国际小额信贷发展的经验及启示

小额信贷是一种有效的金融扶贫方式。通过对福利主义小额信贷模式和制度主义小额信贷模式的比较,揭示国际小额信贷发展的制度主义倾向及其成功经验。分析我国小额信贷的实践并对其进行总体评价,最后指出国际成功小额信贷对我国的启示。     

小额贷款的业务效率与关联效应:解析鲁省邮政储蓄银行

以山东省为样本,采用随机前沿法测算地区邮储银行小额贷款业务的效率,并对收入水平、贷款额度对效率水平的影响进行实证分析后发现,小额贷款业务总体效率水平较高,而且县域地区支行效率高于城区支行;在其他因素相同的条件下,农民收入水平越低的地区,小额贷款业务效率越高;此外,单笔贷款额度的大小对小额贷款业务效率并没有显著影响。     

普惠金融视野下大型商业银行介入小额信贷的模式与机制

国外大型商业银行已越来越多介入小额信贷发展,我国普惠金融建设离不开大型商业银行的作用。但过去我国大型商业银行直接从事小额信贷的效果不理想。基于我国小额信贷发展实际寻求一种新的大型商业银行参与小额信贷模式,从理论角度研究大型商业银行与专业性小额信贷机构合作的实现机制,是大型商业银行成功参与小额信贷的重要前提。     

日本银行的信贷扩张及其危机效应

通常人们将日本银行的坏账和不良资产问题归咎于日本的泡沫经济以及东南亚的经济危机．而在具体、现实的解释上，日本银行自身经营的失败和机制的缺陷才是最重要、最直接的危机成因，对日本银行信贷扩张历程的分析展现了日本银行不良资产困境及其危机效应的形成过程。     

The Synergistic Effects Between Insurance and Credit Markets on Economic Growth: Evidence from China

Insurance and credit markets share some common roles in stimulating economic growth, whether they are complementary or not is worth researching further. Based on the generalized method of moments, this paper investigates the synergistic effects between insurance and credit markets on economic growth in Chinese different regions using an interaction term in the regression model. Moreover, to understand the different economic roles of life and nonlife insurance sectors, we include them into estimation model as well. The results indicate that total insurance and credit markets are substituted, life insurance and credit markets are substituted, and nonlife insurance and credit markets are complementary in the whole region. Specifically, the synergistic effects between insurance and credit markets on economic growth vary considerably across different regions. These findings offer several useful insights for policy-makers.     

市场经济的危机与化解——马克思经济危机理论的当代意义

经济危机作为市场经济的伴生物,它并不是资本主义社会独有的,而是市场经济社会必须共同面对的经济问题。在经济危机之后,当我们重新审视马克思主义经济学的理论价值时,我们不仅要承认马克思的经济危机成因论的理论价值,更要重视马克思在分析资本主义经济危机过程中所给出的走出危机的理论路径。因为,在新的历史条件下,依据马克思主义经济学的基本思想,研究当代经济的现实问题,形成化解经济危机的新的马克思主义经济学理论,应是后危机时期马克思主义经济学的首要任务。     

A Reexamination of Behavior in Experimental Audit Markets: The Effects of Moral Reasoning and Economic Incentives on Auditor Reporting and Fees*

This study uses experimental markets to investigate how moral reasoning influences auditor reporting under different levels of economic incentives. In each multiperiod market, auditor subjects could either (1) misreport low observed outcomes as high and thereby reap economic advantages at the expense of third‐party investors, or (2) truthfully report low observed outcomes as low but thereby forgo the economic advantages of misreporting. We extend the Calegari, Schatzberg, and Sevcik 1998 experimental‐markets setting to incorporate moral reasoning, and test hypotheses based on the economic model of Magee and Tseng 1990 and the neo‐Kohlbergian moral reasoning framework of Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma 1999. We document a significant effect of moral reasoning on auditor behavior. Specifically, we find that misreporting and premium fees are more likely with higher than with lower moral reasoning subjects, and the moral reasoning effect diminishes as economic penalties increase in the market. These findings provide valuable insights for specifying the determinants of auditor misreporting, the observable behaviors that signal its existence, and the institutions that can prevent its occurrence in the market. We conclude that the relation between moral reasoning and behavior is more complex than commonly assumed in the accounting literature, and identify directions for future research.     

读《三足鼎立?全球竞争体系中欧美亚太经济区》

自从经济全球化、知识经济、加入WTO等论点吹进我国后,各种有关论文和专著充斥市场,读者趋之若骛.惜专心读了进去,走不出来,往往不得要领,入宝山而无所得.伍贻康、张幼文主编的<经济全球化论丛>中伍贻康等著<三足鼎立?全球竞争体系中欧美亚太经济区>一书,是上海社会科学院和复旦大学世界经济研究所的联合研究成果,无怪乎内容充实,调研全面,对学者、教授、经济工作者及广大知识界均有开拓思维和参考的作用.     

波兰农业信贷政策及启示：基于信贷配给的视角分析

文章从信贷配给理论的视角,分析说明了波兰促进农业发展的信贷政策是一种以推行农业优惠贷款利息补贴为主要方式、农业项目工程为载体、银行机构监督约束为主体、政府信用担保为补充的信贷配额制。借鉴波兰的经验,我国应采取对金融市场信贷配给进行适度干预、建立和完善农业信贷政策体系、注重政府与商韭银行双重信贷的配合使用和加强农业信贷信用担保体系建设等措施,积极引导银行资金向农业倾斜,以改变农业发展相对滞后的不利局面。