Joint implementation under asymmetric information and strategic behavior

Joint Implementation (JI) under the Framework Convention on Climate Change means that countries could partly offset their national abatement commitments by investing in CO₂ abatement projects abroad. JI is introduced as a mechanism for achieving a certain global abatement target less costly by separating the commitments from the implementation of measures. This paper studies the design of a JI contract when the investor has incomplete information about the foreign firm which carries out the JI project (the host). Asymmetric information leads to a decrease in the potential cost savings from JI. Furthermore, private information held by the potential host firm could give the firm a significant positive utility of participating in JI projects. The possibility of being a host for a JI project in the future can prevent potential host firms from investing in profitable abatement projects today. The paper analyzes the impact on emissions of CO₂ of strategic behavior among potential hosts for JI projects.     

Strategic Environmental Policy Under Incomplete Information

This paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy. It is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition. Relative to the full-information case, incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour. A countervailing effect, tending to raise distortion, is however revealed from the analysis. This effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies. The results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information, when environmental standards, rather than direct production subsidies, are the strategic instrument.     

Strategic Policy and Environmental Quality: Helping the Domestic Industry to Provide Credible Information

This paper shows that a country can improve an industry's competitiveness by requiring domestic firms to produce at the environmental standards at which they claim to produce or otherwise impose a penalty on those firms found cheating. Competitiveness will improve because this regulation will help the domestic industry to provide credible information about the environmental quality of its production. The credible information will differentiate domestic products from other products on the world market, and in this way increase consumers' willingness to pay for domestic products. Even if the government has no preferences for environmental quality, it has incentives to regulate its cheaters in order to help the domestic industry to provide credible information and thereby improve competitiveness.     

Climate Policy with Multiple Sources and Sinks of Greenhouse Gases

This paper studies how inclusion of many sources, sinks and reservoirs -- a comprehensive approach -- affects climate policy, compared with a control merely of CO₂. Two questions of particular importance arise in such an analysis. One is how to aggregate the emissions of different climate gases, and the other is how to include all relevant measures in the analysis. To aggregate gases properly, an intertemporal analysis should be carried out. To assure that all relevant measures are included, we suggest that certain measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases are specified explicitly and evaluated together with indirect measures, such as carbon charges. A numerical analysis based on an optimal control model indicates that direct measures may play an important role in the design of climate policy, especially for the control of the emissions of greenhouse gases other than CO₂. Similar to other studies of the time-path for abatement efforts, the bulk of abatement should be taken by the end of the planning period. This result is significantly strengthened if gases with short life-times in the atmosphere, such as methane, are subject to control.     

Carbon Taxes and Joint Implementation. An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis for Germany and India

Germany has committed itself toreducing its carbon emissions by 25 percent in2005 as compared to 1990 emission levels. Toachieve this goal, the government has recentlylaunched an environmental tax reform whichentails a continuous increase in energy taxesin conjunction with a revenue-neutral cut innon-wage labor costs. This policy is supposedto yield a double dividend, reducing both, theproblem of global warming and high unemploymentrates. In addition to domestic actions,international treaties on climate protectionallow for the supplementary use of flexibleinstruments to exploit cheaper emissionreduction possibilities elsewhere. One concreteoption for Germany would be to enter jointimplementation (JI) with developing countriessuch as India where Germany pays emissionreduction abroad rather than meeting itsreduction target solely by domestic action. Inthis paper, we investigate whether anenvironmental tax reform cum JI providesemployment and overall efficiency gains ascompared to an environmental tax reformstand-alone. We address this question in theframework of a large-scale general equilibriummodel for Germany and India where Germany mayundertake JI with the Indian electricitysector. Our main finding is that JI offsetslargely the adverse effects of carbon emissionconstraints on the German economy. JIsignificantly lowers the level of carbon taxesand thus reduces the total costs of abatementas well as negative effects on labor demand. Inaddition, JI triggers direct investment demandfor energy efficient power plants produced inGermany. This provides positive employmenteffects and additional income for Germany. ForIndia, joint implementation equips itselectricity industry with scarce capital goodsleading to a more efficient power productionwith lower electricity prices for the economyand substantial welfare gains.     

Environmental Taxation and Strategic Commitment in Duopoly Models

In this paper, we address the issue of optimalenvironmental taxation under imperfect competition.The problem is analysed for three different types ofduopoly models, the Cournot open and closed loopmodels, and the Stackelberg model. We explicitlyanalyse the role of strategic behaviour. Each firm hasto make a choice of output level and of the level ofa strategic variable. The choice of this strategicvariable affects both marginal cost and emissions. Wecompare the properties of these three duopoly models,and derive and compare optimal environmental taxes. Weshow that whether the optimal tax is lower or higherthan marginal environmental costs depends on theinformation transmission and the effect of thestrategic variable on marginal costs. In addition, thedifferences in market shares, and the influence of thetax on the cost structure play important roles, indetermining optimal emission taxes.     

战略环境评价中的公众参与及实施条件分析

本文简要介绍了战略环境评价中公众参与的含义，着重分析了我国公众参与战略环境评价的重要意义和作用，并立足我国国情对实施有效的公众参与所必需的制度框架和技术方法进行了深入探讨。     

Strategic human resource management for university-industry collaborations in Korea: financial incentives for academic faculty and employment security of industry liaison offices

In an attempt to understand why some universities achieve better outcomes from university-industry collaborations, this study adopts the perspective of strategic human resource management that emphasises the congruence between the university strategic orientation and the human resource practices. Based on a large-scale survey of universities in Korea, this study suggests that the human resource management practices of providing incentive compensation to academic faculty, and the employment security and size of human resources in the industry liaison offices significantly contribute to the university-industry collaboration performance, such as the number of registered patents, licensing revenue of intellectual property, and the integrated collaboration revenue.     

Policy Adoption Rules and Global Warming

Although there is widespread agreement about the dangers of global warming and the resulting need to cut down emissions, there does not seem to be general agreement about the exact form the policy should take or the timing of its adoption. Failure to adopt and implement policies against global warming reflects the complexity of the problem, the uncertainties of climate change and the cost of policy adoption. Issues associated with the interactions between uncertainties and irreversibilities in determining the timing of policy adoption are analyzed by using the methodology of optimal stopping rules. Optimal policy functions are derived for cooperative and noncooperative solutions, with differential game representation. Issues associated with the empirical application of the optimal policy rules are also considered.     

略论战略性贸易政策在中国电子信息产业的适用性——基于市场结构视角

战略贸易政策总是与寡头垄断的市场结构相联系,且该产业应具有超额垄断利润和外部规模经济.绝大多数战略性贸易政策理论模型都建立在双寡头的Cournot模型的基础上.从产业组织理论和贸易类型两个角度看,目前中国电子信息产业属于垄断竞争市场结构,不适宜实施战略性贸易政策.而应考虑到国外同一产业的市场结构和本国的产业绩效,针对价值增值不同的产业环节,结合产业政策,促进产业市场集中度的提高,实行保护程度不同的贸易政策.     

Property Regimes as Information Regimes: Efficiency and Economies of Joint Production

The paper argues that it is useful to view property regimes asinformation regimes. A conceptual model and numerical example are usedto show that, under some reasonable assumptions, a common propertyregime is preferable to a private property regime when property regimesare viewed as information regimes. The paper considers a case ofidiosyncratic risk in a dynamic grazing context where the marginality ofthe resource is such that insurance markets are thin or non-existent.Agents are thought to be risk averse and exogenous enforcement of a risksharing scheme is not feasible. The policy implication is that theestablishment and maintenance of a common property regime is shown to bea (possibly) reasonable institutional response in the face of difficultand particular circumstances when property regimes are viewed asinformation regimes.     

Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games

This paper shows that, in economic environments with incomplete information, incentive compatibility and a preference reversal condition are sufficient for implementation in sequential equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71, D82.     

战略型创业:概念、机理及研究框架

战略型创业是创业研究领域和战略管理研究领域出现的新概念。它包括创业心智、创业型文化、创业型领导、资源的战略性管理以及运用创造力和开发创新等重要维度,并受到环境、资源、创业家及团队、企业生命周期阶段等因素的影响。这些要素相互作用,从而把机会寻求和优势寻求行为有机地整合在一起,共同解释了财富创造机理。这为企业可持续成长提供了有益思路,具有重要现实意义。     

策略性采购联盟、集体谈判与最优贸易政策选择——基于广义Cournot-Nash谈判函数的分析

文章发展了一个关于由本国企业组成的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的模型一—该模型以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易实践为基础,其中,中间品的采购价格与数量通过有效的Nash谈判过程同时决定。当采购联盟的效用函数的数量弹性高于（低于）价格弹性,则该联盟的偏好为数量（价格）导向的。文章证明：（1）当本国与外国的中间品与最终产品贸易具有互补性时,政府贸易政策调整的价格、数量以及福利效应是不确定的,它们依存于本国采购联盟的偏好、最终产品需求曲线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度;（2）政府贸易政策的干预功能与企业策略性联盟的自主调整功能存在重叠与冲突。     

Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-examination

Berg et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 10, pp. 122–142, 1995) study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting. They find significant amounts of trust and reciprocity and conclude that trust is a guiding behavioral instinct (a primitive in their terminology). We modify the way information is presented to participants and, through a questionnaire, prompt strategic reasoning. To our surprise, none of our various treatments led to a reduction in the amount invested. Previously reported experimental results to the contrary did not survive replication. Our results suggest that those by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe are rather robust to changes in information presentation and strategic reasoning prompts. We discuss the implications of these findings.     

供应链战略联盟的信息共享研究——以零售业供应链为例

随着时代的发展和市场竞争的加剧,供应链中的某些企业不再单独作为供应链中的一个个体而存在,而是逐渐形成了供应链中的战略联盟,他们之间同时存在着竞争与合作。而随着供应链管理的研究深入,供应链企业间的信息共享变得越来越重要。虽然现代信息技术的发展为企业间的信息共享构建了必要的基础平台,但是依然存在着信息技术以外的原因影响企业间的信息共享。本文在总结前人工作的基础上,运用博弈论,以零售业供应链为例,分析了供应链战略联盟的企业间竞争与合作并存情况下的信息共享,并给出了实现信息共享的对策。     

Finance,investment and innovation: A theoretical and empirical comparative analysis

The paper compares the relative efficiency of country models in the relationship between finance and investments. Results, confirmed under three different panel data estimates (Arellano-Bond GMM method, random and fixed effect estimates) suggest that: i) the UK thick market reduces informational asymmetries for large firms and for those firms providing good signals to shareholders; ii) the Japanese vertical (between firms and banks) integration and horizontal (among firms) integration almost eliminates financial constraints (the horizontal integration effect) and equates agency costs across firms (the vertical integration effect). These results are consistent with the short-termist hypothesis which assumes that the Japanese economic system can process information more efficiently reducing managerial myopic behaviour and thereby determining positive effects on long term growth.     

战略风险与收益:中国上市公司的实证研究

国外大量的研究表明,战略风险与收益的关系存在被称为"鲍漫悖论"(Bow-man’s paradox)即负相关关系的现象。文章摒弃了资本资产定价、均值方差等传统的战略风险度量方法,借鉴序数信息下系统组织整体不确定性度量的熵法,把战略风险转化为企业在战略参考系统内收益排名(竞争位置)下降带来的负面不确定信息,给出了序数战略风险度量的一般模型,这个方法符合战略风险的战略本质。通过收集中国上市公司上证50指数36家企业的收益数据,运用该模型方法,根据事件研究思路,对战略风险与收益的相关关系进行了中国情景下的多次验证,得到战略风险与收益的一致负相关关系。这个结果表明,高风险不一定带来高收益,企业持久竞争优势的获取不仅源于高收益,更是长期高收益—低风险的绩效产出结果。     

中小企业战略管理:理论述评及初步分析框架

传统企业战略理论主要以大企业为研究对象,难以有效指导中小企业战略实践及其可持续成长。促进中小企业成长需要高度重视中小企业战略管理。本文基于国内外学者对中小企业战略管理所做的研究,分别从中小企业战略计划、战略选择、战略执行、战略变革、企业家和中小企业战略等方面对中小企业战略管理理论做出述评,建立了中小企业战略管理的初步分析框架,并指出我国中小企业战略管理研究应该关注转型经济情境、企业家能力和成长型中小企业的战略实践等三方面重要问题。     

会计流程绩效评价与实施过程研究

会计流程绩效评价体系的构建和实施,是保证会计信息质量的必要条件。基于流程管理围绕有效性、高效性和适应性构建会计流程绩效评价体系,并借鉴PDCA循环实施管理;在理论上可以开辟通过会计流程绩效评价,确保会计信息质量持续改进的思想与方法,在实践中可以提供会计信息系统自我评价、自我完善的手段与工具。