What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?

Corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans generally assume low investment risk when they have low funding ratios and high default risk, consistent with the risk management hypothesis. However, for financially distressed sponsors and sponsors that freeze, terminate, or convert defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the risk-shifting incentive (moral hazard) dominates. Pension fund risk-taking is also affected by labor unionization and sponsor incentives to maximize tax benefits, restore financial slack, and justify the accounting choices of pension assumptions. Sponsors shift toward an aggressive risk strategy when their pension plans emerge from underfunding, bankruptcy risk is reduced, or marginal tax rate decreases. Overall, we show that corporate sponsors adopt a dynamic risk-taking strategy in their pension fund investments.     

What determines fund performance persistence? International evidence

We study performance persistence across a global sample of equity mutual funds from 27 countries. In contrast to the existing U.S.‐based evidence, we find that net performance persistence is present in the majority of fund industries, suggesting that fund manager skill is commonplace rather than a rarity. Consistent with the intuition that more competition in the mutual fund industry makes remaining a winner fund less likely but keeping a loser fund at the bottom of the performance ranks more probable, we show that competitiveness explains the cross‐sectional variation in performance persistence.     

What determines differences in foreign bank efficiency? Australian evidence

This study examines the factors that determine differences in efficiency of foreign banks in the host market (Australia). The impact of home market, host market and parent bank characteristics are considered within the frameworks offered by comparative advantage and new trade theories. Parametric distance functions are used to estimate the efficiency of foreign banks in Australia, and the robustness of model specification is tested using both general-to-specific modelling and extreme bounds analysis. It is found that following clients reduces the efficiency of profit creation. Incumbent bank's market share acts as a barrier to entry, while parent bank profits do not improve host nation efficiency. The limited global advantage hypothesis was found to be relevant for banks from the United Kingdom, while banks from the United States were generally less efficient.     

What expenditure does Anglosphere foreign borrowing fund?

This paper examines the extent to which foreign borrowing funds private investment, consumption and government expenditure in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand (the Anglosphere), advanced economies which have been the world's largest international borrowers since 1990. Using a bivariate predictive regression model, we estimate the relative importance of these expenditure aggregates as predictors of their external deficits, and hence foreign borrowing. Overall, based on quarterly macroeconomic data for the period 1990–2011, the evidence suggests that foreign borrowing has not financed higher household consumption in these economies over recent decades, with the possible exception of the United States. While results concerning government spending are mixed due to policy reaction, business cycle and public-private saving offset effects, strong results for private investment augur well for the sustainability of this grouping's foreign borrowing.     

What impact does a change of fund manager have on mutual fund performance?

Using a unique database of UK fund manager changes over the period from 1997 to 2011, we examine the impact of such changes on fund performance. We find clear evidence to suggest that a manager change does affect the benchmark-adjusted performance of UK mutual funds. In particular we find a significant deterioration in the benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were top performers before the manager exit and, conversely, a significant improvement in the average benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were poor performers before the manager exit. Our use of the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model reveals that the improvement in average post manager exit performance is accompanied by a reduction in market risk, a slight reduction in exposure to small cap stocks, and an increase in exposure to value and momentum stocks. Overall, our results suggest that UK fund management companies have been relatively successful in replacing bad managers with better managers, but relatively unsuccessful at finding equivalent replacements for their top performing managers. We believe that regulators should therefore try to ensure that all efforts are made by fund management companies to inform all of their investors about a change in management.     

Are mutual fund fees excessive?

There is a long running debate over whether competition in the mutual fund industry limits the ability of investment advisors to charge fees that are disproportionate to the services they provide. We posit that disproportionately high fees are prevalent in funds with multiple share classes and those with weak governance structures. Using a comprehensive sample of index mutual funds for the from 1998 to 2007, we find that internal governance mechanisms matter primarily for funds with relatively small share classes where investors often face increased search costs and/or restricted access to competitive mutual funds. Additionally, we find that funds managed by publicly held sponsors are associated with disproportionately higher fee spreads (about 28 basis points). The results are robust to the inclusion of board characteristics, share class structure, and investment objectives. Overall, our findings suggest that competition and agency considerations are important determinants in the pricing of mutual funds.     

What style-timing skills do mutual fund “stars” possess?

Recent studies suggest that certain growth-oriented fund managers have substantial skill but do not stipulate the particular skills that they possess. We examine in detail the style-timing abilities of growth-oriented equity mutual funds over the period from 1993 to 2006. We find that an important contributor to the persistent abnormal returns is growth timing, i.e., switching stocks along the value/growth continuum, and that this explains at least 45% of the abnormal returns reported. No other style-timing skills are observed. Our results also demonstrate that it is easy to misidentify growth timing as market timing.     

Does advertising strategy matter in influencing mutual fund purchase?

This study explores the role of advertising strategies (informational versus transformational) in consumers’ purchase intentions related to mutual funds. Moreover, this study investigates the possible moderating role of gender and financial literacy in advertising strategy. Findings of the experimental approach applied in this study suggest that advertisement strategy does influence investment intention related to the mutual funds. We also found that females are less likely to purchase mutual funds when exposed to transformational advertisements. Moreover, investors with higher financial literacy prefer informational advertisements. The results also indicate that the informational advertisements are more useful and increase awareness levels among investors.     

Asset sales in the mutual fund industry: Who gains?

We analyze gains from intercorporate sales of mutual fund subsidiaries, using mandated SEC disclosures to assess the performance of mutual funds transferred by these transactions. Sellers are financial conglomerates (banks) using equity-based deals to transfer poorly performing funds to highly focused asset management companies. The transferred funds experience significant improvements in risk-adjusted returns, efficiency, and asset growth. These improvements are closely correlated with the gains in wealth to buyers and sellers at deal announcements, indicating the market efficiently capitalizes expected performance improvements. Our results provide evidence that these transactions transfer assets to acquirers better able to manage them, generating gains for fund holders and buyer and seller shareholders.     

Do mutual fund managers time market liquidity?

This paper examines mutual fund managers' ability to time market-wide liquidity. Using the CRSP mutual fund database, we find strong evidence that over the 1974–2009 period, mutual fund managers demonstrate the ability to time market liquidity at both the portfolio level and the individual fund level. Liquidity timing predicts future fund performance and the difference in the risk-adjusted returns between top and bottom liquidity-timing funds is approximately 2% per year. Funds exhibiting liquidity-timing ability tend to have longer histories, higher expense ratios, and higher turnover rates.     

What do mutual fund managers’ private portfolios tell us about their skills?

I study a registry-based dataset of Swedish mutual fund managers’ personal portfolios. The majority of managers do not invest personal wealth into the very same funds they professionally manage. The managers who do invest personal money into their funds subsequently outperform the managers who do not. The results suggest that fund managers, in contrast to regular investors, are certain about their ability to generate an abnormal return, or lack thereof, and invest their personal wealth accordingly.     

Actively managed mutual funds holding passive investments: What do ETF positions tell us about mutual fund ability?

We provide the first in-depth examination of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) within actively managed mutual fund (AMMF) portfolios to better understand why AMMFs make substantial investments in passive ETFs. We examine the association between holding ETF positions and AMMF performance, as well as indirect measures of performance, including market timing, flow management, and cash holdings. We find that over one-third of AMMFs take an ETF position between 2004 and 2015. Our results indicate that AMMFs allocating large portions of their portfolio to ETFs perform worse, by between 0.41% and 1.63% annually using various performance measures. These AMMFs also exhibit worse market timing and hold more cash. In contrast, AMMFs that hold ETFs in small amounts have similar characteristics to non-user AMMFs. Therefore, the act of holding an ETF does not signal inferior ability, however, taking large ETF positions does.     

UK mutual fund performance: Skill or luck?

Using a comprehensive data set on (surviving and non-surviving) UK equity mutual funds, we use a cross-section bootstrap methodology to distinguish between ‘skill’ and ‘luck’ for individual funds. This methodology allows for non-normality in the idiosyncratic risk of the funds — a major issue when considering those funds which appear to be either very good or very bad performers, since these are the funds which investors are primarily interested in identifying. Our study points to the existence of stock picking ability among a relatively small number of top performing UK equity mutual funds (i.e. performance which is not solely due to good luck). At the negative end of the performance scale, our analysis strongly rejects the hypothesis that most poor performing funds are merely unlucky. Most of these funds demonstrate ‘bad skill’. Recursive estimation and Kalman ‘smoothed’ coefficients indicate temporal stability in the ex-post performance alpha's of winner and loser portfolios. We also find performance persistence amongst loser but not amongst winner funds.     

Informativeness of mutual fund advertisements: Does advertising communicate fund quality to investors?

We uncover a positive relation between advertising expenditures and skill in the mutual fund industry. Motivated by economic signaling models, we find that funds advertising in magazines outperform their peers by 83 basis points in the subsequent year. We determine that the performance differential between advertising and nonadvertising funds is largest when investment opportunities are high and persists for 36 months. Generally, the positive relation between advertising expenditures and future fund flows is not sensitive to the content of the advertisements and is strongest when investor attention is high.     

Can technical trading beat the foreign exchange market in times of crisis?

I examine the profitability of three simple foreign exchange technical trading rules (moving average, momentum, and relative strength index) before, during, and after the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. These rules significantly improve profitability during the crisis (as opposed to before and after it). The moving average rule significantly increases profitability for exchange rate changes during the crisis. The momentum and relative strength index rules generate significant positive excess currency returns (defined as the difference between the forward premium and spot rate changes), but this profitability is not visible in spot rate changes. These findings are robust for portfolios of developed and emerging market currencies as well as for bilateral exchange rates.     

Do machines beat humans? Evidence from mutual fund performance persistence

We study the performance persistence of quantitative actively managed US equity funds. We show that the persistence of quantitative funds originates from poor performers and that there are reversals at the top of the performance scale, which is no different from the widely accepted evidence in the mutual fund literature. When testing for differences in performance persistence between quantitative and non–quantitative funds, we find no differences for poorly performing funds, but we observe significantly more reversals for quantitative funds at the top of the performance distribution. We also find that the differences in performance persistence are not explained by differences in flow–induced incentives to generate alpha, as there is no heterogeneity in investors preferences when allocating capital to these funds. Overall our results are consistent with machines having less skill than their human counterparts.     

Does corporate social responsibility affect mutual fund performance and flows?

We use an asset-weighted composite corporate social responsibility (CSR) fund score to study the effects of CSR on fund performance and flows. Compared to low-CSR funds, high-CSR funds display poorer performance, stronger performance persistence, a weaker performance-flow relationship, and comparable persistence in flows. These findings are consistent with investors in high-CSR funds deriving utility from non-performance attributes.     

Changes to mutual fund risk: Intentional or mean reverting?

An empirical issue is whether a mutual fund’s change in intertemporal risk is intentional or arises from risk mean reversion. Our methodology uses actual fund trades to identify funds that actively change risk. Funds that are statistically identified as trading to change return variance or tracking error variance do not exhibit risk mean reversion. Mostly, funds trade to reduce risk and, in particular, tracking error variance. This is most evident for funds that previously attained a low tracking error variance. We find no evidence of a relation between past performance and intended changes to return variance or tracking error variance.     

In which financial markets do mutual fund theorems hold true?

The mutual fund theorem (MFT) is considered in a general semimartingale financial market S with a finite time horizon T, where agents maximize expected utility of terminal wealth. The main results are:

Do foreign exchange fund managers behave like heterogeneous agents?

This paper estimates an Heterogeneous Agent Model (HAM) on currency trader indices to explain the large shifts in profitability in currency styles surrounding the global financial crisis. In the model, fund managers allocate capital conditional on recent performance to a value strategy, a momentum strategy, and a carry strategy. Subsequent estimation results reveal that (1) a large part of the behavior of currency managers can indeed be described by these three simple strategies, and (2) currency managers shift capital from recent winning styles to recent losing styles, and hence apply a negative feedback strategy. We finally show that a negative feedback strategy is indeed optimal, but currency managers could improve performance by applying it less aggressively if they were able to.