论公有制的实现形式

党的十六届三中全会提出，积极推行公有制的多种有效实现形式，使股份制成为公有制的主要实现形式，这是一次理论上的重大突破。本文论述了所有制与其实现形式之间的辩证关系、公有制的由来、我国公有制的由来及我党探索公有制的最佳实现形式的过程。本文旨在说明股份制将在完善社会主义市场经济体制中起到关键作用。     

浅谈对国有企业改革的几点认识

国有企业改革是我国经济体制改革的中心环节,是社会主义制度的自我完善、自我发展。因此,在改革中应坚持公有制为主体,实行现代企业制度,探索社会主义市场经济条件下公有制与市场经济结合的具体形式,让公有经济适应市场经济的发展。股份制是现代企业的一种资本组织形式,国家可以通过资本渗透控制股份制企业的经营方向。     

所有制结构改革及其风险预期

<正> 成败关键:国有企业的股份制改造 我国所有制结构的改革,大体是沿着以公有制经济为主体、非公有制经济与公有制经济共同发展的方向前进的。但所有制结构改革的问题,从来不在于多种经济成分能否并存和共同发展,而是怎样坚持公有制经济的主体地位。现有经验显示,要坚持公有制经济的主体地位,必须对大中型国有企业进行股份制改造。因此,股份制改造便成为所有制结构改革成败的关键。     

加快国企改革制步伐推进县域经济快速发展

刚刚结束的党的十六届三中全会关于我国经济体制问题取得了许多重大突破和创新,如提出大力发展混合所有制经济,实现投资主体多元化,使股份制成为公有制的主要实现形式;提出建立归属清晰、权责明确,保护严格,流转顺畅的现代化产权制度等;这将对我国全面建设小康社会提供强有力的体制保证,特别是对县域国有企业改革具有重大的指导意义,现以淇县经济状况为例,结合本人审计工作实践,浅谈一点国企改革的想法:     

股份制漫谈

一、股份制现象 改革开放以来，深圳在大量的竞争性行业中，公有制经济普遍采用了股份制、股份合作制的形式，通过建立一大批国有与集体、国有与外资、国有与民营等互相参股的股份制企业．改变计划经济体制下单一形式的公有制模式。随着改革的深入推进，我国各地也都建立了一批股份制企业。 股份制已经成为发达国家公司所有制的主要形式。东亚发展中国家和地区，自８０年代以来对各自的公有企业规模、结构和管理体制进行改革和调整，新加坡政府对国有企业实行国家参与制，政府股占１／４．其余３／４股份由私人或外资占有．我国香港经济是典…     

劳动力资本化是国有企业改革的制度创新

我国对国有企业实行的股份制和民营化的产权改革不能从根本上解决监督激励和效率流失的问题,而劳动力资本化是一项可行的制度选择。劳动力资本化改革是国有企业股份制改革的一项制度补充,是对社会主义公有制的发展和完善。     

王珏对我国经济改革事业的理论贡献

王珏是我国颇有建树、颇有影响的经济学家。第一,他较早地对社会主义经济制度和体制进行反思,提出“社会主义经济是有计划的商品经济和市场调节(即市场经济)”的观点。第二,在改革传统所有制基础理论方面,他提出应当把公有制的性质和具体(实现)形式区别开来以及“股份制的现代企业制度”是国有企业改革的目标等重要观点。第三,他对公有制本身的性质和特征进行深入研究,提出“现代公有制”和“劳动者个人股份所有制”理论。第四,他认为保障和实现劳动者的经济利益是社会主义经济要解决的根本性问题,社会主义应使劳动力资本化,实现“劳者有其股”。第五,在国有经济改革方面,他首先提出“抓大放小”和“国退民进”的宏观改革思路,并把建立“股份制的现代企业制度”作为微观上改革国有企业的总体方向。第六,他还提出经济体制改革三阶段理论,认为社会主义市场经济的最终确立将要经过社会主义与市场经济的初步结合、基本结合和完全结合等三个阶段,这三个阶段的主要任务和目标是改革国有经济、发展民有经济和实现劳动者个人所有的现代公有制经济。     

加快国企改制步伐 推进县域经济快速发展

<正> 刚刚结束的党的十六届三中全会关于我国经济体制问题取得了许多重大突破和创新,如提出大力发展混合所有制经济,实现投资主体多元化,使股份制成为公有制的主要实现形式;提出建立归属清晰、权责明确,保护严格,流转顺畅的现代化产权制度等;这将对我国全面建设小康社会提供强有力的体制保证,特别是对县域国有企业改革具有重大的指导意义,现以淇县经济状况为例,结合本人审计工作实践,浅谈一点国企改革的想法:     

试论国有外贸企业的股份制改革

试论国有外贸企业的股份制改革中国化工进出口总公司杨志伟１９９７年召开的党的十五大和中央经济工作会议，都把搞好国有企业改革放到了经济体制改革和经济结构调整的突出位置。江泽民同志在十五大报告中指出：“公有制实现形式可以而且应当多样化。一切反映社会化生产规...     

企业混合产权管理研究

党的十六大提出,"除极少数必须由国家独资经营的企业外,积极推行股份制,发展混合所有制经济".党的十六届三中全会指出,我国要"大力发展国有资本,集体资本和非公有资本等参股的混合所有制经济,实现投资主体多元化,使股份制成为公有制的主要实现形式".十七大指出,"以现代产权制度为基础,发展混合所有制经济".随着产权的流动与重组,国资监管面临的纯粹的国有产权将越来越少.因此,为了适应国有企业改革发展新形势的需要,探索建立企业混合产权有效管理模式日益提上国资监管的工作议程.     

Building State-owned Assets Supervision System and Conducting Mixed Ownership Reforms to Reinforce Each Other's Collaboration

Improving the state-owned assets supervision system (SOASS) can effectively get over the defects of systems and mechanisms and further promote the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); and the deepening of the reform can advance the change of the SOASS to the supervision on capital. By analyzing the relationship between the SOASS and the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises, we have found that collaborative promotion of the change of the SOASS to the supervision on capital and promotion of the reform of mixed ownership can do good to ameliorating the corporate management mechanism, improving the market-oriented management mechanism of enterprises and completing the medium- and long-term incentive mechanisms, etc. to enhance business operation efficiency. Due to such prevailing problems as relative dispersion and vagueness of the policies relating to deepening the reform of SOEs, inconsistent progress of the reform of state-owned assets (SOAs) and SOEs, and corporate reform focusing on apprence, improving the SOASS and deepening collaborative development of the reform of mixed ownership of SOEs are hindered by some constraints. To construct and improve the SOASS and the reform of mixed ownership collaboratively, we should make efforts to promote the reform in the following five aspects, namely, placing importance to policy coordination, boosting synchronism of the reform of SOAs and SOEs at different levels and in different areas to coordinate the nationwide reform of SOAs and SOEs, facilitating reform of the mechanism of enterprises of mixed ownership through mixed capital, and promoting the SOASS and stimulating classified monitoring and reform of mixed ownership based on classified reform of SOEs.     

当前企业改革与发展中若干重大理论和政策问题

本文认为,中央《关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定》提出要使股份制成为公有制的主要实现形式是一个重大突破,肯定了股份制在社会主义市场经济中的重要地位,也找到了将社会主义公有制同市场经济有机结合起来的道路;国资委发布的《关于规范国有企业改制工作的意见》提出的管理层持股涉及的不仅是企业内部管理者购买企业股权的问题,而且是在整个企业改制过程中怎么按照市场化来运作的问题;《决定》与中央经济工作会议都提出要加快国有经济的战略调整,除了优化国有资源的配置外,还要为其他方面的改革构造一个良好的微观基础,但我们不提倡所谓国有资产完全退出竞争性领域,国家对国有企业也不再实施倾斜性的保护政策,而且要让它们在市场竞争中优胜劣汰。     

Globalisation and Industrial Policy: The Case of China

After a quarter of a century of industrial policy, China's objective of nurturing a group of globally competitive state‐owned enterprises appears to have succeeded beyond most expectations. However, China's SOEs are far from catching up with the world's leading firms. Protection through state ownership in a massive, fast‐growing economy has permitted China's SOEs to earn large profits and achieve high market capitalisations, but this is not the same thing as building globally competitive firms. The fact that China's industrial policy has been unsuccessful after a quarter of a century of intense effort demonstrates how difficult it is to construct an industrial policy in the era of capitalist globalisation, which has produced intense global industrial concentration across large parts of the global value chain. Although the detailed content of the next stage of reform of China's large state‐owned enterprises is unclear, China's determination to build a group of globally competitive large companies remains undimmed.     

国企并购重组中的财务风险及其防范

企业通过重组其竞争对手的途径成为巨型企业是现代企业发展史上的一个突出现象。就我国而言,企业并购还有其特殊的作用:推动国有企业的体制改革,以期实现与国际先进的企业管理模式接轨,最终将国有企业做强做大。目前,国有企业改革已取得实质性重大进展,尽管还有一些攻坚任务,但国企改革最困难的时期已经过去,建立现代企业制度已是国企改革的既定方向。     

管理层持股与公司绩效:基于管理层收购的实证研究

以1997至2009年管理层收购进行私有化的66家国有企业作为研究对象,研究管理层持股与公司经营绩效的关系。结果表明:管理层收购对公司绩效的影响在短期存在负向作用的倾向,而在长期内影响并不显著。考虑到管理层持股变化可能对公司绩效产生的影响,进一步分析持股变化率与公司绩效的关系发现,若持股变化率处于+31%~+50%,-31%~-50%,公司业绩指标将呈现正向变化的趋势,从而反映出管理层收购对公司绩效的积极作用。     

Does state ownership facilitate outward FDI of Chinese SOEs? Institutional development,market competition,and the logic of interdependence between governments and SOEs

Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) of manufacturing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from emerging economies (EE) has emerged as a significant phenomenon in global markets. Although previous research has emphasized the bright-side of state ownership in facilitating SOEs’ OFDI, the stream of research largely overlooks its dark-side effects. Drawing on resource dependence theory (RDT), we argue that state ownership creates dependence of SOEs on their home governments, which may undermine manufacturing SOEs’ willingness to conduct OFDI, autonomy and market orientation, and legitimacy in overseas markets. Thus, substantial state ownership may counteract with manufacturing SOEs’ OFDI from EE. Our empirical results, based on a sample of 507 Chinese publicly-listed manufacturing SOEs during 2007–2013, show that a high percentage of state-owned shares exerts negative effects on SOEs’ OFDI. Relative to local SOEs, central SOEs are less likely to engage in OFDI. Further, the negative effect of the percentage of state-owned shares on SOEs’ OFDI will be alleviated by institutional development and competition intensity. The study contributes to literature by making a real theoretical case for the dark-side effects of state ownership on manufacturing SOEs’ OFDI from EE.     

当前公有产权与私有产权之辨析

当前在公有产权与私有产权的研究中所碰到的问题有:竞争和产权哪个更重要;更注重社会目标和社会福利的国有企业(SOE),是否更易受政府的干预;SOE是否更易受到公司治理问题的困扰等。通过比较公有产权和私有产权在市场竞争、政府行为和公司治理方面的差异,认为由于私有产权对创新和节约成本的激励作用大,其经营运作较少受到政府社会目标的扭曲以及硬的预算约束和有效的市场退出机制使其在公司治理方面具有优势,故而较之私有产权,公有产权具有先天的低效率,产权比市场更为重要。     

Chinese State Enterprises and their Reform

The far-reaching changes in the economic environment in China since the start of the reform period have directly affected enterprise behaviour and have important implications for future enterprise reform. The growth of market transactions has been accompanied by an increase in competition which has forced State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to cut costs and upgrade quality. The growing exposure of Chinese enterprises to international markets and foreign business practices has led to an upgrading of their organization and management structure. The multiplication of the sources of external funds for investment has facilitated the establishment of new enterprises and provided enterprises with wider opportunities for diversifying risk. And the rapid growth of the economy has provided room for the non-state sector to expand without a major contraction of the state sector. But many problems still remain, notably with regard to government interference in the day-to-day management of the SOEs, the development of appropriate and effective governance structures, the need for efficiency-enhancing industrial restructuring, and reform of employment relations and the social security system. This article considers these problems and makes recommendations regarding future reform initiatives particularly with regard to loss-making enterprises.     

Foreign acquisition and post-privatization exit of state-owned firms

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign and domestic ownership on the exit rates of privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in transitional countries. The exit of privatized SOEs can have a profound impact on employment and on the development of local economies of transitional countries. An oligopoly model that incorporates country-level trade costs and individual SOE's productivity is developed to assess the exit of SOEs under either foreign or domestic ownership. The model shows that market competition between firms can lead to liquidation of the SOE by a domestic firm when trade costs increase. When the productivity of SOE is high, neither foreign nor domestic firm will liquidate. The predictions of the model are tested using firm-level privatization data from Central and Eastern Europe. By controlling for productivity, trade costs, and other attributes of SOEs after privatization, it is found that foreign ownership significantly reduces the probability of SOE's exit as compared to domestic ownership. Furthermore, there is evidence that as trade costs increase, the exit probability of domestically owned SOEs increases and the exit probability of foreign-owned SOEs declines.