共查询到13条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Summary. Transaction costs on financial markets may have important consequences for volumes of trade, asset pricing, and welfare. This paper introduces an algorithm for the computation of equilibria in the general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and transaction costs. We show that economies with transaction costs can be analyzed with differentiable homotopy techniques and thus in the same framework as frictionless economies despite the existence of non-differentiabilities of agents asset demand functions and the existence of locally non-unique equilibria. We introduce an equilibrium selection concept into the computation of economic equilibria that picks out a specific equilibrium in the presence of a continuum of equilibria.Received: 2 December 2002, Revised: 15 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
C61, C62, C63, C68, D52, D58, G11, G12.
Correspondence to: P. Jean-Jacques HeringsThis research started when Jean-Jacques Herings enjoyed the generous hospitality of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University. His research has been made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences and a grant of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research. We thank audiences at Stanford University, UC San Diego, and Venice for discussions on the subject. We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. 相似文献
2.
Summary. We prove that locally, Walras' law and homogeneity characterize the structure of market excess demand functions when financial
markets are incomplete and assets' returns are nominal. The method of proof is substantially different from all existing arguments
as the properties of individual demand are also different. We show that this result has important implications and is part
of a more general result that excess demand is an essentially arbitrary function not just of prices, but also of the exogenous
parameters of the economy as asset returns, preferences, and endowments. Thus locally the equilibrium manifold, relating equilibrium
prices to these parameters has also no structure.
Received: September 17, 1996; revised version: November 7, 1997 相似文献
3.
Using a two-country dynamic optimization model, we investigate the impact of exchange risk, incomplete information and short sales constraints on international portfolio decisions around market closure. Using optimal control theory, we provide solutions and simulation results. Our model can be applied to solve several problems in financial economics in the presence of market closure, information asymmetry and short sales constraints. 相似文献
4.
Eduardo L. Giménez 《Economic Theory》2003,21(1):195-204
Summary. This paper argues that the introduction of a short-sale constraint in the Arrow-Radner framework invalidates standard definitions
of complete and incomplete markets. Two threshold values with familiar properties arise in this constrained set-up. If short
sales are not allowed on some security, then financial markets will be incomplete in the standard sense. Beyond a particular
level of the short-sale bound, financial markets are “complete”, since the short-sale constraint is not effective. For intermediate
bounds the distinction between complete and incomplete financial markets is blurred. Although some technical definitions hold,
agents can not fully transfer wealth among states. These intermediate cases, called “technically incomplete markets”, exhibit
interesting welfare properties. For instance, the resulting equilibrium allocations may not be Pareto-dominated by those of
the non-restricted complete markets equilibrium.
Received: November 28, 2000; / revised version: November 9, 2001 相似文献
5.
Summary. We consider a Lucas asset-pricing model with heterogeneous agents, exogenous labor income, and a finite number of exogenous
shocks. Although agents are infinitely lived, endowments and dividends are time-invariant functions of the exogenous shock
alone and are thus restricted to lie in a finite-dimensional space; genericity analysis can be conducted on sets of zero Lebesgue
measure. When financial markets are incomplete, that is, there are fewer financial securities than shocks, we show that generically
in individual endowments all competitive equilibria are Pareto inefficient.
Received: November 22, 1999; revised version: March 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to an anonymous referee for very insightful comments on earlier drafts. 相似文献
6.
Tom Krebs 《Economic Theory》2006,29(3):505-523
This paper analyzes the existence of recursive equilibria in a class of convex growth models with incomplete markets. Households have identical CRRA-preferences, production displays constant returns to scale with respect to physical and human capital, and all markets are competitive. There are aggregate productivity shocks that affect aggregate returns to physical and human capital investment (stock returns and wages), and there are idiosyncratic shocks to human capital (idiosyncratic depreciation shocks) that only affect individual human capital returns. Aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks follow a joint Markov process. Conditional on the aggregate state, idiosyncratic shocks are independently distributed over time and identically distributed across households. Finally, households have the opportunity to trade assets in zero net supply with payoffs that depend on the aggregate shock, but markets are incomplete in the sense that there are no assets with payoffs depending on idiosyncratic shocks. It is shown that there exists a recursive equilibrium for which equilibrium prices (returns) only depend on the exogenous aggregate shock variable (the wealth distribution is not a relevant state variable). Moreover, the allocation associated with this recursive equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium allocation of an economy in which households live in autarky and face both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.I would like to thank for helpful comments Peter Howitt, Bob Lucas, Michael Magill, Tomo Nakajima, Herakles Polemarchakis, Martine Quinzii, Kevin Reffett, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at various universities and conferences. 相似文献
7.
Valeri M. Marakulin 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):621-633
Summary. The aim of the paper is to provide a new proof of the Mas-Colell–Richard existence of equilibrium result when preferences
are non-transitive and incomplete. Our proof generalizes the main ideas of the Negishi approach to the case of unordered preferences.
Received: January 10, 1996; revised version: November 23, 1999 相似文献
8.
Summary. The purpose of this paper is to provide an equilibrium existence result for economies with a measure space of agents, a finite set of producers and infinitely many differentiated commodities. The approach proposed in this paper, based on the discretization of measurable correspondences, allows us to extend the existence results in Ostroy and Zame (1994) and Podczeck (1997) to economies with a non-trivial production sector and with possibly non-ordered preferences. Moreover, our approach allows for more general consumption sets than the positive cone and following the direction introduced by Podczeck (1998), the uniform substitutability assumptions of Mas-Colell (1975), Jones (1983), and Ostroy and Zame (1994), are replaced by the weaker assumptions of uniform properness.Received: 11 June 2001, Revised: 6 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
C62, D51.Thanks to Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Erik J. Balder, Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Bernard Cornet, Monique Florenzano, Konrad Podczeck, Rabee Tourky, Nicholas C. Yannelis and two anonymous referee for helpful discussions and suggestions. 相似文献
9.
Summary. We study a strategic market game associated to an intertemporal economy with a finite horizon and incomplete markets. We demonstrate that generically, for any finite number of players, every sequentially strictly individually rational and default-free stream of allocations can be approximated by a full subgame-perfect equilibrium. As a consequence, imperfect competition may Pareto-dominate perfect competition when markets are incomplete. Moreover - and this contrasts with the main message conveyed by the market games literature - there exists a large open set of initial endowments for which full subgame-perfect equilibria do not converge to
-efficient allocations when the number of players tends to infinity. Finally, strategic speculative bubbles may survive at full subgame-perfect equilibria.Received: 24 January 2002, Revised: 21 February 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72, D43, D52. Correspondence to: Gaël GiraudWe thank Tim Van Zandt for his comments. 相似文献
10.
This paper quantifies the welfare effects of counterfactual public debt policies using an endogenous growth model with incomplete markets. The economy features public debt, Schumpeterian growth, infinitely-lived agents, uninsurable income risk, and discount factor heterogeneity. Two versions of the model are specified, one with households holding equity in the group of innovating firms. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy to match the degree of wealth inequality, the share of R&D expenditure in GDP, the firms’ exit rate, the average growth rate, and other standard long-run targets. When comparing balanced growth paths, I find large welfare gains in equilibria characterized by governments accumulating public wealth. The result is robust to the mechanism used to generate a highly concentrated wealth (i.e., preference heterogeneity or “superstar” income shocks). Welfare effects decompositions show that level effects and growth effects reinforce each other. The responses of both the intermediate goods and their market conditions are key in explaining the large level effects. The version of the model without equity is computationally easier to solve, allowing to consider transitional dynamics. Taking into account the dynamic adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium, I show that the transitional welfare costs are not large enough to change the sign of the welfare effects stemming from a change in public debt. I find that eliminating public debt would lead to a 0.8% increase in welfare, while moving to a debt/GDP ratio of 100% would entail a welfare loss of 0.5%. A decomposition analysis shows that growth accounts for approximately 50% of the overall welfare effects. 相似文献
11.
Sophie Bade 《Economic Theory》2005,26(2):309-332
Summary. This paper investigates Nash equilibrium under the possibility that preferences may be incomplete. I characterize the Nash-equilibrium-set of such a game as the union of the Nash-equilibrium-sets of certain derived games with complete preferences. These games with complete preferences can be derived from the original game by a simple linear procedure, provided that preferences admit a concave vector-representation. These theorems extend some results on finite games by Shapley and Aumann. The applicability of the theoretical results is illustrated with examples from oligopolistic theory, where firms are modelled to aim at maximizing both profits and sales (and thus have multiple objectives). Mixed strategy and trembling hand perfect equilibria are also discussed.Received: 22 September 2003, Revised: 24 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D11, C72, D43.I would like to thank Jean-Pierre Benôit, Juan Dubra, Alejandrio Jofre, Debraj Ray, Kim-Sau Chung and the seminar participants at NYU and at the Universidad de Chile for their comments. I am most grateful to Efe Ok, for his comments, criticism, suggestions and questions. 相似文献
12.
Summary. We consider two periods economies with both intrinsic and extrinsic uncertainty. Asset markets are incomplete in the certainty economy. If assets are nominal, there are enough commodities and the number of agents is greater than two and smaller than the total number of states of nature tomorrow (minus one), then a sunspot-invariant equilibrium is generically Pareto dominated by some sunspot equilibria. When assets are real, and there are enough commodities, if there are sunspot equilibria, there are sunspot equilibria Pareto dominating sunspot-invariant equilibria under the same restriction on the number of agents (and stronger restrictions on the number of commodities).Received: 20 October 2003, Revised: 1 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D52.I wish to thank Paolo Siconolfi for helpful suggestions and comments. I aknowledge the financial support of M.I.U.R. and the kind hospitality of C.C.D.R. in Summer 2003. 相似文献
13.
Summary. An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at
-majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most
percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a
-majority stable stock market equilibrium exists if
where S is the number of states at the last date and J is the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that
-majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller
s.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 14 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D21, D52, D71, G39.
Correspondence to: Hervé CrésThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Danish Research Councils and hospitality of HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Mich Tvede and support from Fondation HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Hervé Crés. 相似文献