Audit firm tenure and financial restatements: An analysis of industry specialization and fee effects

This study investigates the relation between audit firm tenure and clients’ financial restatements. Specifically, we extend the audit tenure literature by assessing restatement-based reporting failures using dimensions of auditor expertise and independence previously assumed to underlie short and long audit tenure problems. Short tenure expertise and independence effects are hypothesized using audit firm industry specialization and audit fees as proxies. Long tenure independence effects are hypothesized using nonaudit fees as a proxy. Using matched-sample logistic regression and 382 companies with and without financial restatements during 2000–2004, the results support prior findings by indicating a negative relation between the length of the auditor–client relationship and the likelihood of restatement. For short tenure engagements, we find that auditor industry specialization and audit fees are negatively related to the likelihood of restatement. This result is consistent with concerns about reduced audit quality due to a lack of client-specific knowledge and low audit fees on new audit engagements. Alternatively, the long tenure results indicate an insignificant relation between nonaudit fees and the likelihood of restatement. This finding contradicts independence concerns about nonaudit fees paid to entrenched auditors.     

What matters in audit pricing: industry specialization or overall market leadership?

Ferguson et al. (2003) report that audit industry fee premia primarily reside with joint national and city‐specific industry leadership as opposed to merely firm‐wide (national) industry expertise, suggesting auditor choice among the Big 5 is best conceptualized on joint industry specialization in city‐specific markets and nationally. The present study examines whether the prior results could be confounded by the presence of city‐specific overall market leadership effects. Our findings reaffirm that joint local and national auditor industry expertise is valued by audit clients. Furthermore, overall city‐specific leadership, by itself, also matters in fee determination and results in higher fees, although at a slightly weaker level of statistical significance.     

An empirical analysis of audit fee price competition after the Korean 1999 Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act

This study examines the audit service market in Korea after the 1999 Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act to determine if increased competition has led to audit fee discounting. Until 19 December 2001, when the Korean government enacted The Financial Supervisory Regulations, researchers could not address questions related to price competition in the Korean audit market due to data limitations. The new regulations allow researchers to examine audit effort for the first time because both audit hours and audit fees are now recommended disclosures. We use audit fee data of Korean companies for the 6-year period 1999–2004, and find evidence that total audit fees paid have been increasing but audit fees per hour have been decreasing. We also find that Big 5 auditing firms’ fees per hour are significantly lower than non-Big 5 auditing firms and are decreasing across time. These price pressures should be of concern to regulators and investors because prior research has demonstrated that price competition leads to discounting, which can result in unrealistically low audit fees and poor audit quality. Finally, as in previous research, we also find discounting of initial audit engagements in the Korean market.     

Response to discussants'' comments: The demand for auditor reputation across international markets for audit services

Previous research has documented a positive relation between variation in audit fees across countries and specific macroeconomic factors such as a country's level of litigiousness and the level of required disclosure. Such studies have focused on the supply of auditor services using single-equation models. This study examines not only the supply of but also the demand for large-firm auditors across 20 different countries using the simultaneous-equations approach. This approach is used to account for the endogeneity between choice of auditor and audit fees. The results indicate an association between greater disclosure requirements and the choice of a large-firm auditor. They also indicate that increased litigation and regulation are associated with higher audit fees.     

Audit committee composition and the use of an industry specialist audit firm

Independent, competent boards of directors and audit committees are said to be important mechanisms of corporate governance. The purpose of the present study is to empirically examine the association between audit committee composition and audit quality. Specifically, the link between the proportion of non‐executive directors on an audit committee, financial qualifications of directors and the number of audit committee meetings held in a year are investigated and expected to have a positive association with the quality of the audit firm used. Audit quality is proxied by industry specialization. The results support the link between a higher proportion of non‐executive directors on an audit committee and use of an industry specialist audit firm. Other measures of audit committee quality (those with a higher proportion of directors with financial qualifications and those that meet more frequently) are not significantly associated with the use of an industry specialist audit firm. Sensitivity analysis shows that the presence of an audit committee is linked to use of an industry specialist audit firm.     

Audit pricing and auditor industry specialization in an emerging market: Evidence from China

In this paper we examine the determinants of audit fees by focusing on auditor industry specialization and second tier auditors in the Chinese market. We find evidence of Big 4 premiums for brand name as well as industry specialization in both the statutory and supplementary market. Big 4 industry specialists earn additional premiums in the statutory market as compared to non-industry specialists. We also find that market expansion did not provide the second tier auditors any price advantage. These auditors increased their market share mainly in the mid- and small-sized clienteles. Moreover, industry experience developed by the second tier firms may have helped them gain economy of scale and reduce service fees. This may be their strategy to win future clients that seek low-priced audits.     

Auditor specialization, perceived audit quality, and audit fees in the local government audit market

Prior governmental research implies a positive relation between auditor specialization and audit quality, but the effect of specialization on audit fees is mixed. However, no single governmental study investigates the effect of auditor specialization on both audit quality and audit fees. Also, prior studies focus on either large- or small audit firms and often employ indirect proxies for audit quality. We study the effects of auditor specialization on perceived audit quality and audit fees. Our data represent both Big 5 and smaller audit firms and include three market-based measures of specialization. We survey 241 Florida local government finance directors and find that specialization is positively associated with perceived audit quality but not with audit fees. We also find that Big 5 auditors, often used as a proxy for higher audit quality in prior research, are not uniformly associated with increased perceived audit quality but consistently charge higher audit fees. Our results confirm a relation between measures of audit firm specialization and audit quality and raise questions regarding audit firm size and audit quality in the municipal sector. Our findings suggest that engaging specialized auditors may be good policy for many local governments.     

Large audit firm premium and audit specialisation in the public sector

The outsourcing of public‐sector audits to the private sector is an important issue. This study examines the fee premium in the public sector by comparing audit fees between the government auditor and the Big5. The study (i) statistically adjusts for self‐selection bias, (ii) allows the slope coefficients in the audit fee model to vary between the Big5 and the government audit and (iii) estimates the counterfactual audit fee premium. The Big5 premium is around 23 percent. However, the variation in premium depends on whether the Big5 auditor is an industry or city specialist.     

Relation between external audit fees, audit committee characteristics and internal audit

This study examines whether the existence of an audit committee, audit committee characteristics and the use of internal audit are associated with higher external audit fees. Higher audit fees imply increased audit testing and higher audit quality. We find that the existence of an audit committee, more frequent committee meetings and increased use of internal audit are related to higher audit fees. The expertise of audit committee members is associated with higher audit fees when meeting frequency and independence are low. These findings are consistent with an increased demand for higher quality auditing by audit committees, and by firms that make greater use of internal audit.     

The association between audit committees,compensation incentives,and corporate audit fees

This study uses audit fee data from the 2001–2003 reporting periods to examine the relationship between measures of audit committee effectiveness and compensation incentives with corporate audit fees. Our results suggest that audit committee size, committee member expertise, and committee member independence are positively associated to audit fee levels, consistent with the notion that audit committees serve as a complement to external auditors in monitoring management. In contrast, CEO long-term pay and insider ownership are inversely related to audit fee levels, substituting for external audit effort in motivating management. Notwithstanding results on the full sample of firm-years, we uncover significant differences in the determinants of audit fees between the years examined. An important implication of these results is that explaining the intra-firm variation in audit fees over time is clearly necessary in order to understand the antecedents and consequences of audit fees.

Female audit committee members and their influence on audit fees

We test the relationship between female representation on the audit committee and audit fees for 624 Australian companies in the year 2011. A positive relationship is found, leading to the conclusion that female presence on audit committees influences the quality of the external audit. Further, we find that gender is the significant audit committee characteristic in predicting audit quality and that women on the audit committee strengthen the positive relationship between firm size and audit fees, and between risk and audit fees. Conversely, we find that female representation dampens the positive relationship between complexity and audit fees.     

Independent audit committee members’ board tenure and audit fees

An independent audit committee is an audit committee on which all members are independent directors. This study examines whether independent audit committee members’ board tenure affects audit fees. On the basis of the prior literature, we formulate an unsigned hypothesis. This is because on the one hand, long board tenure audit committee members (defined as members with board tenure of 10 or more years) have greater incentives to protect their reputational capitals by purchasing increased audit effort, which positively affects audit fees. On the other hand, audit pricing reflects audit committee quality. Long board tenure audit committee members may have less need for increased audit effort because they can effectively oversee the financial reporting process themselves, which negatively affects audit fees. We find that audit fees are negatively associated with the proportion of long board tenure directors on the independent audit committee, consistent with the notion that audit committee members’ long board tenure results in lower audit effort.     

The effects of corporate governance and audit and non-audit fees on IPO Value

This paper examines the effects of non-executive board members, audit committee composition and financial expertise, and fees paid to audit firms on the value of 375 UK initial public offerings (IPOs). Empirical findings show that underpricing decreases in audit fees whereas it increases in non-audit fees. A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the firm’s board and audit committees with a higher proportion of non-executive directors and financial accounting expertise of their members positively moderate the inter-relationships between underpricing and both audit and non-audit fees paid by companies going through an IPO. Further investigations using the adjusted price-to-book value as a proxy for firm value at IPO confirm our main findings that internal governance mechanisms may complement services provided by the auditors in terms of generating higher valuations. Controlling for the simultaneous determination of audit and non-audit fees, our results remain consistent.     

An examination of the relation between market structure and the profitability of audit engagements

Due to increasing supplier concentration, there is growing concern regarding the lack of competition in the audit market. Theory based on Cournot oligopoly predicts that increasing concentration will facilitate monopolistic behaviour. Conversely, if the market for audit services has more in common with a Bertrand oligopoly, concentration may not lead to higher fees. We evaluate whether increased audit supplier concentration leads to economic rents by investigating audit profitability. Using proprietary data from a (then) Big 6 audit firm, we find that local market structure has a significant and positive association with audit profitability, but not auditor effort for large clients.     

Strategic pricing by Big 4 audit firms in private client segments

We examine how Big 4 auditors compete for new private clients. We find evidence suggesting that Big 4 auditors offer fee discounts to attract non‐Big 4 private clients to experience attributes of their brand name audit services. We also find that to attract clients from competing Big 4 suppliers, Big 4 auditors target fee discounts at clients in industries where they are the market leader. Our results further indicate that the Big 4 industry leaders target fee discounts to fast‐growing clients and are able to charge these clients significant price fee increases in the second mandate period (after 3 years).     

Effects of SOX 404(b) implementation on audit fees by SEC filer size category

This study provides novel information about the consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) by documenting differential audit fee shocks accompanying implementation of SOX 404(b) internal control tests and reports for clients in three size categories: large accelerated filers (LAFs), small accelerated filers (SAFs), and non-accelerated filers (NAFs). First, we find that although both LAFs and SAFs experience audit fee shocks attributable to 404(b), SAFs on average experience relatively greater fee shocks than LAFs (107.8% versus 84.6%; Table 6). Second, even though NAFs are not subject to 404(b) procedures, we document a 42.7% fee shock for NAFs. Our interpretation is that 404(b) generated an immediate increase in demand for audit services with no corresponding sudden increase in supply of experienced audit personnel, enabling audit firms to charge higher prices for all filers including NAFs. We find that audit fee shocks attributable to 404(b) are positively associated with audit offices’ bargaining power relative to clients, and that the effect of offices’ bargaining power is strongest for SAFs and weakest for NAFs. Although higher audit fees (with client characteristics held constant) are often considered an indicator of better audit quality, we find virtually no evidence that the massive fee increases in 2004 are accompanied by improvements in same-year or next-year audit quality, measured as decreases in discretionary accruals and a lower likelihood of subsequent restatements of audited financial reports.     

Corporate fraud and the audit expectations gap: A study among business managers

This paper presents the findings of an empirical study on the audit expectations gap concerning the role of the auditor in corporate fraud cases. The purpose of the study is to assess the significance of a reasonableness gap, a deficient performance gap and a deficient standards gap in the specific context of corporate fraud. In order to distinguish all three elements of the expectations gap, respondents need a certain level of expertise on fraud. Therefore, in this research the audit expectations gap is studied primarily from the perspective of three groups of business managers, based on the fact that they typically have a special responsibility in fraud cases. Bankers are used as a control group to assess the potential differences between the views of business managers and ‘society in general’. This study provides clear evidence of a substantial audit expectations gap in the context of fraud, both with respect to the auditor's performance as well as the auditor's formal obligations as laid down in existing standards. However, compared to bankers, business managers are less inclined to judge auditors’ performance of existing duties as inadequate, and see fewer points where auditing standards should be amended.     

Non-audit fees, long-term auditor–client relationships and earnings management

We examine whether auditor independence is affected by the amount spent on non‐audit services. Faster growth in non‐audit fees and longer time periods over which non‐audit services are purchased might reduce the auditor's independence from that client. Our results do not provide any support for a relationship between non‐audit fee growth rates or the length of time of the non‐audit fee relationship with the client and discretionary accruals, our measure of earnings management. We do find some evidence that the interaction of the non‐audit fee time‐period measures and client importance is positive and significantly related to discretionary accruals.     

Effect of regulatory oversight on the association between internal governance characteristics and audit fees

We examine the relationship between internal governance, external audit monitoring and regulatory oversight for a sample comprising industrial companies and financial/utility companies subject to additional industry‐specific regulation. Our results indicate that the association between audit fees and board/audit committee independence and size are weaker for regulated companies. These observations are consistent with the notion that regulatory oversight partially substitutes the external audit as a monitoring mechanism. However, boards/audit committees with more multiple directorships demand a more extensive audit in the presence of regulatory oversight to protect their reputation capital. Our study enhances our understanding of the complex relationships among the major corporate governance elements.     

Further evidence on the determinants of audit pricing in universities

This study investigates the determinants of audit fees for UK universities, involving an analysis of 451 university-year observations over the period 2007–2010. The study contributes to a fledgling strand of research examining audit pricing in the public sector. In seeking to identify an appropriate model to explain audit fees we interview a number of university auditors and use their insights in conjunction with prior findings from both private and public sector studies of audit pricing. Our findings show that audit fees in UK universities are positively influenced by size, the number of subsidiary companies, the amount of endowments, the level of debtors, being located in England and the use of a London-based auditor. We also find that more research-intensive universities (using a range of measures) and universities with greater operating surpluses pay lower audit fees.