Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises

This paper measures “debt disputes” between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research.     

Supersanctions and sovereign debt repayment

What might happen if a third-party entity had the power to implement fiscal reforms and/or punish sovereign debt defaulters? In contrast to recent history, extreme sanctions such as gunboat diplomacy and “fiscal house arrest” were used to punish debt defaulters during the period 1870–1913. We find that, after a “supersanction” was imposed, a country improved its fiscal discipline. As a result, ex ante default probabilities on new issues fell dramatically and the country spent no additional time in default. Our results suggest some type of external fiscal or monetary control may be effective in imposing discipline on serial debt defaulters.     

Basel II and bank lending to emerging markets: Evidence from the German banking sector

This paper investigates whether the new Basel Accord will induce a change in bank lending to emerging markets using a comprehensive new data set on German banks’ foreign exposure. We test two interlinked hypotheses on the conditions under which the change in the regulatory capital would leave lending flows unaffected. This would be the case if (i) the new regulatory capital requirement remains below the economic capital and (ii) banks’ economic capital to emerging markets already adequately reflects risk. On both accounts the evidence indicates that the new Basel Accord should have a limited effect on lending to emerging markets.     

International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance

This paper analyzes the trade-off between official liquidity provision and debtor moral hazard in international financial crises. In the model, crises are caused by the interaction of bad fundamentals, self-fulfilling runs and policies by three classes of optimizing agents: international investors, the local government and an international official lender. Limited contingent liquidity support helps to prevent liquidity runs by raising the number of investors willing to lend to the country for any given fundamentals, i.e., it can have catalytic effects. The influence of the official lender is increasing in the size of its interventions and the precision of its information. Unlike the conventional view stressing debtor moral hazard, our model identifies circumstances in which official lending actually strengthens a government's incentive to implement desirable but costly policies.     

IMF programs, financial and real sector performance, and the Asian crisis

This paper has three objectives. First, using a richer and more comprehensive set of IMF-related news than previous studies, we examine the impact of IMF-related news on both financial and real stock sector returns in Indonesia during the Asian crisis. Second, we draw lessons about financial and real sectoral patterns of adjustment in crisis countries, including whether and how IMF programs facilitate this adjustment. Third, we explore the interplay between IMF actions in crisis countries and the actions and responses of local authorities. To do so, not only do we account for the impact of news regarding IMF policy actions but also the government’s reaction to them and willingness to implement such policies, and the public sentiment about the implemented IMF programs and government policies. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.     

Foreign currency debt,financial crises and economic growth: A long-run view

Foreign currency debt is widely believed to increase risks of financial crisis, especially after being implicated as a cause of the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s. In this paper, we study the effects of foreign currency debt on currency and debt crises and its indirect effects on short-term growth and long-run output effects in both 1880–1913 and 1973–2003 for 45 countries. Greater ratios of foreign currency debt to total debt are associated with increased risks of currency and debt crises, although the strength of the association depends crucially on the size of a country's reserve base and its policy credibility. We found that financial crises, driven by exposure to foreign currency, resulted in significant permanent output losses. We estimate some implications of our findings for the risks posed by currently high levels of foreign currency liabilities in eastern Europe.     

The impact of distressed economies on the EU sovereign market

Financially distressed economies inside the European Union (EU) are being blamed for producing a general increase in borrowing costs. This article analyzes the channels of default risk transmission within the EU countries using the information content in the sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) market. We proceed in two directions. First, we test the existence of cross-border volatility effects between the central and the peripheral EU countries. Second, we explore the effect of distressed economies on the default and risk premium constituents of sovereign default swaps. We show a significant volatility spillover from distressed to central European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) economies. This causality pattern leads to a significant impact on the default swap risk premia. On average, the risk premium accounts for approximately 42% of central EMU spreads and 56% of the spreads for those countries outside of the EMU. The peripheral risk also affects the default component of central economies, although its impact is lower.     

The flight home effect: Evidence from the syndicated loan market during financial crises

This paper shows that the collapse of the global market for syndicated loans during financial crises can in part be explained by a flight home effect whereby lenders rebalance their loan portfolios in favor of domestic borrowers. The home bias of lenders' loan origination increases by approximately 20% if the bank's home country experiences a banking crisis. This flight home effect is distinct from flight to quality because borrowers of different quality are equally affected. The results indicate that the home bias in capital allocation tends to increase when adverse economic shocks reduce the wealth of international investors.     

The systemic risk of European banks during the financial and sovereign debt crises

European banks became a source of risk to global financial markets during the financial crisis and attention to the European banking sector increased during the sovereign debt crisis. To measure the systemic risk of European banks, we calculate a distress insurance premium (DIP), which integrates the characteristics of bank size, probability of default, and correlation. Based on this measure, the systemic risk of European banks reached its height in late 2011 around €500 billion. We find that this was largely due to sovereign default risk. The DIP methodology is also used to measure the systemic contribution of individual banks. This approach identifies the large systemically important European banks, but Italian and Spanish banks as a group notably increased in systemic importance during the sample period. Bank-specific fundamentals like capital-asset ratios predict the one-year-ahead systemic risk contributions.     

Transmission of the financial and sovereign debt crises to the EMU: Stock prices,CDS spreads and exchange rates

This paper tests for the transmission of the 2007–2010 financial and sovereign debt crises to fifteen EMU countries. We use daily data from 2003 to 2010 on country financial and non-financial stock market indexes to analyze the stock market returns for three country groups within EMU: North, South and Small. The following results hold for both the North and South European countries, while the smallest countries seem to be relatively isolated from international events. First, we find strong evidence of crisis transmission to European non-financials from US non-financials, but not for financials. Second, in order to test how the sovereign debt crisis affects stock market developments we split the crisis in pre- and post-Lehman sub periods. Results show that financials become significantly more dependent on changes in the difference between the Greek and German CDS spreads after Lehman’s collapse, compared to the pre-Lehman sub period. However, this increase is much smaller for non-financials. Third, before the crisis euro appreciations coincide with European stock market decreases, whereas this relationship reverses during the crisis. Finally, this reversal seems to be triggered by Lehman’s collapse.     

Financial crises and the composition of cross-border lending

We examine the composition and drivers of cross-border bank lending between 1995 and 2012, distinguishing between syndicated and non-syndicated loans. We show that on-balance sheet syndicated loan exposures, which account for almost one third of total cross-border loan exposures, increased during the global financial crisis due to large drawdowns on credit lines extended before the crisis. Our empirical analysis of the drivers of cross-border loan exposures in a large bilateral dataset leads to three main results. First, banks with lower levels of capital favor syndicated over other kinds of cross-border loans. Second, borrower country characteristics such as level of development, economic size, and capital account openness, are less important in driving syndicated than non-syndicated loan activity, suggesting a diversification motive for syndication. Third, information asymmetries between lender and borrower countries became more binding for both types of cross-border lending activity during the recent crisis.     

On the role and effects of IMF seniority

We analyze the IMF as a lender to countries in financial distress highlighting the fact that it is a senior creditor. An advantage of delegating senior lending in a single institution rather than on competitive markets is that it would be able to reach the socially optimal solution. This would require the IMF not to intervene when the crisis is severe enough. However, a commitment device might be needed to achieve the socially optimal solution. If IMF lending were done for all shocks, the country would be always ex-post better off but lenders would be worse off when the country situation is either good or weak, which is consistent with empirical evidence. Anticipation of senior lending might make the country better off by preventing inefficient liquidation. However it might actually hurt the country ex-ante and too much rescuing in the future could lead to too little lending in the present which is contrary to the moral hazard critique.     

The term structure of sovereign default risk in EMU member countries and its determinants

We analyze the determinants of sovereign default risk of EMU member states using government bond yield spreads as risk indicators. We focus on default risk for different time spans indicated by spreads for different maturities. Using a panel framework we analyze whether there are different drivers of default risk for different maturities. We find that lower economic growth and larger openness increase default risk for all maturities. Higher indebtedness only increases short-term risk, whereas net lending, trade balance and interest rate costs only drive long-term default risk.     

The effects of bank relationships on firm private debt restructuring: Evidence from an emerging market

Our paper seeks to examine the direct benefit of bank relationships for a distressed borrower by assessing its influence on the success of firm private debt restructuring. We find that a distressed firm with a stronger bank relationship has a greater probability to successfully restructure its debt through private renegotiation. Accordingly, an analysis of credit rating recovery provides complementary evidence on the factors of successful debt restructuring. A duration analysis of the length of time needed for a debt restructuring to be completed is fully consistent with our documented results. We conclude that in a bank dominated financial system like Taiwan's where firms are heavily bank-dependent, the bank-firm relationship is of crucial importance to the success of financially distressed firms in private debt restructuring.     

Thousands of models,one story: Current account imbalances in the global economy

The global financial crisis has led to a revival of the empirical literature on current account imbalances. This paper contributes to that literature by investigating the importance of evaluating model and parameter uncertainty prior to reaching any firm conclusion. We explore three alternative econometric strategies: examining all models, selecting a few, and combining them all. Out of thousands (or indeed millions) of models a story emerges. The chance that current accounts were aligned with fundamentals prior to the financial crisis appears to be minimal.     

The cost of private debt over the credit cycle

We identify global and regional fluctuations in international private debt flows to emerging and developing countries using data on cross-border loans and international bond issuance over 1993–2009. We use micro-level data on syndicated cross-border loans and international bond placements to estimate the effects of individual borrower characteristics as well as macroeconomic conditions on the cost of foreign borrowing and test whether these effects differ across phases of the lending cycle. First, we find that borrower characteristics associated with lower loan spreads are not necessarily associated with lower bond spreads. Second, we find differential effects of borrower characteristics between cycle phases for loans and bonds separately. Third, we find strong reductions in the cost of debt finance during periods when international debt flows are more than one standard deviation above their mean, but not for expansionary periods, when the growth rate of debt flows is increasing. We also find that higher trade ratios in the borrower's home country raise loan spreads more in periods of high credit flows but have no effect on bond spreads. At the same time, borrowers residing in countries with high investment ratios pay lower spreads on bond issuance particularly during periods of high credit flows, but we find no similar effect for loan spreads. Inflation rates, real exchange rates and previous banking crises have small impacts on loan and bond spreads.     

The effect of foreign currency hedging on the probability of financial distress

This paper investigates the effect of foreign currency hedging with derivatives on the probability of financial distress. I use Merton’s (1974) structural default model to compute firms’ distance to default as a proxy for their probability of financial distress. Using an instrumental variables approach to control for endogenous hedging and leverage, I find that the extent of foreign currency hedging is associated with a lower probability of financial distress. Whereas previous research finds that the probability of financial distress is a determinant of a firm’s hedging policy, this paper provides direct evidence supporting the hypothesis that the extent of hedging reduces a firm’s probability of financial distress.     

The effect of banking regulation on cross-border lending

Banking regulations often differ between countries: Some regulators require banks to document their evaluation of firms’ creditworthiness, which determines the banks’ choice of lending technology. In a theoretical model, we study how differences in regulation influence competition between domestic and foreign banks and analyze the effect of regulatory harmonization on cross-border lending. We predict that lending rates are lower and access to credit is easier for firms in a border region if the national regulations differ. Using unique bank- and firm-level data from Germany, we show that firms in a border region have better access to credit if regulation differs.     

Transition to the Euro and its impact on country portfolio diversification

By examining the impact of the introduction of the Euro on stock markets and on country diversification within the Eurozone, the evidence does not suggest a high risk to the stock market to justify a risk premium as a result of currency union. Although the Euro market integration has increased inter-country correlations, it does not preclude gains from international diversification, which partially rely on the non-Eurozone countries for an optimal portfolio in a mean-variance framework. Furthermore, the empirical evidence supports that there is a significant stationarity of average correlations over time between pre-Euro and post-Euro periods, and it has improved since the introduction of the Euro. Also, results show that the Euro produced a change in volatility with a different pace within the Eurozone vis-à-vis non-Eurozone countries, to support a direct and opposite relationship between volatility and correlation.     

The Global Side of the Investment-Saving Puzzle

In this paper, we reexamine the long-standing and puzzling correlation between national saving and investment in industrial countries. We apply an econometric methodology that allows us to separate idiosyncratic correlation at the country level from correlation at the global level. In a major break with the existing literature, we find no evidence of a long-run relationship in the idiosyncratic components of saving and investment. We also find that the global components in saving and investments commove, indicating that they react to shocks of a global nature.