Liability and asset uncertainty for banks

Models of bank behavior are developed which incorporate both deposit and loan demand uncertainty. Extensions of the traditional and simple deposit uncertainty model involve the inclusion of required reserves, fixed penalty costs for reserve deficiencies, limits on normal borrowing, and uncertain spot loan demand and use of lines of credit. Results include normal borrowing limits as a new theoretical constraint on bank size and the existence of small fixed costs as a reason for the real world lack of deficient reserves. Policy conclusions include the effects of current reserve accounting and the effects of various interest rate changes.     

The market for borrowing corporate bonds

This paper describes the market for borrowing corporate bonds using a comprehensive data set from a major lender. The cost of borrowing corporate bonds is comparable to the cost of borrowing stock, between 10 and 20 basis points, and both have fallen over time. Factors that influence borrowing costs are loan size, percentage of inventory lent, rating, and borrower identity. There is no evidence that bond short sellers have private information. Bonds with Credit Default Swaps (CDS) contracts are more actively lent than those without. Finally, the 2007 Credit Crunch does not affect average borrowing costs or loan volume, but does increase borrowing cost variance.     

State audit budgets and market assessments of credit risk

While financial statement auditing dominates the market for corporate auditing, internal controls and operational auditing appear to be emphasized in governmental markets. The size of the governmental audit budget (beyond the minimum level prescribed by generally accepted auditing standards) is ultimately a cost/benefit decision, with lower borrowing costs being one of several potential benefits. In testing for empirical regularities between auditing quantity and investor decisions, we found the size of the audit budget to be indeed associated with borrowing costs, but the direction of the relationship was anomalous. The anomalous positive sign for the audit budget variable could be due to self-selection bias. Self-selection bias is a confounding effect that has come up repeatedly to muddy the interpretation of empirical findings in prior (corporate) market based research on discretionary accounting variables. The supply of (discretionary) internal and operational audits may be driven by operational considerations (e.g., internal control weaknesses), which cannot be directly observed by outsiders. The bond markets may be interpreting the size of the audit budget as a signal about underlying economic characteristics that make the state a more risky investment. Alternatively, larger state audit budgets may signal less use of private sector auditors and be interpreted as less useful to investors (though, possibly more useful to governmental concerns focusing on compliance issues). Despite the inclusion of CPAs' audit fees in state budgets, the signal “inferred” for the state's municipalities may have a carryover effect onto state issues.     

Firm age and the evolution of borrowing costs: Evidence from Japanese small firms

This paper investigates how firms’ borrowing costs evolve as they age. Using a new panel data set of about 100,000 bank-dependent small firms for 1997–2002 and focusing on the channel of “adaptation” (i.e., surviving firms’ borrowing costs decline as they age) and that of “selection” (i.e., total borrowing costs decline as defaulting firms exit), we find that the reputation hypothesis suggested by Diamond (1989) provides a more plausible explanation of the downward sloping age profile of borrowing costs than the firm dynamics (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001) or the relationship banking (Boot and Thakor, 1994) hypothesis. In addition, we examine whether the firm selection process in Japan has been natural or unnatural. Our findings suggest that it has been natural in that firms with lower quality are separated, face higher borrowing costs, and are eventually forced to exit, which contrasts with the results of previous studies on credit allocations in Japan, including Peek and Rosengren (2005). Further, we find that the evolution of borrowing costs is partially due to selection but is mainly attributable to adaptation.     

Financing dies in darkness? The impact of newspaper closures on public finance

We examine how local newspaper closures affect public finance outcomes for local governments. Following a newspaper closure, municipal borrowing costs increase by 5–11 basis points, costing the municipality an additional $650,000 per issue. This effect is causal and not driven by underlying economic conditions. The loss of government monitoring resulting from a closure is associated with higher government wages and deficits and increased likelihoods of costly advance refundings and negotiated sales. Overall, our results indicate that local newspapers hold their governments accountable, keeping municipal borrowing costs low and ultimately saving local taxpayers money.     

Fiscal Rules and Government Financing Costs

This paper assesses the effect of fiscal rules on sovereign bond spreads over the short and medium term, for 34 advanced countries and 19 emerging market economies, over the period 1980–2016. Our results, based on impulse response functions, show that the dynamic impact of fiscal rules on sovereign yield spreads is negative and statistically significant, at around 1.2–1.8 percentage points, implying lower government borrowing costs. This result stems essentially from the advanced economies subsample. We also find that more fiscally responsible countries are the ones for which a fiscal rule reduces the government's borrowing costs. Moreover, in times of recession, a fiscal rule leads financial markets to reduce the risk premiums on government bonds. Finally, when it comes to design features of fiscal rules, independent monitoring of compliance to the rule, done outside government, also reduces sovereign spreads.     

The Debt Equivalence Of Leases In The UK: An Empirical Investigation

In finance theory, leasing is viewed as a form of borrowing. Prior studies have indicated that secured debt and lease are regarded as equivalent by the capital market.The following questions are addressed: i) do debt and lease have the same effects on the volatility of equity return? ii) Have changes in the accounting regulations altered the effect of lease obligation on the volatility of equity return? The results indicate that, on average, finance leases have a positive effect on the volatility of the return on equity as debt does. It is also found that the market considers leases more favourably (less risky) than debt.Two explanations are possible for the favourable treatment: i) the finance lease obligations are less like debts due to the imposed capitalisation requirements; ii) firms pay high costs of leasing because of the benefits from leasing relative to debt and the market reacts to those benefits favourably.     

The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses

We test hypotheses about the effects of bank size, foreign ownership, and distress on lending to informationally opaque small firms using a rich new data set on Argentinean banks, firms, and loans. We also test hypotheses about borrowing from a single bank versus multiple banks. Our results suggest that large and foreign-owned institutions may have difficulty extending relationship loans to opaque small firms. Bank distress appears to have no greater effect on small borrowers than on large borrowers, although even small firms may react to bank distress by borrowing from multiple banks, raising borrowing costs and destroying some relationship benefits.     

Public debt,bailouts, and common bonds

We look at a model where countries of different sizes provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants can give rise to optimal expenditure levels, but countries can induce bailouts. We study the characteristics of these bailouts in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and how these characteristics are affected by the introduction of common bonds. Partial substitution of common for sovereign bonds has two implications. First, it lowers the average and marginal borrowing costs of countries which may be eligible for bailouts. This effect leads to higher borrowing in these countries irrespective of their bailout expectations. Second, the lower borrowing costs mitigate the incentives of countries to induce a bailout and, therefore, constrain the parameter set for which a soft budget constraint equilibrium exists. As a result, the introduction of common bonds can also be in the interest of those countries that provide the bailouts.     

Borrowing during periods of policy uncertainty: The role of foreign lenders

Despite the documented detrimental effect of policy uncertainty on borrowing costs, there is no evidence on the potential role of cross border borrowings during such periods. In this study, we test two hypotheses on the potential role of foreign lenders during periods of high policy uncertainty. The first is the common exposure hypothesis, which predicts that domestic lenders pass their uncertainty exposure on to borrowing firms by charging higher loan spreads. Hence, foreign lenders without such exposure could be able to help dispel policy uncertainty. The second is the information cost hypothesis, which predicts that foreign lenders compensate for information asymmetry when lending in host countries by charging high loan spreads, which suggests potential higher costs of foreign borrowing. We find that foreign lenders who are not simultaneously exposed to policy uncertainty charge lower loan spreads than domestic lenders, which supports the common exposure hypothesis. Additional analysis reveals that the two hypotheses complement each other, as the documented effect is particularly pronounced for foreign lenders who are exposed to lower information asymmetry. The findings of the study shed some light on the role of financial market integration during periods of high policy uncertainty.     

House prices, consumption, and monetary policy: a financial accelerator approach

We consider a general equilibrium model with frictions in credit markets used by households. In our economy, houses provide housing services to consumers and serve as collateral to lower borrowing cost. We show that this amplifies and propagates the effect of monetary policy shocks on housing investment, house prices and consumption. We also consider the effect of a structural change in credit markets that lowers the transaction costs of additional borrowing against housing equity. We show that such a change would increase the effect of monetary policy shocks on consumption, but would decrease the effect on house prices and housing investment.     

Investigating corporate management lobbying in the U.K. accounting standard-setting process: a multi-issue/multi-period approach

A large body of literature examines the motives of corporate managers to lobby accounting standard-setters. In general, studies confine their examination to single episodes of the standard-setting process (e.g., exposure draft). This article extends the literature by adopting a multi-issue/multi-period approach to investigate corporate lobbying of the U.K.'s ASB. The findings suggest that the extent of corporate lobbying, defined on the basis of the frequency with which companies made submissions to all of the publications issued by the ASB over a six-year period, depends on the size of companies, the debt covenant costs they face and whether they are listed on a U.S. stock exchange. Separate analyses, however, involving (a) the frequency of lobbying on income-related issues and (b) the frequency of lobbying on disclosure issues revealed that, while all these three variables explain lobbying on income-related issues, only size is significant in explaining lobbying on disclosure issues. The results also suggest that the debt to equity ratio is an imperfect proxy for debt covenant costs.     

Inequality,stock market participation,and the equity premium

The last 30 years saw substantial increases in wealth inequality and stock market participation, smaller increases in consumption inequality and the fraction of indebted households, a decline in interest rates and the expected equity premium, as well as a prolonged stock market boom. In an incomplete markets, overlapping generations model I jointly explain these trends by the observed rise in wage inequality, decrease in participation costs, and loosening of borrowing constraints. After accounting for these changes, I show that the stock market played a major role in increasing wealth inequality. Crucially, these phenomena must be considered jointly; studying one independently leads to counterfactual predictions about others.     

Aversion to Student Debt? Evidence from Low-Wage Workers

We combine state minimum wage changes with individual-level income and credit data to estimate the effect of wage gains on the debt of low-wage workers. In the three years following a $0.88 minimum wage increase, low-wage workers experience a $2,712 income increase and a $856 decrease in debt. The entire decline in debt comes from less student loan borrowing among enrolled college students. Credit constraints, buffer-stock behavior, and other rational channels cannot explain the reduction in student debt. Our results are consistent with students perceiving a utility cost of borrowing student debt arising from mental accounting.     

An empirical reconciliation of the Miller model and the generalized capital structure models

This paper uses time series techniques to demonstrate the compatibility of Miller's capital structure model (Miller, M.H., 1977, Journal of Finance 32, 261–276) with generalized capital structure models from 1970 through 1985. The Miller model represents a long-run equilibrium because deviations from the Miller equilibrium revert toward a mean close to zero, while transitory shocks to the leverage-related costs of debt and bank borrowing costs explain short-run deviations from the Miller equilibrium. The typical levels of leverage-related costs of debt and bank borrowing costs over the sample period do not cause deviations from the Miller equilibrium.     

Resaleable debt and systemic risk

Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable; others, such as repos, are not. There was a fivefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Why? Did banks’ dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We find that decreasing credit market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Such borrowing has a dark side: It causes credit chains to form, because, if a bank makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, as one bank’s default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors’ creditors. Overall, our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse effect on the financial system and even lead to the failures of financial institutions.     

Corporate legal structure and bank loan spread

This study examines how a firm's corporate legal structure may affect its borrowing costs. Corporate legal structure refers to the legal fragmentation of a firm into multiple, separately incorporated entities. This fragmentation is bound to be a factor when lenders determine the pricing of debt and design of contract terms because they can enter into legally enforceable agreements only with specific legal entities. Using a sample of private loans to parent companies in the United States, I find that a more complex corporate legal structure is associated with higher loan spread. The findings are robust to several firm and loan characteristics and are incremental to the effects of other forms of organizational structure, namely business and geographic diversification. Subsequent evidence suggests that the effect of a corporate legal structure on borrowing costs is, at least partly, explained by recovery risk.     

Technology spillovers,asset redeployability and corporate financial policies

Prior research shows that technology spillovers across firms increase innovation, productivity and value. We study how firms finance their own growth stimulated by technology spillovers from their technological peer firms. We find that greater technology spillovers lead to higher leverage. This is the result of technology spillovers increasing asset redeployability, as evidenced by more collateralized borrowing and asset transactions. Borrowing costs also decrease. Exogenous variation in the research and development tax credits of other firms allows us to identify the causal effect of technology spillovers on a given firm.     

Foreign debt supply in an imperfect international capital market: Theory and evidence

We investigate the determinants of foreign borrowing costs in a stochastically growing economy. We find that these increase with the debt-wealth ratio, depending also upon the volatilities of domestic and foreign origin, and the length of debt contract. In addition, the sensitivity of the short-term debt supply to the debt-wealth ratio exceeds that of long-term debt, and the effects of volatility on the borrowing premium, growth of wealth, and its volatility, depend on the relative size of a direct effect and a secondary portfolio-adjustment effect of the initial shock, as well as the length of the debt contract. Panel regressions suggest that the empirical evidence generally support the theoretical predictions.     

The Structure of Multiple Credit Relationships: Evidence from U.S. Firms

When firms borrow from multiple concentrated creditors such as banks they appear to differentiate their allocation of borrowing. In this paper, we put forward hypotheses for this borrowing pattern based on incomplete contract theories and test them using a sample of small U.S. firms. We find that firms with more valuable and more homogeneous assets differentiate borrowing more sharply across concentrated creditors. Moreover, borrowing differentiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively related to firms' informational transparency. The results suggest that the structure of credit relationships is used to discipline creditors and entrepreneurs, especially during corporate reorganizations.