Lloyd Shapley's Matching and Game Theory

This is a survey of Lloyd Shapley's contributions to matching theory and game theory in general, starting with the work that inspired the Swedish Academy to award the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences to Lloyd Shapley and Alvin Roth.     

Elicitation of Strategy Profiles in Large Group Coordination Games

The strategy method is an experimental procedure for eliciting a complete strategy of play for all information sets, not only the ones that happen to be reached during the course of a play of a game. We use it to elicit individual strategy profiles for a class of large group, market entry games in which the payoff for a player who enters on a given market capacity value decreases linearly in the difference between the capacity value and the corresponding number of entrants. Our results show that the aggregate frequencies of entry do not differ from previous results obtained under the more common decision method. Under both methods, the number of entrants across a large set of market capacity values is organized remarkably well by the equilibrium solution. In contrast, theindividual profiles do not support mixed equilibrium play; only three of the sixty profiles suggest attempts at randomization or mixing between periods. About half of the individual profiles appear to converge, albeit slowly, to cutoff decision policies and more than a quarter of the profiles exhibit a variety of patterns that defy classification.     

中间层组织的互补性博弈及其协调机制

中间层组织中各行为主体的互动活动往往具有策略互补性。运用互补性博弈的分析方法,考察中间层组织中各行为主体选择其努力水平的相互依赖性如何影响多重纳什均衡的结构,同时,考察哪些重要的协调机制有助于避免由于策略不确定性等导致的协调失败问题。     

项目团队的冲突协调机制及其博弈分析

项目团队中存在的冲突是影响团队有效构建与和谐发展的重要因素。如何正确而客观地理解和认识项目团队中存在的冲突以及这些冲突之间的关联关系,则直接影响到项目团队的管理和协调。在系统梳理项目团队中产生冲突原因的基础上,利用团队中存在的任务履行冲突与团队成员在情感上冲突之间的关联关系,分析并得到了利用团队成员在情感上的相互支持关系,来促进任务履行中冲突的协调机制。     

Investigating Donating Behavior Using Hypothetical Dictator Game Experiments

We conduct dictator game experiments to investigate donating behavior by simultaneously examining the time delay when the donee receives the donation and the individual characteristics of the donor. We show that donations decrease as the time delay rises and that gender, education level, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and utilitarianism affect donations independent of the time delay.     

Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity

We focus on a class of market entry games in which a newly emergent market opportunity may be fruitfully exploited by no more than a commonly known, exogenously determined number of firms. Our results show significant effects of the parameters manipulated in the study, namely, the market capacity, entry fee, and method of subject assignment to groups (fixed vs. random). In contrast to previous market entry games with linear payoff functions, we find no evidence of convergence to equilibrium play on the aggregate level. Shifting the focus of the analysis from the aggregate to the individual level, four clusters of subjects are identified. The patterns are: (1) choice of the same action that is independent of the parameters of the game or the outcome of previous presentations of the same game; (2) random choices with probabilities prescribed by the equilibrium solution for risk-neutral players; (3) random choices with probabilities equal to the individual observed overall proportion of entry; and (4) sequential dependencies that violate any model that assumes randomization. Subjects in the fourth and largest category are shown to adjust their choices in accordance with a simple principle of strategic reasoning.     

A Coordination Game Model of Charitable Giving and Seed Money Effect

If potential donors for a charity project possess the warm‐glow properties in their preferences, we can represent their behavior with a coordination game. Accordingly, we construct a simultaneous incomplete information game model of charitable giving based on a simple global coordination game. We demonstrate that merely by the effect of seed money to shift the threshold requirement of the donations for project success downwards, the proportion of donors and the total amount of donations strictly and continuously increase with the amount of seed money. This result is partially compatible with the field experimental evidence in List and Lucking‐Reiley (2002).     

An Improved Inventory Coordination Model in a Multi-stage Multi-customer Supply Chain

To solve the inventory coordination model in a multi-stage, multi-customer supply chain, this paper first analyzes the third model （integer powers of two multipliers at each firm） studied by Moutaz Khouja （2003）, and the authors take a numerical example to prove that the third model is irrational to miss feasible solution. Then this paper puts up a new improved model （integer multiplier at each firm）, and takes the example to prove it gives better results than the integer powers of two multipliers at each firm.     

物流业可持续协调发展控制模型探讨

详细分析物流业可持续发展系统及其特点,构建物流业可持续发展大系统递阶结构。从大系统控制论的角度出发,建立物流业可持续协调发展控制模型,探讨物流业可持续发展的协调控制途径及策略。最后,提出相关结论及建议。     

Inter-Industry Wage Differentials in Greece: Evidence from Quantile Regression Analysis

Using a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of the asymptotic distribution of the quantile regression estimator with intra-cluster correlation of the error terms, the paper investigates whether and to what extent inter-industry wage differentials derive from worker heterogeneity in the form of unobserved quality. To conduct this study, we pioneer in utilizing a unique data set, the European Union Structure of Earnings Survey for Greece, which follows a two-stage random sampling approach of employees clustered within firms. Data refer to 2010 when the first elements of the economic adjustment programme to deal with the chronic deficiencies of the Greek economy and restore sustainable public finances, competitiveness and set the foundation for long-term growth, gained visibility. Results point to high wage dispersion across industries at the mean of the conditional wage distribution, even after controlling for personal and workplace characteristics. However, evidence for the unobserved heterogeneity hypothesis is rather scant. Therefore, there is room for efficiency wage or rent-sharing theories in accounting for a large part of inter-industry wage differentials tentatively implying that firm heterogeneity in the ability to pay matters more than employee unobservable attributes in the wage determination process.     

基于M-C协调战略的虚拟团队之间协调管理方法研究

在分析虚拟团队之间相互关系模式和M—C协调战略的基础上，提出了虚拟团队之间协同工作过程中的协调管理方法，并通过对虚拟团队可视化模型的介绍，探讨了这种协调管理方法的可视化实现过程。     

防范家族隧道行为的监管博弈分析

本文的博弈分析从证券市场监管的外部治理环境找出对家族隧道行为产生影响的监管因素,目标在于完善证券市场机制,加强证券监管力度,规避企业领导人的机会主义行为。经过研究,证实了违规交易的收益越高,家族投机心理越强这一舆论关注的现象,同时也发现证监会监管策略b*与家族违规的成本呈反向关系,而家族违规行为策略a*与证监会声誉损失也呈反向关系。     

产业能源消费与产业发展的协整与误差修正模型分析

能源消费与经济增长密切相关。能源消费在三次产业的分布与三次产业经济发展的关系如何，对于我国国民经济的可持续发展，建立资源节约型社会，保证资源的永续利用具有重要现实意义。笔者利用协整理论，检验三次产业的能源消费与产业发展的协整和因果关系，建立误差修正模型。结果表明，三次产业的能源消费弹性是不同的，GDP是能源消费的格兰杰因果关系。     

Control and spread of contagion in networks with global effects

We study proliferation of an action in binary action network coordination games that are generalized to include global effects. This captures important aspects of proliferation of a particular action or narrative in online social networks, providing a basis to understand their impact on societal outcomes. Our model naturally captures complementarities among starting sets, network resilience, and global effects, and highlights interdependence in channels through which contagion spreads. We present new, natural, computationally tractable, and efficient algorithms to define and compute equilibrium objects that facilitate the general study of contagion in networks and prove their theoretical properties. Our algorithms are easy to implement and help to quantify relationships previously inaccessible due to computational intractability. Using these algorithms, we study the spread of contagion in scale-free networks with 1000 players using millions of Monte Carlo simulations. Our analysis provides quantitative and qualitative insight into the design of policies to control or spread contagion in networks. The scope of application is enlarged given the many other situations across different fields that may be modeled using this framework.     

Contagion of Self‐Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

We examine how group decision‐making affects other‐regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision‐making and whether the difference in decision‐making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision‐making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision‐making.     

O2O模式下的供应链协调研究

构建了"线上至线下"的O2O模式下由一个供应商和一个O2O零售商构成的供应链运作模型。具体运作过程如下:供应商将一种短生命周期产品通过O2O平台上的零售商(O2O零售商)卖给消费者,消费者在线下接收所订购的产品并给予相应的评价;O2O平台上的零售商将产品配送业务外包给第三方物流公司并支付相应的配送费用。研究了供应链中的生产计划制定好后供应商如何使用供应链契约协调观察到需求发生偏差后的供应链。研究表明:在集中决策下,当需求偏差在一定范围时,供应商不需调整原有的生产计划,只需调整零售价格;当需求偏差超出一定范围时,供应商需要调整生产量和零售价格;在分散决策下,供应商使用数量折扣契约协调此时的O2O供应链。     

东北区域创新体系建设的行政协调体系研究

在对区域行政协调体系理论进行研究的基础上，通过研究借鉴“长三角”和“泛珠三角”以及发达国家区域行政协调机制的经验，对东北区域创新体系的行政协调模式、行政协调的组织架构以及各机构职能设计做出了初步的探索，并提出了一些具体操作建议。     

Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence

Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction.      

Two more classes of games with the continuous-time fictitious play property

Fictitious Play is the oldest and most studied learning process for games. Since the already classical result for zero-sum games, convergence of beliefs to the set of Nash equilibria has been established for several classes of games, including weighted potential games, supermodular games with diminishing returns, and 3×3 supermodular games. Extending these results, we establish convergence of Continuous-time Fictitious Play for ordinal potential games and quasi-supermodular games with diminishing returns. As a by-product we obtain convergence for 3×m and 4×4 quasi-supermodular games.     

What You Don’t Know Might Hurt You: Some Unresolved Issues in the Design and Analysis of Discrete Choice Experiments

The papers and comments in this issue focus on four broad areas related to understanding and modeling choices: (1) The use of laboratory experiments to improve valuation methods; (2) The design of stated preference choice set and choice occasions; (3) Latent class models as means of identifying and accommodating preference heterogeneity; and (4) Accommodating uncertainty about the “true” model, modeling ranking and rating tasks and pooling data sources. In what follows I offer some comments on each area, and briefly discuss several unresolved issues associated with each area, closing with some comments about future research opportunities.