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1.
Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility 总被引:10,自引:0,他引:10
The costs associated with compiling data on employee stock option portfolios is a substantial obstacle in investigating the impact of stock options on managerial incentives, accounting choice, financing decisions, and the valuation of equity. We present an accurate method of estimating option portfolio value and the sensitivities of option portfolio value to stock price and stock-return volatility that is easily implemented using data from only the current year's proxy statement or annual report. This method can be applied to either executive stock option portfolios or to firm-wide option plans. In broad samples of actual and simulated CEO option portfolios, we show that these proxies capture more than 99% of the variation in option portfolio value and sensitivities. Sensitivity analysis indicates that the degree of bias in these proxies varies with option portfolio characteristics, and is most severe in samples of CEOs with a large proportion of out-of-the-money options. However, the proxies' explanatory power remains above 95% in all subsamples. 相似文献
2.
We examine stock and bond price reactions to CEOs’ first stock option and/or restricted stock grants that appear on ExecuComp. We find positive stock price and negative bond price reactions. Changes in CEO pay-performance (delta) and stock volatility (vega) sensitivities relate to the reactions. Stock reactions decrease with the change in delta and increase with the change in vega. Bond reactions are the opposite and depend on the CEO's prior equity ownership. Stockholder and bondholder wealth effects are negatively correlated for grants that cause a large change in the vega of CEO wealth, consistent with aggravated risk-shifting incentives. 相似文献
3.
Kenneth W. Shaw 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2012,38(3):323-346
Motivated by concerns that stock-based compensation might lead to excessive risk-taking, this paper’s main purpose is to examine
the relations between CEO incentives and the cost of debt. Unlike prior research, this paper uses the sensitivities of CEO
stock and option portfolios to stock price (delta) and stock return volatility (vega) to measure CEO incentives to invest
in risky projects. Higher delta (vega) is predicted to be related to lower (higher) cost of debt. The results show that yield
spreads on new debt issues are lower for firms with higher CEO delta and are unrelated to CEO vega. The results also show
that yield spreads are higher for firms whose CEOs hold more shares and stock options. In sum, the results suggest that both
percentage-ownership and option sensitivity variables are important in understanding relations between CEO incentives and
the cost of debt. 相似文献
4.
We find that passive intensity (PI), measured by the passive‐linked share of total stock market trading volume, is strongly related to the overall pattern of stock price movements. A one‐standard‐deviation increase in PI is associated with an 8% higher price synchronicity. We further investigate the channels through which this relation is established by separately analyzing its impact on aggregate systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns. PI has a positive effect on systematic volatility and a negative impact on firm‐specific volatility. Consistent with the effect of passive trading on price dynamics, we find evidence that PI is negatively associated with mutual funds alpha dissimilarity. After controlling for market and idiosyncratic volatility, a one‐standard‐deviation increase in PI corresponds to a 0.20% decrease in fund dissimilarity. Our findings are robust after controlling for various macro and corporate factors known to affect systematic or firm‐specific volatility. 相似文献
5.
Prior studies have examined the relation between product market competition (PMC) and research and development (R&D) investments, while the impact of executive risk incentives on this relation remains unexplored. In this study, we find that Vega (the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock return volatility) weakens the negative relation between PMC and R&D. We also find that Vega strengthens the negative relation between PMC and firm performance when R&D investments grow higher. In sum, our results suggest that high‐Vega compensation portfolios in competitive environments may induce executives to overinvest in R&D projects, therefore hurting firm performance. 相似文献
6.
HOLLIS ASHBAUGH-SKAIFE DANIEL W. COLLINS† WILLIAM R. KINNEY JR‡ . RYAN LAFOND§ 《Journal of Accounting Research》2009,47(1):1-43
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) mandates management evaluation and independent audits of internal control effectiveness. The mandate is costly to firms but may yield benefits through lower information risk that translates into lower cost of equity. We use unaudited pre–SOX 404 disclosures and SOX 404 audit opinions to assess how changes in internal control quality affect firm risk and cost of equity. After controlling for other risk factors, we find that firms with internal control deficiencies have significantly higher idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and cost of equity. Our change analyses document that auditor-confirmed changes in internal control effectiveness (including remediation of previously disclosed internal control deficiencies) are followed by significant changes in the cost of equity that range from 50 to 150 basis points. Overall, our cross-sectional and intertemporal change test results are consistent with internal control reports affecting investors' risk assessments and firms' cost of equity. 相似文献
7.
I find lower firm risk in the year of a CEO divorce. This lower volatility is consistent with a reduction in risk incentives, as CEOs pay large divorce settlements and are less able to diversify firm-specific risk from their portfolios. Divorce has a larger impact on firms with cash-poor CEOs who lack diversification. Cash flow and accruals have lower volatility in the year of divorce, which is likely due to smoother discretionary expenses. The sensitivity of compensation to both price and volatility is significantly higher after divorce, suggesting compensation incentives adjust to portfolio incentives, with total compensation increasing by over $2 million on average. I find no evidence the results relate to increased distraction or alternative explanations. 相似文献
8.
The Volatility and Price Sensitivities of Managerial Stock Option Portfolios and Corporate Hedging 总被引:3,自引:1,他引:3
We use estimates of the Black–Scholes sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility and the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price to test the relationship between managers' risk preferences and hedging activities. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price increases, firms tend to hedge more. However, as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases, firms tend to hedge less. 相似文献
9.
This study examines the stock price reaction to the internal control reporting required under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 for three distinct groups of firms. After controlling for general stock price movements, we find that stock returns are most negative for firms that delay filing of their internal control reports, continue to be negative for firms with ineffective internal controls, and are positive for firms with effective internal controls. The decrease in stock prices of the first two groups is more pronounced for those with a lower return on assets, higher growth rate in sales, and no prior disclosure of their internal controls weaknesses. Our results indicate that market participants value the reliability of financial information ensuing from Section 404 compliance, irrespective of firm size and debt proportion. Thus, regulators and policymakers worldwide should consider mandating comparable SOX 404 compliance for all publicly held companies to improve the accuracy and reliability of financial reports. 相似文献
10.
Denton Collins Blair B. Marquardt Xu Niu 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2019,46(5-6):739-761
We study the relationship between CEO pay‐performance sensitivity, pay‐risk sensitivity, and shareholder voting outcomes as part of the “say‐on‐pay” provision of the 2010 US Dodd‐Frank Act. Consistent with our hypothesis, we provide evidence that shareholders tend to approve of compensation packages that are more sensitive to changes in stock price (pay‐performance sensitivity). Our findings are consistent with theoretical predictions that outside owners approve of equity incentives as a means of aligning managers' interests with those of shareholders. We also document that future changes to equity‐based incentives are related to voting outcomes and that shareholders incorporate CFO incentives into their votes. Collectively, these results provide evidence of the importance of equity‐based incentives from the perspective of those most concerned with firm value and of the effectiveness of say‐on‐pay as a governance mechanism. 相似文献
11.
KAREN L. SEDATOLE DIMITRIS VRETTOS SALLY K. WIDENER 《Journal of Accounting Research》2012,50(2):553-592
Using archival data from the U.S. passenger airline industry, this study examines whether management control mechanisms aimed at mitigating moral hazard explain outsourcing decisions over and above transaction cost economics (TCE) determinants documented in prior research. Consistent with TCE theory, we find that in‐house production efficiencies and our proxy for transaction risk (i.e., deriving from transaction infrequency, transaction complexity, and relationship‐specific investments) significantly explain the extent of outsourcing of aircraft maintenance. We extend TCE insights to show that incentive delta (i.e., the sensitivity of CEO portfolio holdings to stock price changes) strengthens the negative association between production efficiencies and outsourcing while incentive vega (i.e., the sensitivity of CEO holdings to stock return volatility) weakens the negative association between transaction risk and outsourcing. Monitoring strengthens the negative association between in‐house production efficiencies and outsourcing, but has no effect on the transaction risk–outsourcing relation. The results suggest that the use of outsourcing to achieve cost savings is promoted through both incentive contracts and monitoring, but outsourcing to achieve the desired risk level is promoted only through incentive contracts. 相似文献
12.
This paper examines the effect of CEO compensation contracts on misreporting. We find that the sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport. We do not find that the sensitivity of other components of CEO compensation, i.e., equity, restricted stock, long-term incentive payouts, and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport. Relative to other components of compensation, stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in CEO wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting. 相似文献
13.
This study examines the stock price crash risk for a sample of firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). We find that in the year prior to the initial disclosures, ICW firms are more crash‐prone than firms with effective internal controls. This positive relation is more pronounced when weakness problems are associated with a firm's financial reporting process. More importantly, we find that stock price crash risk reduces significantly after the disclosures of ICWs, despite the disclosure itself signalling bad news. The above results hold after controlling for various firm‐specific determinants of crash risk and ICWs. Using an ICW disclosure as a natural experiment, our study attempts to isolate the presence effect of undisclosed ICWs from the initial disclosure effect of internal control weakness on stock price crash risk. In so doing, we provide more direct evidence on the causal relation between the quality of financial reporting and stock price crash risk. 相似文献
14.
Given the high correlation between a firm's stock price and market capitalisation, it is possible that the well-documented size anomaly is masking a share-price effect. Using a seemingly unrelated regression model to accommodate contemporaneous correlation between portfolios, we estimate the separate effects of firm size and share price on returns to Australian equity portfolios. The analysis is also extended to estimate seasonal components of size and price effects. Our major findings are: (i) firm size and share price have significant and independent effects on portfolio returns averaged over all months, (ii) the familiar negative relation between size and returns is confirmed across all months, and (iii) the relation between share price and returns is negative in July and positive in all other months (with the exception of January where no price effect occurs). These findings, which are consistent across sub-periods and robust to method variations, highlight the need for future research to provide an economic foundation for the relation between average returns, size and price. 相似文献
15.
In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance. 相似文献
16.
CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Abstract: We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms. 相似文献
17.
This study examines the impact of stock price crash risk on future CEO power. Using a large panel sample with 17,816 firm-year observations, we posit and find a significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power, suggesting that CEO power becomes smaller after stock price crashes. We also find that our results are stronger for firms with female CEOs and are largely driven by firms with shorter-tenure CEOs. In addition, we find that the significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power is diminished for firms with strong corporate governance. Our study responds to the call in Habib, Hasan, and Jiang (2018) by providing more empirical evidence on the consequences of stock price crash risk. 相似文献
18.
Christopher S. Armstrong David F. Larcker Gaizka Ormazabal Daniel J. Taylor 《Journal of Financial Economics》2013
Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm?s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk. 相似文献
19.
Jinliang Li 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2016,47(3):475-512
We hypothesize and test an inverse relation between liquidity and price volatility derived from microstructure theory. Two important facets of liquidity trading are examined: volume and noisiness. As represented by the expected turnover rate (volume) and realized average commission cost per share (noisiness) of NYSE equity trading, both facets are found negatively associated with the ex post and ex ante return volatilities of the NYSE stock portfolios and the NYSE composite index futures. Furthermore, the inverse association between noisiness and volatility is amplified in times of market crisis. The negative noisiness–volatility relation is also supported by our analysis on the effects of trade size on price volatility. The overall results demonstrate that volatility increases as noise trading declines. 相似文献
20.
We provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk. Controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on the managerial compensation scheme, we find that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment in R&D, less investment in PPE, more focus, and higher leverage. We also find that riskier policy choices generally lead to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock-return volatility has a positive effect on both vega and delta. 相似文献