Debt and Development

This paper examines incentive and valuation effects of debt financing on land investment. When land is debt financed, the landowner holds both a development option on the land and a default option on the debt. Because development typically devalues the default option, investment may be delayed past the point at which efficient investment would otherwise proceed. The incentive to underinvest is shown to be more pronounced as debt level increases, i.e., as the debt becomes riskier. This agency problem provides an explanation as to why land is generally difficult to debt finance and may also explain why debt levels are relatively low for “land-intensive” real estate firms. Novel comparative statics show that debt value may increase for a given increase in asset volatility as well as for a given increase in interest rate. Renegotiation and restrictive contract provisions are considered as mechanisms to promote efficient investment policy in the presence of debt financing.     

企业的负债风险及其控制

在市场经济条件下,企业负债经营是不可避免的.负债经营可以提高企业的市场竞争能力,扩大企业生产规模,使企业得到财务杠杆效益,减少货币贬值的损失,降低综合资金成本.同时,负债经营也增加了企业的负债风险.那么,怎样才能在企业发展和控制负债风险之间寻求一条最佳途径呢？本文先通过对负债经营的主要风险以及负债风险的成因进行分析,然后针对负债经营企业如何防范和控制负债风险提出了几点建议.     

政府债务对经济增长的影响及作用渠道

基于1960～2010年113个国家的面板数据集,运用系统广义矩动态面板方法和稳健性分析,比较发达国家和发展中国家政府债务经济增长效应的差异,并尝试分析政府债务影响经济增长的渠道。研究结果显示,政府债务对经济增长有非线性影响;发达国家政府债务对经济增长、投资以及全要素生产率均无显著影响;发展中国家对政府债务的直接承受力更弱,但在一个宽松的临界点内,政府债务的增加可以提高投资率。     

Debt Maturity and Tax Avoidance

This study proposes and empirically tests the argument that creditors are likely to extend debt with a shorter maturity to tax-avoiding firms so that they can frequently re-evaluate tax-related risk in debt contracting. Using effective tax rates and uncertain tax benefits as a proxy for tax avoidance, I find that tax-avoiding firms have a larger proportion of short-maturity debt compared to other firms. The empirical findings further show that firms with unsustainable tax positions and with subsidiaries in tax-haven countries are more likely to employ short-maturity debt. Collectively, the empirical findings suggest that frequent debt renegotiations increase the exposure of tax-avoiding firms to credit supply shocks, contributing to their higher demand for cash.     

Debt constraints and monetary policy

In the present paper we show how simple monetary policies can mitigate real effects of credit frictions. We consider stationary overlapping generations economies in which consumers are not equally efficient in producing capital and cannot commit to repay loans. The presence of money in itself does not mitigate the real effects of credit frictions. Equilibrium allocations are generally not Pareto optimal unless the returns on money and capital production are identical for more productive consumers. However, printing money and distributing it to young consumers increase their incomes allowing young more productive consumers to produce more capital. Consequently money printing increases output.     

Debt contracts and cooperative improvements

In this paper, we consider a dynamic game with imperfect information between a borrower and lender who must write a contract to produce a consumption good. In order to analyze the game, we introduce the concept of a coalitional perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (cPBNE). We prove that equilibria exist and are efficient in a precise sense, and that deterministic contracts that resemble debt are optimal for a general class of economies. The cPBNE solution concept captures both the non-cooperative aspect of firm liquidation and the cooperative aspect of renegotiation.     

Legitimacy and Military Intervention in a Democracy

ABSTRACT I examine the role legitimacy plays in the establishment and maintenance of democratic regimes, specifically how people's legitimacy preferences affect a military coup D'état in a mature democracy. Citizens can, under certain circumstances, deter a military takeover by refusing to cooperate with the junta's laws and proclamations. Noncooperation with a military regime, however, faces several hurdles, including a free-riding problem since a legitimate regime is a public good. Although interest groups can overcome this collective action problem, I conclude they lack a general incentive to defend democracy.'     

International Debt, Insolvency and Illiquidity

Western governments and academics alike have neglected the dangers, long- and short-term, of the continuing and ill-considered issue of loans to countries - Poland, Mexico, etc. - whose rulers persisted with policies that have brought them to ruin. Professor Karl Brunner and five American collaborators analyse the genesis of such financial incontinence and indicate seven steps for the West to avoid international illiquidity.     

Debt,equity, and information

Most firms issue financial assets such as debt or equity (e.g. bonds or stock) to outside investors. While these financial assets differ greatly in their characteristics, their diversity has received little attention in the literature. Filling this important gap in the literature, this paper views debt and equity as financial contracts, and asks why they are optimal instead of other financial contracts. By endogenizing the bankruptcy process, this paper shows how debt and equity arise as a consequence of an optimal allocation of cash-flow rights and monitoring rights, and how equity leads to dividend signaling.     

Debt,deficits, and inflation

This article sketches the theory of debt finance and cites historical evidence on the sustainability of debt. If it is accepted that the future should under the current circumstances of COVID‐19 help to alleviate the problems of the present, then debt finance is in principle appropriate. It need not lead to an explosive rise in the debt‐to‐GNP ratio. British history shows that the theory can work in practice. A satisfactory outcome, however, depends on government being reliable, honest, and competent. Trust is easily lost and hard to restore.     

Debt Erosion and the Market Process

This paper explores the effects of debt erosion on the market process. Debt erosion is the attempt by government to lower the real value of its debt through the creation of unexpected inflation. In addition to the costs recognised by most economists, debt erosion through unexpected inflation can impair the price system's ability to coordinate exchange activity and can result in costly capital misallocations. This is because the creation of unexpected inflation implies disequilibrium in the money market. To avoid the harm from such monetary shocks, this paper suggests a separation between money and state, enshrined in an explicit rule at the constitutional level.     

信息披露质量与债务成本——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

以深圳证券市场部分A股上市公司为样本,研究了我国上市公司信息披露质量与企业债务成本之同的关系.研究发现,样本公司的债务成本与信息披露质量之间存在显著的负相关关系,也即信息披露质量越高,债务成本越低,而且这一结果是稳健的.此外,企业的市场风险越大,信息披露质量对债务成本的影响程度就越大.     

CFO权力与企业债务违约

本文从组织权力、专家权力、声誉权力、所有权权力四方面构建CFO综合权力指数,基于2008~2017年沪深A股数据,分析了CFO权力对企业债务违约概率的影响及作用机制。研究结果显示,CFO权力越大,企业债务违约概率越低,在控制内生性影响后,该结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,具有较大权力的CFO通过降低业绩波动性和缓解融资约束来抑制企业发生债务违约。本文从CFO权力视角拓展了债务违约影响因素研究,对企业完善人力资源制度安排和降低债务违约风险具有一定的借鉴价值。     

Private Debt and Timely Loss Recognition

Abstract

In this study, we investigate whether private debt contracting provides incentives for borrowers to recognize economic losses earlier in accounting earnings. Focusing on the window around firms' issuances of private loans, we document that timely loss recognition significantly increases following an issuance. This effect is significantly stronger for debt contracts that include performance covenants acting as trip-wires when firm performance deteriorates. We also find that timely loss recognition is particularly used when writing debt contracts is hampered by uncertainty about a firm's future development. These findings are consistent with timely loss recognition being used to increase contract efficiency by facilitating state-contingent control allocation based on a borrower's performance over the loan term.