A computable general equilibrium analysis of Brexit: Barriers to trade and immigration restrictions

This paper estimates the economic effects of different types of restrictions on trade and immigration in the United Kingdom after Brexit. Regarding trade restrictions, we focus on UK–EU increases in tariffs and non-tariff barriers. We also analyse the removal of all tariffs in the UK to all its trading partners. Concerning immigration, we run a 5-year cumulative annual reduction in net migrants by 87,000 workers following OECD estimations, which looks realistic even if there is a hard Brexit. The study is conducted using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, which allows us to estimate the impact on GDP, welfare, wages and capital remuneration, together with the evolution of aggregate and sectoral output, exports and imports. We obtain a more sizeable negative impact on the UK than other previous influential studies. Trade restrictions would generate welfare reductions between −0.38% and −1.94% for the UK, while they would be between −0.03% and −0.14% in the EU. This is because the EU is a crucial trade partner for the UK, which cannot be easily substituted through trade with other regions in the world. We simulate the impact of both reductions in net inflows and in the stock of EU migrants, accumulated through 5 years. Migration is compatible with wage increases but puts downward pressure on GDPpc. However, migration restrictions would not compensate the overall GDPpc contractions arising from a hard Brexit.     

Trade and foreign direct investment-related impacts of Brexit

We offer a general-equilibrium analysis of Brexit incorporating the state-of-the-art differences in productivity and firms' selection within manufacturing sectors à la Melitz (Econometrica, 2003, 71 , 1695) and multinationals in services. Our results suggest that trade, output and average productivity diminish across most sectors in the UK and the Rest of the European Union (REU), as well as GDP, welfare, wages and capital remuneration. However, the UK loses more due to the missing preferential access to the huge EU market. Significant welfare losses along the extensive margin occur in the UK due to the lost imported varieties produced by highly productive European firms. These cannot be compensated by the new varieties of less productive domestic firms that enter the British market due to increased protectionism and reduced import competition. In addition, the emergence of barriers against multinationals, which is often ignored in previous studies, explains approximately one third of the negative effect in both the UK and REU. Furthermore, we show that the Brexit impact is about only half if we do not include both foreign direct investment barriers and Melitz structure. Thus, previous studies without these important model features would underestimate the Brexit impact significantly.     

EU Financial Market Access After Brexit

Brexit means Brexit, or out means out — and that includes the UK’s exit from the single financial market. With financial services accounting for about eight per cent of the country’s GDP, it is understandable why the UK attaches immense importance to retaining access to the EU’s single market. But putting a mutually acceptable regime in place will take years of negotiations, and the final agreement will clearly allow much less access than UK-licensed firms enjoy today.     

Wie geht es mit dem Brexit weiter?

The UK’s 2016 EU referendum may account for great income losses in the UK. Gabriel Felbermayr et al. use a “new” quantitative trade model to assess various Brexit scenarios. The results broadly show that all EU member states lose, and the relative losses in the UK are about five times those of the average remaining EU country. These findings have important implications for the EU’s negotiation strategy. The outcome depends largely on the decisions about trade relations. Michael Hüther thinks that the UK is heading for an extremely hard Brexit and that it already shows. Therefore, the UK government should work out a consistent industrial policy and make up its mind about its preferences on its future economic relationship with its neighbours. In light of the currently very close and mutually welfare-enhancing business relations between the EU27 and the UK, one of the central tasks and challenges of the Brexit negotiations is undoubtedly the creation of a new supportive post-supranational legal framework governing these economic transactions in the future. Andreas Grimmel argues that the EU’s crises are largely the result of a certain mode of integration that is based on actors’ interests rather than on a comprehensive constitutional framework.     

EU Migration to and from the UK After Brexit

In the 2016 referendum over the UK’s membership of the EU, the question of how Brexit would impact migration to the UK was a major point of contention. Those leading the campaign to leave the EU promised lower levels of immigration and the introduction of an “Australian type points based system” to regulate future inflows of EU nationals to the country, while at the same time maintaining access to the EU single market. At the same time, the status of EU nationals already living in the UK was not a key topic in the debate. The leaders of the campaign to leave the EU suggested that EU nationals already residing in the UK would be granted some form of residence permit and would retain most of their current rights. Likewise, there was little concern about the legal status of UK nationals in other EU countries and the argument that the “EU would be obliged to grant permanent settlement rights to Britons living in Ireland and mainland Europe”.     

Which manufacturing industries and sectors are most vulnerable to Brexit?

When the UK leaves the EU, trade arrangements between the UK and EU will change. Most of the options for future UK‐EU relationships currently under discussion imply increased trade barriers, which will reduce trade and also have effects on output and prices. In this paper, we use a multi‐market partial equilibrium model to analyse the vulnerability of 122 manufacturing industries to Brexit. In all five Brexit scenarios we model, there is an overall reduction in UK manufacturing output. Output grows in some industries but at the expense of higher consumer and intermediate goods prices. High tech and medium–high tech sectors are more at risk of a decline in domestic production than lower tech sectors. In most areas of the country, demand for high‐skilled workers falls more than for medium and low‐skilled workers.     

Brexit and its economic consequences

As the formal process of Brexit has already started, there is much uncertainty about Brexit's impacts on Britain's social, political and economic future. This paper examines the economic impact. After briefly discussing some significant EU treaties that serve as the background materials, it presents the key arguments advocated by the leave and remain camps. The economic impact depends critically on the negotiation outcomes. Aside from the debate on the divorce costs, there are numerous issues that must be negotiated, such as immigration, trade in goods, services, agriculture, fisheries and financial regulations. We discuss various scenarios of possible new trade regimes, resulting in different impacts on the UK economy. With each side having its bargaining chips to play, the trade‐offs between “give and take” in the negotiation game are analysed. Considering various strategic options, this paper urges rationality and cooperation, especially weighing both sides’ entwined economic interests, in addition to their mutual security, defence, environmental and world concerns. The potential gains and losses in the event where the UK contemplates new trade arrangements with the non‐EU countries are analysed in the Appendix .     

The Brexit Dynamics: British and EU27 Challenges After the EU Referendum

Prior to the Brexit referendum, the UK government sent an information brochure to households across the country. Surprisingly, key findings of a study by the UK Treasury — including an expected per capita income loss of £1800 — were not included in the brochure. Calculations indicate that if this information had been included, the outcome of the referendum would have been 52.1% for Remain. Instead, the pro-Brexit campaign utilised anti-immigrant rhetoric to create a scapegoat for the under-provision of local public services, when actually this was due to massive cuts in budget transfers to local communities after the financial crisis. Looking ahead, major reforms are now necessary if the EU is not to disintegrate. Given the fresh support in the UK and US for banking deregulation, the EU must stand firm in support of prudential supervision and banking regulation to prevent a new international banking crisis.     

Brexit and Trade: Between Facts and Irrelevance

This paper examines four claims made by Brexit supporters regarding the United Kingdom’s post-exit arrangement on trade with the EU. It reviews the nature and importance of UK-EU trade links and the possible impact on the UK of leaving the EU customs union. It argues that all four of the claims are based on incongruous arguments which are either logically inconsistent or ignore the extent of the commitment required by trade agreements that tackle regulatory barriers, not just tariffs and border restrictions. We demonstrate that the attractiveness of the UK market will progressively decline as the UK enters into additional bilateral agreements. We conclude by analysing the implications for the UK of “taking back control” of its trade policy.     

Macroprudential Risk Management Problems in Brexit

Brexit is not only a historical chapter of the British — EU relationship, but it also carries immense challenges for fi nancial market stability in the short and medium run for the 28 member states of the European Union. The scale of these challenges depends heavily on the outcome of EU-UK negotiations. The European Systemic Risk Board plays a critical role in macroprudential supervision, a crucial policy challenge for the EU. However, there are doubts as to whether it will fulfill its mandate. The EU27 faces major problems in terms of prudential supervision after Brexit since a very large part of their wholesale banking markets are in the UK and thus will not be regulated by the EU after 29 March 2019. Indications point to a considerable risk of a new transatlantic banking crisis in the future.     

Foreign multinationals in service sectors: A general equilibrium analysis of Brexit

We examine the role of foreign multinationals in service sectors in the context of Brexit, which is assumed to induce an increase in different types of barriers: (a) FDI barriers to multinationals in services; (b) non-tariff barriers to trade; and (c) import tariffs between the UK and the rest of the EU. We use a state-of-the-art Melitz approach in manufactures with multinationals operating in imperfectly competitive service sectors in a multiregional general equilibrium framework. We find that the increased FDI barriers in services explain about one third of the total welfare loss of Brexit. Furthermore, our decomposition analysis (by introducing each type of barriers separately) shows that the barriers against the EU service multinationals in the UK are harmful to British manufacturing sectors because they face a reduced (and more expensive) supply of intermediate services.     

Brexit und die Zukunft Europas – eine spieltheoretische Einordnung

After the Brexit referendum’s leave outcome last summer, the new relationship between the UK and the EU has to be shaped institutionally. For the two bargaining parties the question now is which negotiation strategy to take. In order to choose the optimal strategy, the players have to factor in their time preferences. A game theoretical approach yields that the EU — no matter what is economically feasible in the short run — has to play a tough negotiation strategy if they care about the long run. This result is not a question of punishment but of pure economic rationale.     

An examination of EU trade disintegration scenarios

This paper demonstrates the welfare implications of the differential disintegration of the EU. Using a structural gravity approach, our estimates suggest that the rest of the EU countries have much more to lose from the disintegration of the EU compared to a disorderly Brexit. At the same time, neighbouring high‐income and middle‐income countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Norway, are expected to benefit from EU disintegration under some scenarios because trade would be diverted from EU countries.     

中国与欧盟和东盟的贸易特点及影响因素比较——基于引力模型的实证分析

本文首先比较了中国与两大区域经济集团——欧盟和东盟的贸易特点,然后通过引力模型分析了影响中国与欧盟和东盟贸易的因素,并就各个因素所带来影响的不同进行了对比。结果表明,中国与东盟贸易的GDP弹性较大,而中国与欧盟贸易的人均GDP弹性较大。本文认为,前者的原因在于中国与东盟贸易更具潜力,后者主要是因为中国与欧盟的贸易互补性更强。     

Trade Liberalisation and Poverty Reduction in Vietnam

This paper investigates the impacts of trade liberalisation on poverty reduction in Vietnam during the period of economic reform. Using a combined approach dealing with four transmitting channels from trade to poverty, the major findings are summarised as follows. First, Vietnam's trade liberalisation has fostered economic growth, which has helped to raise per capita GDP and reduce poverty. Second, trade liberalisation has directly benefited the poor through creating pro‐poor employment and raising wages. Third, another impact of trade liberalisation on poverty is income and substitution effects associated with reduced domestic prices of importables and increased domestic prices of exportables such as coffee and rice. Fourth, trade liberalisation has indirectly benefited the poor because it raises government revenue, which enhances the government's ability to subsidise the poor. Finally, although the poverty rate in Vietnam has been reduced impressively, there is an increasing disparity between urban and rural areas and, among the latter, concern does exist regarding ethnic minorities.     

How Do US Economic Sanctions Affect EU's Trade with Target Countries?

We investigate the impact of US economic sanctions on EU's trade using a panel data approach expressed in a two‐level framework. Both multilateral and unilateral sanctions involving the US and the EU have a negative impact on EU trade (total, imports and exports). We argue that unilateral sanctions, if extensive in nature, would have a depressing impact on target countries’ trade, especially in the stage after sanctions have been imposed. Over time, both multilateral and unilateral sanctions lead to an increase in a target country's exports to the EU, lending support to the third‐country effect of sanctions.     

Predicting the poverty impacts of trade reform

There have been a number of high profile food safety disputes in trade over the past decade. These include the widely publicized case at the World Trade Organization between the US and EU over hormone-treated beef. In particular, consumers in some industrialized countries have expressed concern over the health implications of consuming beef produced with antibiotics and other artificial supplements. Developing countries are affected in a significant way in how these concerns are addressed, as well as the balance between risk and safety reflected in how standards are set. This paper examines the impact of drug residue standards on trade in beef and the trade effect of setting harmonized international standards. We find that if international standards set by Codex were followed in antibiotics, global trade in beef would rise by over $3.2 billion. Among other developing countries, South African exports would rise by $160 million, Brazil's by $200 million, and Argentina's by over $300 million.     

Brexit Poker — Wer hat die besseren Karten in den Austrittsverhandlungen?

The political, economic and legal situation of Great Britain vis-à-vis European Union in the aftermath of the membership referendum and awaiting the commencement of withdrawal negotiations is interesting. The authors summarise the legal controversy in the UK over the powers and procedures needed to be complied with in order to duly trigger the Brexit. They then sketch the legal framework as provided by the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to reconstruct the decision-making architecture under which parties to the upcoming negotiations will have to make their choices. After outlining the opportunity cost for Great Britain associated with leaving the Union, in particular those regarding the financial institutions and foreign direct investments, they conclude that decision-making architecture governing the upcoming withdrawal negotiations puts Brussels in pole position vis-à-vis London. It is likely that Britain will have to accept transfer payments to the EU similar to, if not higher than the net transfers that have been due so far. Some degree of the compliance with the acquis communautaire, at least with regard to the treaty’s fundamental freedoms (goods, workers, services, establishment and capital) will most likely also be expected from London, if it wants to benefit from access to the European market after the termination of its EU membership.     

Clearing von außerbörslichen Euro-Derivaten

Based on experiences from the financial crisis, it was decided at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh in 2009 that OTC derivatives transactions should be predominantly cleared through central counterparties (CCP). CCPs contribute to a reduction of systemic risk. The global clearing volume of OTC interest rate, equity and currency derivatives is approximately USD 400 trillion per year. In light of the upcoming Brexit, the question arises as to whether or not the clearing of euro denominated OTC derivatives, currently performed primarily by the London based clearing house LCH Clearnet, should remain in the UK due to economies of scale available to LCH Clearnet as the current European market leader. On the other hand, CCPs are of increasing importance for financial stability in the eurozone, particularly because of potential spillover effects on monetary policy if a systemically important CCP experiences financial distress. Hence, a relocation of euro OTC derivatives clearing from the UK to the EU would ensure direct supervision by European authorities. Opponents of a relocation are concerned about decreasing market liquidity and capital efficiency alongside higher transaction costs due to market fragmentation. The analysis presented in this paper shows that the existing relocation cost estimates of up to USD 100 billion are far too high; realistically, they can be expected to amount to just USD 3.2 billion over a period of five years.