Firm-level determinants of tax evasion in transition economies

Business tax evasion is an important issue for governments. Yet the factors that determine business tax evasion have not been sufficiently examined in the literature in general, and in transition contexts in particular. To address this gap, this study uses the WB/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) database with a sample of over 12,692 firms from 26 transition economies. Applying various modelling strategies, we argue that tax evasion is a function of firm-level and institutional-level variables. We contribute to the literature by providing robust evidence showing that the perceived tax burden has a positive impact on tax evasion. We also find that the tax evasive behaviour of firms is positively influenced by low trust in government and in the judicial system as well as by higher perceptions of corruption and higher compliance costs. We find that smaller firms, individual businesses and firms in sectors that are less visible to the tax administration are more likely to get involved in evasive behaviour. Overall, institutional factors play an important role in determining firms’ tax evasion behaviour in transition economies. This finding has important policy implications.     

Distributional implications of informal economy in the EU countries: Accounting for the spread of tax evasion benefits and cultural characteristics

This study provides evidence about the impact of informal economy on income inequality by using annual cross-country panel data from 28 European Union countries observed during the period 2005–2017. Particular attention is dedicated to the cultural setting which is expected to impact taxpayers’ behaviour and thereby income distribution. The study reveals a relationship between the size of the underground economy and income inequality, which is negative when approaching domestic informality and positive when international tax evasion by individuals is related to the top-bottom income disparity. Moreover, a delay of one-year is needed for these effects to occur, sustaining the hypothesis of secondary consequences of the informality. The study also shows that a set of cultural peculiarities are relevant for the nexus of international tax evasion by individuals and income polarisation. The inequality enhancing effect of the offshore activities is larger in countries with high degree of uncertainty avoidance and power distance, and low level of indulgence and long-term orientation respectively.     

Tax enforcement policies,tax evasion and time allocation

Several studies examine the effect of tax rates on households’ labor supply decisions in attempts to account for observed differences in work hours across countries. Interestingly, these studies fail to consider a fundamental action associated with taxation: tax evasion. This paper introduces, into a general equilibrium model of household labor supply, the possibility that households can evade labor income taxes. We show that the relationship between tax-enforcement policies, the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure and the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal work is key to explain formal labor supply in major OECD countries. In a model without informal work, there is a positive relationship between the elasticity of substitution and the tax rate on formal income and people tend to work more. This is the case for the United States, Greece, Finland and the United Kingdom. This relationship becomes negative once informal activities are introduced and the model can explain formal labor supply better in countries where agents work relative less, i.e., in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, Norway and Sweden. We also obtain estimates of hours worked in the informal sector for these countries.     

Exploring tax evasion in the context of political uncertainty

We present a model of agents facing the uncertainty of two future forms of government who are able to insure against this uncertainty by hiding funds from taxation. In order to choose whether or not to hide funds from taxation, agents need to know policy choices that each government would make should it come to power. But each government, before it could make its decision, would need to know the choices of the agents who would, for example, produce tax revenues. This informational tension is resolved endogenously. We derive the resulting level of tax evasion in society and the optimal choices made by the potential governments. We examine how changes in governmental structure would affect the level of tax evasion, and how that, in turn, would affect a particular form of capital flight.     

Why is there so little tax coordination? The role of majority voting and international tax evasion

It is a striking feature of EU tax policy that countries find it difficult to agree on capital tax coordination. This is in conflict with the prevailing theoretical view, according to which tax coordination is beneficial. This paper develops a political economy argument which may help to explain this puzzle. We consider a model of tax competition where fiscal policy decisions are taken via majority voting and tax evasion is possible but costly. It turns out that tax coordination agreements may fail to generate political support because middle income groups may lose from tax coordination, even if their capital income is below average.     

Analysing tax evasion dynamics via the Ising model

We develop a model of tax evasion based on the Ising model. We augment the model using an appropriate enforcement mechanism that may allow policy makers to curb tax evasion. With a certain probability tax evaders are subject to an audit. If they get caught they behave honestly for a certain number of periods. Simulating the model for a range of parameter combinations, we show that tax evasion may be controlled effectively by using punishment as an enforcement mechanism.     

现代企业自主创新与税制激励:问题与出路

为实施自主创新战略,需要从税收政策上为国内企业的自主创新提供必要的外部激励环境。我国现行税制存在对自主研发激励不足、税收优惠体系不完善、税收优惠政策偏重于创新结果以及个人所得税优惠不明显等问题。下一步应当调整政策激励重点,确立研发环节税收激励的核心地位,同时要加快鼓励创新的企业所得税制改革,健全创新人才的税收激励机制,健全有利于自主创新的税收征管制度。     

AGRICULTURAL POLICY AS A SOCIAL ENGINEERING TOOL: A NEW JERSEY CASE STUDY

This study uses logistic regression to examine the preferences for social engineering policies in the agricultural sector in a New Jersey case study. It finds that farm operators are unlikely to support a policy allowing countries to restrict trade to pursue domestic economic and social policy goals if the policies affect international trade. In particular, it suggests that farm operators with annual gross sales including government payments between $500 000 and $999 999 are 80 percent less likely to indicate such a preference. Farm operators with advanced degrees, some college education, and a high school diploma are also unlikely to indicate such a preference. In contrast, farm operators who receive no income from farming or ranching and those who receive a percentage of family income from farming or ranching indicate that countries should be allowed to restrict trade to pursue domestic economic and social policy goals even if the policies affect international trade.     

住房保障视角下的房地产税改革策略研究

房地产税改革不仅仅关系到中央和地方间的财事权分配、普通居民的税收负担,关系到房地产市场的稳定发展,也会对我国城镇住房保障体系的建设和创新形成制度约束.本文介绍了房地产税收政策支持住房保障体系建设的国际经验,运用经济学理论,分析了在我国当前的住房保障制度中,房地产税改革对不同类型保障性住房建设和运营的影响.在此基础上,提...     

A quantitative view on policymakers’ goal,institutions and tax evasion

We develop a general theoretical model to compare two different policymakers both facing tax evasion. Policymakers differs in that they aim to maximize either the fiscal revenues ( $T$ ) as in a social-democracy as, e.g., Sweden, or the GDP as in a capitalistic country as, e.g., the USA. Both Bureaus can manoeuvre the tax rate and the share of tax receipts spent to fight the tax evasion rather than to increase the public capital. Our model merges the indications of two distinct, and sometimes conflicting, approaches to the analysis of tax evasion in that reconciling them. We also find that the feedbacks between the private and public sector are linked to some Laffer-type relationships usually unexplored by the existing literature. As compared to capitalistic systems, then, our results show that social-democracies end up imposing higher tax rates and, possibly, more pervasive regulations. Consequently, they are likely to suffer from larger tax-evasion-to-GDP ratios. This notwithstanding, social-democracies spend relatively more to contrast tax dodgers. On the other hand, $T$ -maximizing governments have better institutional settings and greater employment rates. Whichever the preferred target, however, no policymaker is able to erase totally the tax evasion, which may explain why this latter is so pervasive and persistent even among the richest countries.     

PRESUMPTIVE TAXATION METHODS: A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

This paper reviews the empirical literature studying the effect of the introduction of presumptive taxation methods on taxpayers’ behavior. Although the concept of presumptive taxation entails numerous alternative methods to determine tax liabilities, I survey two main areas of the literature: indirect tax assessment methods and presumptive minimum taxes. The review investigates efficiency and equity implications of presumptive taxation methods. Conflicting conclusions emerge about the effectiveness of presumptive policy tools in achieving different goals, such as the increase of voluntary tax compliance, the growth of tax revenues, and the reduction of shadow economy and fiscal evasion.     

Macroeconomic conditions and investment stimuli

Based on a calibrated real options model, this paper examines a tax-subsidy program offered by a government to stimulate corporate investment under business cycles. We derive and discuss optimal incentive policies for different states of the economy. We find that it is optimal for the government to offer a combination of tax cuts and lump-sum subsidy for stimulating levered firms’ investment under business cycles. Furthermore, the government should adopt counter-cyclical tax-subsidy policy, namely a higher (lower) tax cuts and a larger (smaller) lump-sum subsidy during recessions (booms). In particular, we provide a possible explanation why many governments around the world have reduced and even implemented negative interest rates to stimulate the economy during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Finally, our conclusions also predict that the break-even tax-subsidy program always provides effective investment stimulus under business cycles.     

MANAGING THE PROCESS OF REMOVING CAPITAL CONTROLS: WHAT DOES THE LITERATURE SUGGEST?

Economic theory suggests that opening the capital account should allow a country to diversify away economic shocks, increase capital inflows, expand economic growth and efficiency as well as encourage governments to pursue good policies. The empirical evidence with regard to these theoretical predictions, however, are in some instances debatable. Many studies, for example, have reported mixed results as it relates to the impact of capital account integration on growth, exchange rates, trade and policy discipline. This paper provides a review of this literature as well as some recommendations for policymakers in relation to managing the process of removing capital controls.     

Optimal dynamic tax evasion

We study optimal dynamic tax evasion in the framework proposed by Lin and Yang (2001) and Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2011) with some modifications: a more flexible utility function, a more realistic audit process, and a penalty function which can be defined both on evaded income and evaded taxes. In the former case the elasticity between tax rate and tax evasion is positive, unless the subsistence consumption level is higher than a given threshold. In the latter case the relationship is usually negative , but the value of elasticity depends on the form of absolute risk aversion. In particular we show that for increasing relative risk aversion, for a tax rate higher than 50%, the elasticity may even become positive. US data are consistent with IRRA preferences.     

完善我国研发支出的财税政策

随着经济发展,研发创新活动已经成为各国竞争的重要手段之一。科技创新可以优化一个国家的资源配置,提高国家的综合竞争力。各国政府为了研发创新活动的开展,都在积极探索并制定研发创新的财税政策。本文分析了我国目前研发支出财税政策存在的不足之处,如财税政策的受益范围窄且力度小、财税支持方式不合理及法律法规不健全等问题。接着介绍国外激励研发创新的财税政策,总结出对我国财税政策的启示。最后从扩大财税政策激励范围、丰富财税政策激励方式以及完善我国财税的法律法规等方面提出优化我国研发支出财税政策的建议。     

浅析会计制度对企业所得税税收筹划的影响

税收筹划是指纳税人在税法规定许可的范围内,通过对经营、投资、理财活动的事先筹划和安排,尽可能地取得节约税收或成本的税收收益。税收筹划应具备"三性"合法性、筹划性和目地性。对于"偷税",世界各国认识较一致,面对"避税"和"税收筹划",又有区别。前者虽然不违法,但属于钻税法的空子,有悖于国家的税收政策导向,后者是完全合法的,甚至是税收政策予以引导和鼓励的。     

The effects of an environmental accountability system on local environmental governance and firms’ emissions

The Chinese central government introduced the environmental accountability system (EAS) policy in 2006 to encourage local governments to execute environmental policies appropriately. However, the effects of this EAS policy have not been investigated at the firm level. In this study, we first measured the environmental governance intensity of local governments by calculating the environment word portion (EWP) of the annual governments’ work reports and found that local governments increased their efforts after the EAS policy implementation. We then constructed a continuous difference-in-difference (DID) strategy to estimate the effect of the EAS on firms’ emission and found that firms significantly reduced their sulphur dioxide (SO₂) emission under the regulation intensity of local governments after the EAS policy. The reductions are mainly because of the private, non-export, labour- and capital-intensive firms. The EAS policy may encourage firms to reduce coal usage, design more products, decrease capacity investment and even withdraw from the market, thus reducing pollutant emission. Finally, we tested firms’ response in various polluting sectors and found that the EAS policy may cause local governments to fail in distinguishing low pollution sectors from high pollution sectors.     

Proposals to Tax Life Insurance Savings as Personal Income

A bstract . Proposals to tax the realized net increment built up in life insurance policies amount to suggestions that we tax rewards to suppliers of capital. As tax policy it would tend to discourage capital accumulation. Many types of income and of capital gains are not taxed as a matter of social policy. Taxing the "inside buildup" would obstruct the building up of a capital base for the family and the economy. Economists recognize that there are alternatives, e.g. , a consumption based tax. In a time of great need for capital, a time of capital shortage, this tax policy would be retrogressive.     

基于收入差异下的企业年金税收优惠政策研究

企业年金作为我国社会养老保险制度中的第二大支柱,其发展状况在国内并不理想。而本文的研究认为税收作为国民收入调节的重要工具,其税惠政策应有所区别对待。针对不同的收入群体来实施税收优惠政策,将有利于实现社会的公平和提高企业员工参与年金计划的积极性。     

The shadow economy as an equilibrium outcome

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of tax evasion where agents choose to report some of their income. Unreported income requires using a payment method that avoids recordkeeping in some markets—cash. Trade using cash to avoid taxes is the ‘shadow economy’ in our model. We then calibrate our model using money, interest rate and GDP data to back out the size of the shadow economy for a sample of countries and compare our measures to traditional reduced form estimates.