Why should anyone be led by you?

We all know that leaders need vision and energy, but after an exhaustive review of the most influential theories on leadership--as well as workshops with thousands of leaders and aspiring leaders--the authors learned that great leaders also share four unexpected qualities. The first quality of exceptional leaders is that they selectively reveal their weaknesses (weaknesses, not fatal flaws). Doing so lets employees see that they are approachable. It builds an atmosphere of trust and helps galvanize commitment. The second quality of inspirational leaders is their heavy reliance on intuition to gauge the appropriate timing and course of their actions. Such leaders are good "situation sensors"--they can sense what's going on without having things spelled out for them. Managing employees with "tough empathy" is the third quality of exceptional leadership. Tough empathy means giving people what they need, not what they want. Leaders must empathize passionately and realistically with employees, care intensely about the work they do, and be straightforward with them. The fourth quality of top-notch leaders is that they capitalize on their differences. They use what's unique about themselves to create a social distance and to signal separateness, which in turn motivates employees to perform better. All four qualities are necessary for inspirational leadership, but they cannot be used mechanically; they must be mixed and matched to meet the demands of particular situations. Most important, however, is that the qualities encourage authenticity among leaders. To be a true leader, the authors advise, "Be yourself--more--with skill."     

Bank mergers: What should policymakers do?

These remarks discuss why the “cluster” of financial services and local banking markets are still relevant for antitrust analysis in banking. A key portion of the Federal Reserve’s Order approving the NationsBank–Barnett merger is interpreted, and the extent to which antitrust is a practical constraint on the development of a nationwide banking structure is commented upon.     

What should regulators do about merger policy?

I argue that merger policy needs to be driven by different considerations in Europe, Japan and the United States. In Europe the main challenge is to set up a system so that efficient consolidation can occur once the single currency is established. In Japan the policy ought to be directed towards trying to attract foreign institutions to acquire under-capitalized domestic institutions. Japan does not seem to be taking this route. In the US consolidation it is already occurring and the current policy should be continued.     

What should regulators do about consolidation and electronic money?

Shared systems in the credit card mode may offer electronic money such as stored value (“smart”) cards, e-cash, and cybermoney. In such consolidations bank partners potentially may come from far outside the customary regulated banking fraternity. While some cyberbanks have been granted official status with its responsibilities, other nonbank cyberbanks have absconded with deposits amidst fraudulent claims. Electronic money is distributed typically in complex tiers, with backup reserves often held by nonbank third parties. The regulatory rules which apply to the mixed systems are therefore uneven and unclear. Banking regulators and the Antitrust Division wrestle with the ensuing dilemmas.     

Cohabitation before marriage: do prior alliances enhance post-merger performance?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We investigate the impact of prior alliance relationships on subsequent mergers between partner firms. We argue that an acquirer’s prior...     

What do financial intermediaries do?

This paper presents evidence that the traditional banking business of accepting deposits and making loans has declined significantly in the US in recent years. There has been a switch from directly held assets to pension funds and mutual funds. However, banks have maintained their position relative to GDP by innovating and switching from their traditional business to fee-producing activities. A comparison of investor portfolios across countries shows that households in the US and UK bear considerably more risk from their investments than counterparts in Japan, France and Germany. It is argued that in these latter countries intermediaries can manage risk by holding liquid reserves and intertemporally smoothing. However, in the US and UK competition from financial markets prevents this and risk management must be accomplished using derivatives and other similar techniques. The decline in the traditional banking business and the financial innovation undertaken by banks in the US is interpreted as a response to the competition from markets and the decline of intertemporal smoothing.     

What causes home asset bias and how should it be measured?

Many explanations of home asset bias involve intuitions that should affect the data inputs used by investors in optimizing portfolios: (1) transaction costs affecting expected returns, (2) perceived riskiness of foreign assets affecting standard deviations, and (3) omitted assets affecting correlations. Only the first area has been examined empirically. We examine the empirical feasibility of the second and third explanations, as well as whether combining explanations can fully account for home asset bias. We find that no single set of adjustments can explain home asset bias by itself. Combining adjustments is promising but the implied correlation structure among asset returns is puzzling.     

How right should the customer be?

If your salespeople aren't sure who their boss is--the district manager? the regional manager? the customer?--it could be a sign that your company's sales force controls are working at cross-purposes and that your sales function is in trouble. Sales force controls are the policies and practices that govern the way you train, supervise, motivate, and evaluate your sales staff. They include the types of compensation you offer your people and the criteria your sales managers use to evaluate the reps' performance. These controls let salespeople know which trade-offs the company would prefer them to make when the inevitable conflicts arise between what they want to do (spend lots of time and money to get a sale) and what they actually can do (use limited resources and still get the sale). When sales force controls aren't aligned--when, say, the system simultaneously encourages reps to be entrepreneurial but also to file detailed call reports and check in frequently with their bosses--individuals become discouraged and unproductive, and they eventually leave the company. The authors' research suggests there are significant differences between the control systems of companies that encourage salespeople to put the customer first-outcome control (OC) systems--and those that encourage reps to put their managers first--behavior control (BC) systems. In this article, they list the characteristics of OC and BC systems, describe the potential fallout from conflicts within these systems, and explain how you can tell which control system is appropriate for your firm. In most cases, the right choice will be a consistent system somewhere in the middle of the OC-BC continuum.     

What do dividend reductions signal?

Dividend reductions have long been considered a “last resort” action for firm managers. Managerial reluctance to reduce dividends emanates from the view that dividend drops signal managerial pessimism regarding future earnings. Contrary to expectations, studies show that earnings rebound significantly following a dividend reduction; yet investors react negatively to the dividend-drop announcement. We present an explanation for the anomalous behavior of earnings and returns around the time of a dividend drop. Our evidence suggests that a reduction in a firm's established dividend coincides with a decrease in the value of the firm's real options. Earnings rebound following the dividend reduction due to the savings that result as the firm allows growth options to expire; however, announcement period returns suggest that investors recognize the lost value associated with the forthcoming expiration of growth options.     

What do retail FX traders learn?

What is the benefit of experience? Using data from a leading trading platform we find no evidence that retail FX traders learn to trade better, but they do appear to learn about their innate abilities as traders and respond appropriately. In particular, following an unsuccessful trading day, they are more likely to cease trading, to trade smaller amounts and to trade less frequently. These effects are stronger for younger and less experienced traders who might be expected to have more to learn than older, more experienced traders. As regards learning through experience, surprisingly we find that more seasoned traders demonstrate a slight decline in performance once we account for the endogenous decision to cease trading, and even very experienced traders consistently lose money.     

What do two plus two equal?

A mathematician,an accountant and an economistapply for the same job.The interviewer calls in the mathematician and asksWhat do two plus two equal?The mathematician     

Apple's changing business model: What should the world's richest company do with all those profits?

Apple Inc. stands out as the world's most famous, and currently richest, company. To the general public, Apple is known for three things: its intriguing CEO Steve Jobs, who has achieved iconic status in death as in life; its amazing iOS products, especially the iPhone and the iPad, and their predecessor the iPod, which have literally placed sophisticated technology in the hands of the masses; and its stratospheric stock price, which even when in March 2013 it had dropped to 63 percent of its September 2012 peak, gave Apple the highest market capitalization of any company in the world. As a result of its phenomenal success, at the end of fiscal 2012 Apple had $121 billion in liquid assets. In April 2013 the company committed to distributing as much as $100 billion to shareholders in stock buybacks and cash dividends by the end of calendar 2015. By employing the theory of innovative enterprise to analyze how over the course of its 37-year history Apple became so profitable, we argue that there is no economic justification from a risk-reward perspective for this distribution to Apple's shareholders. Taxpayers and workers have superior claims on these profits. In analyzing by whom value is created as a basis for considering for whom value should be extracted, we raise the implications of Apple's changing business model for the future of innovation at this heretofore exceptional American company and even in the U.S. economy as a whole.     

What does it mean to be green?

Today a company is not considered environmentalist unless it moves beyond mere compliance with government regulations to behavior its competitors, and even customers, do not expect. How should it set its agenda? Author Art Kleiner proposes that, to be green, a company must ask three questions: What products should we bring to market? How much disclosure of pollution information should we support? And how can we reduce waste at its source? These questions can't be answered, Kleiner says, unless managers insist on sustainable growth. In this sense, a big investment in environmentalism is like a big one in R&D--both presuppose patient capital and managerial maturity. What are green products? Kleiner cautions against giving in to misinformed public opinion--as McDonald's did in giving up its styrene "clamshells," which were more recyclable than the composite papers it switched to. Rather, companies should rely on literature that analyzes the product life cycle. As for public disclosure, the benefits may be unexpected. Federal legislation requiring companies to report the emission of potentially hazardous waste to a central data bank has not made environmentalists attack them. Rather, it has forced companies to learn what chemicals they inadvertently produce and how much--knowledge that helps them improve production processes. Sharing it helps ecological researchers study the combined effects of plant emissions. As for pollution prevention, Kleiner notes the analogy to quality and observes that it is better to design harmful waste products out of the system than catch them at the end of the line.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

What do price discovery metrics really measure?

A market is typically considered to dominate price discovery if it is the first to reflect new information about the fundamental value. Our simulations indicate that common price discovery metrics – Hasbrouck information share and Harris–McInish–Wood component share – are only consistent with this view of price discovery if the price series have equal levels of noise, including microstructure frictions and liquidity. If the noise in the price series differs, the information and component shares measure a combination of leadership in impounding new information and relative avoidance of noise, to varying degrees. A third price discovery metric, the ‘information leadership share’ uses the information share and the component share together to identify the price series that is first to impound new information. This third metric is robust to differences in noise levels and therefore correctly attributes price discovery in a wider range of settings. Using four recent empirical studies of price discovery we show that the choice and interpretation of price discovery metrics can have a substantial impact on conclusions about price discovery.     

Why do auditors fail? What might work? What won’t?†

Auditing failures and scandals have become commonplace. In response, reformers (including the Kingman Review in the U.K. and a recent report of the U.K.’s Competition and Market Authority) have proposed a variety of remedies, including prophylactic bans on auditors providing consulting services to their clients in the belief that this will minimize the conflicts of interest that produce auditing failures. Although useful, such reforms are already in place to a considerable degree and may have reached the point of diminishing returns. Moreover, this strategy does not address the deeper problem that clients (or their managements) may not want aggressive auditing, but rather prefer a deferential and perfunctory audit. If so, auditors will realize that they are marketing a ‘commodity’ service and cannot successfully compete based on their quality of services. Rationally, they would respond to such a market by seeking to adopt a cost-minimization strategy, competing by reducing the cost of their services and not investing in new technology or higher-priced personnel.

What could change this pattern? Gatekeepers, including auditors, serve investors, but are hired by corporate management. To induce gatekeepers to better serve investors, one needs to reduce the ‘agency costs’ surrounding this relationship by making gatekeepers more accountable to investors. This might be accomplished through litigation (as happens to some degree in the U.S.), but the U.K. and Europe have rules that discourage collective litigation. Thus, a more feasible approach would be to give investors greater ability to select and remove the auditor. This paper proposes a two part strategy to this end: (1) public ‘grading’ of the auditor by the audit regulator in an easily comparable fashion (and with a mandatory grading curve), and (2) enabling a minority of the shareholders (hypothetically, 10%) to propose a replacement auditor for a shareholder vote. It further argues that both activist shareholders and diversified shareholders might support such a strategy and undertake it under different circumstances. Absent such a focus on agency costs, however, reformers are likely only re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.