有限理性、信息不对称与企业并购模型

本文基于有限理性与信息不对称框架，建立了一个企业并购的一般性信号博彝模型。模型表明，股权并购交易价格受目标企业资产质量、造假成本、并购企业调查成本、并购市场调查效率及买卖双方机会成本等因素的共同影响。建立高效、公平的市场体系，大幅度提高造假成本或建立完备而高效的信用体系，具有显著而理想的效果；足够大的造假成本或市场调查的高效率不仅可以保证市场配置资源的效率而且可以保证最好的交易公平性；但在一个不具有高效而完备信用体系且对造假者缺乏严厉惩处机制的市场里。改进并购市场调查效率或小幅提高造假成本反而可能对市场配置资源的效率形成伤害。     

Uncertainty,Rationality and the Study of Social Institutions

The insight that both ontological and epistemological perspectives are intertwined is certainly correct, but at the same time insufficient to differentiate mainstream from heterodox approaches to economic institutions. As this paper argues, it is important whether one starts from ontological or epistemological considerations first. The paper suggests that the difference can be described in terms of function versus rules and demonstrates that an intersubjective ontology for institutions requires also an intersubjective epistemology. Otherwise, ontological precepts contradict the epistemological ones with important repercussions for understanding knowledge, rationality and institutions.     

Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View

In this paper, we argue that it is essential to incorporate bounded rationality into game theory. Game theory has been applied to aspects of economics such as industrial organizati on on the basis of the naive interpret ation of game theory, which requires players to be ideally rational in an extremely unrealistic way. We stress the importance of establishing the perceptive interpretation of game theory by taking boundedly rational players' inductive reasoning processes into account. We explain my recent work, Matsushima (1997), which shows that the subjective games perceived by players in the long run are entirely different from the true objective game, and are trivial games in the sense that there exists a strictly dominant and subjectively Pareto-efficient strategy profile among the set of pure strategy profiles.
JEL Classification Numbers: C70, C90, D43, D80     

A Tax Paradox for Investment Decisions under Uncertainty

In this paper we use a real option model for assessing uncertain investment projects and we show that—due to a flexibility premium—taxes asymmetrically affect the option value of projects that differ in their riskiness. Hence, this may generate distortions. We analytically identify a set of neutral tax rates (a tax regime) that preserve the post‐tax investment threshold if taxes change, and determine normal and paradoxical settings for investments. Unlike other tax paradoxes neither depreciation rules nor loss offset restrictions cause these paradoxical reactions. Taxes affect each project individually, depending on the project risks involved. This implies that, for a variety of uncertain projects, taxes cannot be neutral on aggregate.     

有限理性监管、初步询价和IPO定价效率

在询价机制中加入初步询价阶段是我国累计投标询价机制区别于国际通行做法的主要特征。作为定价源头,初步询价为定价提供了最重要信息。本文从询价规则本身合理性出发,研究了初步询价在定价程序中的关键作用。研究发现,监管者的有限理性导致询价规则本身存在缺陷;由初步询价得到的初始价格区间主要受到询价家数、筹资额和市场整体回报影响,研究结果不同于成熟市场的结论;由于询价规则存在歧视性分配机制缺失、发行价受到控制和初步询价报价无有效约束等缺陷,初步询价没有改善定价效率。     

有限理性下中美投资者对财富和消费偏好的比较研究

投资和消费是人们最重要的经济决策,而投资和消费的选择是由对财富和消费的偏好决定的。在效用最大化的前提下,构建有限理性的效用函数,来比较中国和美国投资者对于消费和财富的偏好。研究的结果表明,相对中国人而言美国人是更加偏好消费的,而中国人更偏重于财富。这样的差异形成的原因可能在于中国的金融市场发达程度不如美国,中国的社会保障体系不如美国完善。     

有限理性、异质预期与房价内生演化机制

本文通过将传统蛛网模型推广为双边异质预期蛛网模型,分析了房价的内生演化机制,通过数值分析考察了市场参与者心理预期对房价的影响。结论表明,市场中基本面分析者的预期不影响房价动态系统的稳定性,技术分析者与开发商的预期则导致房价波动,进而影响房价动态系统的稳定性。模型还给出了房地产开发成本对房价动态演化的影响。开发成本不仅对基本面价格有正向冲击,而且当成本增加到一定临界值后也将导致房价演化出现分岔。     

有限理性、规范内化与利他行为:一个演化视角

本文沿着有限理性的理论进路,通过规范内化对利他行为做出一个解释。以往的理论通过规范提供的外在奖惩解释利他行为,但无法解释在外在奖惩不存在的情况下出现的纯利他行为。本文认为,这些利他行为可以通过规范内化来解释,而后者则是有限理性的一个自然结果。为了阐明规范内化如何产生,本文给出了一个形式化的复制者动态,其结果表明,在考虑有限理性的前提下,社会交往越复杂,人类处理复杂性的认知能力越有限,规范内化出现的可能性就越大。针对复制者动态模型的局限,本文还运用基于行为主体建模对规范内化过程进行了模拟。模拟结果显示,当人类理性计算能力相对于社会生活的复杂程度越小,规范内化出现的可能性越大,该结果与之前分析结论一致。本文的分析结果再次支持了Herbert Simon对利他行为的解释,即利他行为是人类有限理性的结果,虽然利他行为自身减少个体适应性,但由于它是规范内化所产生的一个自然结果,所以利他行为因为规范内化所具有的适应性而留存。     

Environmental Policy Theory Given Bounded Rationality and Other-regarding Preferences

Established environmental policy theory is based on the assumption of homo economicus. This means that people are seen as fully rational and acting in a self-regarding manner. In line with this, economics emphasizes efficient policy solutions and the associated advantages of price incentives. Behavioral economics offers alternative, more realistic views on individual behavior. In this paper we investigate opportunities to integrate bounded rationality and other-regarding preferences into environmental policy theory to arrive at recommendations for more effective policies. For this purpose, we will address decisions made under risk and uncertainty, intertemporal choice, decision heuristics, other-regarding preferences, heterogeneity, evolutionary selection of behaviors, and the role of happiness. Three aspects of environmental policy are considered in detail, namely sustainable consumption, environmental valuation and policy design. We pay special attention to the role of non-pecuniary, informative instruments and illustrate the implications for climate policy.     

有限理性、新制度经济学与转型期中国民间组织

本文从新制度经济学的视角提出了一个理论框架,认为转型期中国民间组织的兴起与发展是制度环境变迁的产物,是克服有限理性的一种制度安排.文章对理性、有限理性等理念进行了梳理.说明转型期中国民间组织在建立与政府的合作互动关系、促进社会管理、提供公共服务、确保政府公共权力有序、健康运行等方面应发挥积极作用.     

有限理性视角下基于价值结构的企业组织协同分析

在有限理性视角下,从价值结构角度研究了企业网络组织的协同效应。通过构建演化博弈模型分析得到企业合作态度的演化稳定策略。在此基础上建立两个企业合作的价值模型,描述了企业组织协同状态的特征,并分别在经典博弈和行为博弈情形下讨论了达成协同的条件。     

Quality Uncertainty as Resolution of the Bertrand Paradox

It is well‐known that product differentiation eliminates the Bertrand paradox (i.e. marginal cost pricing under duopoly). While differentiation is often justified with reference to the consumer's ‘preference for variety’, the conditions under which such a preference is likely to arise are rarely considered. We investigate this question in a setting in which uncertainty about product quality can endogenously generate either convex or non‐convex preferences. We show that even when two goods are ex ante homogeneous, quality uncertainty can eliminate the Bertrand paradox.     

有限理性视角下知识产权质押贷款风险形成、评估与检验

创新型企业面临的信贷配给等融资约束已为经验研究所证实。中国政府为解决该问题,制定了知识产权质押贷款融资等政策并在实施后取得了阶段性效果,但后续的贷款风险正在形成和积累。借助有限理性理论解释知识产权质押贷款风险的形成机理是一种新尝试。同时,运用中国早期专利质押贷款试点数据,基于有限理性理论对知识产权质押贷款风险进行评估与检验。研究结果能够为检验、完善和改进中国知识产权质押融资政策提供经验依据。     

The Effective Protection Rate Under Uncertainty: A Note*

This note presents a measure of the effective protection rate in a general equilibrium model under uncertainty where a stock market exists and international trade in securities takes place. Real equity prices replace the final commodity prices since, in the presence of uncertainty, resource allocation and therefore the output of each industry is governed by real equity prices. Using expected utility as a welfare criterion, it is shown that second-best optimum can be achieved by a tariff on the intermediate good at a rate given by setting the new measure to zero. This note provides the theoretical foundations to the measure estimated by Eldor (1984).     

信贷市场上投资项目的正逆向选择--不确定和不对称信息条件下投资项目正向和逆向选择的一般条件及转换

文章研究在不确定且信息非对称情况下,信贷市场上投资项目逆向和正向选择的一般条件.这里假设投资项目的结果只有两种,即要么成功,要么失败.我们定义并证明在一组仅具有两种结果的项目中,在成功概率-回报空间上存在一个逆向选择"区域"和一个正向选择"区域".Stiglitz和Weiss(1981)以及De Meza和Webb(1987)早先关于逆向选择和正向选择的案例实际上是一种特例,因为取决于所考察的项目情况,可以有无数个逆向和正向选择的情况.文章也考察了参数变化对企业家选择投资项目的比较静态影响,以及通过银行的某种决策组合把逆向选择转化为正向选择的可能性.     

风险社会视域下科技理性的悖论与超越

科技理性是滥觞于西欧的世界现代化进程的精神根基,对科技理性的张扬及其社会后果的反思和批判,都是学术界经久不衰的热门话题。作为一种新兴的社会批判理论,风险社会理论打开了科技理性批判的新视域。在全球化背景下,现代社会面临的前所未有的新风险使科技理性的悖论昭然若揭。要应对全球风险,必须超越科技理性的悖论,实现科技理性与社会理性的大融合。     

Uncertainty and the Choice of Policy Instruments: A Note On Baumol and Oates Propositions

Baumol and Oates' propositions, the irrelevancy of benefit uncertainty and the importance of cost uncertainty on the choice between a tax and a system of marketable permits, are limited to a large-number case in which the opportunities for victims of pollution to participate in a permit market are non-existent. However, with the evolution of environmental groups and coalitions of victims in neighborhoods, the large-number case can easily transform into a small-number case. This paper shows that when the pollution standard, set at what appears to be optimal ex ante, is excessively lenient, the system of marketable permits offers such groups a flexibility to buy pollution permits in a competitive market and destroy them until the optimal solution is realized. In the reverse situation, however, Baumol and Oates propositions are unambiguously valid.     

The Game Take–or–Play: A Paradox of Rationality in Simultaneous Move Games

We show that paradoxical conclusions similar to those emerging from reasonings of backward induction can arise also in simultaneous move games with incomplete information.
In a static setting, these paradoxes are particularly puzzling, because the usual attempts to avoid the backward induction solution do not work.
In a dynamic setting, there is a way out of the paradoxes, which hinges on a (possibly endogenous) uncertainty over the past behaviour of the players and does not call for a long time–horizon.