宗教信仰、政治身份与企业投资偏好

文章运用企业家宗教信仰的直接调查数据,考察了企业家的个人宗教信仰对企业投资活动的影响。研究发现,相对于研发型投资,有宗教信仰的企业家偏好于风险相对较小的关系型投资;不同类型的宗教信仰对企业投资偏好具有不同的影响,笃信东方宗教的企业家相对于笃信西方宗教的企业家更加偏好于关系型投资;企业家的宗教信仰对投资偏好的影响因企业家是否具有政治身份而有所不同,相对于有政治身份的企业家,没有政治身份的企业家的宗教信仰会更加显著地正向影响关系型投资,表明政治身份可能会弱化宗教信仰在关系型投资中的作用。     

Growth, Environment and Uncertain Future Preferences

The attitude of future generations towards environmental assets may well be different from ours, and it is necessary to take into account thispossibility explicitly in the current debate about environmental policy. The question we are addressing here is: should uncertainty about futurepreferences lead to a more conservative attitude towards environment?Previous literature shows that it is the case when society expects that onaverage future preferences will be more in favor of environment than ours,but this result relies heavily on the assumption of a separability betweenconsumption and environmental quality in the utility function. We show thatthings are less simple when preferences are non-separable: the attitude ofthe society now depends not only on the expectation of the change inpreferences but also on the characteristics of the economy (impatience,intertemporal flexibility, natural capacities of regeneration of theenvironment, relative preference for the environment), on its history(initial level of the environmental quality) and on the date at whichpreferences are expected to change (near or far future).     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.      

Sticky Norms,Endogenous Preferences,and Shareable Goods

The Internet has reduced the cost of borrowing and lending “shareable goods,” including tools, gear, toys, lodging, and vehicles. Online platforms can better match people with underutilized goods, but it may take time for people to develop sticky norms and endogenous preferences that are conducive to greater peer-to-peer sharing. This study estimates the current and potential value of sharing items across households. Data from the General Social Survey, the website NeighborGoods, and a new survey show that peer-to-peer borrowing is already worth at least $179 a year for 30% of Americans. Spending on shareable goods provides an upper bound on the potential gains from sharing. The consumer expenditure survey reveals that the average household spends $9,090 each year on shareable goods. Private vehicles account for 80% of these expenses, which suggests that the largest opportunities may be in greater car-sharing and ride-sharing.     

Social Preferences, Skill Segregation, and Wage Dynamics

We study the earning structure and the equilibrium assignment of workers to firms in a model in which workers have social preferences, and skills are perfectly substitutable in production. Firms offer long-term contracts, and we allow for frictions in the labour market in the form of mobility costs. The model delivers specific predictions about the nature of worker flows, about the characteristics of workplace skill segregation, and about wage dispersion both within and across firms. We show that long-term contracts in the presence of social preferences associate within-firm wage dispersion with novel "internal labour market" features such as gradual promotions, productivity-unrelated wage increases, and downward wage flexibility. These three dynamic features lead to productivity-unrelated wage volatility within firms.     

Heterogeneous Preferences, Education Expenditures and Income Distribution

This paper introduces heterogeneous preferences to a growth model which incorporates human capital, accumulated through either public or private education. The implications of heterogeneous preferences for income and its distribution are the focus of the paper. Public education expenditure is determined through a voting mechanism where the median preference rather than median income household is the decisive voter. The paper extends the work of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and shows first, that heterogeneous preferences increase income inequality in the private education model and second, public education can overcome the added heterogeneity and reduce income inequality. The results strengthen the arguments for public education as a redistributive mechanism.     

Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games

Research on ultimatum and dictator games has found that because of "fairness" first movers in such games offer more than noncooperative game theory predicts. We find that if the right to be the first mover is "earned" by scoring high on a general knowledge quiz, then first movers behave in a more self-regarding manner. We also conducted dictator double blind experiments, in which the experimenter could not identify the decision maker. The results yielded by far our largest observed incidence of self-regarding offers, suggesting that offers are due to strategic and expectation considerations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C91.     

Law and Preferences

Legal rules do more than provide incentives, they change people.When preferences and norms are endogenously determined via aprocess of imitation and learning, legal rules, by affectingthe market outcome, may affect the dynamics of preference formation.Analyzing the effect of different legal rules should thereforego beyond the analysis of the incentives they provide. It shouldalso include an analysis of their effect on the distributionof preferences and norms of behavior. We illustrate this claimby considering a simple market game in which individuals mayhave preferences that include fairness concerns. We show thatdifferent legal rules change not only the pattern of trade ina market game, but also individuals' fairness concerns. Thatis, different rules may eventually make individuals care more(or less) about a fair outcome. Specifically, our model suggeststhat enhanced remedies for breach of contract may reduce equilibriumpreferences for fairness.     

Preferences for Educational Status,Human Capital Accumulation,and Growth

Using an overlapping generations model in which human capital accumulation has positive external effects on the production of the human capital of future generations, this paper analyzes implications of agents’ having preferences for educational status, represented by human capital holdings relative to the social average. Examining the value and sign of the optimal distortionary tax in the optimal taxation scheme, we analyze the efficiency of the level of human capital accumulation in a decentralized economy. The desire for educational status can compensate for insufficient accumulation of human capital stemming from human capital externalities directed toward future generations.     

非位似偏好、非线性本地市场效应与服务贸易出口

本文将Stone-Geary偏好嵌套到CD-CES效用函数中,构建了基于非位似偏好下的服务贸易模型,并把总需求分解为需求结构与需求规模,从理论上推导出相对需求结构与需求规模对服务业出口的本地市场效应(home market effect,HME);同时基于2000—2014年42个国家或地区间29个服务业分行业双边贸易数据,计算发现世界各国分行业服务业需求收入弹性差异显著,呈现出明显的非位似特征,并首次从实证上验证了世界整体服务业出口存在需求结构作用的反向HME和非线性HME;并发现当相对市场规模越大时,相对需求结构的反向效应越强。分类型情形下,消费性服务业需求结构作用的反向HME及其非线性效应均高于生产性服务业,而生产性服务业需求规模作用的HME高于消费性服务业;不同类别收入水平国家之间需求结构和需求规模作用的HME差异显著。据此,扩大内需规模、优化需求结构,结合供给侧结构改革倒逼服务业创新,构建外贸增长和收入合理分配并行的激励政策体系等,对一国迈向服务业大国乃至强国具有重要的政策意义。     

Schooling choices: Preferences, discount rates, and rates of return

This paper develops an empirical model to identify the structural parameters of schooling preferences and human capital production. Our model distinguishes between consumption and investment motives with regard to schooling. The results show that both motives matter. Preferences for schooling vary with social background and ability. Children from poorer social backgrounds and of lower ability have a lower preference for schooling. The discount rate that enters the net value of lifetime income varies with social background as well. The marginal rate of return to schooling decreases with ability and schooling. On average the marginal rate of return is 7.3 per cent, which can be contrasted with a `Mincerian' rate of return equal to 4.8 per cent. This indicates that the usual OLS estimate underestimates the true rate of return. First version received: November 1997/Final version received: February 1999     

Endogenous Future Preferences and Conservation

A dynamic optimization model is developed in whichuncertainty about future preferences is endogenous,namely depending on the state of the environment atthe time the change in preferences occurs.Endogeneizing preferences not only provides economicintuition to previous results but also implies thatoptimal policies are less conservative.     

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

The paper aims at obtaining new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal–agent relationships with theories of other-regarding preferences, in particular inequity aversion theory. The principal is in general worse off, as the agent cares more about the wellbeing of the principal. When there are multiple symmetric agents who care about each other's wellbeing, the principal can optimally exploit their other-regarding nature by designing an appropriate interdependent contract such as a "fair" team contract or a relative performance contract. The approach taken in this paper can shed light on issues on endogenous preferences within organizations.     

Tariffs, Time Preference, and the Current Account under Weakly Nonseparable Preferences

Incorporating weakly nonseparable preferences into the familiar time–preference model, the author emphasizes a role of steady–state welfare changes in determining the effect of permanent tariffs on the current account. The effect consists of a welfare effect, due to steady–state welfare changes, which is negative (positive) when preferences toward imports are more (less) wealth–enhanced than toward exports; and a substitution effect, which occurs only with initial distortion. Even without initial distortion, a marginal tariff has a first–order welfare effect on the current account. Its sign does not depend on whether impatience is increasing or decreasing in wealth.     

Mean-Variance Preferences and Investor Behaviour

We study the comparative statics implications of mean-variance preferences for optimal portfolios. Specifically, we show that all risk-averse mean-variance investors raise their investment in a risky asset in response to a change in that asset's return distribution if and only if the change lowers both the mean and standard deviation of the return by the same percentage. Besides being of interest in its own right, our results allow us to compare some comparative statics implications and the expected utility and mean-variance models systematically.     

Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria

This paper studies n-player games where players' beliefs about their opponents' behaviour are modelled as non-additive probabilities. The concept of an “equilibrium under uncertainty” which is introduced in this paper extends the equilibrium notion of Dow and Werlang (1994, J. Econom. Theory64, 305–324) to n-player games in strategic form. Existence of such an equilibrium is demonstrated under usual conditions. For low degrees of ambiguity, equilibria under uncertainty approximate Nash equilibria. At the other extreme, with a low degree of confidence, maximin equilibria appear. Finally, robustness against a lack of confidence may be viewed as a refinement for Nash equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.     

Stated Preferences, Real Behaviour and Anchoring: Some Empirical Evidence

We compare different contingent valuation question formats with each other and with observed behaviour for a non-monetary estimation task, the expected number of kilometers travelled by automobile. Open-ended questions, open-ended follow-up questions, dichotomous choice (DC) questions, and double-bound DC questions are included. The single and double-bound DC questions result in an estimated mean about twice as high as the actual value and the open-ended mean. The DC question overestimation seems to be due to an anchoring effect leading to yea-saying behaviour. Our results about the difference between DC questions and open-ended questions is consistent with the pattern observed in contingent valuations studies of the willingness to pay. Our results indicates that DC questions seem to be associated with a general overestimation problem that is present even for simple non-monetary estimation tasks.     

Capital Movements, Intersectoral Resource Shifts, and the Trade Balance with Recursive Preferences

This paper examines interactions between internal resource shifts and the external balance. It sets up a simple infinite-period model with recursive preferences. It shows simple patterns between capital movements and trade balances and clarifies the resource shifts between traded goods and nontraded goods sectors when world interest rate changes and government spending changes are taking place.     

Interdependent Preferences and Groups of Agents

An individual's preferences are assumed to be malleable and may be influenced by the preferences of others. Mutual interaction among individuals whose preferences are interdependent powers a dynamic process in which preference profiles evolve over time. Two formulations of the dynamic process are presented. One is an abstract model in which the iteration of a mapping from profiles to profiles defines a discrete time dynamic process; the other is a linear discrete time process specified in more detail. Examples motivate the model and illustrate its application. Conditions are given for the existence of a stable preference profile—a rest point of the dynamic process. A stable profile is naturally associated with a division, not in general unique, of the set of agents into subgroups with the property that preference interdependencies within a subgroup are "stronger" than those across subgroups. The conventional case in which each agent's preference relation is exogenously given is, in this model, the special case where each subgroup consists of just one agent.