众筹投资意愿影响机理研究

众筹活动是落实“大众创业、万众创新”政策的重要推手，但当前面临投资意愿不足的问题。依托扎根理论，对众筹成功案例展开研究，探讨了众筹投资意愿的影响机理。研究发现，投资者的知觉创新与产品涉入通过负向影响其对众筹方案的知觉风险来正向影响投资者的投资意愿，投资者与筹资者的沟通及其相同或相似的价值观通过正向影响投资者对筹资者的信任来正向影响投资者的投资意愿，筹投双方相同或相似的价值观及投资者的知觉利益通过正向影响众筹承诺来正向影响投资者的投资意愿。最后，提出了提升众筹投资意愿的对策。     

Toward state funding of elections in india? a comparative perspective on possible options

This paper explores the issue of introduction of state funding of elections in India, focussing on the incentive structures of electoral finance reforms. After summarising the main points in the history of political finance reform in other democracies, and in India, the historical pattern of fund-raising and election expenditures of major parties in India is surveyed. Six electoral finance reform options for India are outlined. It is argued that the time is now ripe for state funding of elections from the point of view of the incentives facing parties and donors.     

Why is free education so popular? A political economy explanation

This paper analyzes the political support for different funding regimes of education in a one‐person, one‐vote democracy. We focus the analysis on four systems that have had a preponderant presence in the political debate on education: a private system, a public system that delivers the same resources to each student (universal‐free education), a public system that intends to equalize results, and a public system that aims to maximize the output of the economy. We show that a system of universal free education is the Condorcet winner. The level of income inequality and the degree to which income distribution is skewed to the right are key factors behind this conclusion. We also show that the voting outcome of public versus private funding for education depends crucially on the type of public funding under consideration.     

Vote buying and campaign promises

What explains the wide variation across countries in the use of vote buying and policy promises during election campaigns? We address this question, and account for a number of stylized facts and apparent anomalies regarding vote buying, using a model in which parties cannot fully commit to campaign promises. We find that high vote buying is associated with frequent reneging on campaign promises, strong electoral competition, and high policy rents. Frequent reneging and low party competence reduce campaign promises. If vote buying can be financed out of public resources, incumbents buy more votes and enjoy an electoral advantage, but they also promise more public goods. Vote buying has distributional consequences: voters targeted with vote buying pre-election may receive no government benefits post-election. The results point to obstacles to the democratic transition from clientelist to programmatic forms of electoral competition: parties may not benefit electorally from institutions that increase commitment.     

国库集中支付操作风险产生机理的博弈分析

国库集中支付操作风险是指国库资金支付过程中出现违规操作行为的可能性。国库集中支付制度框架下财政资金支付活动是财政部门、预算单位、代理银行和人民银行共同参与的博弈过程。本文运用博弈理论首先分析国库集中支付操作风险产生的内在机理，然后剖析国库集中支付操作风险产生的外在博弈条件，最后从优化博弈条件出发，提出建立健全监督激励机制以防范国库集中支付操作风险的建议。     

Shocks,financial dependence and efficiency: Evidence from U.S. and Canadian industries

This paper investigates how changes in industries’ funding costs affect total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Based on panel regressions using data for U.S. and Canadian industries and industries’ dependence on external funding as an identification mechanism, we show that increases in the cost of funds affect TFP growth negatively. The effect is non‐monotonic depending on a sector's external finance need. This paper presents a theoretical model that produces the observed non‐monotonic effect of financial shocks on TFP growth and suggests that financial shocks distort the allocation of factors across firms even within an industry, thus reducing TFP growth.     

Social Security Systems,Human Capital,and Growth in a Small Open Economy

We consider a small open economy in which the level of public education funding is determined by popular vote. We show that growth can be enhanced by the introduction of pay‐as‐you‐go pensions even if the growth rate of aggregate wages falls short of the interest rate. The reason is that the pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) system allows future retirees to partially internalize positive externalities of public education due to the positive effect of higher future labor productivity on their pension benefits. The majority support for education funding will be especially strong when the PAYG benefit formula is flat, i.e., progressively redistributive. If a flat benefit PAYG pension system is in place then the economy will achieve the highest growth rate relative to the alternative pension system designs. While such PAYG pension system may be opposed by the majority of working individuals due to inferior returns to their pension contributions relative to a funded scheme, it is likely to be politically sustained by a coalition of older individuals and lower income workers.     

Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures*

This paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997. We find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support. This is borne out in two ways. (i) Counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments. (ii) When control of the state government changes, the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party. We find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts. Finally, we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections. This suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results, and the mechanism through which this works is “mobilization” rather than “conversion” of voters in a fixed electorate.     

Voter turnout and the size of government

This paper uses Swedish and Finnish municipal data to investigate the effect of changes in voter turnout on the tax rate, public spending and vote-shares. A reform in Sweden in 1970, which overall lowered the cost of voting, is applied as an instrument for voter turnout in local elections. The reform increased voter turnout in Sweden. The higher voter turnout resulted in higher municipal taxes and greater per capita local public spending. There are also indications that higher turnout decreased the vote share for right-wing parties. I use an individual survey data set to conclude that it was in particular low income earners that began to vote to a greater extent after the reform.     

The Development of The Local Area Network Market As Determined By User Needs

Using an original survey sample of 103 unquoted Belgian technology-based small firms (TBSFs), we examine the capital structure of start-up companies during their consecutive development stages. We find that internal funds, either alone as personal savings or in combination with family and friends, to be the primary source of financing. Personal funds of the founders are used to finance the start of 82% of TBSFs. Commercial bank and government funds are the most important sources of external finance for TBSFs subsequent to start-up. Most founders agreed that business angels and venture capitalists play a greater role at later stages. However, once granted, more substantial amounts of funding come from venture capitalists. There is also evidence that suggests a change in the mix of internal and external sources of finance. Finally, our findings based on founders’ scores in raising external funds suggest a call for urgent policy action to improve access to and availability of early-stage entrepreneurial finance in Belgium. We discuss our findings in light of the capital structure of small firms relating to TBSFs.     

Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods*

Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. In order to study this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated.     

Reshaping the schooling system: The role of immigration

This paper studies how the schooling system may be impacted by the number and skill type of immigrants. When the number of low-skilled immigrants is large, the education regime tends to become segregated. Wealthy locals are more likely to choose private schools and vote for a lower tax rate to finance public education. In contrast, high-skilled immigrants tend to reinforce the public system. The optimal immigration policy is highly skill-biased. The admission of high-skilled immigrants expedites redistribution toward the less-skilled local households through both a stronger fiscal support for public education and a reduction in the skill wage premium.     

Biotechnology as a Technological Paradigm in the Global Knowledge Structure

The aim of this study is to analyse whether the receipt of public R&D funding determines firm's R&D strategy selection. This issue is crucial, as previous studies have shown that each R&D strategy is associated to a higher, or lower, innovation performance. We consider three R&D strategies – make, buy, make–buy – and three different sources of public funding – regional, state and other (such as EU). The model estimation is performed through a multinomial logit model with random effects with a sample of 457 large firms for the period 1992–2005, taken from the Spanish Survey of Business Strategies. The main finding is that the source of the funding influences whether firms select the make, buy or make–buy strategy. Additionally, because of the panel structure of the sample, we observe that the effect of public funding on the R&D strategy selection lasts longer for state and regional funds than for other funds.     

我国省对县(市)一般性转移支付的绩效评价——基于DEA二次相对效益模型的研究

一般性转移支付是我国转移支付制度的重要组成部分,它是中央财政为了平衡地区间财力差异、促进基本公共服务均等化为目的的重要制度安排。然而,中央财政以均等化为目标、以标准财政收支差为依据对省(市、自治区)拨付一般性转移支付资金,以及省对县(市)级政府拨付该项资金时,并没有规定具体用途,因此,县(市)级地方政府拥有对这部分资金完全的自主支配权。在多重目标,尤其是经济增长目标的压力下,一般性转移支付资金可能被挪用和挤占,上级政府实现公共服务均等化的政策意图难以达到预期的效果。本文的目的是:从制度层面论述一般性转移支付政策目标与效率评价的内在联系;探讨DEA二次相对效益模型对一般性转移支付绩效评价的适用性;从基本公共服务资金配置和提升效率两个方面,构建了省对县(市)一般性转移支付绩效评价体系;以云南省的县(市)为样本,对一般性转移支付绩效进行实证模拟评价;提出建立绩效评价是完善省对县(市)一般性转移支付制度的重要内容。     

税费改革对农村公共品融资制度的影响——基于山东省调查资料的分析

农村公共品融资是中国农村财务管理面临的重要问题。税费制度改革之后,随着村提留和各种收费的废除,尤其是免征农业税后,农村公共管理可用资金明显减少,因而在废除这种制度后建立起一种新的、有效的农村公共品融资制度已成为公共财政建设的重点内容,也是摆在我们面前的一项重大课题。     

POLITICAL CYCLES

A model of elections is put forth in which there are two parties, each representing a different constituency of voters (the poor and the rich). The political issue is the choice of a proportional tax rate on income, revenues from which are used to finance a public good. There is a stochastic element in which party wins the elections, due to party uncertainty concerning voter preferences, or due to uncertainty concerning which voters will show up at the polls. A political equilibrium in one period consists in a tax policy put forth by each party, and a probability that each party wins. A long series of elections is simulated (100 periods). Voter preferences for the public good change adversely as a function of length of time the incumbent party has been in power and the level of the public good in the last period. Thus, if the party in power funds high levels of the public good, preferences start to move against the public good. This model generates dramatic political cycles, and it is argued that these cycles are of fundamentally different origin from that discussed in the realignment literature.     

Environmental Funds,Public Abatement,and Welfare

This paper addresses some features of environmental funds that the government uses to finance public abatement with pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue. I find that when the pollution tax rate and the tariff rate are jointly chosen optimally, then the optimal pollution tax rate is higher than the Pigouvian tax rate under public abatement financed by tariff revenue, and lower when public abatement is financed by pollution tax revenue. Furthermore, I show that the optimal tariff rate is positive regardless of which tax revenue is used to finance public abatement. These results are relevant for countries where the government seeks revenues earmarked for the financing of environmental funds.     

基于PSM-DID的科研经费“包干制”政策激励效应研究

随着科技体制机制改革的深入推进，科技政策环境不断优化，科研经费“包干制”对于扩大科研人员自主权、激发科研人员创新活力、提高科研经费使用效率具有重要意义，但目前对于科研经费“包干制”政策效果的实证分析较为欠缺。基于实验经济学研究思路，构建对照组和实验组，采用双重差分（PSM-DID）方法对中国实施科研经费“包干制”产生的政策激励效应进行实证分析。结果表明，科研经费“包干制”政策实施对科研人员工作满意度起正向调节作用和正向激励作用，“包干制”政策初步体现出较强的激励效应。未来在科研经费“包干制”实施中应进一步扩大科研人员自主权、适度提高间接费用比例、健全柔性化科研经费管理体系、加强部门间协同与沟通、建立人性化监督审计机制，充分发挥科研经费管理改革对科研人员的政策激励效应，促进科研绩效不断提升。     

Matthew effect,capabilities and innovation policy: the Argentinean case

The purpose of this paper is to test the presence of Matthew effects in different types of public funding for innovation – non-refundable grants, subsidized loans and tax credits. According to the literature, Matthew effect refers to the impact of past accessing to public funds on reputation, which increases the probability of accessing in the present. The dataset is made of 966 firms that accessed the Technological Argentinean Fund (FONTAR), main instrument to foster innovation in Argentina, during 2007–2013 – 3300 observations. Results confirm the existence of Matthew effects: past accessing to FONTAR increases the probability of accessing in the present, but only when different instruments are taken altogether. Then, Matthew effect is positively associated with the diversification of access to promotional instruments rather than the repeated access to one type of funding tool. Additionally, results show that firm’s innovation investments, R&D activities, and human resources, explain the increase in probability of accessing, which provides evidence regarding the presence of capability effects. All of this suggests that once the firm enters the system of public funding, it remains with an active innovative behaviour, not just because of reputation effects, but because it has accumulated capabilities in the pursuit of a technological advantage.     

Social security, public education and the growth-inequality relationship

We study how the relationship between economic growth and inequality depends upon the levels of funding of two of the largest government programs, public education and social security. We do this in the context of an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous agents where the government collects a tax on labor income to finance these programs. We show that in our model an increase in government spending on social security reduces income inequality and can have a non-monotonic effect on growth. When the initial level of social security funding is low, as is the case in most poor economies, then its increase will enhance growth. When its funding level is high as is typical for developed countries, we show that its further increase can slow down growth while reducing income inequality. These results obtain regardless of whether the increase in social security funding is financed by a tax increase or by cutting the public education budget. We also find that the effects of increasing the level of public education expenditures or the overall size of the government budget (holding the budget composition fixed) are characterized by similar non-monotonic growth-inequality relationships.