Management earnings forecasts and bank loan contracting

We find that firms tend to issue management earnings forecasts and convey good news before bank loan initiation. Issuing firms enjoy more favorable contracting terms and attract more lenders. Management forecasts issuance within a nine‐month period prior to the loan activating quarter can lower the subsequent loan spread by 14.06 basis points. Moreover, firms with larger management forecast errors are charged harsher contracting terms and attract fewer lenders. Our study suggests that firms strategically issue management earnings forecasts before entering into debt contracts and lenders incorporate the information contained in management earnings forecasts into bank loan contracting.     

Managerial ability and bond rating changes

This study examines the relation between managerial ability and bond credit rating changes. We attempt to add to the credit rating agency literature by exploring the role managerial ability plays in the initial bond rating assignments and in rating changes. We predict firms with more‐able managers are more likely to have higher bond ratings and to be more able to have a positive influence on rating changes. We find a significant and positive relation between managerial ability and change in credit ratings, suggesting that more‐able managers can take effective actions to improve their credit ratings.     

State‐preference pricing and volatility indices

This study uses a state‐preference pricing approach to develop a state‐price volatility index (SVX), as a forecast for market future realised volatility. We show that SVX is a more efficient forecaster than CBOE VIX for 30‐day realised volatility of SPX returns, using both in‐the‐sample and out‐of‐the‐sample tests. This result is robust to different measures of realised market volatilities. We also show that SVX provides a better volatility forecast than other alternative measures, including the at‐the‐money implied volatilities and GARCH (1, 1) volatility. Our results provide a foundation for forecasting higher risk‐neutral moments using the same state prices.     

Managerial ability and debt maturity

We examine whether and how managerial ability affects corporate debt maturity decisions. The demand for shorter maturity debt is expected to be higher in firms operated by high-ability managers, who possess the superior skills needed to anticipate firms’ economic prospects and communicate their private information, thereby alleviating information asymmetry and bolstering their reputation. We document that firms with high ability managers are associated with more short-term debt financing. The effect becomes stronger for firms facing severe information asymmetry problems, unconstrained firms or high quality firms. Supportive evidence is found from the analysis of short- and long-term debt issuance activity. Our findings remain robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and debt maturity choice, and are not driven by omitted variable bias, endogeneity concerns or industry group. Overall, we provide robust evidence that supports the signalling theory for debt maturity structure and contributes to the literatures on managerial ability.     

Intra‐industry bankruptcy contagion: Evidence from the pricing of industry recovery rates

How does bankruptcy contagion propagate among industry peers? We study the debt recovery channel of industry contagion by examining whether the cost of a company's debt is affected by the observed recovery rates of its bankrupt industry peers. Our results show that lower industry recovery rates are associated with higher loan spreads, but only when the contracts were originated during industry bankruptcy waves. Consistent with the debt recovery channel of industry contagion, we find that the negative effects of industry recovery rates are significantly stronger under situations where the effect is expected to be more salient.     

The Australian asset‐pricing debate

Utilising a comprehensive data set for Australian firms, we examine a range of competing asset‐pricing models, including the four‐ and five‐factor models where the equity‐risk premium is augmented by size, value, momentum and liquidity premia, and find that none of the models tested appears to adequately explain the cross section of Australian returns. A model accounting for Australia's integration with the US equity market appears to be the best of the competing models we study. Our argument that a model recognising Australia's integration with the USA is supported when we apply the portfolio and factor construction methodology suggested by Brailsford et al. (2012a,b).     

Profitability and investment‐based factor pricing models

Ex ante predictors of stock returns must exhibit explanatory power across the feasible set of investments. But empirical results of factor pricing models that incorporate firm investment and profitability cannot explain the apparently high returns of US small stocks with very high investment levels and very low profitability. Whilst these stocks comprise only a small fraction of US data sets, this is not the case across global markets. Using a data set that is concentrated with stocks that exhibit high investment despite low profitability, we demonstrate that such factor models are limited in their explanatory power over these stocks.     

Managerial Ownership and Financial Analysts’ Information Environment

Despite the importance of sell‐side financial analysts as information intermediaries in the capital market, little is known about how managerial equity ownership is associated with their information environment. Using Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens’ (1998) framework for measuring the precision of financial analysts’ information, we observe that managerial ownership is positively associated with the precision of financial analysts’ public (common) and private (idiosyncratic) information, largely consistent with the alignment view of managerial equity ownership. These results are robust to controlling for various economic and statistical factors that might affect the inference.     

The Effects of Regulating Hidden Add‐On Costs

We examine the welfare effects of price and disclosure regulation in a model where firms can shroud add‐on costs, such as penalty fees for consumer financial products. Such regulation can increase or decrease welfare even when there are no direct costs. There are, however, strong complementarities between price controls and disclosure mandates: conditional on disclosure being mandated, price controls always (weakly) increase welfare, and conditional on prices being sufficiently constrained, disclosure mandates always (weakly) increase welfare.     

中小企业银行融资方案的新型设计 --"关系贷款"及"银行辛迪加和相机治理"

本文旨在从信息不对称造成信贷配给的角度为中小企业融资难问题提供一种解决方案。欧美等成熟市场经济国家通过银企建立稳定的交易关系来消除两者之间的信息不对称,提高贷款可得性;青木昌彦的银行辛迪加和相机治理模式的突出特点在于组建辛迪加,加强牵头行对企业贷款的事中和事后监督。本文吸收两者的优点并结合我国的实际情况,提出了我国中小企业银行融资的模式:企业向银行申请贷款之前必须与其有稳定的交易关系,以便银行进行有效的事前监督;银行一旦接受贷款申请,即可作为牵头行来组建银行辛迪加,集中借款企业与辛迪加成员的交易信息,并承担全部的事中和事后监督责任;一旦企业出现财务危机,牵头行负责大部分债务的偿还。     

Managerial ability,investment efficiency and stock price crash risk

We examine empirically the effect of managerial ability on firm-level investment efficiency and how this affects future stock price crash risk. Using a managerial ability measure developed by Demerjian et al. (2012), the paper documents consistent evidence that the more able managers over-invest compared to their not-so-able counterparts, even after controlling for the effects of financial reporting quality and other firm specific determinants of investment efficiency. This evidence is robust to alternative proxies for investment efficiency. The empirical evidence also suggests that crash risk increases for firms with more able managers, primarily through the investment inefficiency channel. Overall, the study contributes to a better understanding of the influence of managerial ability on investment decisions in the context of diverging opinions regarding manager-specific effects on organizational outcomes.     

Disclosure Prominence and the Quality of Non‐GAAP Earnings

The SEC prohibits the presentation of non‐GAAP measures before corresponding GAAP measures; however, a large proportion of non‐GAAP reporters present non‐GAAP EPS before GAAP EPS in their earnings announcements. This noncompliance raises questions about whether firms use prominence to highlight higher or lower quality non‐GAAP information. For firms reporting non‐GAAP EPS between 2003 and 2016, prominent non‐GAAP EPS is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting. Further tests reveal that nonregulatory incentives, rather than regulatory costs, explain this relation. Specifically, prominence is associated with higher quality non‐GAAP reporting in settings where prominence is not regulated, investors ignore prominence when non‐GAAP reporting quality is lower, and the minority of firms using prominence to mislead exhibit characteristics associated with weaker investor monitoring. Overall, we provide evidence that regulatory noncompliance can reflect an intent to inform, and that most firms use prominence to highlight higher quality non‐GAAP information despite prohibitive regulation.     

Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions

We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bank‐specific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bank‐specific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.     

Deal Size,Bid Premium,and Gains in Bank Mergers: The Impact of Managerial Motivations

Do mergers with greater target relative to acquirer size create more value than mergers with smaller relative sized targets? Do larger bid amounts represent wealth transfers from acquirers or do they signal greater expected merger gains? We hypothesize that the relations among aggregate merger gains, relative size, and bid premiums are asymmetric across mergers made by value‐enhancing versus value‐reducing managers. We use a large sample of bank mergers to test these predictions and find that the value response to different explanatory variables is asymmetric. Our findings provide new insights into how the market values merger bids.     

Mind the gap: CEO–employee pay ratios and shareholder say‐on‐pay votes

We examine the Securities and Exchange Commission's assertion in the pay ratio disclosure rule that the ratio of Chief Executive Officer to employee pay is useful to shareholders for say‐on‐pay (SOP) voting decisions. Using an estimated pay ratio for a broad panel of commercial banks from 2010 to 2017, we find that voting dissent on SOP proposals is significantly higher in the top pay ratio decile, particularly when institutional ownership is high. Results are robust to controlling for a number of other determinants of voting dissent, including proxy advisor recommendations and executive compensation. Additionally, inferences using the first year of disclosed pay ratios in 2017 for S&P 1500 firms are consistent. However, we do not find similar results in the other deciles of the pay ratio in either sample, calling into question whether a cost‐benefit analysis would support the disclosure requirement imposed by Dodd‐Frank and implemented by the SEC.     

The Effect of Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk on Corporate Capital Structure and R&D Investment

In this study we use estimates of the sensitivities of managers' portfolios to stock return volatility and stock price to directly test the relationship between managerial incentives to bear risk and two important corporate decisions. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases firms tend to choose higher debt ratios and make higher levels of R&D investment. These results are even stronger in a subsample of firms with relatively low outside monitoring. For these firms, managerial incentives to bear risk play a particularly pivotal role in determining leverage and R&D investment.     

The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking

We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk‐taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress‐test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk‐taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene banks, coordinating them preemptively into taking lower risks. We find that, if the regulator has a strong incentive to bail out, stress tests improve welfare, whereas if the regulator's incentive to bail out is weak, stress tests impair welfare.     

International evidence on economic policy uncertainty and asymmetric adjustment of audit pricing: Big 4 versus non‐big 4 auditors

By investigating the association between economic policy uncertainty and audit fees using data from eight countries, this study examines whether and how Big 4 auditors reinforce their advantages over non‐Big 4 auditors through audit pricing. We find that both Big 4 and non‐Big 4 auditors reduce their audit fees when economic policy uncertainty increases. However, while non‐Big 4 auditors adjust audit pricing asymmetrically as economic policy uncertainty changes, i.e., the magnitude of decline in audit fees when economic policy uncertainty increases exceeds the magnitude of rise when economic policy uncertainty decreases, Big 4 auditors regulate their audit pricing in a symmetric manner. Further analyses reveal that: (1) the asymmetric pricing of non‐Big 4 auditors mainly exists in countries where Big 4 auditors have dominant market share, (2) Big 4 auditors provide higher‐quality audits when economic policy uncertainty increases and (3) many firms in better financial condition turn to Big 4 auditors during uncertain years. Our findings suggest that the symmetric audit pricing helps Big 4 auditors maintain a favorable position in the audit market.