产业转移促进产业升级机制分析

国民经济可持续发展是以产业结构合理均衡为基础的,同时,产业结构的合理均衡又需要通过产业结构的优化升级来实现产业结构的合理化和高度化;进而促进共同协调产业结构调整和经济转型,最终形成经济增长和可持续发展的良好局面。因此,有序承接产业转移、促进区域产业升级意义重大。     

必须加强对高新技术产业发展的宏观调控

为实现全面建设小康社会的目标,为促进产业结构升级、解决资源约束的"瓶颈"问题和维护国家安全,国家必须高度重视高新技术产业的发展,加强对高新技术产业发展的宏观润控,特别是要加强对经济增长有突破性重大带动作用的高新技术产业发展的宏观调控。     

当前国际产业转移的背景、特点及效应分析

在世界经济发展的实践中,国际产业转移是发达国家和发展中国家都普遍关注的问题.发达国家可以通过产业转移调整产业结构,实现全球战略目标,发展中国家可以通过承接产业转移促进对外贸易的发展、加快产业结构升级和经济发展.二战以来,全球发生了几次大规模的产业结构调整与转移,每次产业转移都极大地影响了世界经济的发展.20世纪90年代后期以来,信息技术的快速发展和知识经济蓬勃兴起,有力地推动了经济全球化的进程和发达国家产业结构的升级,引发了新一轮的国际产业转移浪潮.     

黑龙江省承接东部沿海地区产业转移优化产业结构的探讨

金融危机使东部沿海地区以外向型和劳动密集型加工业为特征的经济结构面临着较大转型压力,加速了区域间产业结构调整、升级和产业转移步伐。地处东北亚区域中心的黑龙江等老工业基地凭借着自身的资源优势及产业区位优势,积极承接东部地区产业转移,优化产业结构,实现产业转型升级意义重大。     

如何处理产业结构高度化与协调化的关系

改革开放以来 ,我国产业结构有了很大的改善 ,成为经济增长的主要动因 ,但仍存在许多结构不协调和产业低度化的问题 ,影响了产业升级。如何处理好产业结构高度化与协调化的关系 ,促进产业结构升级 ,成为推动我国国民经济快速健康发展的关键环节。本文就此问题做了初步分析     

后金融危机时代促进我国产业结构优化升级的对策

后金融危机时代全球经济出现的新特点,引发了全球产业结构的重新调整,势必给我国产业结构带来巨大影响,对产业结构升级提出了更高的要求。而我国产业结构中存在的诸多问题尚未解决,产业升级的压力更大、难度更高。本文从科技创新、扩大内需、大力发展第三产业、发展低碳经济等方面提出了促进我国产业结构优化升级的对策建议。     

数字经济对长江经济带产业结构升级的影响

数字经济已成为长江经济带构建新发展格局的动力源泉。本文从数字产业化、产业数字化和数字化环境三个维度衡量长江经济带数字经济发展水平,从产业结构合理化、高级化和产业聚集三个层面定量评价产业结构发展水平,从理论和实证两个方面考察数字经济对产业结构升级的影响机理。研究发现,数字经济促进了产业结构升级,周边城市产业结构升级会对本地的产业结构调整产生积极作用;数字经济优化了产业结构布局,提高了服务业聚集水平,促进了制造业企业转型升级。数字经济通过提高绿色创新效能和吸引劳动力流入两大机制推动产业结构升级。进一步研究发现,数字经济促进了制造业企业绿色化转型。为此,应当加快数字化转型,培养创新人才,提升绿色创新效能。     

运用财政投资政策加快龙江产业结构升级

产业结构升级不仅表现为三次产业结构的不断优化,更体现为高新技术产业的快速发展、现代服务产业的蓬勃发展等,其对转变经济发展方式、协调区域经济增长、吸纳劳动力资源等具有积极意义。分析黑龙江省产业结构的现状及存在的问题,积极运用财政投资政策,加大对农业、低碳产业、高新技术产业、现代服务产业财政资金的投入力度,旨在加快黑龙江省产业结构优化升级,促进黑龙江省经济持续、协调发展。     

浙江民营制造业升级途径研究——基于逆微笑曲线视角

随着经济全球化发展,浙江经济在迅速发展的同时出现了企业经济效益比较好但产业附加值比较低等矛盾和问题,产业结构升级的难题亟待解决.本文基于逆微笑曲线视角,分析了浙江民营制造业的竞争优势和在产业升级过程中遇到的困境,探讨了实现产业升级的途径.     

优化产业结构，提升苏南地区的产业竞争力

产业结构的优化升级是增强产业竞争力的重要途径。苏南地区要实现经济长期可持续发展,必须在促进产业结构优化升级方面下工夫。本文对苏南地区产业发展现状进行了分析,指出了当前苏南产业发展中存在的问题。在此基础上,就如何解决存在的问题,进一步提升苏南地区产业竞争力提出了6个方面的建议。     

Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income

We estimate the interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, and income levels, using identification through heteroskedasticity (IH). We split our cross‐national dataset into two sub‐samples: (i) colonies versus non‐colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East–West versus those aligned on a North–South axis. We exploit the difference in the structural variances in these two sub‐samples to gain identification. We find that democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes. Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive effect on rule of law. Higher income produces greater openness and better institutions, but these effects are not very strong. Rule of law and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.     

Inflation,money, interest rate,exchange rate,and casuality: the case of Egypt,Morocco, and Tunisia

This study provides further evidence of the inflationary efects of the rates of growth of money supply, gross domestic product, efective exchange rate, and imported inflation for Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia using quarterly data from 1964 to 1990. In addition, it examines the Granger causality between inflation and money supply as well as between inflation and the real exchange rate in the countries under consideration. Most of the results are consistent with extant theory and empirical evidence.     

The Complexities and Potential of Theorizing Gender,Caste, Race,and Class

Most economists have not yet grappled with the demands of intersectional scholarship, which recognizes the intertwined nature of gender, race, class, caste and other influences on the economic situation of individuals and groups. Among economists, feminist economists may have made the most progress and be best positioned to break further ground, though we can do better and much remains to be done. This article synthesizes the case for intersectional work, reviews the state of the economic literature, describes the contributions of the articles in this special issue of Feminist Economics on "gender, color, caste and class," and sketches directions for the future.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Quality of judicial institutions,crimes, misdemeanors,and dishonesty

We investigate the extent to which quality of judicial institutions has an impact on individuals’ propensity for criminal and dishonest behavior and on their views regarding the acceptability of dishonesty and law-breaking. We use micro data on residents of 25 European countries and employ alternative measures of judicial quality as perceived by the residents of these countries. As an instrument for judicial quality we employ the procedures with which prosecutors and judges are appointed to their posts in each country. As alternative instruments, we employ an index of de jure institutional quality as well as its components, which provide similar results. The findings show that an increase in the perception of the quality of judicial institutions, such as an improvement in judicial independence or the impartiality of the courts, has a deterrent effect on dishonest and criminal acts. A higher perceived quality of the judicial system also makes individuals less likely to find acceptable a variety of dishonest and illicit behaviors, suggesting that institutions help shape the beliefs of the society. We obtain the same results when we analyze the sample of immigrants, whose cultural attributes should be (more) related to their countries of origin, rather than their countries of residence, and thus should be arguably uncorrelated with the factors that can impact the instrument. We show that people’s beliefs in the importance of the family, in the fairness of others, and the importance of being rich are not impacted by judicial quality, suggesting that judicial quality is not a blanket representation of underlying cultural norms and beliefs in the society.     

Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare

Three issues in the political economy of protection are examined. The first, the endogenization of interest group formation, is addressed from the perspective of profitability instead of the difficulty caused by the free-rider problem. The second issue is the determinants of an interest group's political influence. Two sets of determinants—the characteristics of the interest group and the political economic environment faced by that group—are identified. The third is the circumstances under which the presence of more interest groups is socially preferable to fewer. Such circumstances are related to the parameters of the model.     

Recession,terms of trade,and immigrants

The current literature does not adequately analyze how economic crisis affects employment of immigrants in host countries. It is generally believed that immigrants lose jobs and return home during recession. We show that recession may instead help relatively unskilled immigrants when it leads to terms-of-trade improvement in the host country, and when the unskilled sector is protected by minimum wage regulations. We also derive the condition under which the income gap between natives and immigrants falls.     

Uncertainty, Insurance, and Division of Labor

This paper develops an equilibrium model to investigate the relationships between transaction uncertainties, risk aversion, insurance, specialization, per capita real income, and productivity progress. It is shown that transaction uncertainties can restrict the division of labor; the level of division of labor decreases with the degree of risk aversion; insurance will promote the equilibrium level of division of labor, per capita real income, and productivity.     

Savings, Volume of Trade, and Growth

This paper develops a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous growth to analyze the effects of international trade on steady-stage growth. The two countries differ both in preferences and in technologies. It is shown first that both countries cannot simultaneously experience increases in consumption growth from trade. It is then shown that trade can increase output growth for both countries if the attitude towards saving matches the change in the terms of trade in each country. A country facing a decline (rise) in its output price grows faster if its intertemporal elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low (high).