foreign direct investment (FDI). Under both export and FDI, we find that cross-border alliances (mergers) dominate domestic alliances (mergers); and cross-border alliances and mergers are preferred to independence if and only if distribution cost is high. Under export, cross-border alliances are chosen in equilibrium if distribution cost is high. Under FDI and with high distribution cost, cross-border alliances (mergers) are chosen in equilibrium if plant setup cost is low (high).     

Multinational status and firm exit in the Italian manufacturing and service sectors

The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of survival for Italian firms according to their ownership status. To this end, we analyze firm survival distinguishing the Italian firms in foreign multinationals (FMNEs), domestic multinationals (DMNEs) and domestic non-multinational firms (NMNEs). The empirical analysis, carried out over the period 2004–2008, is based on the Cox Proportional Hazard Model, in which we look for the impact of ownership dummies on firm survival controlling for several firm and industry specific covariates. Our main findings reveal that FMNEs are more likely to exit the market than national firms in manufacturing and services. In contrast, DMNEs have a higher chance of survival compared with the other firm categories in services. However, when we conduct a finer level of industry classification, we observe the presence of some heterogeneity in the patterns of firm survival. Moreover, we find that the presence of foreign firms has a positive impact on firms’ survival mainly in the service sectors.     

The role of extensive and intensive margins and export growth

We investigate and compare countries' export growth based on their performance at the extensive and intensive export margins. Our empirical approach is motivated by an extension to the Melitz (2003) model of heterogeneous firms in which exporters are subject to a one-time sunk cost and also a per-period fixed cost. With imperfect information a firm may enter export markets but shortly exit when it learns its per-period fixed costs. We apply this insight to disaggregated export data and confirm that indeed most export relationships are very short lived. We then show that the survival issue is a significant factor in explaining differences in long run export performance. We find that developing countries would experience significantly higher export growth if they were able to improve their performance with respect to the two key components of the intensive margin: survival and deepening.     

Foreign competition and social efficiency of entry

We consider social efficiency of firm-entry in the presence of foreign competition. If the labour markets are competitive, entry is insufficient for the domestic country if the transportation cost is low and the marginal costs of the domestic firms are sufficiently higher than the marginal cost of the foreign firm. In the presence of a domestic labour union, entry is always socially insufficient for the domestic country. Hence, the anti-competitive entry-regulation policy may not be justified in an industry facing foreign competition, and it may depend on the transportation cost, the marginal cost difference between the firms and the domestic labour market structure.     

Export market participation with sunk costs and firm heterogeneity

In this article we investigate the importance of sunk costs, firm characteristics and spillovers from nearby exporters on a firm's decision to participate in exporting. The empirical analysis involves the estimation of a nonstructural, discrete choice, dynamic model with firm heterogeneity. By using panel data for Estonian companies from 1994 to 1999 we find that: (i) both sunk costs and observable firm characteristics are important determinants of export market participation; (ii) previous history matters, in that, if a firm has been exporting the previous period or the period before, it significantly increases the likelihood of the firm exporting in the current period; (iii) larger firms with high capital intensity and foreign ownership are more likely to be exporters; (iv) operating in an export-oriented industry increases a firm's likelihood of exporting.     

Vertical differentiation and collusion: Pruning or proliferation?

In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning emerges and, if so, a fighting brand is marketed. We find that it is always more profitable for colluding firms to adopt a pricing strategy such that some variants are withdrawn from the market. Under pruning, these firms commercialize a fighting brand only when facing competitors in a low-end market.     

Market size and entry in international trade: Product versus firm fixed costs

This paper develops a theoretical framework to infer the nature of fixed costs from the relationship between entry patterns in international markets and destination market size. If fixed costs are at the firm level, firms take advantage of an intrafirm spillover by expanding firm‐level product range (scope). Few firms enter with many products and dominate international trade. If fixed costs are at the product level, an interfirm spillover reduces the fixed costs to export for all firms producing the product. The resulting entry pattern consists of many firms exporting different varieties of the same product. Using cross‐country data on firm and product entry, I find empirical evidence consistent with product‐level costs. More firms than products enter in larger markets offering their consumers lower prices and a greater variety of goods within the product category.     

Human Capital and Growth: New Evidences from African Data

Assuming that all firms have rising marginal costs, merger between a dominant firm and one of the firms in the competitive fringe is considered. The effects on market price and output, profits and market power are shown when the dominant firm operates as a two-plant firm after merger and output arises from both plants. It is proved that if merger offers no efficiency gain, then market price always rises; and if merger results in efficiency gain, then market price falls if and only if there are sufficiently large number of firms in the fringe. In any case, there is profit incentive for merger to take place. [611]