Market concentration and the likelihood of financial crises

According to theory, market concentration affects the likelihood of a financial crisis in different ways. The “concentration-stability” and the “concentration-fragility” hypotheses suggest opposing effects operating through specific channels. Using data of 160 countries for the period 1970–2009, this paper empirically tests these indirect effects of financial market structure. We set up a simultaneous system in order to jointly estimate financial stability and the relevant channel variables as endogenous variables. Our findings provide support for the assumption of channel effects in general and both the concentration-stability and the concentration-fragility hypothesis in particular. The effects are found to vary between high and low income countries.     

Neglected risks,financial innovation,and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to the safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.     

Credit crises, money and contractions: An historical view

The relatively infrequent nature of major credit distress events makes an historical approach particularly useful. Using a combination of historical narrative and econometric techniques, we identify major periods of credit distress from 1875 to 2007, examine the extent to which credit distress arises as part of the transmission of monetary policy, and document the subsequent effect on output. Using turning points defined by the Harding-Pagan algorithm, we identify and compare the timing, duration, amplitude and co-movement of cycles in money, credit and output. Regressions show that financial distress events exacerbate business cycle downturns both in the 19th and 20th centuries and that a confluence of such events makes recessions even worse.     

The response of the external finance premium in Asian corporate bond markets to financial characteristics,financial constraints and two financial crises

Empirical investigation of the external finance premium has been conducted on the margin between internal finance and bank borrowing or equities but little attention has been given to corporate bonds, especially for the emerging Asian market. In this paper, we hypothesize that balance sheet indicators of creditworthiness could affect the external finance premium for bonds as they do for premia in other markets. Using bond-specific and firm-specific data for China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand during 1995–2009 we find that firms with better financial health face lower external finance premia in all countries. When we introduce firm-level heterogeneity, we show that financial variables appear to be both statistically and quantitatively more important for financially constrained firms. Finally, when we examine the effects of the 1997–1998 Asian crisis and the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, we find that the sensitivity of the premium is greater for constrained firms during the Asian crisis compared to other times.     

Trade credit and bank credit: Evidence from recent financial crises

This paper studies the effect of financial crises on trade credit for a sample of 890 firms in six emerging economies. Although the provision of trade credit increases right after a crisis, it contracts in the following months and years. Firms that are financially more vulnerable to crises extend less trade credit to their customers. We argue that the decline in aggregate trade credit ratios is driven by the reduction in the supply of trade credit that follows a bank credit crunch, consistent with the “redistribution view” of trade credit provision, whereby bank credit is redistributed via trade credit from financially stronger firms to weaker firms.     

Stock market reaction to fed funds rate surprises: State dependence and the financial crisis

This paper examines the response of US stock returns to Federal Funds rate (FFR) surprises between 1989 and 2012, focusing on the impact of the recent financial crisis. We find that outside the crisis period, stock prices increased as a response to unexpected FFR cuts. State dependence is identified with stocks exhibiting larger increases when interest rate easing coincided with recessions, bear markets, and tightening credit conditions. However, an important structural shift occurred during the crisis, changing the stocks’ response to FFR shocks and the nature of state dependence. Throughout the crisis period, stocks did not react positively to unexpected FFR cuts, which were interpreted as signals of worsening future economic conditions. This triggered a rebalancing of investment portfolios away from falling equities and towards safe-haven assets. Our results highlight the severity of the crisis and the ineffectiveness of conventional monetary policy close to the zero lower bound.     

Investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints: Evidence from the time series

Investment-cash flow sensitivity has declined and disappeared, even during the 2007-2009 credit crunch. If one believes that financial constraints have not disappeared, then investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints. The decline and disappearance are robust to considerations of R&D and cash reserves, and across groups of firms. The information content in cash flow regarding investment opportunities has declined, but measurement error in Tobin's q does not completely explain the patterns in investment-cash flow sensitivity. The decline and disappearance cannot be explained by changes in sample composition, corporate governance, or market power—and remain a puzzle.     

Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence

This paper analyzes the effect of banking crises on market discipline in an international sample of banks. We also evaluate how bank regulation, supervision, institutions, and crisis intervention policies shape the effect of banking crises on market discipline. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using a panel data set of banks from 66 countries around 79 banking crises. The results suggest that on average market discipline weakens after a banking crisis. This weakening is higher in countries where bank regulation, supervision, and institutions promoted market discipline before the banking crisis, and where a more accommodative approach is adopted to resolve it.     

Credit and liquidity components of corporate CDS spreads

This paper investigates the role of credit and liquidity factors in explaining corporate CDS price changes during normal and crisis periods. We find that liquidity risk is more important than firm-specific credit risk regardless of market conditions. Moreover, in the period prior to the recent “Great Recession” credit risk plays no role in explaining CDS price changes. The dominance of liquidity effects casts serious doubts on the relevance of CDS price changes as an indicator of default risk dynamics. Our results show how multiple liquidity factors including firm specific and aggregate liquidity proxies as well as an asymmetric information measure are critical determinants of CDS price variations. In particular, the impact of informed traders on the CDS price increases when markets are characterised by higher uncertainty, which supports concerns of insider trading during the crisis.     

Gross capital flows: Dynamics and crises

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents, dubbed gross capital flows, over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. When foreigners invest in a country, domestic agents invest abroad, and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners invest more domestically and domestic agents invest more abroad. During crises, total gross flows collapse and there is a retrenchment in both inflows by foreigners and outflows by domestic agents. These patterns hold for different types of capital flows and crises. This evidence sheds light on the sources of fluctuations driving capital flows and helps discriminate among existing theories. Our findings seem consistent with crises affecting domestic and foreign agents asymmetrically, as would be the case under the presence of sovereign risk or asymmetric information.     

Risk management,corporate governance,and bank performance in the financial crisis

The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, are associated with a better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We measure bank performance by buy-and-hold returns and ROE and we control for standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board size, and board independence. Most importantly, our results indicate that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks’ performance during the crisis.     

Credit market shocks and economic fluctuations: Evidence from corporate bond and stock markets

To identify disruptions in credit markets, research on the role of asset prices in economic fluctuations has focused on the information content of various corporate credit spreads. We re-examine this evidence using a broad array of credit spreads constructed directly from the secondary bond prices on outstanding senior unsecured debt issued by a large panel of nonfinancial firms. An advantage of our “ground-up” approach is that we are able to construct matched portfolios of equity returns, which allows us to examine the information content of bond spreads that is orthogonal to the information contained in stock prices of the same set of firms, as well as in macroeconomic variables measuring economic activity, inflation, interest rates, and other financial indicators. Our portfolio-based bond spreads contain substantial predictive power for economic activity and outperform—especially at longer horizons—standard default-risk indicators. Much of the predictive power of bond spreads for economic activity is embedded in securities issued by intermediate-risk rather than high-risk firms. According to impulse responses from a structural factor-augmented vector autoregression, unexpected increases in bond spreads cause large and persistent contractions in economic activity. Indeed, shocks emanating from the corporate bond market account for more than 30 percent of the forecast error variance in economic activity at the two- to four-year horizon. Overall, our results imply that credit market shocks have contributed significantly to US economic fluctuations during the 1990-2008 period.     

Uninsurable risk and financial market puzzles

We compare the empirical performances of three risk-sharing arrangements involving idiosyncratic skill shocks: (a) where individuals are unable to directly insure their consumption against individual-specific shocks, (b) where agents strike long-term insurance contract with financial intermediaries involving a truth revelation constraint as in Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009), (c) full risk sharing. Based on the widely accepted assumption of cross-sectional log-normality of individual consumption levels, we work out closed form expressions of the pricing kernels for (a) and (b). We put these three models to test four financial market anomalies, namely the equity premium, currency premium, risk-free rate, and consumption-real exchange rate puzzles simultaneously in an integrated framework. We find that the pricing kernel associated with (a) outperforms the other two models in terms of the produced estimates of the agent’s preference parameters and the model ability to predict the equity and currency premia, the risk-free rate, and the log growth in the exchange rate. However, the predictive ability is still far from satisfactory for all three models under scrutiny.     

Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.     

Securitized banking and the run on repo

The panic of 2007–2008 was a run on the sale and repurchase market (the repo market), which is a very large, short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of securitization activities and financial institutions. Repo transactions are collateralized, frequently with securitized bonds. We refer to the combination of securitization plus repo finance as “securitized banking” and argue that these activities were at the nexus of the crisis. We use a novel data set that includes credit spreads for hundreds of securitized bonds to trace the path of the crisis from subprime-housing related assets into markets that had no connection to housing. We find that changes in the LIB-OIS spread, a proxy for counterparty risk, were strongly correlated with changes in credit spreads and repo rates for securitized bonds. These changes implied higher uncertainty about bank solvency and lower values for repo collateral. Concerns about the liquidity of markets for the bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo haircuts, that is the amount of collateral required for any given transaction. With declining asset values and increasing haircuts, the US banking system was effectively insolvent for the first time since the Great Depression.     

Transmission of the financial and sovereign debt crises to the EMU: Stock prices,CDS spreads and exchange rates

This paper tests for the transmission of the 2007–2010 financial and sovereign debt crises to fifteen EMU countries. We use daily data from 2003 to 2010 on country financial and non-financial stock market indexes to analyze the stock market returns for three country groups within EMU: North, South and Small. The following results hold for both the North and South European countries, while the smallest countries seem to be relatively isolated from international events. First, we find strong evidence of crisis transmission to European non-financials from US non-financials, but not for financials. Second, in order to test how the sovereign debt crisis affects stock market developments we split the crisis in pre- and post-Lehman sub periods. Results show that financials become significantly more dependent on changes in the difference between the Greek and German CDS spreads after Lehman’s collapse, compared to the pre-Lehman sub period. However, this increase is much smaller for non-financials. Third, before the crisis euro appreciations coincide with European stock market decreases, whereas this relationship reverses during the crisis. Finally, this reversal seems to be triggered by Lehman’s collapse.     

Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities

We examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities—the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)—that provided liquidity against a range of assets during 2008–2009. Dealers with lower equity returns and greater leverage prior to borrowing from the facilities were more likely to participate in the programs, borrow more, and, in the case of the TSLF, at higher bidding rates. Dealers with less liquid collateral on their balance sheets before the facilities were introduced also tended to borrow more. The results suggest that both financial performance and balance sheet liquidity play a role in LOLR utilization.     

Identifying the effects of a lender of last resort on financial markets: Lessons from the founding of the fed

We use the founding of the Federal Reserve to identify the effects of a lender of last resort. We examine stock return and interest rate volatility during September and October, when markets were vulnerable because of financial stringency from the harvest. Stock volatility fell by 40% and interest rate volatility by more than 70% following the monetary regime change. The drop is insignificant if major panic years are omitted from the analysis, however. Because business cycle downturns occurred in the same year as financial crises, our results suggest that the existence of the Federal Reserve reduced liquidity risk.     

Adverse selection and the financial accelerator

Many economists believe that credit market distortions create a financial accelerator which destabilizes the economy. This paper shows that when credit market distortions arise from adverse selection they sometimes stabilize the economy rather than destabilize it. The stabilizing forces are closely related to forces that cause overinvestment in static models. When investment projects are equity financed, or when contracts are written optimally, the distortions always stabilize the economy. Thus, stabilizing equilibria are a robust feature of the model. The empirical distinction between accelerator and stabilizer equilibria is subtle. Many empirical tests are unable to distinguish between accelerator and stabilizer equilibria.     

A perspective on the symptoms and causes of the financial crisis

Prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis, banking sector profits were very high but the profitability of financial intermediation was poor. Using a novel model of banking, this article argues that the high profits were achieved through balance sheet expansion and growing default, liquidity, and term risk mismatches between assets and liabilities. As a result, large banks’ financial leverage rose as they became less liquid, setting the conditions for a systemic banking crisis. This article argues that the increase in financial leverage was possible due to misguided changes in the regulatory framework, specifically, the Basel I capital accord and reductions in reserve requirements. Finally, this article overviews and assesses the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis.